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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the content of popular Chinese TV dramas helps construct and re- 
enforce social and political reality in China by defining what is true. With the increasing 
liberalisation of the Chinese TV drama market, this construction process is becoming more 
and more complex: it is not merely influenced by the political interests of state and party 
institutions, but also by the commercial interests of producers and broadcasters, as well as by 
the viewing habits and interests of audiences. Consequently, Chinese TV dramas create ideas 
concerning Chinese society which are simultaneously popular and politically 'healthy'. 
Based on qualitative interviews with Chinese media experts and production crew members 
conducted in 2007, my research shows how various actors and institutional factors influence 
the production of political discourses in Chinese TV dramas. This thesis also offers a 
qualitative analysis of how the discourses on two political concepts (governance and security) 
are depicted in three particularly popular dramas, one historical epic, one crime drama, and 
one teen drama. This analysis shows that these programs all link their political message to 
patriotic sentiments or conservative gender discourses, and that this is not the result of 
political directives but instead of market dynamics and of audiences' viewing preferences. In 
this sense, the present research shows how the apparent liberalisation of the drama market in 
reality imposes a whole framework of new cultural, political, and economic restrictions, 
which in turn leads to the production of TV content that is firmly rooted in hegemonic 
discourses. This discourse is then not primarily reproduced because it is politically 
opportune, but because it is popular. 
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Throughout the following text, all Chinese characters are printed in their simplified form. All 
transliterations of Chinese names and phrases follow the Hanyu Pinyin system, and are, 
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The sections in this thesis that analyse qualitative interviews (Chapter 3) and visual materials 
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the respective research methodologies (sections 2.5 and 2.6). 
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I Introduction 
In the People's Republic of China (PRC), television has become arguably the most influential 
information medium: with nearly every urban family now having access to a television set 
(and therefore access to nationwide news-coverage and entertainment), the success of this 
medium has prompted media analysts to retrospectively call the introduction of television to 
the large cities of China in the 1980s "the most important cultural event since the Cultural 
Revolution" (Allen, 1992b, 2). 
But television is not only relevant because of its rapid spread in this nation of 1.3 billion 
inhabitants. To researchers in the field of Chinese Studies, the analysis of popular television 
promises to expose how political messages are communicated to Chinese audiences, or as 
one German media researcher states (Kramer, 2004,39; author's translation): 
... television 
has adopted the function of an announcement medium, i. e. the 
function of communicating the official discourses and, through the effects its 
narratives and images have on emotions and identifications, of controlling not 
only mere information but also the self-perception of its recipients, that is to 
say: of the entire Chinese population. 
Other observers, such as the Hong Kong journalist Yan Hua, follow a similar argument when 
they observe that in particular popular television drama series are not solely an 
entertainment format, but more importantly a crucial propaganda tool of the Chinese 
leadership (Yan, 2005). According to Yan's assessment of recent historical costume dramas, 
the depiction of various Chinese emperors as benevolent rulers functions as an allegory, 
indirectly propagating the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule over China: "President 
Hu Jintao thus is a good emperor - its clear from prime-time TV" (ibid. ). 
Such observations are made before a backdrop of ongoing reform in the PRC: numerous 
researchers have pointed out that the Chinese media market, including the market segment 
of television drama production and broadcasting, has become more and more liberalised 
over the past decade and is today primarily a profit-driven industry (Griffiths, 2005; Zhang et 
11 
al., 2005). This contradiction between market liberalisation and political control in the 
broadcasting sector poses a challenge to our understanding of popular entertainment in the 
PRC. The question is: does a format such as the television drama serial function as an 
entertainment enterprise, as a political propaganda tool, or possibly as a mixture of both? 
The present thesis attempts to answer this question by qualitatively analysing what factors 
influence the production of popular Chinese television drama series, and what political 
discourses are presented in such programmes. In order to do so, this project approaches 
television dramas from two angles: 
First, the conditions under which television drama series are produced and broadcasted are 
analysed. This was achieved by conducting fourteen qualitative interviews with Chinese 
media experts about their experiences with this particular entertainment format and the 
factors that they believed influenced its production. The research subjects included 
producers, directors, screenwriters, editors, broadcasting directors as well as Chinese 
university researchers involved in the analysis of the Chinese TV drama market. 
This production-side analysis is followed by the main section of the thesis: a visual analysis 
of three television drama series, aimed at establishing what discourses different types of 
dramas communicate. The three programmes are: the historical epic Han Wu Da Di N At 
("The Great Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty"; in the following referred to as HWDD), the 
state-commissioned crime drama Gonganju Zhang 2 ýýrA -K = ("The Commissioner - Part 
2"; GAJZ), and the teen drama Nancai Nümao 93 7r t lA ("Talented Man and Beautiful 
Woman"; NCNM). All series were aired on China Central Television between 2003 and 2005, 
and achieving audience ratings that made them rank among the twenty most popular TV 
dramas in the annual statistics (Wang, 2004; 2005; 2006). The analysis of these programmes 
combines a critical discourse analysis approach with a visual research methodology that is 
12 
based on semiotic theory. It applies analytical tools such as sequence protocols, shot 
protocols, transcripts and shot graphics in order to isolate how meaning is communicated 
through various visual, acoustic and verbal markers (so called 'signs'). In a next step, the 
analysis combines these markers in order to establish what statements they make concerning 
two political issues (or'discourse strands'): governance and security. 
A number of issues are not addressed in this thesis: first, it should be pointed out that this 
research project only examines the discourses presented in television dramas that were aired 
on national television. Popular programmes that were created for provincial, municipal or 
satellite stations were not examined in this analysis, seeing as such programmes are aimed at 
very specific groups of viewers, and not at the standard national target audience. In addition, 
entertainment formats other than drama series (for instance game shows or talk shows) have 
also been excluded from the analysis, based on the observation that drama series currently 
constitute the most influential entertainment format on Chinese television (see Section 2.2. iii). 
Finally, the present project does not include an analysis of poplar entertainment's effect on 
Chinese audiences. The way in which production crew's conceptions of a target audience 
influence the creation of content is examined (Section 3.4), but no interviews or surveys were 
conducted for this research that focused on the actual viewers of such programmes. Such 
analyses have, however, been conducted by other researchers, and the merits and flaws of 
audience-centred approaches are reviewed in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.1. ii and 2.2. iv). 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 offers first a review of the types of research 
that have been conducted on media content, and particularly on television entertainment 
formats (2.1). It then gives an overview of the Chinese broadcasting sector and summarises 
what issues recent research has raised concerning television entertainment's function in the 
PRC (2.2). Next, the chapter introduces the theoretical and methodological concepts used in 
this thesis, i. e. the critical discourse analysis approach (2.3) as well as the visual analytical 
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tools (2.4) which are later applied in the analysis of the three television drama series. Finally, 
the research procedures for both the qualitative interviews (2.5) and the visual analysis (2.6) 
are explained. 
Chapter 3 presents the findings of the qualitative interview analysis and deals with the 
various factors that the interview subjects believed influenced the production of television 
drama content. The chapter first examines what organizations can create television dramas, 
and how they procure their funding (3.1). It then analyses the different phases of television 
drama production and establishes which production crew members are responsible for 
which part of the content production process (3.2). Section 3.3 examines how television 
drama series are marketed, sold and then broadcasted. The subsequent section analyses 
which role preconceived notions of a Chinese TV drama target audience play in the 
production of such programmes (3.4). Next, the question of how the authorities influence the 
production and broadcasting of television content is addressed (3.5). The final two sections 
of the chapter examine how the media experts who were interviewed for this project 
explained the relevance of television entertainment in China: Section 3.6 analyses the 
interviewees' views on the influence that television has on Chinese viewers, and Section 3.7 
examines what conceptions the research subjects hold concerning the functions that TV plays 
in the PRC. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the visual analysis, and constitutes the central focus of this 
thesis. The first section examines the television drama HWDD (4.1), the second the 
programme GAJZ (4.2), and the final section the series NCNM (4.3). In each case, the 
statements that are made concerning the themes of governance and security are analysed. 
The central issues and findings of each chapter are presented in respective summaries (2.7; 
3.8; 4.4), and the research results are brought together in the final conclusion (Chapter 5). The 
appendix is provided in a separate volume, which includes a DVD with the visual data. 
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2 Popular Television Analysis: Research, Theory and 
Methodology 
The aim of this research project is to undertake a visual political analysis of popular Chinese 
television series. Although there are numerous approaches and examples on how to analyse 
media products in general and the medium of television drama serials in particular, there is 
no consistent and comprehensive methodological framework that such research follows (see, 
for example, the various contributions in Allen, 1992b and 1995). In this chapter I would 
therefore like to first offer an overview of the relevant literature that deals with the research 
of media products, both in the Chinese context and in other societies (Section 2.1), and then 
summarise what is currently known about broadcasting in the PRC (Section 2.2). I shall then 
turn to the theory and methodology relevant to my research: first the critical discourse 
approach that forms the basis for this project (Section 2.3), then the visual political 
communication approach I am adopting to examine visual material (Section 2.4). My aim is 
to show how these two research approaches are compatible, and how the combination of the 
two offers a comprehensive methodology for the analysis of political discourses in popular 
television products. 
Since the analysis presented in this thesis focuses on two aspects of Chinese television 
dramas (the general circumstances of TV drama production as well as the content of three 
specific series), the final two sections of this chapter explain what criteria and procedures 
were adopted in each of these cases: Section 2.5 summarises the procedure of selecting and 
interviewing Chinese media experts, while Section 2.6 explains the process of selecting and 
analysing the three particular television drama series. 
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2.1 Recent Developments in TV and Media Analysis 
The analysis of popular media content and visual communication practices is a broad, 
interdisciplinary research topic, which has been approached by analysts from various fields. 
The following section provides an overview of these fields (2.11), a summary of research that 
focuses on media products, particular visual materials (2.1. ii), and a review of the work that 
has in this respect been conducted in the Chinese context (2.1. äi). 
2.1.1 The Relevance of Popular Culture and Visual Material in the Social Sciences 
The study of visual material traditionally falls into the realm of art historical research, 
concentrating largely on the fine arts, on architecture, sculpting and painting (Ellenius, 1998; 
Panofsky, 1987). It has not been until most recently that researchers from the social sciences 
have come to recognise to what extent visual communication offers insight into the problems 
of their specific fields: Today, the analysis of visual material provides a valuable tool to 
researchers in fields as diverse as political science, media studies, cultural studies, 
psychology, or history, to name just a few (an overview of how visual material is analysed in 
these fields is provide in Müller, 2003,121-266). Particularly researchers in the cultural 
studies (Hall, 1980; Kellner, 1995) and political scientists (Leggewie, 1994; Müller, 1999; 
Warnke, 1994) have developed ways to combine traditional iconography (i. e. the analysis of 
images and their meaning in their respective social and cultural contexts; Müller, 2003,249- 
256) with political and sociological questions, for example how images are used to purvey 
political messages (Warnke, 1994), or what role images of politicians play in electoral 
campaigns (Müller, 1997a; Müller, 1997b). 
Political imagery in movies and the print media has received considerable attention from 
social scientists. Examples include the various analyses in Hoffmann (1999), which focus on 
the question of how authority is portrayed visually, as well as Marion Müller's examination 
of the imagery in the German tabloid BILD (Muller, 2003; see also Section 2.4). However, the 
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analysis of popular television formats such as soap operas, sport events, music videos, talk 
shows or game shows is mostly conducted by cultural studies researchers (take for example 
the analyses presented in Allen, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; and Donald et al., 2002c). To most 
social science scholars the seeming triviality of such materials appears to offer little, if any, 
explanatory value in regard to issues of society, politics, international relations, or economics 
(Allen, 1992b, 3-4). Robert Allen, Professor of Radio, Television, and Motion Pictures at the 
University of North Carolina, aptly describes this problem when he concedes "that we don't 
regard many of the programmes we watch as serious, consequential, or important. They're 
not'supposed' to be taken seriously, and they certainly don't seem to require close analysis 
to be comprehended or made enjoyable" (ibid. ). This reluctance to attribute scientific 
relevance to popular visual communication is further aggravated by aesthetical and 
traditional cultural notions that popular television formats are of less quality than 
established art forms, such as oil paintings on canvas or motion pictures (Allen, 1995,3). 
Entertainment formats such as soap operas or sit-corns are often depreciated as part of a 
"lower" culture and are regarded as "dirt" (ibid. ). In the wake of such preconceptions, the 
idea that popular television programmes may offer insights into political discourses and 
popular sentiment particularly because of their popularity is often overlooked: Chris Barker 
from the University of Wollongong in Australia sums this problem up when he writes 
(Barker, 1997,218): 
... it makes little sense to 
discuss whether television is 'good' or 'bad' in an 
abstract aesthetic manner, rather, we need to consider, from a political and 
inevitably value-laden position, the ideological construction and potential 
consequences of television. 
As shall be shown below, the popular format of television drama series is a major influence 
on culture and society in the PRC, and deserves attentions from social scientists and 
researchers in Chinese Studies alike (2.2. iii). 
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2.1.!! Types of Analyses: Production, Product and Audiences 
As Marion Müller has points out, analyses of visual material broadly fall into at least one of 
three categories (Müller, 2003,15-17): 
1. Production analyses: studies that focus on the production processes of 
visual material, as well as on the political-economic dynamics within 
the media sector that influenced this process. 
2. Product analyses: research that examines the content, narrative and 
central themes of specific materials. 
3. Effect analyses: works that examine how audiences perceive visual 
materials. 
In the area of production analyses, researchers are usually concerned primarily with market 
developments and the procedures involved in producing television programmes. Since 
television, as "a modem industrial organization", rarely possesses a distinct "author" (Allen, 
1992b, 9), such analyses are often driven by theories and methodologies derived from 
economics, administration theory or political science. Examples of this in the Chinese context 
(and not necessarily with a focus on TV) are the contributions in Lee (2003a), which analyse 
the effects that globalization dynamics and China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has had on the domestic media market (Chan, 2003; McCormick et al., 
2003; Zhao, 2003), arguing that the introduction of new technologies and a new business 
culture has opened up new spaces for the construction of discourses in the "public sphere" 
(McCormick et al., 2003). The aim of such research, whether in the Chinese case or elsewhere, 
is usually to shed light on the "formal and informal rules regarding who has access to the 
means of production and distribution", for example "the laws of the land in areas such as 
libel, obscenity, public order, ownership and free speech" (Barker, 1997,28). In some cases, 
analyses follow the production of one particular media product, for example Michael James 
Intintoli's work on the production process of the soap opera Guiding Light (Intintoli, 1984). 
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In product analyses of visual material, authors commonly draw their theoretical and 
methodological approaches from disciplines such as film studies (Borstnar, 2002; Faulstich, 
2002; Korte, 1999; Mikos, 2003), literature and narrative studies (Kozloff, 1992), psychology 
(Flitterman-Lewis, 1992), iconography (Müller, 1999), cultural studies (Fiske, 1992), semiotics 
(Seiter, 1992) or gender studies (Kaplan, 1992; Brunsdon, 1995). 1 Often such research is 
augmented by discourse theory in the tradition of Michel Foucault, meaning that the authors 
regard television as a communication practice that constitutes the social and political reality 
that people live in (for examples see Allen, 1992b and Kramer, 2004; the discourse analytical 
approach used in the present research project follows a similar logic and is explained in 
chapter 2.3). Critical discourse analytical approaches are particularly common in analyses of 
television drama series: a common argument is that this particular programme format 
constitutes "a model of 'how we live' and is talked about in civil society as much, if not more, 
than the news", making it detrimental to the construction of the reality we live in (Barker, 
1997,225). However, in many cases the work of researchers examining television drama 
content is confined to a specific set of problems; the central research questions that are 
usually asked are (ibid., 118): 
1. What is the aesthetical or cultural 'quality' of soap operas? 
2. Is the main target group of this specific format a female audience? 
3. What gender issues are raised in these programmes? 
4. Does the popularity of Western soap operas such as Dallas, Dynasty or 
Neighbours and their export to foreign markets facilitate cultural 
imperialism? (For such an argument see in particular Hagedorn, 1995) 
5. What are the similarities and differences in productions from different 
countries? 
This last question is addressed particularly in case-studies of Latin American telenovelas, 
such as the ones conducted by Ana Lopez and Jesus Martin-Barbero. Lopez analyses the 
1 That these theoretical and methodological approaches of western scholars are perceived by Chinese 
intellectuals is shown in Zhang Yingjin's article (2004) in the Journal of the Beijing Film Academy (Jt3AUj 0; lc1 
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genre of the telenovela in comparison to the US soap opera and shows that whereas the 
North American format is constructed in a way that mainly targets female viewers, the South 
American format of the telenovela is aimed at viewers of a certain (upper) class background 
(Lopez, 1995,260-261). Martin-Barbero further shows that the way in which this local format 
reproduces specific Latin-American cultural traditions (such as melodramatic narratives, a 
focus on kinship, or particular types of satire) has enabled the telenovela to replace US- 
American soap operas in the Latin-American broadcasting market (Martin-Barbero, 1995). 
Both Martin-Barbero and Lopez argue that in order to satisfy such a large market, the 
telenovela format has been moving away from promoting national themes to advocating a 
form of pan-nationalism (Lopez, 1995,270) and Latin American integration (Martin-Barbero, 
1995,283). Another contribution to cross-cultural research on soap operas is Gabriele 
Kreutzner and Ellen Seiter's comparison of the American series Dallas and Dynasty with the 
popular German programme Die Schwarzwaldklinik (The Black Forest Clinic), in which the 
researchers analyse and contrast the respective programmes from a gender studies 
perspective (Kreutzner et al., 1995). 
Whereas the above analyses are primarily concerned with cultural issues, there are studies 
that address more explicitly political questions: for instance, Alison Griffiths explores the 
role that a particular Welsh-language soap opera plays in the formation of the national or 
cultural identity of Welsh viewers (Griffiths, 1995). A similar perspective is adopted by Lisa 
Rofel from the University of California in Santa Cruz: Rofel analyses how the Chinese drama 
series Yearnings aimed at constructing a mutual Chinese identity (Rofel, 1995; see also section 
2.1. iii). Other studies focus on the way that contemporary discourses are depicted in soap 
operas: For example, Christine Geraghty's research is concerned with the question of how 
social issues are presented and discussed in UK soap operas (Geraghty, 1995), and Joy Fuqua 
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(1995) examines how homosexuality and AIDS are portrayed in the soap opera One Life to 
Live. 
The central issues of effect analyses, i. e. the question of how who watches what, is mostly 
addressed by market researchers, psychological studies and research conducted in the 
cultural studies. As Chris Barker shows in his introduction to global television research 
(Barker, 1997), market researchers usually use quantitative data such as TV ratings and 
demographic statistics (sometimes combined with qualitative information concerning the 
preferences of certain target audiences) to provide advertisers and broadcasters with 
information concerning the popularity of certain programmes or programme formats. 
Examples of such surveys are discussed below, in Section 2.2. iv. An effect study that 
attempts to provide statistical data of its own is Stefan Kramer's analysis of the Chinese 
television audience (Kramer, 2006). It is discussed in Section 2.1. iii. 
Psychologists, on the other hand, usually try to determine what effect television has on 
viewers' minds, and how visual information influences behaviour and perceptions, both 
consciously and unconsciously. A good example of this research is the work by Sandy 
Flitterman-Lewis (1992), who shows how the viewing of soap operas works at a 
subconscious level to create desires in viewers, make the viewing experience pleasurable, 
and create ways for the audience to identify with certain characters. A broad overview on 
audience research in the field of psychology is offered by John Condry (1989). Although such 
approaches are valuable within their particular scientific field, they have little explanatory 
power when it comes to the content of visual political communication and the way in which 
such content is produced. For this reason psychological approaches shall not be reviewed 
here further. 
Another approach to the effect side of media consumption is the so-called "reader-oriented 
criticism", which is often adopted by authors from the discipline of cultural studies, such as 
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Richard Allen (1992a): Allen attempts to explain how television 'addresses' the audience and 
how the so-called 'readers' of television infer meaning from particular programmes (ibid. ). 
Similar to Flitterman-Lewis' psychoanalytical analysis (1992), Allen's intention is to show 
how viewers derive pleasure from watching popular television programmes such as soap 
operas and game shows. In order to do so, Allen draws from literary theory and treats 
television as 'text'; this enables Allen to highlight how viewers fill in the 'gaps' in television 
plots, and how they derive a coherent narrative from the generally elliptic formats on TV, 
just like the readers of a novel would (Allen, 1992a, 102-113). Another author who similarly 
focuses on how specific viewers'read' popular television is Kate Baldwin (1995). Baldwin 
examines viewers' reception of a Latin American telenovela in a foreign cultural context (the 
reaction of Russian audiences to the Mexican programme Los Ricos Tambien Lloran, The Rich 
Also Cry) and argues that the melodramatic narrative format of that particular telenovela was 
so popular in Russian urban centres because it tapped into the reading habits of its audience, 
who had up to that time (the 1990s) been occupied primarily with narratives in the printed 
form (ibid., 288). 
While such literary-studies approaches help us to understand how narratives function in 
various formats (on television as much as in novels), the general treatment of television as 
'text' also poses a problem, which Allen himself summarises as follows (Allen, 1992a, 127): 
... there is a 
danger in discussing the role of the television viewer in terms of 
the role of the literary reader (... ). The danger, rather obviously, is that such a 
discussion obscures important differences between watching television and 
reading a book. 
Since such approaches neglect to take into account the full range of modes in which 
television functions as a communication practice, I will not follow up on this specific strand 
of research here. Instead, I provide a research approach below that does not treat visual 
materials as text, but rather as a complex interaction of signs in different modes (Chapter 2.3). 
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2.1.11! Research on the Chinese Media 
In China, the relatively young commercial media market has drawn the attention of 
numerous authors, focusing both on print and visual media (Lee, 2003a). With regard to 
production analyses, contributions focus on such diverse topics as the influence of 
globalization on media technology, media content, and the public sphere in China 
(McCormick et al., 2003), cross-market analyses of administrative restrictions on the media 
market (Chan, 2003), comparisons of the mainland film market with the markets of Taiwan 
and Hong Kong (Curtin, 2003), the implications of opening up China's media sector to 
foreign investors (He, 2003) and to foreign programming content (Hong, 1998), the 
introduction of recent media reforms in China (Pan et al., 2003), the liberalization of China's 
newspaper market (Zhao, 2000), or the interests of different Chinese social and political 
groups in this rapidly growing sector (Lee, 2003b). 
Particularly noteworthy is the work of media expert Zhao Yuezhi (1998), who examines the 
reforms of the media system and of journalistic practices in the PRC during the 80s and early 
90s. Even though her focus is mainly on the evolution of newspaper journalism, her analysis 
of China's news system also encompasses radio and television programming (ibid., 94-126). 
Zhao's work shows how news production is caught between commercial pressures and 
political directives. She challenges claims that the move towards more audience-friendly 
content automatically leads to a democratization of the media (ibid., 185-189). By providing 
illustrative examples from her interviews with Chinese journalists and from her analysis of 
news content, Zhao demonstrates that Chinese journalism in the reform era has in many 
cases not overcome the political guidance of the CCP, but has instead merely replaced it with 
a commercial market logic that has led to wide-spread corruption (ibid., 72-76), sensationalist 
marketing (ibid., 136), irresponsible and false reporting (ibid., 76-81), and a new 
commercially inspired form of self-censorship (ibid., 160). Her conclusion is that these 
developments are highly damaging to the credibility of Chinese journalism, and that only a 
23 
comprehensive reform of China's political system and Chinese political communication 
processes will be able to create media that truly represent the Chinese citizen (ibid., 192). 
Although Zhao's analysis focuses on the news media, and only on developments up to the 
mid-90s, her analysis nonetheless raise a central question, which shall be addressed more 
fully below (see Chapter 3): does the market reform of media formats in China conflict with 
political directives of Party and State, or does the market logic in fact fuse with (and possibly 
facilitate) political mechanisms geared towards controlling media content (ibid., 159; for a 
similar argument see also Zhao, 1999)? 
Another contribution that explicitly deals with Chinese television is Stefan Kramer's 
extensive analysis of the conflict between 'local' and 'global' aspects in the modern Chinese 
broadcasting system (Kramer, 2004,55). Kramer argues that television is the most important 
medium for constructing Chinese reality and identity today (ibid., 144). At the heart of 
Kramer's study lies the question of how'Chinese' television in the People's Republic actually 
is: Kramer argues that China does not share the western concepts of communication, 
imagery, and reality from which the western media technologies have historically been 
derived, and that the medium of television is therefore a foreign import that has no basis in 
Chinese culture (ibid., 61); he concludes that Chinese society has proven highly adaptive in 
tailoring the 'apparatuses' (i. e. the instruments) of this western technology to its local needs, 
creating programmes that communicate distinctly Chinese discourses (ibid., 542-543). 
In the Chinese literature, the production process of television programming is usually 
treated by teaching manuals that describe what issues directors and producers should 
consider in their work, and that are aimed at preparing students of such trades for university 
examinations (see in particular Chen et al., 2005 as well as Huang, 2005; for a similar teaching 
manual that deals with the movie industry see Huang et a!., 2006). For this purpose, such 
books include practical advice on how to write script outlines (Chen et al., 2005,83-95 and 
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177-178), calculate production costs (ibid., 208-220), write an investment plan (ibid., 274-277), 
or film and edit visual material (Huang, 2005), and provide information on what legal issues 
a television production might be confronted with (Lu et al., 2002,309-323; Wei et al., 2005). 
When it comes to product analyses, research of media discourses in Chinese Studies has 
mostly focused on the journalistic coverage of major events such as China's accession to the 
WTO in the year 2001 (Zhao, 2003), the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
on the nationalist sentiment of Chinese youths (Rosen, 2003), or the preparations for the 2008 
Beijing Olympics (Polumbaum, 2003). When it comes to visual material, scholars of Chinese 
Studies are mostly concerned with popular mainland cinema (Cornelius et al., 2002; Lu et al., 
2005; Zhang, 2002), avant-garde movies (Cui, 2005) or individual motion pictures by such 
influential Chinese directors as Zhang Yimou (Lu, 2005). Popular Chinese culture is rarely 
the focus of comprehensive political analysis. Instead, it seems, it is left up to journalistic 
authors to account for how pop is evolving and shaping modern China (Zha, 1995), and such 
authors do not apply a specific scientific approach to their analysis, much less a visual 
analytical methodology. In fact, to my knowledge there exist only two works in Western 
academia that specifically deal with soap operas in China from a scientific perspective: 
1. One is the unpublished doctoral dissertation of Wang Yi (Wang Yi, 1996,129-255) 
from Murdoch University (Perth, Australia). Wang's research includes, among other 
things, an analysis of the popular 1990 Chinese'indoor soap' (shinei ju f)l 111) 
Expectations (Kewang A ). The analysis offers general television market statistics 
(production side), a view at the audience reception of the series and at press feedback 
(effect side), and a comparison of the major discourses within the soap on one hand 
and contemporary popular literature on the other (product side). The study does not, 
however, include a detailed analysis of the actual visual material, and is much rather 
an account of the series' narrative and its characters. 
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2. The second paper is an article by Lisa Rofel from the University of California in Santa 
Cruz (Rofel, 1995), which also focuses on the series Kewang (though in Rofel's article 
the programme is translated as Yearning). Rofel's product analysis primarily looks at 
the functions that the melodramatic style of the series serves, and at the hegemonic 
discourse within the programmes narrative. Although the short article adopts a 
discourse analytical approach, it is, like Wang's work, lacking an in-depth visual 
analysis, and primarily deals with narrative issues. 
In China, the topic of television drama content is actively discussed by many writers. 
However, none of the authors provide comprehensive visual analyses, and the focus of the 
research is again usually placed on the narrative and on character development; the 
questions such research is concerned with in the PRC is whether particular dramas are 
socially, politically and aesthetically acceptable (Zeng, 2002; 2005; and 2006), and what 
gender perspectives they promote (Dai, 2004,222-267; Liu, 2005). They are, in that sense, 
very often television drama critiques rather than research into the functioning of television 
communication practices. 
With respect to effect analyses of Chinese television, the most comprehensive work is 
arguably that by James Lull (1991). Lull not only provides background information on the 
development of the Chinese broadcasting market from the foundation of the PRC to the 
open-door policy of the 1980s (ibid., 1-29), but also offers a qualitative analysis of interviews 
with urban Chinese viewers that he conducted in 1986 (Lull interviewed eighty-five families 
in the four cities Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Xi an; ibid., 42). Through this analysis 
Lull shows on the one hand how Chinese families generally watch television (ibid., 59-91 and 
154-181), and on the other hand what the interviewees' reactions to one particular television 
drama serial were (New Star, Xin Xing VrM, aired on CCTV in 1986; ibid., 92-126). In addition, 
Lull recounts how the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 were televised in the PRC (ibid., 
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182-207). In this sense Lull's work is a stunning account of how a government-critical view 
pervaded the perceptions of Chinese audiences through the medium of television in the late 
1980s, thereby undermining the authority of the Communist Party (ibid., 212) and leading to 
a sentiment of resistance that found its culminated in the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 
(ibid., 218). However, despite these findings, Lull's analysis contributes little to the present 
research: due to its time frame, Lull's assessment of the Chinese broadcasting system is now 
largely outdated, and can serve only as a historical overview of the situation between 1949 
and 1989. From a methodological perspective, Lull's focus on audiences also does not 
provide approaches that can be applied to the analysis of the political discourses in television 
drama series and the factors that lead to their production. 
Another analysis of audiences was recently conducted by Stefan Kramer (2006). Kramer's 
project essentially emulates the approach taken by Lull two decades earlier, but also includes 
quantitative data. Kramer argues that Chinese television generally communicates a 
hegemonic discourse concerning the question of what it means to be Chinese, and that this 
hegemonic discourse essentially fuses various different concepts together (such as the state, 
the Communist Party, and Chinese national culture; ibid., 211). He further argues that even 
though this discourse has been internalised by many viewers, the medium of television 
nonetheless offers audiences the opportunity to reassemble such information, combine it 
with counter-hegemonic discourses, and apply it to the actual environment that the 
respective viewers live in (ibid., 219). In this sense Kramer sees television as a tool that has 
the potential of creating an active and emancipated Chinese audience that is able to free itself 
from the worldview that the authorities are trying to dictate (ibid., 220). 
Although such arguments are highly instructive, Kramer's research is nonetheless 
problematic and should be treated with caution. This has several reasons: 
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1. The author bases many of his findings on quantitative data, but uses a questionable 
statistical sample base: Kramer handed out questionnaires to 1,400 research subjects 
in Shanghai and Beijing, as well as to 1,400 research subjects in two selected counties 
in Hebei and Shanxi (ibid., 56). This essentially narrows the research project down to 
two urban environments and a very selective northern rural area. Kramer then 
combines his data with the data set of an entirely unrelated domestic project (without 
showing what the focus of that project was; ibid., 98) and uses the results to make 
generalised statements about all of China (for examples see ibid., 208 or 218-219). 
2. Kramer misinterprets some of his quantitative data, for instance when he assesses 
that roughly twenty per cent of urban citizens receive their news information from 
TV, and then concludes that "television has by far taken over the function of the 
leading medium and most important method of entertainment" (thereby completely 
ignoring that, according to his own findings, radio, newspapers, and magazines each 
achieved similar statistical values as television did; Kramer, 2006,94). 
3. Kramer's research repeatedly refers to statistical material that is not referenced (for 
example when Kramer compares the Chinese situation with alleged conditions in 
Europe and the US; ibid., 85). 
4. Finally, Kramer augments his quantitative research with qualitative data derived 
from interviews with Chinese viewers (ibid., 61-63). However, Kramer offers no 
information on how precisely these interviews were conducted or what questions 
were asked, and provides no quotes from or references to this qualitative data 
throughout his explanations. 
Due to these various drawbacks in Kramer's approach, his data will not be used in the 
present research project. 
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In the PRC, audience research is primarily conducted by two companies: AGB Nielsen and 
CSM (see Section 2.2. iv for a discussion of their work, and Section 3.4. i for an analysis of the 
effect that these statistics have on the television drama market). The statistical data on 
Chinese television audiences collected by CSM is published annually in the China TV Rating 
Yearbooks (Wang, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007). In addition, a group of researchers from the 
Communication University of China (CUC) in Beijing is currently involved in an ongoing 
project to analyse the data provided by AGB Nielsen. Their goal is to establish what types of 
Chinese viewers watch what kinds of television drama series, and how they react to the 
programs on offer; the first of their annually planned evaluations has recently been 
published in Beijing (Li, 2007). The project of the CUC researchers is reviewed (2.2. iv) and 
analysed (3.4. v) below. 
2.2 Chinese Broadcasting 
Before offering my own analysis of the factors that are relevant to the production of Chinese 
television drama series (Chapter 3), it is worth summarizing what other researchers have so 
far established concerning the workings of the Chinese broadcasting system, and what issues 
give rise to debate. This section therefore first gives an overview over the history of Chinese 
broadcasting (2.2. i), before then summarizing how the broadcasting sector itself is structured 
(2.2. ii). The following sections then examine what is known about the entertainment format 
of Chinese TV drama series (2.2. iii) as well as the audiences who watch it (2.2. iv). The final 
section focuses on two conflicting trends in the broadcasting sector (2.2. iv): the market 
liberalisations that have brought more and more freedoms to the system throughout the past 
two decades, and the ongoing attempts to nonetheless control that system and censor the 
content that is broadcasted. 
29 
2.2.1 The History of Chinese Broadcasting 
When the first television stations were founded in the People's Republic of China in 1958 as 
part of the so called "Great Leap of Broadcasting Work" (Guangbo gongzuo dayuejin ! '"# l I1 
Eii)2, Chinese television was still at an infant stage (Kramer, 2004,86). The country 
possessed no content production facilities of its own and its TV broadcasting system was 
merely able to reach a small number of privileged cadres (ibid., 84-87). As Lull writes: "In 
these early years (.. ) almost no one had a television set with which to view the shows. 
Progress in the development of television hardware and software was slow" (Lull, 1991,20). 
Today, the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (Guojia guangbo dianying 
dianshi zongju (M*T`' 4 %CU. t P; or SARFT) claims that approximately ninety-four per 
cent of Chinese citizens had access to the nation's television programmes at the turn of the 
millennium (SARFT, 2002). The number of television stations is said to currently lie at 
roughly 2,000 (ibid. ). 3 
In a 1983 declaration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hailed television as the most 
important propaganda method for reaching Chinese households (Zhang et al., 2005,36). 
Since then, television has arguably become the most dominant medium in modern China 
(ibid.; Kramer, 2006,13). Nevertheless, the road to success for Chinese television has been a 
winding one. 
While from the 1950s to late 1970s Chinese television was only a very nascent media format 
incapable of competing with more established information channels such as cinema and 
radio, the media environment experienced a massive period of change after the Cultural 
Revolution (Lull, 1991,20-24). The rediscovery of television as a potential propaganda 
2 Beijing TV (Beijing dianshitai) LA'oft; or BTV) was founded on 1 Mai 1958, Shanghai TV (Shanghai 
dianshitai ±it9 F#M ft; or STV) on 1 October of the same year, and Harbin TV (Haerbin dianshitai ' 7: iß t#J'f ) 
on 20 December; for details see Kramer, 2004,84-111. 3 The exact number of television stations in China varies depending on the source. The SARFT recorded 1,984 
stations for the year 2002 (SARFT, 2002). According to the estimates by Anke Redl and Rowan Simons, China 
may have possessed "more than 980 terrestrial and over 1,300 cable stations at provincial, city and (still) county 
level as well as over 30 provincial satellite channels" in that particular year (Red) of al., 2002,19). 
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medium by the authorities led to the foundation of television stations in every province and 
major city (Redl et al., 2002,19). At the same time, television sets were made available to the 
public at subsidised prices: from 1979 to 1982 alone, the number of households with TV sets 
rose from 4.85 million to 27.61 million (Kramer, 2004,112). 
At the time, television content was largely dominated and dictated by China Central 
Television (Zhongguo zhongyang dianshitai 1' M r4 A*14, nl, &; or CCTV; Lull, 1991,24-26). It was 
not long, however, until local stations were increasingly able to produce their own 
programmes while slowly dissociating themselves from the centralistic organization (Zhang 
eta!., 2005,36-37). Their success has caused even CCTV to imitate their programming 
strategy: since the late 1980s, the central broadcaster has begun to focus more on the 
demands of its viewers and much less on its traditional function of offering ideological 
education to the masses (Kramer, 2004,133-134). This has lead to an increase in content that 
is often considered "vulgar" by the authorities (television dramas, sit-corns, game shows), 
but is nonetheless tolerated in the name of market development and social stability: as 
audiences are occupied with human-interest stories, cathartically emotional dramas, and 
patriotic demonstrations of China's cultural superiority, their need to demand structural 
political changes, is believed to be assuaged (Zhao et a!., 2005). 
While China's television industry diversified, the authorities both at the central and the 
provincial level increased the population's access to TV. Chinese institutions started 
investing heavily in a new technology: satellite broadcasting (Harrison, 2002). The potential 
of reaching even the remote regions of China spurred two major endeavours: first the 
Beijing-based ChinaSat project, later the Shanghai-based SinoSat venture (ibid., 171-172). 
Satellite technology promised to function as a "new delivery weapon" that could help 
broadcasters "regain their political importance and generate additional revenues" (Redl et al., 
2002,20). However, the central authorities quickly realised the ambivalent nature of their 
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new projects (Zhao, 1998,172-174). Outfitting Chinese households with satellite dishes not 
only enabled viewers to receive CCTV programming, but also opened the door to potentially 
subversive broadcasting signals from abroad (ibid. ), or as Anke Redl and Rowan Simons put 
it (2002,20): 
A combination of fears about foreign channels carried on the same satellites 
and the opportunities offered by alternative technologies led to the 
development of new policies, partly designed to stop proliferation of satellite 
dishes in non-remote regions. The new drive was towards investment into 
new communications infrastructure - cable. The process was already in full 
swing when satellite was unceremoniously dumped with the 1994 ban on 
private urban ownership of dishes. 
Since this ban, the reception of foreign satellite services is permitted only "in hotels rated at 
three stars and above, residences approved for foreigners and certain approved 
organizations"; all illegal access is punishable by fines or jail terms (Harrison, 2002,173). 
Whereas these developments have caused cable transmission to become the primary 
broadcasting method for Chinese television, a new reform project is already taking shape. 
The SARFT is currently planning to transform the analogue Chinese television system into a 
digital one: with a combination of satellite and broad-band technology, the institution plans 
to fully digitalise the country by 2015, modernizing first the Eastern regions of China, then 
the central provinces, and finally the West (Zhang et al., 2005,37). If successful, the reform 
could increase the number of channels available to viewers from currently about fifty to over 
500 (ibid. ). 
The rapid expansion of broadcasting capacities in China has led to a high demand for TV 
content (Hong, 2002,38). Television programmes range from distinctly Chinese productions 
to adaptations of foreign formats or dubbed foreign imports (BBC, 2004b; BBC, 2006c; Hong, 
1998,57-76; Keane, 2002a; Keane 2005). What can be shown, and how much of the content 
may be foreign, is subject to strict regulation (Hong, 1998,103; Hong, 2002,38-39; Zhang et al., 
2005,38). Most commercially successful television stations to some extent produce their own 
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content, i. e. news, films, shows, and drama series (Kramer, 2004,129). A good example of 
this is Shanghai Television (STV) which purchases large parts of its content from the 
Shanghai Film Studio, one of the three largest content producers in China (ibid. ). 4 
While content production was firmly in the hands of governmentally owned enterprises 
until 2001, the most recent reforms by the SARFT have allowed the involvement of private 
companies. First, the production of television dramas was permitted to non-state firms 
(Zhang et al., 2005,37). According to Zhang Junhua, almost 2,000 organizations are currently 
licensed to produce or distribute television films and series, with under fifteen per cent of 
these being owned by the state (ibid. ). This shows that, whereas at the turn of the millennium 
content creation was dominated by state owned enterprises, the private sector now has 
become the driving force behind film and drama production (ibid. ). In addition, legislation 
from 2004 enables private businesses to purchase parts of formerly state-owned media 
facilities (ibid. ): this now entitles private enterprises to make management decisions 
concerning information coverage, programme structure and human resources, and has 
substantially altered the face of the Chinese broadcasting system. 
2.2.11 Structure of the Chinese Broadcasting System 
Since the introduction of television to China, the most important TV broadcaster has been 
CCTV (Lull, 1991,24-26; Zhang et al., 2005,36). With 800 million viewers, CCTV is the most 
powerful media giant in China today (Zhang et al., 2005,36). CCTV has continuously 
expanded over the years and now carries twelve channels (Kramer, 2004,367-368) as well as 
six specialized channels5: CCTV -1 is China's "comprehensive channel" (zonghe pindao 
f 
i); it produces the national news (aired on all provincial stations at seven p. m. Beijing time) 
as well as information programmes and entertainment. Stefan Kramer calls this station the 
4 Shanghai Film Studio (Shanghai dianying zhlplan chan ±* FhW *J 1' T) is part of the Shanghai Film and TV 
Group (Shanghai dianyingdianshijituan gongsi±*LUZVAVý'JFL1'4 uJ). See also the Group's homepage for 
detailed information http: /twww. sfs-cn. com/ (24.01.08]. 5 For an updated list of CCTV channels and their programming, as well as online live-streaming offers, see 
http: //tv. cctv. com/live_ttindex. shtml/ [25.01.09]. 
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television equivalent of the People's Daily newspaper (Renmin Ribao ARH #R; RMRB) and 
argues that it functions primarily as the official propaganda mouthpiece of state and Party 
(ibid). The CCTV-1 programmes are complemented by a channel covering economics and 
society (jingji shenghuo 9IA; CCTV-2), one concerning culture, art and religion (zongyi tT 
Z; CCTV-3) and an international channel (guoji M Wr; CCTV-4); these four channels are 
available nation-wide (ibid. ). In addition, viewers with cable-access receive a sports channel 
(tiyu 4N; CCTV-5), a movie channel (dianying 0-1 C; CCTV-6), a channel covering the topics 
of children, military, science & technology and agriculture (shao'er junshi keji nongye AV 
. 
}#1k; CCTV-7), a drama channel (dianshi ju ßk1 1; CCTV-8), an English-language 
channel (CCTV-9), an education channel (kejiao MA; CCTV-10), a channel showing theatre 
productions (xiqu #Z FHJ; CCTV-11) as well as a channel that focuses on legal and social issues 
(shehui yufa Utz -,!; CCTV-12; this channel formerly promoted the image profile of China's 
Western regions and used to be therefore called CCTV "West", xibu AN; ibid. ). In addition, 
CCTV broadcasts a channel dedicated entirely to news reports (CCTV xinwentl), a special 
children's channel (CCTV shao'er y`)L), a music channel (CCTV yinyueFrench and 
Spanish language channels (CCTVfayu Yip and CCTV xiyu gig), as well as a high- 
definition channel that features programmes such as US-American shows in HD (CCTV 
ganging A; ibid. ). 
CCTV is further complemented by stations at three additional administrative levels: 
provincial, municipal (or prefectural) and county (Hong, 2002,29). At the provincial level, 
China possesses thirty-two stations (Zhang et al., 2005,36). At the next lower level, each large 
Chinese city has at least one television station at its disposal (ibid. ). These stations constitute 
the most direct method of reaching television audiences, since the broadcasters' programmes 
focus directly on local everyday life issues (ibid. ). The final tier consists of broadcasters at the 
communal level. These stations have exceptionally large numbers of potential viewers, but 
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are not considered particularly influential, at least from the perspective of advertisers: the 
majority of these viewers belongs to the rural population and hence has a far lesser income at 
its disposal than the urban viewers who watch the channels of stations like STV or Beijing TV 
(BTV; ibid. ). 
Some of the stations at the provincial and municipal level have grown to become strong 
players in the sector, and due to their regional channels and their individual programming 
content they today constitute serious competitors for CCTV (Kramer, 2004,128-131). One of 
the first stations that were able to successfully develop a strong market presence by 
establishing itself as a distinctly local TV stations was STV (ibid.; Hong, 1998,61-62). STV, 
which since 2001 is part of the commercial conglomerate Shanghai Media Group (Shanghai 
wenguang xinwen chuanmei jituan irX 4*1K W), currently airs seven different 
channels (Kramer, 2004,369): a news channel (xinwen zonghe 4r AÄ), a channel covering 
social issues and fashions (shenghuo shishang tY fl I'll), a drama channel (dianshiju #i 9), a 
satellite channel promoting Shanghai's image as an economic metropolis throughout the 
nation (weishi T-41), an economics channel (caijing #91), a sports channel (tiyu f* ft) and a 
channel for current affairs (jishi The example of STV has been emulated by other 
provincial and municipal television stations (Zhang et al., 2005,29). Notable examples of 
popular and influential stations are BTV, Shenzhen TV, and the Shanghai-based station 
Oriental Television (OTV) which, like STV, is part of the Shanghai Media Group (Kramer, 
2004,369-371). In addition, a number of pay-TV channels are available in China, for example 
Shanghai Cable TV (Shanghai youxian dianshi ±140 *, 1; ibid. ). 
With the number of broadcasters growing exponentially throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a 
maze of institutions was developed in order to control the sector, and counteract a number of 
problems that had arisen from the expansion: By the end of the 1990s, many local cadres had 
come to discover the television and broadcasting stations at the provincial, municipal and 
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communal level as important assets for disseminating propaganda and generating financial 
profits (Zhang et al., 2005,36). From the view of the central authorities, this development 
threatened to reduce the influence that the national government and party institutions had 
on these stations (ibid. ). In order to deal with the new complexity of the media sector and re- 
establish control, two governmental institutions were formed. 
In March 1998, at the First Session of the Ninth People's Congress, the Ministry of the 
Information Industry (Xinxi chanye bu 1ä,, i `kil; MII) was created out of the merger of 
three former ministries (Redl et al., 2002,18): the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
(Youzheng tongxun bu Wil Affi l; MPT), the Ministry of the Electronics Industry (Dianzi 
gongye bu -211811; MEI) and parts of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (Guangbo 
dianying dianshi bu ! `#4 q 4J l; MRFT). This ministry "has been given the task of 
overseeing the management of Chinese information networks into the twenty-first century. 
The MII also coordinates state policy on construction and management of electronic media as 
voice, video and data technologies converge" (ibid. ). 6 
The second relevant state institution is the SARFF, which officially has the same status and 
authority as a ministry (Zhang et al., 2005,31). In 1998, it was constructed out of the remnants 
of the MRFT that had not been integrated into the newly founded MII (ibid. ). The function of 
the SARFT is to "censor content and to manage the country's existing broadcast 
infrastructure" (ibid.; author's translation). It passes regulations concerning cable content 
which "are heavily focussed on the national peace, prosperity and interests, as well as 
disobeying national laws" (Harrison, 2002,170). It was the SARFT that was in charge of re- 
regulating the broadcasting industry in 1999: all television stations were pooled at the central 
and provincial level, and many municipal and communal stations had to merge with 
For a detailed mission statement of the ministry and an overview of its different units see the MII homepage (MII, 
2005). 
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institutions at a higher level (Zhang et al., 2005,36). In general, the SARFF now functions as 
the principle regulatory authority for the film and television industry (ibid. ). 
In theory, the MII and the SARFT have distinct fields of responsibility. As Marc Harrison 
explains, "MII manages planning, administration and technical standards of broadcasting 
and telecommunications, which covers television, while SARFT regulates content, CCTV and 
the development of the cable system (... )"(Harrison, 2002,170). In practice, however, the MII 
and SARFT have been fighting a turf war since their foundation (Redl et al., 2002,19): 
SARFT is anxious not to cede any further power to the superministry, while 
the MII is aiming at controlling all information networks including those of 
the broadcast industry with its cable holdings. 
Considering the additional editorial involvement of other institutions such as the Ministry of 
Culture (Wenhua bu }Z11j ; MC), the State Press and Publication Administration (Guojia 
xinwen chuban shu (R*0fR , 'fi1XW; SPPA), and propaganda departments within each 
broadcasting and television station, jurisdictions in the sector remain highly obscure (ibid. ). 
2.2.111 The Broadcasting Market and Its Primary Product: the TV Drama Series 
Due to the continuous liberalisation of China's market since the start of the open-door policy 
and the introduction of relaxed guidelines concerning television advertisement, the Chinese 
broadcasting industry has become a major source of revenues: as Zhang Junhua shows, 
television station profits rose from 0.98 billion RMB in 1982 to 69.6 billion RMB in 2003; a 
more than seventy-fold increase (Zhang et al., 2005,35). Almost half of this sum consisted of 
advertisement revenues (ibid.; for an overview of advertisement increases in CCTV's budget 
see Zhao, 1998,57-58 as well as Zhao, 1999,298). Other authors also attest to the fact that 
advertisement has become the crucial source of income for television broadcasters (Redl et al., 
2002,22). This development constitutes a major shift away from previous financing methods: 
While all broadcasters were originally funded through state subsidies, "the vast majority of 
TV stations in urban centres are now relying totally on advertising revenue and third-party 
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investment to fund their development" (Redl et al., 2002,21). Advertising is generally 
restricted by legislation - during prime time, for example, the advertisement limit is nine 
minutes per hour - but local stations continuously attempt to circumvent these restrictions in 
order to make more profits (Zhang et al., 2005,37). 
One of the formats that create the highest advertisement revenues on Chinese television is 
the television drama series (dianshiju *-RUM; Keane, 2002b, 132). It is the most popular 
television format in China: according to the audience measurement company CSM, the 
format of the TV drama series consistently scored the highest viewer ratings during the years 
2004 to 2006 out of fifteen television programming categories (between 34.6 and 36.4 per cent 
nationwide; the second most popular format was the news, which achieved between 12.7 
and 14.0 per cent viewer ratings nationwide during the same period of time; Wang, 2007, 
229). According to another survey conducted by CSM in 2004, trading of drama programmes 
generated revenues of 4.3 billion RMB from advertisements and programme trade that year 
(CSM, 2005), making it a highly profitable cultural industry. Such developments have led 
researchers such as Professor Hong Yin from the Qinghua University in Beijing to conclude 
that "television drama has gradually taken the place of cinema and become the most popular 
audio-visual narrative form" (Hong, 2002,30). 
The question then is what types of television dramas Chinese viewer find popular. Chinese 
authors' classifications of Chinese television drama genres vary widely. For instance, the 
authors Liu Yuan (All VI) and Dong Mei (fe) differentiate between ten genres (Xu et al., 2006, 
180-193); five 'realistic drama' genres (xianshi ticai dianshiju IX M# +A I) and the five 
'costume drama' genres (guzhuang ticai dianshiju -i 8 #ß'q4 11). 'The'realistic' dramas are 
(ibid. ): 
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1. The "main melody" drama (zhuxuanlü ju 
2. The teen drama (qingnian ouxiangju WVA1 Mil), 
3. The crime drama (po'an ju ü *XIJ), 
4. The family drama (jiating lunli ju TQJlJ), and 
5. The biographical drama (zhuanjilei dianshiju 41iEA*, 4RtJPJ). 
'Costume dramas' include (ibid. ): 
1. The historical drama (lishi ju ff5 'J), 
2. The romance drama (yanqingju ä fiirl l), 
3. The swordsmen drama (wuxiaju t1gl1), 
4. The comedy (xiju 11J), and 
5. The fairy tale (shenhuaju #'Pi 1 J)" 
The audience measurement company AGB Nielsen, on the other hand, differentiates 
between twenty genres (Li, 2007,176) without offering precise criteria for the distinction. For 
instance, the company includes a range of historical genres in its listing, such as 
'revolutionary history dramas' (geming lishi ju *ý'ti 0ii RIJ), 'palace dramas' (gongting juL-T 
0J), 'significant historical dramas' (zhongda lishi ju I 1j *1 1), 'normal historical dramas' 
(yiban lishi ju --JRJ)ii)PJ), and'other historical dramas' (qita lishiju T W33SP-51J; ibid. ). This 
categorization also includes criteria that are not related to content, for instance introducing 
genres such as'imported drama' (yinjinju qI AMiJ) and'collaborately produced drama' (liepai 
ju Ä MM). Other sources refer to yet different genres, such as'kongfü (wuda pian A#T1i ), 
'reworked legends' (chuanqi W% or'pink dramas' (fenhong ju #W101; i. e. series that focus 
on the relationship problems of young, urban women and often copy the concept of US 
programmes such as "Sex and the City"; Keane, 2005,84 & 88). 
The inconsistent range of genre categories makes it difficult to properly assess what drama 
genres audiences watch, but from the statistics provided both by AGB Nielsen (Li, 2007,177) 
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and CSM (Wang, 2007) it can be said that crime dramas, historical dramas and series that are 
set in an urban environment (teen dramas and family dramas) frequently attract large 
audiences. The question remains how those involved in the actual creation of TV drama 
series classify different kinds of dramas, and how such classifications and viewer preferences 
for certain genres influence the criteria adopted to create drama content. This problem shall 
be examined in more detail in Chapter 3.4. 
What is important to note here is that Chinese drama series are conceived and aired 
differently than comparable Western formats. Other authors have emphasised the 
similarities that Chinese television dramas share with Western drama formats (Zhu, 2005), 
but these similarities pertain to filming techniques and the general conventions of character 
as well as plot development; my research suggests that Chinese drama series are created and 
structured differently from Western programmes, and that Chinese media experts believe the 
differences between Chinese and Western formats to outweigh the similarities. I will return 
to this issue later (section 3.4. iii), but first it is useful to summarise what the unique features 
of Chinese drama series are. Examples for this are on one hand the drama series analysed in 
this research project (GAJZ, HWDD, and NCNM; sequence protocols are provided on the 
appendix DVD), on the other hand a sample television schedule (Figure 1), which shows a 
section from the evening programming of CCTV-1 and CCTV-8 on a randomly chosen day in 
2005.7 
7 Source: http: /twww. liaohe. net. cn/tvý_programme/CCTV-1. html [03.01.08]; authors translation. 
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Figure 1: Sample TV Schedule, Evening Programme for I February 2005 (Tuesday) 
CCTV-1 
Time Chinese Schedule 
(... ) 
19: 00 
19: 38 
19: 55 
20: 48 
21: 42 
22: 30 
23: 02 
23: 57 
00: 50 
Niivlm#Ji) 
AAWi( 
181k*.; Rk$IJ: R, G-ýM(1) 
01 fal rA 
60 **I"AI1: iXýý: ý(55) 
60*Ftl*P1: rX; ýCýý(56) 
60 *FtlVtO1: YRAJ: ýf'r(57) 
CCTV-8 
Time Chinese Schedule 
19: 02 
19: 18 
19: 48 
20: 43 
21: 43 
22: 04 
23: 02 
23: 54 
00: 49 
Mlfitte: U"4hm-m1# (-) 
ä's#'ý1ä7gi«: 2005-27 
ýýlýJ(IJý1ý L ): ýäßAhýý 22 
23 
LH'-nlt, *J4X: 2005-32 
*UNA: tttagto$10 
ý4hlý+Jtýo: #Ctfiýýýý1,5 
ý4Flý+Jýb: #Cdiýýýý16 
ý$ýý1: CýJM! NJ*20 
English Translation 
News Broadcast 
Key Interview 
TV Series: My Heart Circles in the Air (Episode 1/18) 
TV Series: My Heart Circles in the Air (Episode 2/18) 
Tell It Like It Is 
Evening News 
TV Series: Han Emperor Wu (Episode 55/60) 
TV Series: Han Emperor Wu (Episode 56/60) 
TV Series: Han Emperor Wu (Episode 57/60) 
English Translation 
Animal World: Wild Africa - Seashore (Part 1) 
Movie & TV Express (2005-27) 
TV Series (Drama Centre): Colour of Life (Episode 22) 
TV Series (Drama Centre): Colour of Life (Episode 23) 
World Cinema (2005-32) 
Art Theatre: Global Attack and Capture (Episode 10) 
Foreign Theatre: Female Driver (Episode 5) 
Foreign Theatre: Female Driver (Episode 6) 
TV Series: Trial of Mental Strength (Episode 20) 
First, a series of peculiarities can be discerned concerning the structure of the broadcasting 
schedule: 
1. On both stations, television dramas are the predominant television format during 
the evening hours. This observation is also made by Stefan Kramer (2004,361), and is 
further exemplified by the average annual per centage of broadcasting time allocated 
to TV drama series on China's TV channels, which amounts to roughly twenty-five 
per cent (Wang, 2007,229). 
2. For each series, two or three episodes are shown consecutively (note how three 
episodes of HWDD are aired in a row in Figure 1). 
3. The time table is not structured by the hour like most Western television schedules 
are: a new programme starts when the previous one has ended, regardless of the time 
(note the arbitrary starting times, particularly of the television dramas, in Figure 1). 
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4. Television dramas episodes are not broadcasted at a weekly interval, but are instead 
aired consecutively, two to five episodes per day, until the drama is concluded .8 
Second, there are a number of distinct characteristic that television drama series share with 
regards to the way their plot is structured and presented: 
1. Chinese drama series are conceived as closed, over-arching narrations, which are 
usually told within twenty episodes. This sets them apart from continuous 'open' 
serials such as the Western 'soap opera' format, and places them more in the vicinity 
of the 'closed' Latin-American telenovelas (Allen, 1995,17-24). 
2. In China, 'sequels' or different 'seasons' of a TV drama series are not usually 
produced: If a series is followed by a sequel, the new programme will only retain the 
name and general theme of the original, but will feature an entirely new storyline, 
new characters, and new actors. Examples of this are the three instalments of GAJZ as 
well as the various spin-offs of NCNM, which do not continue the narrative of 
previous instalments but constitute closed narratives in their own right. 
3. Chinese television dramas do not possess as clearly a defined episode structure as 
most comparable Western programmes, i. e. the various narrative arcs are not created 
to span across precisely one episode, ending in a cliff-hanger ending at the end of 
each episode (see the three sequence protocols on the appendix DVD for proof of this 
observation). This has the effect that when watched on DVD, Chinese drama 
programmes seem more like a sixteen-hour drama movie than a television series. 
Even though the programme is later broadcasted in episodes that have the standard 
length of roughly fourty-two minutes, episodes will usually start with the last shots 
of the previous episode, and then move on to the subsequent scene, essentially 
picking up the narration exactly where the programme previously left off (for 
e This peculiarity is not demonstrated In Figure 1, but can be observed in the N schedule of CCTV as provided 
on the homepage www. cctv. com/tvguide/index. shtml (27.07.081. 
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examples see the mid-scene transition in GAJZ from episode 12 to 13 or in NCNM 
from episode 4 to 5, as well as the break between two narratives in HWDD in the 
middle of episode 14). 
4. The starting and ending credits of each episode of Chinese television dramas are 
constructed in a way that provides a montage of scenes from the series in its entirety, 
and it is not uncommon that key scenes or a drama's conclusion are already shown in 
the opening sequence, or later during the end credits of a television drama, 
essentially 'giving away' major plot points that have not yet been shown (for example, 
the opening credits of NCNM conclude with a scene from the final episode, showing 
the main characters getting married). This suggests that the concept of suspense (i. e. 
of not knowing the outcome of a narrative) that most Western viewers are used to 
from programmes such as 24, Lost or Prison Break is not a defining aspect of television 
dramas in China. 
I shall return to these observations later in Sections 3.4. iii as well as 3.7, when discussing the 
viewing habits that Chinese media experts believe characterise the Chinese audience, as well 
as the functions that television drama is said to have in China. 
2.2.1v The Chinese TV Drama Audience 
Considering the market value of Chinese television drama series and the importance that 
advertisement revenues have for the TV stations, the question for producers and 
broadcasters alike is: who watches television dramas in China? As Anke Redl and Rowan 
Simons point out, the lack of so-called "accountable audience measurement tools" is 
becoming a major obstacle for generating profits in the industry (Redl et al., 2002,22). To date, 
reliable data on audience ratings comparable to that used in most industrialised countries is 
still rare in China (ibid. ). Current audience research in China mainly relies on the data 
produced by two institutions: The first is CVSC Sofres Media Ltd, or CSM (Yangshi-Suofisrui 
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meijie yanjiu youxian gongsi 4? -7`aSjfl%`I)"9 CSM is a joint-venture between 
the French media research company Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) and the Chinese enterprise 
CTR Market Research. 20 The second relevant company is the China branch office of AGB 
Nielsen Media (formerly known as AC Nielsen Media). 11 The work of these two institutions 
differs substantially, and the statistical data they produce is not congruent. The main reason 
for this is that the two institutions base their calculations on different samples: CSM 
measures the viewing habits of 178,800 panellists in 54,000 households across China 
(covering, as the company profile both on the TNS and the CSM homepage states, "China's 
1.2 billion TV population"); this includes viewers both from rural and urban China, as well 
as from the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. 12 In contrast, AGB Nielsen covers 
mainly urban China; it used a sample base of over 11,000 panel households in late 2007, 
which according to company information represented "471 million Chinese TV viewers". 13 
What problems arise for producers and broadcasters from the use of the data provided by 
these companies will be discussed in Section 3.4. i. For now, it is worth turning to the 
question of who the typical viewers of Chinese TV drama series are according to the 
6A detailed presentation of the company in English as well as an online rating service for television programmes, 
TV drama series and TV sporting events in China's largest urban centres since 2004 is presented on the CSM 
homepage http: //www. csm. com. cn [20.11.07]. 10 For more information on TNS, see the company homepage http: /twww. tnsglobal. com/ (20.11.07]. An overview 
of CTR Market research can be found on the webpage http: //www. ctrchina. cn/en/about/index. htmi (20.11.07). The 
information provided there shows that CTR is itself a joint venture between TNS and the China International 
Television Corporation (CITVC), which Is In turn the sole wholly-owned subsidiary of China Central Television 
CCTV)" (ibid. ) This makes CSM indirectly subordinated to CCTV. 1 For information on AGB Nielsen see the webpage 
http: //www. agbnielsen. net/wheroweare/dynPage. asp? languenglish&id=420&country=China [20.11.07). A third 
institution that produces ratings data is the Horizon Research Consultancy Group (Lingdian diaocha gongsi ; 
i, 1 >WJ); however this enterprise primarily focuses on market research and market entry solutions, as their 
company homepage shows (http: //www. horizon-china. com/serviet/Page? Node=8724 (20.11.071). It does not play 
as important a role in the TV ratings measurement sector as CSM or AGB Nielsen. 12 See both the TNS homepage http: //www. tnsgiobal. com/news/news- 
E8768F249EA94150822C9510AF5B3881. aspx [20.11.07] and the CSM website on China and Hong Kong 
http: Nwww. csm. com. on/en/aboutAndexhk. html (20.11.07]. 13 According to the information provided by the company on Its Internet homepage 
(http: //www. agbnielsen. nettwhereweare/dynPage. asp? tather 420&iang=english&id=303&country=China 
[20.11.07]), the research sample includes households from the municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing 
and Tianjin, as well as from the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Sichuan and 
Liaoning. AGB Nielsen plans to include all of mainland China in its calculations In the future. It has announced 
that it will presently widen Its sample base to "18 provinces, based on 18,000 panel households" (ibid. ). AGB 
Nielsen does not specify which 16 provinces it plans to Include, but considering that the company's medium-term 
aim is to provide "overnight TV ratings for nearly 900 million Chinese, or In other words, nearly two thirds of the 
Chinese population who contribute more than 80% of the national GDP" (ibid. ), it seems safe to assume that the 
urban population will continue to constitute the main sampling share in the near future. 
44 
available statistical data, and how these viewers react to the current offer of drama 
entertainment on Chinese TV. Answers to these questions are provided by the CUC 
researchers in Beijing who have analysed the data provided by AGB Nielsen on how many 
minutes per day urban Chinese viewers watched television drama series in the year 2005, as 
well as what feedback viewers provided to TV stations concerning the programmes that had 
been aired (Li, 2007)14 
According to the assessment of the CUC researchers, the appeal of television drama series 
depends on the following five criteria: 
1. Gender: Drama viewers are predominantly female (with women 
watching roughly eight minutes more television drama per day than 
men; ibid., 184). 
2. Age: The main age group that watches television dramas are viewers 
older than 45 (with the age group 45-54 on average watching 72 
minutes of drama per day, and the age group above 55 years watching 
84 minutes, i. e. roughly two episodes per day; ibid. ). Young viewers 
generally watch less television drama, and the age group of the 25-34 
year-olds has the lowest average viewing time, watching only about 
half the amount that the oldest audience group consumes (44 minutes 
per day; ibid. ). 
3. Education: According to the survey, audiences with an elementary or 
middle-school diploma watch the most television drama (between 60 
and 70 minutes per day; ibid. ), whereas university graduates watch the 
least amount (48 minutes per day; ibid). 
4. Prosperity: A similar decrease in viewing time seems to accompany 
rising incomes: the group classified as "low monthly income" in the 
survey (less than 1,000 RMB per month) watched roughly 62 minutes 
of television drama per day, compared to only 48 minutes per day for 
the group with "high monthly income" (more than 2,000 RMB per 
month; ibid). 
5. Place of Residence: The data presented by the CUC researchers 
suggests that TV dramas equally constitute the largest share of 
television consumption for viewers in all metropolises across the 
nation, generally amounting to just above 40 per cent (Beijing 39 per 
cent, Chongqing 46 per cent, Shanghai 42 per cent, and Guangzhou 43 
per cent; ibid., 185-198). There are, however, differences in the degrees 
14 It should be pointed out that the data provided by AGB Nielsen does not include rural viewers, and hence 
cannot represent all of China. How this problem affects the way in which producers and broadcasters target their 
programmes at certain viewers is discussed In Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.11. 
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to which viewers from different regions consume dramas aired on 
CCTV. For instance, CCTV drama consumption is noted as highest in 
Beijing (24 per cent compared to dramas aired on local or satellite 
stations), followed by Chongqing (19 per cent). In contrast, viewers in 
Shanghai only watched CCTV drama broadcasts 11 per cent of the 
time, and audiences in Guangzhou hardly watched any CCTV series at 
all (4 per cent; ibid). If these numbers are to be believed, CCTV dramas 
are generally more likely to be watched by northern or western 
Chinese audiences than by viewers living along the southern and 
eastern coastal regions. It is likely that this difference in CCTV 
consumption arises from alternative offers from other broadcasters, 
such as STV in Shanghai (Kramer, 2004,130) and various Hong Kong 
stations that are received in Guangzhou (Fung et al., 2002). 
The questions of whether those involved in the actual production and broadcasting of TV 
dramas share this assessment, and how their perception of target audiences influences their 
work, are discussed in section 3.4. ii. Let me turn to the second issue that the CUC research 
project addresses, i. e. what kind of feedback Chinese TV drama viewers provide to the TV 
stations that broadcast the programmes. 15 I have summarised the top eight issues that 
viewers raised in 2005 according to the researchers in Figure 2 (Li, 2007,226-227; author's 
translation). 
In addition to analyzing the general topics that viewers commented on as well as the form in 
which these comments were made (letters, phone calls, email, mobile phone text messages 
and message board posts; ibid., 225), the CUC researchers also provide sample remarks from 
the letters and emails sent to the respective stations (ibid., 229-231). These statements are part 
of the analysis provided in Section 3.4. v of this thesis. 
15 The researchers conducted interviews with employees from twelve different broadcasting institutions (CCTV, 
Beijing TV, Shaanxi TV, Shanxi TV, Sichuan TV, Chongqing TV, Anhui TV, Hubei TV, Hunan TV, the Shanghai 
Wenguan Group, Zhejiang TV and Guangdong TV). In addition to the interviews, viewers' feedback letters to 
CCTV, Beijing TV, and Anhui TV were evaluated, as where the smalls sent to BTV (between September and 
December 2005) and the message board entries made on the websites of Shanxi TV and Zhejiang TV; for all 
other stations, the feedback files had either been lost or not yet processed (Li, 2007,225). 
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Figure 2: Main Concerns of Viewer Feedback (Ordered by Quantity) 
Rank Feedback Issue 
1. Demand that a previously broadcasted television drama be repeated. 
2. Suggest a drama for broadcasting; for instance a programme that was aired on 
another station or was mentioned in a magazine. 
(A#ffý1RxqJ) 
3. Inquire about a television drama; for instance inquire when a programme will be aired, 
where the DVD can be purchased, how the end title song might be obtained, etc. 
(-ill , #1ZONtr? ) 
4. Comment on a television drama; i. e. voice an opinion concerning content, acting, etc. 
(Al ItRnpj 0 i. Wff1") 
Ask that a television drama's broadcasting time be changed. 
OM ýý AU diaffi7) 
6. Complain that a TV drama was cancelled midway. 
7. Complain that a TV drama was announced to not be broadcast. 
(#ýii Ä ý'1 1c#>ýt) 
8. Complain about too much advertising. 
2.2. v The Debate: TV Content between Market Liberalisation and State Control 
The numerous reform strategies that have been applied to China's media market in recent 
years (Zhang et al., 2005,36-38) as well as the popularity of TV drama entertainment has 
sparked numerous debates, both in and outside of China. In the PRC, the popularity of 
drama shows has led domestic critics to question the cultural, political, social and aesthetical 
value of this particular entertainment format (Hong, 2002,33). According to Hong Yin, many 
intellectuals take a "militant'anti-marketization' stance", criticizing television drama's 
supposed "lack of social responsibility, its audiences, its social function, the problem of 
cultural globalization, and its tendencies towards vulgarity", often demanding stricter 
government controls of televised content (ibid., 33). At the same time, popular television is 
not without its supporters among Chinese intellectuals (ibid. ): 
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There are also, however, intellectuals who embrace the common values and 
popularization of culture brought about by commercialization. They argue 
that this kind of change has allowed television drama to break away from its 
pedagogic and propagandist tradition, and also from its elitist aristocratic 
tradition. And while people ought to be vigilant about vulgarity, 
commercialization is indeed a revolution of some significance, one that has 
brought an affective element to drama. 
What role these stances play in the production of television drama content will be examined 
in Chapters 3.6 and 3.7. 
Outside of China, the debate has concerned the question of how market liberalisation has 
affected the broadcasting system. The liberalisation strategies have allowed television 
stations to increasingly adopt market orientated management and private ownership 
structures (Kramer, 2004,128-131). Many stations, for example STV, today employ a staff of 
professional television experts and adhere to a pragmatic set of quality criteria modelled 
after those of Hong Kong television stations (ibid. ). In many cases, the ownership structure 
has also been subject to reform (Zhang et al., 2005,29; Zhao, 1998,112-114). In addition, the 
reforms have made the dissemination of technological innovation possible across the country 
(such as broad-band internet access and digital television), and have also enabled foreign 
firms to engage in joint-venture-projects and the extensive trading of cultural products 
(Zhang et al., 2005,36-38 and 42-43). The soaring growth rates in the cultural sector 
(approximately ten per cent in 2001; ibid., 41) along with the increasing involvement of 
global players such as News Corporation, Viacom and Sony Pictures (Feuilherade, 2005) 
have prompted international observers to speak about a "breakneck media revolution" in the 
PRC (Griffiths, 2005). 
Yet, at the same time, the optimistic assessments of recent Chinese media developments are 
offset by regular reports of extensive market regulations for foreign firms (BBC, 2004a) as 
well as of content censorship on television (BBC, 2006b), in the press (Holbig, 2006), and on 
the internet (Holbig, 2005; BBC, 2006a). The contradiction between market reforms and 
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continuous state control has led to a debate concerning the question of how open the newly 
reformed media market in China truly is. Authors such as Stefan Kramer argue that even 
though Chinese television broadcasting has become a strongly commercially driven 
enterprise, it is nevertheless the primary tool for propaganda work (Kramer, 2004,464-465). 
According to Kramer, the illusion of direct and unaltered coverage of the truth that television 
provides makes it the central mouthpiece for the CCP and the state (ibid. ). The argument is 
that important events are first edited and tailored to represent the official viewpoint of the 
nation's leadership, then aired by CCTV at prime time, and next disseminated throughout 
the country via the provincial television stations; the reality portrayed on television, so the 
argument goes, is finally flanked and strengthened by follow-up articles in the state-owned 
print media such as the RMRB (ibid. ). Other authors, such as Zhang Junhua, share this 
assessment of the situation in China, arguing that television has become the main anchor for 
the authority's ideological work ever since incomes have risen enough to enable the majority 
of the population to own a television set (Zhang et al., 2005,36; author's translation): 
As long as standards of living were relatively low, newspapers and cinemas 
offered the best way of propagating political information. Meanwhile, 
television has moved to the centre and constitutes the last bastion of the 
propaganda machinery. 
The importance that the authorities attribute to television content as a propaganda tool is 
reflected in the array of regulations and censorship proceedings that govern broadcasting, 
both at the news and the entertainment level. According to the Chinese media scientist Hong 
Yin, CCTV and provincial stations are required to broadcast only television drama series 
during prime time that conform to the propaganda guidelines of the party and state (so- 
called 'socialist main melody' dramas (shehui zhuyi zhuxuanlü #f$IXtfii; Hong, 2002, 
33). In addition, the stations are required to "reduce the amount of popular entertainment- 
oriented 'Royal Court' costume plays and kung fu stories" that are aired during this time 
(ibid. ). Furthermore, the authorities operate an intricate management system with the 
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intention of strengthening the CCP's supervision of content production. Citing the example 
of Chinese television drama production, Hong Yin describes the four levels of this system as 
follows (Hong, 2002,36): 
The first is that a television drama production permit system was instituted on 
1 June 1986. Any organization wanting to produce drama had to gain a permit 
from the Ministry of Film Radio and Television (later SARFT). (... ) The second 
area of strengthening management concerns lies in the actual policing of 
regulations. Before production can begin, the production unit must report the 
topic to the Chinese Television Arts Committee for clearance. These regulatory 
bureaux decide what may proceed at any given time according to the current 
political terrain and certain approved drama topics. The third area is 
distribution supervision; (... ) the distribution and broadcast of television 
drama has to navigate the supervision of local CCP propaganda departments. 
Fourth broadcasting itself is monitored. Today SARFT, CCTV and provincial- 
level stations have television inspection procedures. When programmes 
exhibit 'political problems' they can be officially terminated. These measures 
ensure that production and circulation of programming accords with the 
political interests of the state. 
At first sight, such procedures make the Chinese media market appear to be highly regulated 
and strongly censored by the authorities. The question of what role censorship (shencha W; 
literally: 'examination' or 'investigation') plays in the system is, in a sense, dependent on 
what is understood as censorship. The term itself can be defined either narrowly, or very 
broadly. A narrow definition is provided by The Oxford World Encyclopaedia, which refers 
to censorship as a "system whereby a government-appointed body or official claims the right 
to protect the public interest by influencing the release of any item of mass communication, " 
and states that censorship "falls into four broad categories - politics, religion, pornography 
or violence" (Censorship, 2005). Such a definition essentially sees censorship as the 
prohibition of certain content by government institutions. However, many authors question 
whether such prohibitions still truly function in a liberalised market such as Chinas. As 
Donald and Keane argue, "centralized control of the media does not necessarily translate 
into compliance by producers with chapter and verse of the regulatory canon. The media in 
China are heavily regulated in theory but, due to the sheer size of the media sector, 
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guidelines and policies are difficult to implement and enforce" (Donald et al., 2002a, 7). Hong 
also concedes that the state supervision of television drama production is continuously 
adapting to the logics of free market development: "(... ) non-television companies can 
produce television drama, accept non-state funding, accept investment from foreign and 
overseas enterprises as well as joint funding arrangements, and allow regional executive 
branches to monitor without incurring centralized censorship inspection. These relatively 
relaxed administrative controls make the production of television drama appear a more 
pluralistic undertaking" than that of cinematic movie production (Hong, 2002,36). 
According to Zhang Junhua, such changes have been brought about by China's accession to 
the WTO in late 2001: As China 'entered the world' (Zhongguo ru shi 41 [M/\t), a shift in 
cultural policy took place (Zhang et al., 2005,30) that caused governmental authorities to no 
longer function as creators and carriers of culture (ban wenhua )0 3Z ft) but rather as 
administrators (guan wenhua `X1. t). Official institutions such as the SARFI' or the MII, so 
the argument goes, increasingly see themselves as providing the general framework for 
media production and broadcasting while rarely exerting direct control (ibid). 
However, analyses of the Chinese media by researchers such as Guo Zhenzhi (Zhao et a!., 
2005), Barrett McCormick (2004), Zhao Bin (1999), or Zhao Yuezhi (1998) show that just 
because centralised, administrative prohibitions have become less important in China, this 
does not mean that the system is not subjected to various sorts of softer censorship, such as 
self-censorship or government incentives for the production of certain content. In order to 
account for such mechanisms, a broader definition of the term censorship is required, such as 
the one provided by Robert E. Drechsel (2005), who describes censorship as "any restriction 
on the dissemination or content of expression (... )". How various 'hard' and 'soft' 
mechanisms influence the creation and dissemination of television drama content in China 
shall be analysed in Chapter 3.5. 
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What is evident from the research described above is that the administrative controls that 
govern the Chinese broadcasting system have changed, and this has led researchers to argue 
that the propaganda messages of prime-time central television have also shifted (Donald et 
al., 2002a, 14): 
Rather than broadcasting doctrinal propaganda about the truth of socialism 
and the decadence of capitalism as in the past, the Chinese media now 
inculcate lessons about what it means to live in a changing world where 
competitiveness drives national economic productivity. 
The development of the Chinese broadcasting industry shows, as observers argue, the trade- 
off with which the authorities are currently confronted in China: On the one hand, 
deregulated markets create profits and rising living standards; on the other hand, an 
excessively liberalised media system ceases to function as an effective propaganda tool and 
eventually threatens to completely elude management by the authorities (Donald et al., 2002b, 
200). 
What is remarkable in this context is the argument by Mark Harrison from the University of 
Westminster in London. Harrison states that despite the degree to which the Chinese 
broadcasting system has been liberalised, television content in China has not become 
significantly more diverse (Harrison, 2002,176). Instead, so Harrison observes, Chinese 
television displays a "surprising uniformity" of programming content (ibid. ). Harrison 
argues that types of Chinese television entertainment are not varied at all, but in fact 
converge, reproducing "the historically-specific and evolving ideologies of what constitutes 
the experience of being nationally Chinese. Therefore, even the very large urban centres of 
Shanghai and Guangzhou do not produce a sufficient amount of local and regional 
programming to compete with the political and cultural hegemony that nationalist ideology 
exercises over the rest of China" (Harrison, 2002,177). Such an assessment stands in stark 
contrast to the argument made by Stefan Kramer that Chinese audiences are increasingly 
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assembling counter-hegemonic discourses from what they are presented with on TV (Kramer, 
2004; 2006). 
The current debates on the situation in the Chinese broadcasting sector and the relevance of 
television drama series in China raise a number of questions that have not been sufficiently 
addressed by past research. It is not clear from previous accounts: 
1. How the tension between market liberalisations and state controls 
actually affects the production and broadcasting of television content; 
2. To what degree the Chinese authorities are truly influencing the 
production and broadcasting of such content; and 
3. What kinds of political messages are disseminated under the present 
conditions. 
By examining the factors that lead to the production of television drama series in China, as 
well as the political content of three such drama series, the analysis provided in Chapters 3 
and 4 will shed light on these issues. 
2.3 The Theory of Discourse 
The theoretical orientation of this research project is derived from a discourse analytical 
approach. In this sense, the present analysis has a similar theoretical foundation as some of 
the studies mentioned above (for instance Rofel, 1995; Geraghty, 1995). However, it differs 
substantially in its methodology, specifically in the way it links the tools of discursive fine- 
analysis to the methodology of visual communication analysis. But before turning to these 
issues, it is necessary to define what the term'discourse' refers to in this dissertation. 
2.3.1 Communication Practices and the Construction of Truth 
For the purpose of this research project, I define discourse as communication practices that 
systematically construct our knowledge of reality, and consequently both the objects and the 
subjects of communication (for a full glossary of terms and their definitions see Figure 8 in 
Chapter 2.7). The author who is arguably most associated with such an interpretation of the 
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term discourse is the French philosopher and sociologist Michel Foucault. The aim of 
Foucault's research was to analyze "regimes of truth" (Potter, 2005,86) and their history, i. e. 
the development, demise and reoccurrence of statements. His main question was: what 
could be said in what way at specific points in time? As Foucault himself wrote in his early 
work (Foucault, 2005,30-31): 
We must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; 
determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its 
correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show 
what other forms of statements it excludes. (... ) The question proper to such an 
analysis might be formulated in this way: what is this specific existence that 
emerges from what is said and nowhere else? 
Foucault originally attempted to map the rules that govern the emergence of such statements, 
as well as the historical ordering of knowledge (Dreyfus et al., 1982,102-103). This 
"archaeological" approach, which Foucault applied to such fields as the history of medicine, 
of psychology, and of the social sciences (Foucault, 2005b), questioned the objectivist position 
on truth. It aimed to uncover mechanism such as classification strategies or theory building 
that Foucault argued created the objects of our social world (Dreyfus et al., 1982,61). Due to 
the assumption that such practices were based on overarching regularities, authors such as 
Dreyfus and Rabinow identify Foucault's early work with the structuralist paradigm of that 
period and argue that Foucault's early conception of discourse was caught in the same 
ontological dilemmas that he had originally set out to solve (Dreyfus eta!., 1982,16-17). It 
was not until Foucault's later analyses of power relations that he was able to leave these 
problems behind. Foucault's works on disciplinary and confessional technologies (Foucault, 
1990 & 1995) focus no longer solely on the "objects" of discourse but instead bring the 
"subjects" back to the fore: In these later "genealogical" works, Foucault explicitly questions 
the researcher's role in the creation of knowledge, and hence of power relations; this marks a 
shift from the idea that historical rules govern communication to the realization that social 
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practices construct (and in turn are being constructed by) discourse (Dreyfus et ä!., l982,118- 
119 & 199). David Howarth (2000,72) from the University of Essex explains: 
Genealogy is thus explicitly concerned with the centrality of power and 
domination in the constitution of discourse, identities and institutions and 
involves the adoption of a critical ethos towards them (... ). 
Through this approach Foucault proved how specific opinions came to be formed and 
preserved as what is today commonly called the hegemonic discourse, that is as the 
dominant viewpoint(s) throughout society, kept stable by political power dynamics 
(MacDonald, 2003,32). 
Today, the analysis of discourses is a well-established method in the social sciences. It is, as 
the German discourse analyst Siegfried Jäger points out, a method that is not only capable of 
revealing "with what means and for what'truths' acceptance is created within a population; 
what is to be considered normal and abnormal; what can be said (and done), and what 
cannot" (Jäger, 2004,223; author's translation), but also an approach that "(... ) offers clues to 
the ideological assessment concerning, for example, the fundamental understanding of 
society, the internalised generic conception of man, positions on new technology, ecological 
questions, expectations of future developments, questions of human existence, perceptions of 
general normality and truth, etc" (Jäger, 2004,184; author's translation). The analysis of 
discourses is, therefore, not primarily concerned with hermeneutic questions such as "what 
is being said in what is said? " or linguistic problems such as "according to what rules has a 
particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other 
similar statements be made? " (Foucault, 2005a, 30). It is instead the analysis of 
communication practices that systematically form the subjects and objects of which they 
speak (Dreyfus et al., 1982,109 & 203; Howarth, 2000,82-83; Jäger, 2004,116), and this is the 
definition of discourse analysis that forms the basis of the present research project. In this 
sense, the term 'discourse' is regarded as a constructivist concept. 
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2.3.11 The Anglo-Saxon Tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis 
Such a constructivist interpretation of discourse is essentially grounded in continental 
European usages of the term, which often clash with the Anglo-Saxon understanding of the 
word. This becomes particularly clear when considering the work of researchers in the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), such as Lilie Chouliaraki 
(Chouliaraki et al., 1999), Teun van Dijk (1993), Norman Fairclough (1995), or Myra 
McDonald (2003) 76 Such CDA analyses certainly have their merits: for instance, the British 
linguist Norman Fairclough demonstrates skilfully how the use of certain analytical tools can 
uncover ideological positions shaped by rhetoric and linguistic devices (see in particular his 
analysis of liberal ideology in the British "enterprise discourse" in various political speeches 
and promotion texts of the 1980s; Fairclough, 1995,112-129). However, while CDA authors 
such as Fairclough share the Foucauldian view that discourse reflects and reinforces power 
relations across society, and that this "interconnectedness of things" needs to be made 
"visible" (and then criticised; hence the use of the term "critical" in "Critical Discourse 
Analysis"; ibid., 36), they do not attribute the same constructivist power to discourse as 
German discourse analysts such as Jürgen Link or Siegfried Jäger do (Jäger, 2004,111-112). 
Even though Fairclough argues that language is not only "socially shaped", but "also socially 
shaping, or constitutive", and that language use "is always simultaneously constitutive of (i) 
social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and belief" (ibid., 131), he 
nonetheless seems to be arguing at the same time that there are different types of knowledge 
(ibid., 44): On the one hand "beliefs, values, ideologies" (in a sense, types of false knowledge), 
and on the other hand "knowledge properly so called" (what one might view as true 
1° It should be noted that despite the overarching similarities of CDA approaches, there are also some differences. 
For instance, as Greg Philo explains in his comparison of van Dljk's and Fairclough's work (Philo, 2006), van 
Dijk's approach to CDA examines a wider variety of structural Issues (text layout, headlines, graphic 
arrangements, etc. ) and also places more emphasis on quantitative methods of analysis. Also, while authors such 
as Fairclough and Chouliarakl try to link their theoretical work to post-modem cultural critiques (Chouliaraki at al., 
1999,79 & 89-93), van Dijk criticizes post-modernism as esoteric and tries to exclude it from his own research 
agenda (van Dijk, 1995). Finally, van Dijk's Interpretation of the term "Ideology" is purely functional and 
consequently stands in stark contrast to normative usages of the word in other CDA approaches (2003,24); it is 
therefore much closer to the semiotic definition of ideology used In this research project (see Section 2.4. ii). 
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knowledge). The latter includes "judgements of truth and falsity", such as required "when 
faced with issues such as war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia" (ibid., 19), but also inferences about 
the true state of the world, such as the knowledge "that there is some identifiable door which 
is closed when some speaker asks some addressee to 'open the door'" (ibid., 31). In this sense, 
Fairclough distances himself somewhat from the Foucauldian concept which understands 
discourse as the construction of all truth, and argues instead that there is such a thing as false 
truth that has been pulled over the actual truth by certain interest groups to promote their 
power interests; to this end he introduces the Marxist concept of ideology to his theory 
(signifying precisely such false truths), hoping that it will shift the focus away from the 
Foucauldian institutions of power and instead to the struggle of different classes who are 
allegedly vying for ideological dominance over society (ibid., 17; for a similar use of the term 
ideology in CDA see MacDonald, 2003,36). I shall not follow the CDA interpretation of the 
term ideology in this project, seeing as the introduction of such a term to discourse analysis 
threatens to obscure the notion that all communication practices continuously construct all of 
our knowledge, and hence all of reality. This constructivist aspect of discourse is essential: In 
the interpretation used in this thesis, discourse is not merely, as some researchers put it, the 
"socially constructed knowledge of (some aspect of) reality" (Kress et al., 2001,4) or a system 
of communicative practices that "help to construct specific frameworks of thinking" 
(MacDonald, 2003,1), it is not a reflection, mirror, or representation of reality, but its primary 
constitutive (Jäger, 2004,23). 17 
Another problem with CDA approaches is that they focus mostly on written or spoken texts. 
As Greg Philo from the Glasgow University Media Group criticizes, CDA researchers 
primarily produce "text only" analyses (2007,185). This becomes clear when considering 
17 There has been considerable debate between constructivist (or'relativist') analysts and objectivist (or'realist') 
researchers concerning the advantages and drawbacks of each approach to science. I do not wish to go into 
these debates here. The realist point of view is presented by Sokal at al., 2003,49-95, for a relativist position see 
Edwards at aL, 1995. Suffice to say that the discourse analytical approach adopted in this thesis agrees with the 
epistemological and ontological implications of relativist theories while at the same time not condoning moral 
relativism. 
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Fairclough's definition of discourse, which refers both to "language use conceived as social 
practice" and a "way of signifying experience from a particular perspective"; the term 
discourse practice then means "the production, distribution and consumption of a text", i. e. 
of "the written or spoken language produced in a discursive event" (1995,135). Essentially, 
this definition narrows the term discourse down to speech acts and written documents, 
while ignoring other communication practices (such as communication through images or 
music; van Dijk, 1993,264). Although CDA researchers point out that their framework also 
accounts for other forms of communication than merely language (i. e. the "design" of 
advertisements or the usage of images; Chouliaraki et al., 1999,10), the interaction of these 
different discursive modes are not made explicit. A consequence is that in some cases 
researchers overlook the importance of the visual and offer interpretations of discourse that 
are not plausible. An example is Fairclough and Chouliaraki's analysis of a Christmas 
advertisement for a charity organization (ibid., 10-15). Although the researchers point out 
that the use of a photograph and the particular design of the ad are relevant, their analysis 
focuses on linguistic issues, primarily the tag-line underneath the photo, which reads: "We 
could try to guilt trip you" (ibid. ). The author's then take this declaration, along with the 
written explanation beneath it, at face-value and argue that the advertisers are criticizing 
guilt-tripping charity advertisements produced for the Christmas holidays as a form of 
commercialization that the institution itself does not condone. What the researchers fail to 
see is that the catch-phrase and the explanatory paragraph below it work in combination 
with the image: a close-up, frontal photo of a young man, looking straight into the camera, 
with a slightly sad look in his eyes. The effect is that the advertisement indeed does "guilt- 
trip" the reader, but attempts to justify this attempt through a rhetoric device. Instead of 
questioning the dynamics of this advertisement, the researchers argue that the language-use 
is a counter-hegemonic act of re-assembling discourse in order to contest the logic of 
contemporary capitalist society. 
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This questionable interpretation results on one hand from the purely text-based analytical 
focus of CDA. On the other hand, it is grounded in an inherent bias to support the struggle 
of marginalized groups against the alleged dominance of capitalism and (late) modernity 
(ibid., 93). In the above example, the author's do not consider that the advertisement may be 
implicitly reinforcing power relations rather than battling them, precisely because they 
regard the social organization responsible for the poster as inherently "good". In this sense, 
CDA is more than a scientific approach, it is a political project, or as van Dijk writes, the 
work of critical discourse analysts "is admittedly and ultimately political" (1993,252). As 
such, CDA makes a number of assumptions and claims that are not unproblematic. First, its 
supporters argue that the researcher can (and should) take a normative position on the issues 
he or she analyses; in other words, the discourse analyst is in a position to evaluate which 
discourses are good and which are bad (Chouliaraki, 1999,4 & 136). Second, CDA authors 
make a choice concerning the value system they believes should be endorsed. In the words of 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (ibid., 8): "CDA is a matter of democracy in the sense that its aim 
is to bring into democratic control aspects of the contemporary social use of language which 
are currently outside democratic control... ". Not only do the author's fail to specify what 
they mean by "democracy" (and apparently they see no contradiction between the CDA 
claim to critically question social control through power relations and the simultaneous 
attempt to bring social relations under "democratic control"; ibid. ), they furthermore offer no 
explanation of how the CDA researcher is able to assure that his emancipatory project is not 
part of precisely the economic and political domination it is claiming to fight. Foucault 
himself criticized such humanist claims to absolute truths precisely for this reason: "the 
belief that one is resisting repression, whether by self-knowledge or by speaking the truth, 
supports domination, for it hides the real working of power" (Dreyfus et al., 1982,169). Put in 
other words, the political project of CDA may well cover up and reinforce the very practices 
it is trying to unveil. 
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2.3.111 The Post Marxist Approach to Discourse Analysis 
Aside from CDA researchers, other linguists and social scientists have also developed 
approaches to discourse analysis, which in some cases differ substantially from the central 
CDA ideas. Particularly Post-Marxist authors such as David Howarth from the University of 
Essex (2000,99) distances themselves from the argument that discourse is defined primarily 
by the class struggle of late-modem capitalism. Howarth, for instance, acknowledges the 
contribution of Marxism as a critical social science approach, but also discusses how Marxist 
thought nonetheless failed to give discourse analysis a broader applicability to social 
phenomena due to its recourse to overarching structural determinants such as economic 
forces (ibid. ). To counter these problems, Howarth introduces discourse interpretations by 
authors such as Laclau and Mouffe, which he views as the pinnacle of the discourse project: 
He argues that Laclau and Mouffe not only reaffirm the constructivist notion of discourse 
(ibid., 104), but also widen the range of materials that lend themselves to discourse analysis 
(ibid., 140). Methodologically speaking, the present approach therefore shares Howarth's 
premises (ibid. ): 
Discourse analysts (.. ) gather primary information from a range of possible 
sources, which include surveys of newspapers, official reports, 'unofficial' 
documents such as pamphlets, organizational minutes and agendas, personal 
biographies and media representations such as television documentaries and 
films. They also supplement these more narrowly textual modes of 
investigation by making use of in-depth interviews and ethnographic forms of 
investigation such as participation-observation, and by investigating the 
structural features of the contexts that limit, but do not determine, social and 
political possibilities. 18 
In addition, Howarth argues that Post-Marxist discourse analysis also accounts for issues 
such as resistance and conflict without having to rely on distinctions of class. Such problems 
are instead treated by the Laclauian discourse theory as a result of discursive shifts that 
prevent social groups from realizing their identity. When identities are attacked, social 
tB Howarth nonetheless regards all of these media as "text" (ibid., 10); a view that I argue obscures the various 
dynamics of visual and acoustic communication. An alternative approach to such media is provided in Chapter 2.4. 
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agents are compelled to act. In this sense, the work of Post-Marxist authors suffers from an 
overemphasis on social struggle similar to the one inherent to CDA. Such a focus 
presupposes that social relations are primarily characterized by constant antagonistic 
struggles for domination, and motivated by conscious efforts of social actors to assert their 
discursive position. As Dreyfus and Rabinow show (1983,169 & 186-187), such an 
understanding of social interaction runs contrary to Foucault's vision of power, knowledge, 
and discourse. For this reason the approach introduced in this thesis does not attempt to 
trace forms of contestation in popular Chinese media discourses, but instead focuses on 
social practices that make certain interpretations of concepts such as security or nationality 
seem "normal". The theoretical axioms behind this reasoning are that: 
1) although all social interaction is governed by power, the actual mesh of 
power relations is not consciously motivated by certain classes or 
groups, but instead possesses its own logic, based on wider social 
practices; 
2) while subjects construct discourse, discourse in turn constructs both its 
objects and its subjects. 
In order to analyse the normalizing effects that mass communication has on political 
discourse and at the same time retain the original radically constructivist concept of 
discourse proposed by Michel Foucault, my approach rejects various concepts used in other 
forms of discourse analysis, such as the Marxist notion of ideology, the cultural studies focus 
on representation and mis-representation of an objective truth, the view that all social 
practices should be equated with "text", or the Post-Marxist premise that the defining 
elements of discourse are struggle and antagonism. Instead, the analytical approach used for 
this project combines the general theoretical framework of Foucauldian discourse analysis as 
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summarized by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) with the methodological toolbox of the German 
critical discourse analyst Siegfried Jäger (2004). 19 
2.3. iv Discourse and the Building Blocks of Reality 
If we accept the premise that discourse is, as Jäger writes, "the flow of knowledge through 
time" (Jäger, 2004,129; author's translation), established and reinforced through 
communication practices, then this leads to two questions: first, what does this "knowledge 
flow" encompasses (i. e. what is it constructed from)? And second, what factors define its 
flow (i. e. how is it constructed)? The fundamental building blocks of discourse are, to use 
Jäger's terminology, the discourse strand, the discourse fragment, and the discourse layer. 
The term discourse strand refers to specific themes or topics (ibid., 160-163). Allow me to 
give an example: the topic of globalization is a discourse strand; it brings together all 
knowledge concerning the concept of globalization, thereby creating the'truth' of what 
globalization is. The various discourse strands do not exist separate from each other, but are 
interwoven: for example, the globalization strand intersects with strands such as migration, 
crime, law enforcement, labour, gender, ethnicity, religion, and many others. In this sense, 
what we hold to be true about globalization may also influence what we hold to be true 
about the nature of crime, and in turn may be influenced by those conceptions. All discourse 
strands together form the discourse in its entirety, i. e. everything that is known and believed 
to be true throughout society. 
Discourse strands consist of yet smaller building blocks, the discourse fragments (ibid., 166- 
168): The term'fragment' refers to statements, or claims of truth, concerning a discursive 
theme, and they can be made both consciously and unconsciously. To again give an example, 
19 This is not to say that the present research approach stands in stark opposition to the approaches developed 
by CDA researchers or discourse analysts such as Fairclough, van Dijk, or Howarth. As Howarth himself states, 
discourse analysis needs to be an open approach: "... Instead of applying theory mechanically to empirical objects, 
or testing theories against empirical reality, discourse theorists argue for the articulation and modification of 
concepts and logics in each particular research context" (Howarth, 2000,139). 
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within the discourse strand of globalization, the statement globalization brings the people of the 
world closer together is just as much a discourse fragment as the statement globalization has 
brought about the Clash of Civilizations, or because of globalization, immigrants are taking away our 
jobs. From a discourse analytical perspective, any such statement made concerning 
globalization is part of that particular discourse strand, consequently contributing to the 
construction of the 'truth' about globalization. In addition, any notion that has not been 
voiced concerning globalization is not part of that discourse strand. Such hypothetical 
statements would exist outside of discourse, denying us their use in our communication 
practices, which in discourse terms means that they do not exist at all. 
As mentioned above (2.3. i), the discourse fragments that are most widely accepted 
throughout society are said to be part of the hegemonic discourse (i. e. the dominant world 
view throughout society, held in place by power dynamics). Statements that diverge from 
this mainstream view of the world are said to be part of a counter-hegemonic discourse (a 
worldview that challenges the dominant interpretation of truth). For example, we could say 
that the neoliberal statement open markets benefit society is part of the hegemonic globalization 
discourse, whereas the statement globalization marginalises certain social groups is associated 
with the counter-hegemonic discourse on globalization (of course such relations may change, 
and some might argue that the later of the above statements is actually becoming more of a 
hegemonic than a counter-hegemonic one). The diverse array of discourse fragments that we 
each use in our communication practices define our individual perception of what is true, i. e. 
our discursive position (ibid., 163). 
Finally, discourse has various layers, meaning that communication practices can take place 
in different settings (ibid., 163-165). Allow me to provide another example: discussions 
concerning globalization produce certain statements in an academic setting, but other 
statements in the media, and yet other statements in the privacy of our homes. In this sense, 
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the discourse strand of globalization has an academic layer, a media layer, a domestic layer, 
and many more. Just like the various discourse strands interact with each other, so do the 
discourse layers influence one another: for instance, the discourse fragment that globalization 
brings about the Clash of Civilization can be said to have originated in the academic discourse 
layer (with the publication of Samuel Huntington's now famous book "The Clash of 
Civilizations"; Huntington, 1996), but to now have made its way into all other layers of the 
discourse strand on globalization (for example by being referenced in the media, or possibly 
in a private dinner conversation, whether consciously or unconsciously). 
2.3. v 'Synchronic' vs. 'Diachronic' Discourse Analysis 
Returning to Jäger's imagery of viewing discourse as the flow of knowledge through time, 
we can generally differentiate between two different types of discourse analysis. The first is 
what Jäger refers to as synchronic sectional examination of a discourse strand (Jäger, 2004, 
171). This is the analysis of the statements that are made concerning a specific topic at one 
point in time. Jäger himself offers a comprehensive example of how bio-political issues were 
discussed in Germany's most popular tabloid newspaper, the BILD, in the year 1994 (ibid., 
321-363). 
The second method of analysis is the so-called diachronic discourse analysis in which 
individual sections of the discourse strand are compared over time (ibid., 171). This was 
Foucault's approach: he focused not only on what was said at different points in history, but 
also on who could make such historical statements, from what institutional position they 
were made, what social context gave rise to their formulation, and consequently how these 
conditions changed over time. In his early work, Foucault gives the example of medical 
diagnostic statements in western society (Foucault, 2005,55-60): He describes how "medical 
statements cannot come from anybody" and how only a person who can claim to have the 
power to overcome suffering and death (i. e. a doctor) may offer advice or treatment. 
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Foucault continues to show how, on the one hand, the institutional setting of the hospital 
(with its laboratories and libraries) and on the other hand the role of the medical practitioner 
(along with his training and the established methods of diagnostics and treatment he makes 
use of) define the array of statements he can make; Foucault then goes on to describe how 
such statements along with their socio-historical background changed throughout the 18th 
and 19th century (ibid. ). A similarly diachronic approach characterizes Foucault's later work, 
in which he traces the changes in disciplinary techniques (Foucault, 1995) and of conceptions 
of sexuality since the 17th century (Foucault, 1990). 
A historically diachronic analysis of discourse is a challenging project that should only be 
conducted by researchers with substantial resources and an extended time frame; as Jäger 
points out, it is not a feasible undertaking for a single research thesis (Jäger, 2004,188). 1 will 
therefore focus on a synchronic analysis of discourse, i. e. on what is being said in specific 
popular television programmes in China at a specific time. For this purpose I have chosen 
television series that were broadcasted during the random time interval of the years 2003 to 
2005 (see also Section 2.6. i). 
2.3. vi A Methodology of Critical Discourse Fine-Analysis 
In order to conduct a critical discourse analysis, or what Jäger refers to as "discursive fine- 
analysis" (ibid., 175; meaning: a detailed analyses of the discourse fragments represented in 
individual media products, such as newspaper articles, television dramas, etc. ), a 
comprehensive methodological framework is required. But before turning to the tools that 
discourse analysts apply, a look at the analytical questions that they most commonly address 
is in order. Generally speaking, the central research questions of critical discourse analysis 
are (ibid., 185): 
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1. What is the message of the product (the motives and intentions behind 
the product)? 
2. Who is the author or producer of the statements made in the product (i. e. 
who is speaking)? 
3. What are the linguistic and rhetorical methods used by this author? 
4. Who is the target audience? 
5. What change of world views is the product supposed to bring about? 
Are the discourse fragments aimed at reaffirming old truths (i. e. are they 
part of the hegemonic discourse) or are they meant to introduce new 
truths (i. e. are they part of the counter-hegemonic discourse)? 
6. What is the social context in which the product has been created? 
7. How does the text refer to or make use of political, economical, historical 
or cultural events (so called 'discursive events')? 
To answer these questions Jäger suggests conducting a fine-analysis of the particular 
products. He offers the following open five-step-framework of analytical methods (ibid., 175): 
1. Analysis of the institutional context: This includes defining the medium 
and the category of the product, the author(s) and any possible events 
which the product refers to, but also what could be called the production 
process. Jäger gives the example of news articles, which should be 
defined according to the newspaper that they are published in (along 
with information concerning the editorial staff, general political position 
of the paper, its affiliation with other organizations, production 
expenditures and general finances, target audiences, etc. ), the genre of the 
article (commentary, news, report, etc. ), but also according to its technical 
quality (paper, type set, readability, number of pages, etc.; ibid. ). 
2. Analysis of the 'text surface': This stage of analysis is concerned with 
graphical configurations of the product (in the case of a newspaper article 
this may include the analysis of photos, graphics, headlines, etc. ), with its 
structure (paragraphs, sections, subsections, etc. ), and with the particular 
topics discussed. At this stage it may be useful to prepare the product for 
further analysis by numbering the lines of the text, summarizing the 
content, marking structural segments according to their function and 
meaning, and so on (ibid. ). 
3. Analysis of linguistic and rhetoric tools: This is the actual core of a fine- 
analysis. It includes the examination of arguments, of the products logical 
composition, of implications, conclusions, allusions, metaphors, idioms, 
proverbs, etc. It also focuses on the general style of the product, on 
protagonists and antagonists, on vocabulary (nouns, adjectives, verbs, 
adverbs, pronouns, etc. ), on collective symbols as well as on references 
and intertextuality. The preparation of this analytical phase is probably 
the most elaborate work step in a discourse analysis. Jäger shows what 
66 
detail is required in dissecting a qualitative interview (ibid., 275-328): 
Every statement has to be categorised according to content and context, 
communication strategies need to be identified, and idioms classified. In 
his example (an interview with a German couple conducted in 1992, 
analysed for racist statements), Jäger is able to identify over one hundred 
different racially charged idioms. He analyses twenty-six separate 
narrative strategies (such as a generalization about gangs of Turkish 
immigrants or about Jewish money lenders) and goes on to show how the 
interviewees use pronouns ("I", "we", "they") to differentiate between 
themselves and others, thereby avoiding direct references to specific 
ethnic groups ("we Germans", "those Turks", etc. ). Jäger's analysis also 
focuses on metaphors, collective symbols and syntactic strategies used by 
the interviewees (such as the strategy of giving information, of appealing 
to the interviewer, of declaring an opinion, etc. ). It may be useful to apply 
some quantitative methods during this section of the analysis, for 
example computer searches for keywords. This may "make it possible to 
draw conclusions concerning the emphasis on topics or the shifting of 
discourses", but should, according to Jäger, never replace the qualitative 
dimension of the analysis (ibid., 197). 
4. Analysis of content and discursive positions: As a fourth step, the 
product needs to be analysed for discursive positions, such as the general 
worldview expressed by the author(s) as well as the text-immanent 
understanding of such concepts as politics, society, technology, history, 
future, gender, race, etc. (ibid., 175). 
5. Interpretation: After the above four analytical steps have been completed, 
an actual coherent description and interpretation of the product can be 
composed. The different elements and results of the fine-analysis need to 
be related to each other, the discourse analytical questions cited at the 
beginning of this section have to be addressed, and a final conclusion 
needs to be drawn. As a sample conclusion I would like to cite from the 
interpretation of the bio-political discourse in the German BILD 
newspaper as conducted by Jäger and a group of other German discourse 
researchers: "The bio-political discourse contributes to keeping the reader 
small and faint. One is supposed to be scared, not think on one's own. In 
this way, it is not only possible to describe a beautiful passing-away, but 
also to show gruesome deaths due to accidents or cancer in all their 
harshness. On the one hand, BILD fuels fears; on the other hand, it puts 
the cruelty of death into perspective. That way, BILD can praise peaceful 
death and at the same time frighten readers with the horrors of mistaken 
organ transplants from patients in suspended animation" (ibid., 361; 
author's translation). 
These methods need not all be applied to a single discourse analytical project. Jäger calls this 
set of methods a "toolbox" and points out that researchers should choose freely the 
instruments they find most useful depending on their particular research question (ibid., 
159). 
67 
2.3. vil Analysing Political Discourse Strands 
Since this research project is concerned with the analysis of political discourse, it is first 
necessary to clarify what the term'political discourse' refers to, and then define which 
political discourses shall be analysed here. By political discourse I mean any discourse strand 
that deals with any of the classical issues of politics, i. e. the "art and science of government" 
(McLean et al., 2003,423), or more precisely "regularities concerning the inner order and the 
actual functioning of systems of governance" in respect to their form (polity), procedures 
(politics), and results (policies; Schmidt, 1995,907; author's translation). 
Traditionally, the main organization relevant in politics is the state (McLean et al., 2003,512; 
Zürn, 1998,37). The term state originally signifies a condition of political order under which 
a group of persons are bound to a territorial region and controlled by sovereign rule (Evans 
et al., 1998,512; Schmidt, 1995,896). According to the German political scientist Michael ZUrn, 
states have three characteristics (Ztirn, 1998,37-38): a state possesses a legitimate monopoly 
of force that gives it the autonomy to acquire resources across a territory; it follows goals in 
order to achieve a certain degree of public welfare; and it is recognised by other states (for 
similar conceptions of the state in Anglo-Saxon political science literature, see Evans et al., 
1998,512 and McLean et al., 2003,512). 
In this sense, the state is traditionally regarded as the main institution that regulates society. 
The term governance refers to the measures that the state or other institutions adopts in 
order to do so (Evans et al., 1998,209; Ztürn, 1998,35-40) 20 More recently, the question has 
been posed whether the institution of the state is actually the best entity to fulfil this 
governance function (ZÜrn, 1998,165-176). Authors such as Peter Taylor (1996) criticize that 
the concept of territoriality that is associated with statehood is outdated. Also, as Susan 
20 The modem concept of governance has its origins in German public administration literature and system theory; 
the British political scientist Bob Jessop (1998) gives an overview of these roots and of the various German 
researchers, such as Grabher, Luhmann, Messner, Scharpf, or Wilke, who have influenced the Anglo-Saxon 
understanding of the word. 
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Strange's analysis of the world economy shows, the state as a political entity is increasingly 
being replaced by new power dynamics (1996,91-179). Similarly, Andrew Gamble (2000,114) 
writes that due to the rising complexity of political issues and the increased proneness of 
states to yield policy failures, the institution of the state today primarily plays "an enabling 
rather than a planning" role in social regulatory activities. Gamble argues that the state's task 
is now mostly to support "markets and networks or corporate hierarchies in governing the 
economy, rather than to seek to impose its own pattern or its own agenda" (ibid. ). 
Such considerations have lead to a broader understanding of the term governance, which 
"embraces governmental institutions, but (.. ) also covers more informal regulatory 
mechanisms which exist in the absence of central authority" (Evans et al., 1998,209). Andrew 
Gamble shows in his analysis of governance in the European Union (2006,42-44) that the 
concept can be understood either in a narrow, territorial sense (i. e. mostly referring to the 
regulatory activities of the nation state and its institutions) or in the broader sense of multi- 
level network governance, meaning: "steering mechanisms that involve networks, markets 
and other decentralized forms of co-ordination across legal jurisdictions and administrative 
boundaries" (ibid., 43). Wider interpretations of governance often turn towards civil society 
and its relation to the state, arguing that civil agents can regulate aspects of society apart 
from, against, in support of, in dialogue with, in partnership with, or beyond the state 
(Chambers et al., 2008,364). Gerry Stokes, former director of the British Economic and Social 
Research Council's Local Governance Research Programme, writes that "governance is about 
a change in the long-standing balance between the state and civil society" (1998,21). He 
describes how such a change can blur the distinction between the public and the private 
sectors in society (ibid., 17). Consequently, Stokes argues, the increased flexibility of non- 
state governance is accompanied by legitimacy and accountability deficits, possible blame 
avoidance or scapegoating, potential unintended outcomes, and a continued risk of 
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governance failure (ibid., 19). Similar concerns are raised by Bob Jessop from Lancaster 
University (1998,38-42), who further points out that many governance shortcomings are not 
actually consequences of state failure, but instead have their roots in the logic of modern 
capitalism (1997,573-577). To counter such tendencies, Jessop suggests a stronger role for 
governmental institutions, which he believes should create a non-hierarchical framework for 
regulatory activities, or in his words: "meta-governance" (ibid., 575). The state, so the 
argument goes, should take responsibility for overarching political regulation and should 
coordinate the networks and agents involved in acts of governance (Jessop, 1998,42-43). 
Whichever actual form mechanisms for steering society take, they generally function through 
the use of power. The term stems from the Latin noun potentia and signifies an ability, faculty, 
or potential (Brunner, 2004,836). This notion of capability is reflected in the definition of 
power by sociologist Max Weber, who refers to power as "any chance of enforcing one's own 
will in a social relationship, even against reluctance, regardless of what that chance may be 
based on" (Weber, 1980,28; author's translation; this definition is essentially also used by 
Strange, 1996,17 and 25). In short, power describes the ability to prevail, and in the present 
context refers to the ability of public and private agents to achieve the goals of governance. 
Governance generally follows four such goals (ZÜrn, 1998,41-42). The first of these goals is 
to provide security for the population of a specific territory (ibid., 41; Cemy, 1996,123; 
Stoker, 1998,17; Strange, 19%, 84); in Europe this goal dates back to the time of the feudal 
system, and its achievement is often regarded as the minimal activity required of the state 
(McLean et al., 2003,515; Aim, 1998,40-44). The need for security traditionally justifies the 
use of force both within a territory in order to secure stability and protect the population 
against crime (inner security), as well as outside of that territory to protect it against foreign 
aggression (outer security). ZtOrn shows that it was this requirement for security which made 
the rise of European territorial states in the 12th and 130, century possible and, paradoxically, 
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caused the continuous increase in the need for outer security over the centuries due to states' 
growing ambitions for territorial expansion (ibid., for another critique of states' inherent 
inclination to use force in order to secure their sovereign territory see Giddens, 1994,231). 
A second objective of governance is the goal of welfare (Cerny 1996,128; Marshall, 1975,11- 
12; Zürn, 1998,48-54): In the modern state, welfare not only implies economic success, i. e. 
high levels of national productivity, maximum employment, optimal resource-allocation and 
production-distribution as well as economic growth; it also includes provisions in such areas 
as education, health and environmental protection. 
The third goal of governance is that of creating and maintaining national identity (McLean et 
al., 2003,515; Zürn, 1998,44-46): This goal is relevant in order to assure that the citizens of a 
state associate themselves with the entity that governs their society, and is achieved by 
recourse to a collective cultural, historical or ethnical background. 
A fourth goal of governance is legitimacy (McLean et al., 2003,515; Stoker, 1998,20-21; Zürn, 
1998,46-48). Some authors, such as Michael Zürn, understand legitimacy as essentially the 
western liberal-democratic rights of citizenship and participation that have come to play a 
central role in democratic welfare states (Zürn, 1998,46-48). Such a notion of legitimacy is 
not unproblematic. To narrow down legitimacy to a concern of Western democratic welfare 
states, and to give it an entirely normative meaning (i. e. asking whether or not governance is 
good governance), neglects the fact that political institutions in general need to justify their 
political activities (McLean et al., 2003,305-306). This idea is reflected in Max Weber's use of 
the term legitimacy, which I shall be using here (Weber, 1980,122-176): For Weber, the 
central question of legitimacy was functional in nature, not normative; he asked how a 
sovereign justified the claim for authority, not whether or not that claim was valid. For 
example, a system of governance can be justified through certain traditions, through the 
charismatic qualities of a leader, or by adopting a certain legal system (ibid. ). What is 
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important to realise is that political institutions, such as states, all aim at justifying their 
existence and their activities. This is acknowledged by Philip Cerny when he writes that the 
essence of the state "lies in the fact that sovereign and autonomous political institutions are 
capable of deriving legitimacy from a distinct citizenry located in a defined territory" (1996, 
123; for a similar understanding of the term legitimacy see also McLean et al., 2003,305-306; 
Stokes, 1998,20; and Strange, 1996,71-72). 
The present analysis of political discourses in Chinese television dramas takes as its starting 
point the discourse strands on governance and its four goals (security, welfare, identity and 
legitimacy). For reasons of feasibility, the complexity was reduced by selecting only two of 
these strands for detailed fine-analysis: The discourse on governance, and that on the first 
goal of governance, i. e. security. However, even though the analysis presented in Chapters 
4.2,4.3, and 4.4 solely focuses on these two political topics, the coding procedure used to 
identify the discourse strands presented in the respective drama series nonetheless used 
categories devised from all of the discourse strands discussed above (for an explanation of 
how the coding categories were devised see section 2.6. ii). This was done in order to assure 
that the possible interaction of different discourse strands that Jäger describes (2004,161) is 
not missed in the analysis (for instance in cases where the discourse strand on public security 
interacts with the discourse strand on national identity). 
2.4 The Theory of Visual Communication 
The methodological practices described so far offer many suggestions on how to analyse 
discourse, but broad approaches such as the one offered by Jäger are mostly concerned with 
language and its social setting. The analysis of visual components is rarely featured very 
prominently in the works of discourse researchers (for example, Jäger's analysis of the BILD 
newspaper, a tabloid which makes substantial use of photos and montages, hardly touches 
on the importance of visual images at all, 2004,329-263). This is quite surprising, considering 
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that a number of very useful tools have been developed in order to study the meaning of 
images. The German political scientist Marion Müller, for example, has summarised the most 
common methods in her book "Basics of Visual Communication"21 In her own research, 
Müller explores, among other things, how the BILD newspaper uses photos of deceased in 
different contexts (2003,84-85): depending on whether the person shown is depicted as a 
victim or as a perpetrator, the paper shows either a frontal shot (in order to make the reader 
identify with the deceased) or a profile shot (to create a distance between the viewer and the 
depicted person). 
Although Müller does not use the term 'discourse' in her work, her methodological approach 
nonetheless bears a certain similarity to that of discourse specialists such as Jäger, and some 
of her analyses (for instance her examination of how former German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischers alleged involvement in violent demonstrations during the 1970s was 
visually reworked in 2001 by the conservative German press and the opposition party to 
associate Fischer's party with violence and chaos) could be called discourse analyses (ibid., 
88-91). The proximity to discourse analytical approaches is also apparent in other visual 
analyses, for instance in Gombrich's research on how blurred images are used to suggest that 
their content is particularly 'true' (1980). I therefore argue that such concepts of images as a 
type of communication, as well as the notion that images signify meaning which can be 
tested and analysed, can be quite readily integrated into the framework of discursive fine 
analyses which I have described above. 
2.4.1 Understanding Images as Purveyors of Meaning 
Marion Miiller's concept of the image is essentially this: that an image constitutes a visual 
representation of a material thing and that this material image is intricately linked to a 
mental image of that material thing (2003,20-25). This idea that images represent certain 
21 For more examples on the political analysis of images see Hoffman (1999), Muller (1999), and Warnke (1994). 
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things or ideas bears a certain resemblance to semiotic approaches. For practical reasons, 
Müller herself abandons the rather technical and often abstract notions that many 
semioticians hold concerning visual communication (ibid., 162), but also concludes that 
semiotic approaches can be fruitful for questions "that deal with mixed forms of 
communication in which audio, verbal and visual processes are intertwined, such as for 
example in the case of film analyses" (ibid., 163; author's translation). Since the present 
analysis focuses precisely on such a multi-dimensional form of communication, it is worth 
considering some of the semiotic ideas that have been developed concerning the question of 
how meaning is purveyed in such communication processes. 
The essential concept in semiotics is that messages are communicated through a series of 
signs, or as Ellen Seiter writes (1992,31): "Semiotics is the study of everything that can be 
used for communication: words, images, traffic signs, flowers, music, medical symptoms, 
and much more. Semiotics studies the way such'signs' communicate and the rules that 
govern their use. " 
One definition of the sign was provided by the French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (for an 
overview of Saussure's life and work see Preucel, 2006,21-43). Saussure, being mainly 
interested in the functioning of language, defined the sign as a "two-sided psychological 
entity" that links a mental concept of a thing, i. e. the 'signified', to a sound pattern, i. e. the 
'signifier' (ibid., 28). In other words, when human beings verbally formulate an expression to 
communicate an idea, we are confronted with a sign. This concept of the sign is not 
unproblematic (Eco, 1979,15; Hoopes, 1991,11): since Saussure was analysing only language, 
he assumed that the relation between signified and signifier had to always be entirely 
arbitrary. This can be observed when various languages employ entirely different terms for 
the same thing, while none of these words in any way resembles the actual thing (for instance 
when water pours from the sky, the English signify such a phenomenon by using the word 
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'rain', while the Germans use the term'Regen', and the French the word 'pluie'; Seiter, 1992, 
14). Based on this observation, Saussure excluded from his analysis all non-verbal impulses 
that could also be used to signify meaning and communicate a message (such as, for example, 
an image of rain), on the other hand he excluded any signals that were not intentionally and 
artificially articulated by human beings for communication purposes, but could also become 
carriers of meaning (for instance, Saussure would not have given any importance to the idea 
that the sound of rain falling on the roof of a house can also signify'rain' to those inside). 
A more comprehensive definition of signs was provided by the American logician and 
pragmatist Charles Peirce, who formulates that a sign is (1991b, 239): 
Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an 
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant 
becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum. 
By using this definition, Peirce establishes a triangle in which the sign (or'referent') is linked 
to the thing it stands for (the 'object') as well as to its interpretation. Note how interpretant 
does not mean interpreter, but rather "that which guarantees the validity of the sign, even in 
the absence of the interpreter" (Eco, 1979,68); this makes it possible to view various different 
denotations or connotations of a sign as interpretants, which then in turn can become signs 
in further chains of communication (ibid. ). 
Peirce definition is fundamentally different from Saussure's, as is explained by the Peirce- 
scholar James Hoopes (1991,11-12): 
While words may be arbitrary in some respect, verbal language is far too 
narrow a field from which to construct a general theory of signs, as becomes 
evident from the arbitrariness posited of the social world by those who 
suppose that it is constituted in language. Peirce's theory, based on an analysis 
of thought rather than language (in the narrow, verbal sense), posits within 
the signifying process not only an object and its sign but also a third element, 
the interpretant, or thought, to which the sign gives rise. 
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Resorting to Peirce's definition now enables us to regard signs as much more than verbal 
expressions. In addition, it assures that the relation between the sign and the object it stands 
for is not understood as random, or as Peirce puts it (1991a, 141): "a sign must have some 
real connection with the thing it signifies. " He himself gives the following example (ibid): 
A weathercock is a sign of the direction of the wind. It would not be so unless 
the wind made it turn round. There is to be such a physical connection 
between every sign and its object. 
Peirce then goes on to classify three different types of signs, depending on their particular 
relationship with the object and the interpretant. Peirce defines these types of signs as 
follows (1991b, 239-240): 
A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which would 
possess the character which renders it significant, even though its object had 
no existence; such as a lead pencil streak as representing a geometrical line. 
An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a 
sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were 
no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it 
as a sign of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but 
there is a hole there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or 
not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign 
if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies 
what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification. 
In other words, the icon bears a resemblance to its object, such as a drawing of a horse 
signifying a horse. An index is the consequence or symptom of its object (and therefore 
requires the presence of its object to become a sign), such as smoke signifying fire, or 
lightning signifying a thunderstorm. Finally, a symbol is a sign that depends on its 
interpretant in order to become a sign, such as a stop sign signifying 'stop' only because 
social conventions has taught people to treat it as such a sign. 
This division of signs into three types may lead some to believe that symbols are the 
arbitrary signs that Saussure was referring to (and possibly interpret them as 'subjective'), 
while understanding indices and icons as objectively real signs that are based on objects in 
the material world (and therefore possibly conclude that they are 'truer' than symbols). 
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However, such a simplification would be misleading, as the Italian novelist and semiotician 
Umberto Eco shows. Eco argues that all signs are part of a social system of rules, or what he 
calls codes. A code defines unambiguously what the content of the sign is. A sign is related 
to content by means of code, and this relation between sign and content is called a sign- 
function (Eco, 1979,191): 
... a sign-function is the correlation 
between an expression and a content based 
on a conventionally established code (a system of correlational rules) and (.. ) 
codes provide the rules that generate sign functions. 
This means that just because a symbol, for instance a word that is not referring to a specific 
physical object (such as freedom or peace), is based on social conventions does not mean that 
it is less real or less true for those who use it (ibid., 62): 
In order to understand the history of Christian theology, it is not necessary to 
know whether a specific actual phenomenon corresponds to the word 
/transubstantiation/ (even though for many people this belief was vitally 
important). But it is necessary to know which cultural unit (what intensionally 
analyzable set of cultural properties) corresponded to the content of that word. 
The semiotic object of a semantics is the content, not the referent, and the 
content has to be defined as a cultural unit (or as a cluster or a system of 
interconnected cultural units). 
Conversely, indices may be referents to physical objects in the material world, but they 
nonetheless carry content in a manner that is similarly based on social conventions: 
The first doctor who discovered a sort of constant relationship between an 
array of red spots on the patient's face and a given disease (measles) made an 
inference: but insofar as this relationship has been made conventional and has 
been registered as such in medical treatises a semiotic convention has been 
established. There is a sign every time a human group decides to use and to 
recognize something as the vehicle of something else. 
Smoke is only a sign of fire to the extent that fire is not actually perceived 
along with the smoke: but smoke can be a sign-vehicle standing for a non- 
visible fire, providing that a social rule has necessarily and usually associated 
smoke with fire. 
As another example Eco explains that the Evening Star in the night sky is only relevant 
because of the code that governs the semiotic event of a person recognizing it as such (ibid., 
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66): the light of the star may be an index denoting "a certain large physical 'object' of a 
spherical form, which travels through space some scores of millions of miles from the earth", 
but to the person seeing that light, it denotes "'a certain' corresponding cultural unit to 
which the speaker refers, and which he has accepted in the way described by the culture in 
which he lives, without having ever experienced the real referent" (ibid. ); in this sense, the 
light in the sky may be the Evening Star to one person, and the Morning Star to someone 
using a different set of cultural units (i. e. a different code): 
We may commonly speak of a thing called /Alpha Centauri/, but we have never 
experienced it. An astronomer has occasionally experienced it with some 
strange apparatus. But we do not know this astronomer. We only know a 
cultural unit communicated to us by means of words, drawings or other 
means. (ibid. ) 
In this sense, even an icon such as an image, i. e. the visual representation of the'real thing', 
is based on a code, and therefore on social conventions (ibid., 199): 
... what matters is not the relationship 
between the image and its object but 
rather that between an image and its content. The content, in this case, is the 
result of a convention, as is the proportional correlation. The elements of 
motivation exist, but they can only work when they have been conventionally 
accepted and coded. 22 
Even though an icon is similar to its object, this does not change the fact that "similitude is 
produced and must be learned" (ibid., 200). 
In order to capture the notion that all signs are socially constructed, Umberto Eco formulates 
his own definition of the sign, and this definition shall be the basis for the analysis provided 
in this thesis (ibid., 16): 
I propose to define as a sign everything that, on the grounds of a previously 
established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something 
else. 
22 What Umberto Eco means by "motivation" is that the use of signs and codes requires human action. He 
explains: "Everybody who wants to know something wants to know it in order to do something. If he claims that he 
wants to know it only in order'to know' and not In order'to do' it means that he wants to know It in order to do 
nothing, which is in fact a surreptitious way of doing something, i. e. leaving the wona dust as it is for as nis 
approach assumes that it ought to be)" (Eco, 1979,29). 
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In addition to the idea that signs have a social dimension, it is important to realise that they 
themselves also possess constructivist power. Eco gives examples of different codes and how 
they structure the reality of those who use them: for example, the fact that the Latin language 
has only one word signifying both "rat" and "mouse", while the English language has two 
words, means that from a semiotic perspective "there exists in English a semantic field 
governing rodents, which is more analytic than its equivalent in Latin, and that therefore for 
the speaker of English there exist two cultural units where for the speaker of Latin there 
exists only one" (ibid., 79). Similarly, we can divide the spectrum of light into various 
sections of different wavelengths, thereby differentiating between various colours; however, 
as Eco shows (ibid., 77-78), Hindu culture combines under one term what in European 
culture would be perceived as red and orange, while Russian culture subdivides the European 
concept of blue into two distinct colours (a light blue and a dark blue). In that sense, people 
with different cultural backgrounds see the same colour spectrum, but experience a different 
reality of colours (i. e. of cultural units). It is this notion that signs have a social dimension 
that leads Eco to the conclusion: "Semiotics is mainly concerned with signs as social force" 
(ibid., 65). It is also this notion that makes it possible to integrate semiotic theory into 
discourse theory. With discourse being communication practices that construct reality, and 
signs being cultural signification units that make up communication practices, it is only 
logical to view signs as the building blocks of discourse. 
2.4.11 How Signs Work within Visual Communication 
In the present analysis, I shall view discourse as consisting of discourse fragments, which in 
turn are composed of a series of signs. Considering the above explanation on signs, and 
particularly Peirce's categorization of signs into icons, indices and symbols, one might now 
assume that the study of visual communication practices such as moving images is primarily 
concerned with the analysis of icons, i. e. of signs that resemble their object. However, this 
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would not fully capture the various dimensions at which a medium such as television 
functions (Seiter, 1992,35): 
The categories symbolic, iconic, and indexical are not mutually exclusive. 
Television images are both iconic and indexical, and programmes often use 
words (symbolic signs) on the screen and the soundtrack. 
The question then is: how do signs compose a complex message such as the one we find in a 
television drama series? The answer is provided on the one hand by Umberto Eco's concepts 
of denotation and connotation, on the other hand by Roland Barthes considerations of how 
these concepts apply to multi-dimensional processes of mass communication. 
First, let me explain what the difference between denotation and connotation is according to 
Umberto Eco's theory of semiotics. Eco gives the example of a particular communication 
process (1979,32-40 & 54-57) in which a machine measures the level of water at a dam (the 
'source') in four intervals and then 'codes' the respective intervals with a combination of two 
letters (AB, BC, CD and AD). The machine (or 'transmitter') then transmits the two-letter 
expression (the 'signal') to a station in the valley (the 'destination'), where an engineer 
interprets the signal (thereby making it a 'sign'). What happens in this example is that the de- 
coding of the sign happens at two levels: first, the sign denotes something; for example, the 
letter combination AB directly stands for 'danger level'. This kind of semiotic relation is 
called a denotation. Second, the denotation 'danger level' in turn stands for something else: 
in this case it signifies an appropriate response for the engineer; i. e., the letter combination 
AB indirectly stands for 'evacuation of water'. This kind of semiotic relation is called a 
connotation. Eco writes (ibid., 55): 
There is a connotative semiotics when there is a semiotics whose expression 
plane is another semiotics. In the above example the content of the former 
signification (along with the units that conveyed it) becomes the expression of 
a further content. Thus the expression AB denotes «danger level), and connotes 
«evacuation». 
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In this sense, connotation is the signification of a signification, or a sign-function within a 
sign-function. Eco explains this as follows (ibid., 56): 
... the 
difference between denotation and connotation is only due to a coding 
convention (... ): once the connotation has been established, the connotation is 
the stable functive of a sign-function of which the underlying functive is 
another sign function. A connotative code, insofar as it relies on a more basic 
one, can be called a subcode. 
The concept of connotation provides one challenge, however, and that is that signs can be 
ambivalent. As Eco shows, one denotation can connote more than one thing, for instance 
'danger level' can signify both 'evacuation' and 'flood' for the engineer (ibid., 56). In this 
particular case, the two connotations are not mutually exclusive, but one can easily think of 
examples in which connotations clash. Allow me to give a hypothetical example: Imagine the 
image of a car. The image denotes a particular automobile, say a powerful off-road vehicle. 
The image of that car may now connote various things: for one person the idea of the car 
may stand for freedom, while for another person it may signify environmental degradation. 
The question then is: Is one connotation more relevant than the other? 
The answer is again provided by the code. One should not mistake the ambivalence of 
connotations with arbitrariness. Connotations are culturally constructed. Allow me to 
provide another hypothetical example: Imagine a Chinese advertisement for cosmetics that 
features a woman with very pale skin; in this particular context, the skin tone connotes 
beauty (and, at one level removed, further connotes prosperity). This connotation is based on 
a code of cultural units, which associates tanned skin with the type of physical outdoor 
labour that peasants and workers perform. Hence this connotation would hold anytime pale 
skin was featured in the promotion of cosmetic products in China. However, if we were 
watching a similar commercial in a Western country, the pale skin tone would connote 
'unhealthyness', since in that culture the code would link the sign of tanned skin to beauty 
and prosperity (based on the association of tanned skin with leisure time for outdoor 
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activity). The different connotations are not arbitrary, but what is required to understand 
them is knowledge of the code that led to their formation (ibid., 72): 
... cultural units are the semiotic postulate required in order to justify the very 
fact that society does equate codes with codes, sign-vehicles with meanings, 
expressions with contents. Unseen but used by the layman, they are not used 
but seen by the semiotics, which is simply the science of this culturally 
performed (if unexpressed) competence. 
This concept of connotation as the socially coded content of a denoted message may lead 
some to assume that the difference between denotation and connotation is in fact the same as 
between objective and subjective signification. However, Eco shows that denotations are just 
as much based on social and cultural conventions as connotations. He gives the example of a 
black pencil line sketching the outlines of a horse (ibid., 193-194): The black pencil line will 
only be recognised as the image of a horse if it adheres to certain conventions. Similarly, Eco 
demonstrates how flawed drawings of rhinos from 18th century Europe had such a cultural 
impact on society at the time that for over a century they would define the'reality' of what 
rhino-skin looked like, even though other more accurate images were soon available (ibid., 
205). One may argue that images only follow cultural conventions in the case of drawings or 
paintings, but that a photo actually represents 'the real thing'. This is also not the case. The 
mere fact that we flatten a three-dimensional experience to two dimensions, place it in the 
rectangular from of the photo (Snyder, 1980,225), but still recognise its denotation, is based 
on a cultural convention, or as Ellen Seiter put is (1992,37): 
Conventional expectations of scale, perspective, camera angle, color, lighting, 
lens focal length, and subject-to-camera distance (that is, non-representational 
aspects of the image) are acquired through exposure to television; if a camera 
operator violates too many of these conventions, we may not be able to 
'recognize' the image at all. 
This is amply proven by the fact that children have to first learn how to decode photos and 
television images (Barthes, 1977,36); man is not born with this ability, and the denotative 
value of photos and motion pictures is not as intuitive as one might believe. Allow me to 
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give another example, that of the various conventionalised camera angles that are used in 
motion pictures. The only angle that could in some sense be called "natural" is the so-called 
point-of-view shot (POV shot), which lets the viewer see through the eyes of one of the 
characters, suggesting that he or she is actually taking part in the action (such a shot of 
course only simulates naturalness; there is very little that is natural about looking through 
the eyes of another person). But let us consider another camera angle, one of the most-often 
used angles in film-making: the so-called over-the-shoulder shot (OTS shot). In such a shot, 
the viewer is placed next to one of the characters in a dialogue, looking over that character's 
shoulder at the person he or she is talking to. The angle is then reversed to place the viewer 
next to the other person, looking over their shoulder back at the first character. This 
technique has become so conventionalised that most viewers will hardly notice it when 
watching a dialogue scene on television. However, there is nothing about this angle that is 
natural or intuitive: the space that the camera fills in order to provide this shot is actually not 
held by any character in the motion picture so that once the shot is reversed one would 
normally have to wonder where the perspective was actually coming from. In addition, the 
OTS shot is a perspective that will hardly ever be encountered in real life (unless for those 
who tend to lurk behind people that are having conversations). The reason why a viewer will 
identify an OTS shot as part of a dialogue scene is that he or she has acquired knowledge of 
the code that defines how meaning is purveyed in motion pictures. 
But let me return to the potential ambivalence of signs and offer another explanation why 
such a pluralism of meanings does not pose a problem for the analysis of communication 
forms such as television. The reason is that we are dealing not, as Umberto Eco would say, 
with aesthetic text such as art (1979,261-264), but rather with what Roland Barthes calls 
mass communication (1977,38 & 51). Barthes uses the example of the advertisement image 
to show how verbal messages are used to reduce the potential ambivalence of images in 
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popular culture. This can happen through two techniques: anchorage and relay (ibid., 38). 
Anchorage is used in order to clarify what a sign denotes (ibid., 39): 
The denominative function corresponds exactly to an anchorage of all the 
possible (denoted) meanings of the object by recourse to a nomenclature. 
Shown a plateful of something (in an Amieux advertisement), I may hesitate in 
identifying the forms and masses; the caption ('rice and tuna fish with 
mushrooms') helps me to choose the correct level of perception, permits me to 
focus not simply my gaze but also my understanding. 
In Barthes' example, two redundant signs that denote the same object (one visually, one 
verbally) are used in order to prevent a misinterpretation of what is supposed to be denoted, 
thereby 'anchoring' the viewers perception. In a similar fashion, a connoted meaning can be 
'relayed'. In such a case (ibid., 39-40): 
... the 
linguistic message no longer guides identification but interpretation, 
constituting a kind of vice which holds the connoted meanings from 
proliferating, whether towards excessively individual regions (it limits, that is 
to say, the projective power of the image) or towards dysphoric values. An 
advertisement (for d'Arcy preserves) shows a few fruits scattered around a 
ladder; the caption ('as if from your own garden') banishes one possible signified 
(parsimony, the paucity of the harvest) because of its unpleasantness and 
orientates the reading towards a more flattering signified (the natural and 
personal character of fruit from a private garden); it acts here as a counter- 
taboo, combating the disagreeable myth of the artificial usually associated 
with preserves. 
Through a verbal statement, the ambivalence of the image is reduced, and one particular 
interpretation is relayed to the viewer. We could quite easily imagine, to return to the 
hypothetical example made earlier, that the image of the off-road vehicle was part of a car 
commercial. In order to assure that those looking at the image associated it with the intended 
connotation (the car signifying freedom), a verbal caption could relay that notion by stating 
"experience the freedom of the great outdoors" (or something similar). Another verbal 
statement could prevent the unwanted association with environmental degradation, for 
example by stating that the car had "the lowest C02 emissions in its class". But so far these 
relaying signs have all been verbal. I would argue that signs in other modes (for instance 
visual or acoustic signs) can also relay an intended connotation. Imagine, for instance, that in 
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the image the outdoor car drove along the Grand Canyon and past a large American flag 
while an eagle soared in the background. Even without the verbal message, the connotation 
of freedom would be relayed (at least in a US-American context; other viewers might 
connote such an image with entirely different things, since they were applying a different 
code). Similarly, if the commercial featured the melody (without the lyrics) of a popular song 
such as Free Falling by US-singer-songwriter Tom Petty, the signification of freedom would 
still be acoustically relayed (provided that the recipient was familiar with that song). In order 
to define this process of sign arrangement, Barthes introduced the term ideology, and his use 
of the term is much more readily compatible with the discourse analytical approach 
presented in Chapter 2.3 than is Norman Fairclough's interpretation of the word (1995,17). 23 
According to Barthes (1977,40), ideology refers to the practice of arranging signs in different 
modes in order to relay a certain discursive position. I would therefore argue that when 
analysing complex forms of mass communication such as television dramas, we need to pay 
particular attention to the question of how different signs interact in order to relay (i. e. 
disambiguate) a message, and whether that message is part of a particular discursive 
position. In the extreme this may mean that we are looking at the intentional promotion of 
the discursive position held by a particular political agent or institution. This is what I will 
refer to here as propaganda. 
The above considerations make it less useful for the present analysis to refer to iconic, 
indexical and symbolic signs. Such distinctions are important to understand the various 
ways in which signs interact with their objects and their interpretants, but they offer little 
explanatory power with regard to the question of how signs function in multi-dimensional 
communication processes. It is therefore more useful to instead, as Barthes suggests (ibid., 
34), distinguish signs according to their substance, meaning according to the dimension they 
23 For an interpretation of the term ideology in CDA that largely correlates with Barthes' usage of the term, see 
van Dijk, 2003,24. 
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function in. This means that we need to discern signs such as verbal signs, acoustic signs, 
visual signs, gestural signs, etc. This is essentially what Kress and Van Leeuwen mean when 
they are referring to the various modes of discourse (what Eco would call a channel; 1979, 
174-176), and state "that media become modes once their principles of semiosis begin to be 
conceived of in more abstract ways (as'grammars' of some kind)" (Kress et a!., 2001,22). 
The mass communication medium of television drama then consists of signs in different 
modes, which function according to a specific socio-cultural code (just like language 
functions on the basis of grammar). One has to then wonder how culturally specific the code 
of a medium such as television entertainment is, and whether a researcher from one cultural 
background can decode the content of such a medium in another culture (for instance a 
European analysing television drama in China). I wish to argue that the code systems for 
visual mass entertainment may indeed possess certain culturally-specific aspects, for 
example when the colour white signifies death in a Chinese drama, but innocence in a 
Western series. However, even though the connotation of the sign in question may be 
different depending on the cultural context, the general rules that govern the use of such 
signs are the same: Even a viewer who is not familiar with the cultural meaning of the colour 
white in the Chinese context can still detect that he is confronted with a case of colour 
symbolism. Chinese television dramas of course feature an array of visual or acoustic signs 
that are decidedly Chinese (certain types of musical scores, background sounds such as 
gongs or bells, certain colours, the use of the Chinese written language, culturally specific 
gestures, and of course all verbal statements made in Chinese), however throughout my 
research I did not come across any cases in which the rules of arranging these signs deviated 
from those adopted in Western television entertainment. The Chinese television dramas 
reviewed for the present research adopted the same tools of editing, montage, choice of 
camera angles, camera movements, etc. in the same conventionalised way that is used in the 
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Western context. In a sense, the 'vocabulary' of television drama may differ from one 
country to the next, but the 'grammar' is nonetheless the same. This phenomenon is perfectly 
in line with semiotic theory; again, we are not dealing with aesthetic text (in which case an 
artist may indeed re-invent codes and change the rules of how communication works; Eco, 
1979,188), but with mass communication that aims at relaying clear and unambiguous 
messages. In the case of television drama entertainment, this is achieved by adopting a code 
that is largely international. 
U. 111 A Methodology of Visual Analysis 
Combining the concepts of critical discourse analysis with the semiotic notion of the sign as 
the detrimental unit of communication, and applying both to the communication process 
that is television drama, makes it possible to resort to two 'toolboxes' at the same time in 
order perform a visual analysis. On the one hand, discourse analysis teaches us to identify 
discourse fragments (i. e. discursive statements) within communication processes, and to ask 
what institutional background influenced their formulation. On the other hand, a semiotic 
vantage point opens up the methodology of visual analysis, which breaks down multi- 
dimensional communication processes such as film and television and shows how its 
elements work together according to conventionalised rules to form messages (visual 
communication analysts do not refer to these elements as signs, but I would argue that they 
in fact are signs). 
The question then is: what is the methodology of visual analysis. To answer this question, we 
need to recall that motion pictures function at various levels, all of which have to be 
addressed by researches: First, there is the image. Its composition relies on the following 
factors: 
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" Camera angle (Faulstich, 2002,113-121; Katz, 1991,121-129,159,239-245; 
Mikos, 2003,182-192; Müller, 2003,47-48; Phillips, 2002,72-86), 
" Colour schemes (Faulstich, 2002,147-149; Phillips, 2002,61-64), 
" Lighting (Borstnar et al., 2002,106-109; Faulstich, 2002,146-147; Mikos, 
2003,199-204; Phillips, 2002,65-72), 
" Mise-en-scene, i. e. the arrangement of persons and objects in the scene 
(Borstnar et al., 2002,97-106; Faulstich, 2002,144-145; Katz, 1991,102-104; 
Mikos, 2003,224-227; Phillips, 2002,9-15,31-51; I shall include under this 
heading not only stage design, but also costume design and make-up), 
and finally 
" The acting or demeanour of the persons shown in the image (Faulstich, 
2002,100; Mikos, 2003,155-160; Phillips, 2002,16-31). 
All of these aspects are visual signs. Next, motion pictures usually contain acoustic signs, 
Le.: 
" Music, either on-screen or off-screen (Borstnar et al., 2002,126-128; 
Faulstich, 2002,137-143; Katz, 1991,101-102; Mikos, 2003,232-235; 
Phillips, 2002,152-156), and 
" Sound effects and ambience sounds, again either on-screen or off- 
screen (Borstnar et al., 2002,125-126; Faulstich, 2002,136-137; Katz, 1991, 
101-102; Mikos, 2003,228-231; Phillips, 2002,148-165). 
Third, the use of verbal signs is relevant, i. e.: 
" Spoken text, on-screen or off-screen (Borstnar et al., 2002,124-125; 
Faulstich 2002,131-136; Phillips 2002,144-148,162-165,184-186), and 
" Written language on objects in the scene, etc (Phillips, 2002,49-51). 
Finally, we need to consider the dimension of time: motion pictures consist of a series of 
images shown in succession. Hence, the following dynamic aspects of the product need to be 
taken into account: 
" Camera movements (Faulstich, 2002,121; Katz, 1991,279-291; Mikos, 
2003,193-197; Müller, 2003,52; Phillips, 2002,86-92), 
" Montage (Borstnar et al., 2002,133-148; Faulstich, 2002,122-123; Katz, 
1991,321-326; Mikos, 2003,206-222; Phillips, 2002,109-128), and 
Cutting frequencies (Faulstich, 2002,124-129; Katz, 1991,321; Korte, 
1999,86; Mikos, 2003,215-216; Phillips, 2002,128-135). 
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Since these aspects of moving pictures are perceived visually, I shall in the following refer to 
them also as visual signs. 
Aside from these formal methods of film-making, there are numerous additional issues that 
need to be addressed in the analysis of motion pictures. The most important aspects include: 
" Characters (traits, appearance, background, names, actions; Faulstich, 
2002,95-112; Mikos, 2003,161-165; Phillips, 2002,16-31), 
" References (to historical or fictional events/characters; Faulstich, 2002, 
174-179; Phillips, 2002,49-51) and intertextuality (for example literary or 
visual templates; Borstnar et al., 2002,74-82; Faulstich, 2002,57-61; Mikos, 
2003,261-268; Phillips, 2002,208-217), 
" Plot (Borstnar et al., 2002,41,152; Faulstich, 2002,80-94; Katz, 1991,145- 
152; Mikos, 2003,128-134; Phillips, 2002,284-290) and story (Borstnar et 
al., 2002,152; Faulstich, 2002,25-27,59-61; Katz, 1991,145-152; Mikos, 
2003,128-134; Phillips, 2002,262-264), and where applicable: 
" Special effects (Faulstich, 2002,130-131; Mikos, 2003,237-244; Phillips, 
2002,92-94). 
The relevance of all of the above factors is highly dependent on what kind of product one is 
analysing. For instance, in a black-and-white film colour schemes will not be of relevance, in 
a silent movie the function of spoken language can be ignored, and in a character-driven 
dialogue film special effects may not play a role. The question of which aspects of a film an 
analysis should focus on therefore needs to be answered on a case to case basis. What is 
important to realise is that in each case we need to distinguish between three types of signs 
when analysing moving images: the visual, the acoustic and the verbal signs. This makes 
analysing films and television series a particularly complex task. There are, however, a 
number of tools which can be applied to deal with these challenges. 
First, it is important to understand how films are structured. A film tells its story as a 
sequence of events. A sequence is, as William Phillips explains, "a series of related 
consecutive scenes, perceived as a major unit of a narrative film" (Phillips, 2002,554). The 
sequence therefore is a unit of story-telling. Next, a scene can be defined as 
"a section of a 
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narrative film that gives the impression of continuous action taking place in continuous time 
and space" (ibid. ). A scene usually ends if there is a major shift in personage, setting, time, 
perspective or style, whereas a sequence ends when a narrative section of a film ends (an 
example of how scenes work together to form sequences is provided in ibid., 106-107). 
Finally, each scene consists of a series of shots. A shot can be defined as "an uninterrupted 
strip of exposed motion-picture film or videotape that presents a subject, perhaps even a 
blank screen, during an uninterrupted segment of time" (ibid., 555), meaning that a shot 
ends when a camera perspective changes due to a cut. Television dramas are essentially 
constructed the same way, with the difference that the narrative is further divided into 
episodes. 
In order to analyse motion pictures, the first step is to identify the sequences of which the 
motion picture consists. This is done in a sequence protocol (Borstnar et al., 2002,131-132; 
Faulstich, 2002,73-80; Korte, 1999,82-83). A sequence protocol is a table in which the 
researcher lists all relevant sequences of a motion picture, numbers them, and provides 
information on their length, central plot points, settings, characters, audio, etc. The sequence 
protocol therefore gives an overview of the motion picture's general structure and provides 
verifiable information on details that may be lost during a simple individual screening of the 
picture. As an example I have provided in Figure 3a portion of my sequence protocol to the 
Chinese television drama GAJZ, which is analysed in detail in Chapter 4.2. 
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Figure 3: Sample Sequence Protocol from the Television Drama Series "The Commissioner 2" 
"irmssioner Yuan 
Mi ig loses his job 
)n arrests two 
, at the harbour 
Highway; Yundu 
police precinct 
Yundu s harbour; 
streets of Yundu 
0001.40- 
000305 
000306- 
00.05: 05 
000506- 
000621 
Yuan Ming, police 
officers 
passengers; robbers, 
victims 
suspenseful law, law enforcement, guidelines 
employment. crime, failure 
demotion; police 
come, money, pudic, 
tronaponaaon. police, violence 
The main advantage of such a table is that it gives a quick and easy overview of the most 
important aspects of the film material. It may also draw attention to specific sequences (for 
example a particularly long sequence, one in which the music is in stark contrast to that of 
previous and successive sequences, etc. ). A table like this should, of course, be amended 
according to the requirements of the particular research project. In the above example, I have 
included columns with information on the locations in which the sequences take place, on 
the characters that appear in each sequence, on the music that is used to underscore the 
images, and on the discourse strands that each sequence touches upon (the criteria that were 
used to divide each series into sequences and code them for discourse strands are explained 
in Section 2.6. ii). Like the methods of discourse analysis, those of visual analysis should be 
understood as a 'toolbox' that can be modified to suit certain research needs. 
The second tool of motion picture analysis is the transcript (Korte, 1999, ti)). It contains the 
spoken text of the picture with information on who is speaking and where (on-screen or (n- 
screen). It may not be necessary (or useful) to transcribe an entire movie or television series, 
but those sections of the product which are to be analysed in detail (such as the climax of a 
movie, its denouement, or a sequence that strongly features a particular discourse strand) 
should be transcribed with scrutiny. 
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Figure 4: Sample Shot Protocol from the Television Drama "The Great Han Emperor Wu" 
), n to, t, p 
M 
"t the . -I M 
U 
Caribbean 
2 MCU Zhang Qian apologizes to theme from Zhang Qian: "I, the Han envoy Zhang, clean 
(eta); t (u) the emperor Pirates of the 
Caribbean 
I1 MCU (eta) Zhang Qian apologizes to imperial "... Iý'l P) 1 ?d Ld _. ^ 
Zhang Qian offer your majesty my missio. r 
the emperor theme (slow) report 
4 MCU Zhang Qian apologizes to imperial ',... '. ýý'. II' I, 1 V`. IM(. Zhang Oian your servant your servant 
t s.. 
i 
(ela); t (u) the emperor theme (slow) j your servant 
has arrived late 
try. 
t34 MS (ela); Zhang Qian breakes down beads; 5K ft: (J Zhang Qian Isobsl 
p (r); t (d); and the emperor rushes to imperial 
P, 
: z (-) his side theme 
(slow) 
Once a specific sequence has been singled out for detailed analysis, it needs to be 
summarised in what is called a shot protocol (Borstnar et al., 2002,131-132; Faulstich, 
2002,66-73; Korte, 1999,79-81). This table now provides detailed information on the acoustic, 
verbal, and visual signs that interact in each shot of a sequence. A shot protocol lists every 
single camera shot and provides short-hand information on camera movement and 
perspective. It also measures the exact length of every shot and maps the spoken text (in this 
case both the Chinese original and the English translation) in relation to the image sequence. 
In addition, it provides information on the music score and the acoustic signs used 
throughout the sequence, and shows how they coincide with the images and the spoken text. 
As an example, I have included part of my shot protocol to a sequence of the Chinese 
television drama series HWDD (episode 45, sequence 19, shots 74 - 78) in Figure 4. For a list 
of the abbreviations24 used to describe camera perspectives and movements in these shot 
protocols, see Figure 5. 
24 Based on the terms and abbreviations used in Katz (1991,159) and Phillips (2002,77-81). 
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Figure 5: Abbreviations of Camera Perspectives and Movements 
Types of Shots Abbreviation 
extreme close-up ECU 
close-up CU 
medium close-up MCU 
medium shot MS 
long shot LS 
extreme long shot ELS 
Perspectives and Angles 
over the shoulder lots) 
point of view (pov) 
bird's-eye view (bev) 
high angle (ha) 
eye-level angle (ela) 
low angle (la) 
hand camera (he) 
Dutch angle (da) 
Camera Movements 
zoom in z (+) 
zoom out z (-) 
into focus f (+) 
out of focus f (-) 
tilt up t (u) 
tilt down t (d) 
pan left p (I) 
pan right p (r) 
movement (left, right, up, down, forward, backward) m (l, r, u, d, f, b) 
In addition to these three fundamental tools of film analysis, there are a number of methods 
to graphically depict certain aspects of a motion picture. One is the frequency graphic. It 
shows the number of cuts per minute over a certain extent of time (for instance throughout 
the entire motion picture, a sequence, a scene, or a section of dialogue). Such a graphic (as 
shown below in Figure 6) offers an overview of the general dynamics of a motion picture. 
Another tool is the so called shot graphic, which enables the researcher to flexibly show 
different aspects of a motion picture (such as camera movement, dialogue, music, content, 
cuts, etc. ), thereby giving a detailed overview of the movies composition (for an example see 
Korte, 1999,85). 
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Figure 6: Frequency Graphic "Berlin: 
Symphony of a Great City" (Korte, 1999,86) 
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the researcher isolate the various signs in 
a motion picture, and makes it possible to 
assess how these signs interact. Once the 
different signs have been identified and 
described, the next step is to paraphrase 
the discourse fragments that they form. 
To paraphrase signs that are non-verbal 
confronts us with a practical challenge: can we use spoken and written language (as a kind of 
'meta-language') in order to summarise the content of images and sounds? Or in other words: 
can a message that is communicated in one mode be readily translated into another mode? 
Umberto Eco summarises this problem when he writes that it would be "somewhat reckless 
to maintain that there is no difference between various types of signs" (1979,172). l le 
continues by giving an example of how difficult it can be to express verbal statements in 
other modes (ibid. ): 
It is indeed possible to express a given content both by the expression /the 
sun rises/ and by another visual expression composed of a horizontal line, a 
semicircle and a series of diagonal lines radiating from the imaginary center of 
the semicircle. But it would seem more difficult to assert that /the sun also 
rises/ by means of the same visual device and it would be quite impossible to 
assert that /Walter Scott is the author of Waverleij/ by visual means. It is 
possible to assert both verbally and kinesically that I am hungry (at least in 
Italian! ) but it is impossible to assert by means of kinesic devices that , The 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft proves that the category of causality is an a priori 
form while space and time are pure intuitions» (even if I larpo Marx got 
remarkably near it). 
Since the present research project does not attempt to transfer verbal signs into other modes 
(for example by drawing, whistling, or gesturing the main argument of Immanuel Kant's 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft), the above case need not concern us here. More problematic, 
however, is the fact that just like many verbal statements cannot be expressed in any mode 
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other than the verbal one, there exist according to Eco also non-verbal expressions that are 
'unspeakable' (ibid., 173): 
... it is true that every content expressed by a verbal unit can be translated into 
another verbal unit; it is true that the greater part of the content expressed by 
non-verbal units can also be translated into verbal units; but it is likewise true 
that there are many contents expressed by complex non-verbal units which 
cannot be translated into one or more verbal units (other than by means of a 
very weak approximation). 
The reason why this observation poses no problem when conducting a visual discourse 
analysis of television dramas is that Eco is again referring primarily to the 'unspeakable' 
qualities of aesthetic texts. It may be indeed difficult (or impossible) to articulate verbally the 
discursive content of the Mona Lisa, or of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, but in the case of mass 
communication the content of signs stands in a disambiguated context in which we can 
understand (and verbally paraphrase) their message. This may require a'weak 
approximation', as Eco would say, but it nonetheless makes the transfer of visual or acoustic 
content into verbal statements possible. Eco himself confirms this when he writes (ibid., 215- 
216): 
An iconic sign [i. e. a visual sign; author's note] is indeed a text, for its verbal 
equivalent (except in rare cases of considerable schematization) is not a word 
but a phrase or indeed a whole story; the iconic representation of a horse does 
not correspond to the word /horse/ but rather to a description (a black horse, 
standing up, or jumping, etc. ), to a mention (this horse is galloping) or to some 
other different speech act (look, what a beautiful horse! ) If inserted in a 
scientific text, an iconic sign can correspond to a statement of the type /all 
horses have four legs and such visual properties ... 
/. 
The units composing an iconic text are established - if at all - by the context. 
Out of context these so-called 'signs' are not signs at all, because they are 
neither coded nor possess any resemblance to anything. Thus insofar as it 
establishes the coded value of a sign, the iconic text is an act of code-making. 
Barthes makes a very similar argument, when he writes that visual connotations can be 
difficult to phrase verbally, but that denotations are a form of syntagm, and hence "very 
close to speech" (1977,52). Since forms of mass communication (such as television dramas) 
place connotative visual signs in the context of denotative signs, the formerly otherwise 
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unspeakable aspect of the icons and symbols becomes naturalised: "the discontinuous 
connotators are connected, actualized, 'spoken' through the syntagm of the denotation, the 
discontinuous world of symbols plunges into the story of the denoted scene as though into a 
lustral bath of innocence" (ibid. ). For this reason, the following analysis focuses first on 
identifying the multi-modal sign-functions that work within television dramas, and second 
on paraphrasing the discourse fragments that these sign-functions help construct. 
2.5 The Basis for the Production Analysis: Interviews with 
Chinese Media Experts 
Both discourse theory and semiotics teach us that the production of media content is a social 
as well as political process, and that in order to understand how discourses are formed, this 
process needs to be explored. Consequently, the main analysis of Chinese television drama 
content that this thesis focuses on (Chapter 4) is augmented by a background analysis of 
drama production procedures in China (Chapter 3). Since this "production analysis", to use 
the terminology of Marion Müller (2003,24), is primarily25 based on fourteen qualitative 
interviews conducted with Chinese media experts in the summer of 2007, I shall first offer an 
overview of the criteria which provided the foundation for the selection of interview subjects 
(2.5. i), the formulation of interview questions (2.5. ii), and the subsequent qualitative analysis 
(2.5. iii). Also, this section covers the ethical considerations that accompanied this research 
(2.5. iv). 
2.5.1 Selection of Interview Subjects 
The interviewees who participated in this research project were selected either as internal or 
external experts on the Chinese television drama market. Internal experts were recruited for 
their first-hand knowledge of production, distribution and broadcasting procedures. They 
included professionals with experience as screenwriters, directors, producers (at large state- 
25 In addition to interview statements, Chapter 3 further draws from primary written sources such as official 
government documents and statistic material were applicable. 
96 
run production units and private companies, both at the central and the provincial level), 
editors, investors, censors and broadcasters. Experts from outside the market (i. e. academics 
with a research focus on Chinese television dramas) were approached for their knowledge of 
the general Chinese system of television drama production and broadcasting. In the majority 
of cases, the interviewees worked in several of these fields simultaneously (for instance when 
research subjects held positions as university professors, screenwriters and producers at the 
same time). All of the interviewees are Chinese nationals and were working in the Chinese 
media sector or at a Chinese university at the time of the interviews. Some had inside 
information to offer on the production and meaning of the TV dramas that are being 
analyzed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, but that was not a necessary requirement for 
interviewee selection. 
Once the necessary contact details of relevant experts had been gathered, the potential 
interviewees were contacted via email. If individuals were not available through email, it 
was attempted to reach them on the telephone. All persons contacted were provided with an 
outline of the research project. Those who agreed to participate were further asked for advice 
on how to contact other potential research subjects. By Mai 2007, sixteen media experts based 
in Shanghai, Beijing and Nanjing had been recruited. These experts were then interviewed 
during the subsequent two months in a total of fourteen interview sessions (interviews 13 
and 14 were conducted with two interviewees each). 
2.5.11 Research Procedure: Structure and Questions of the Qualitative Interviews 
Methodologically, the interviews were designed to be semi-structured and qualitative in 
nature26, although quantitative statements were encouraged as well. The sessions were each 
scheduled for one hour (giving time for at least forty-five minutes of actual interview time), 
26 The interview methodology was based on Froschauer at al. (2003,15-41 & 51-79), and was prepared in line 
with the methodological quality standards defined in Mayring (2002,140-148). 
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but were allowed to last longer, in some cases up to three hours. The location for the 
interview was selected by the respective research subject. 27 
The purpose of the interviews was threefold: To gather factual information on the workings 
of the television drama sector, to establish what aspects of drama production Chinese experts 
considered relevant, and to analyse how the interviewees talked about their area of expertise 
as well as the relevance of television dramas in China. If an interviewee had particular 
insights into the production of the television drama series that this research focuses on, then 
the conversation would focus on that particular theme accordingly. Each interviewee was 
generally asked questions28 concerning three different aspects of TV dramas: 
1. The production and broadcasting process, 
2. The legal framework governing the TV drama market, 
3. The social impact of TV dramas in China. 
However, the conversations did not necessarily proceed in this order, and the focus that was 
placed on the different aspects varied depending on the respective interviewee's area of 
expertise. This was done in order to offer the interview subjects room to fully voice their own 
opinions and emphasise what they themselves felt were relevant issues. For this reason, the 
conversations were kept as open as possible. Particularly with respect to the third set of 
questions (concerning the social impact of TV dramas), the purpose of the questions was not 
to gather factual evidence, but to establish what Chinese media experts' opinion and line of 
argument on the topic were. 
27 In the majority of cases the Interviewees opted for a public setting, such as a caf6 or teahouse. Otherwise the 
interviews were conducted In the respective research subject's office. 28 If the Interviewees asked to receive more information concerning the questions that would be asked during the 
interview, they were provided with a broad outline of the topics under discussion as well as some sample 
questions. 
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All conversations were conducted in standard Chinese, and were recorded with permission 
of the interviewees. In addition, research notes were taken both during and immediately 
after the conversations. 
2.5.111 Processing, Analyzing and Referencing the Interview Material 
Once the interviews had been concluded, the recorded material and the research notes were 
used to summarise each conversation in an interview protocol. The first step in creating these 
protocols was to divide the interviews into narrative segments, providing a time-code for 
each segment. The segments were then arranged in tables, which featured information on the 
topics discussed during each of the segments, as well as paraphrases of what had been said. 
Additional research notes were added in brackets. The interview protocols are presented in 
Appendix 2. Throughout this thesis, they are referenced in brackets that include the 
following information: the number of the interview "I#", plus the recording time-code. For 
example, the reference (Il, 0: 00 - 1: 00) refers to the first minute of interview number one. 
In addition to the interview protocols, interview segments containing particularly 
noteworthy arguments by the interviewees were transcribed. 29 The transcripts attempt to 
reproduce each spoken syllable, including particularities of the spoken language. 30 These 
29 There are three reasons why only selected parts of the Interviews were transcribed: First, the present research 
procedure does not aim at a discursive fine-analysis of the Interviews, making it unnecessary to capture the entire 
recorded material in transcribed form; second, the amount of recorded material (a total of twenty hours) made a 
more expansive transliteration unfeasible; and third, In the majority of cases the production of full transcripts was 
found to not yield much additional information compared to the paraphrasing of the interview segments. 30 The transcriptions follow the conventions presented in Froschauer at al. (2003,223-224): Interviewees are 
marked as "11" through "114"; If more than one interviewee was present, letters were used to differentiate between 
them (for instance "I13a" and "113b"). The researcher is marked as "R". Pauses are marked by periods, with each 
period being equivalent to one second. Nonverbal exclamations or interjections by others are presented in 
brackets, and exclamations are written out in cursive script: (R: laughs). Noises are presented in pointed 
brackets: >mobile phone<. English words are marked as follows: *boyfriend*. Verbal exclamations are presented 
by a corresponding Chinese character in the original and by an English equivalent in the translation (such as "Ulk" 
becoming "oh"; "09" becoming "uhu", etc), Emphases are underlined: "all&*. Unintelligible sections are marked 
by periods in brackets, one period representing a syllable, i. e. "(.... )" marks four unintelligible syllables. Where 
the meaning of such sections can be guessed from the context or from the research notes, an approximation is 
presented in brackets, such as "(.... t}gW44)", Le. '(Influence of.... )". 
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transcripts were then edited and translated into English by the author to produce the quotes 
used throughout this thesis 31 
2.5.1v Ethic Guidelines for Interview-Based Research 
All interviews were conducted and analysed in line with the ethics guidelines adopted by 
the School of East Asian Studies of the University of Sheffield. No remuneration was offered 
for the involvement in this project, and all interviewees participated voluntarily. Prior to the 
interviews, all participants were informed about the project's purpose, as well as the scope of 
their involvement (the information leaflet for interviewees is reproduced in Appendix 2). It 
was explained to all participants that they were not required to discuss any matters they did 
not wish to talk about. It was also made clear that no information would be used in this 
research that the interviewees felt was subject to non-disclosure. All interviewees will remain 
anonymous, and the interview recordings are used only by the researcher, and solely for the 
purpose of this research project. The fieldwork conducted as part of this research project has 
been reviewed and approved by the University of Sheffield's Research Ethics Committee. 32 
2.6 The Basis for the Product Analysis: A Cross-Genre 
Examination of Chinese Television Drama Series 
Considering the vast amount of television drama content that is produced in China each year, 
this project was faced with the question of how to select representative material (2.6. i), and 
how to conduct the main part of this project: the visual analysis (2.6. ii). 
31 The transcriptions were edited Into simplified quotes for two reasons: First, the public setting of most interviews 
and the overall non-ideal interview conditions had led to recordings of pure quality, which often made it impossible 
to Identify each individual spoken syllable in the respective Interview segments. Whereas this did not pose a 
problem when formulating paraphrases, It was a crucial factor in deciding not to conduct a more comprehensive 
linguistic fine-analysis of the material. Second, the conventions of transcribing spoken language made the 
interview sections unwieldy for the purpose of this analysis, while offering little additional Information concerning 
what had been said. For these reasons, the quotes were simplified in the following ways: 1) nonverbal 
exclamations have largely been removed; 2) repetitions and other peculiarities of the spoken language have been 
deleted to produce a more readable language; 3) Inaudible or unintelligible words In the recordings were, If 
possible, replaced by the likeliest approximation, derived from the context and the researcher's interview notes. 
It should be pointed out that the British ethics guidelines adopted for this project Ignore the practical issues of 
conducting fieldwork in China. The formal requirements on how to recruit research subjects and inform them 
about the research project's purpose was regarded by most Interviewees as excessively official. Considering that 
any form of 'officialism' is viewed highly sceptically in mainland China, the ethics procedures probably hampered 
the fieldwork more than they contributed to it. I would argue that revisions of these guidelines are necessary to 
accommodate the cultural specifics in other countries. Concerning practical issues and problems of conducting 
fieldwork in China, see the various contributions in Helmer of al. (2005). 
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Z6.1 The Selection of Representative Research Material 
In order to ensure that the material selected for this analysis offered representative insights 
into the political discourses presented in popular television series, the programmes had to fit 
the following seven criteria: 
1. The programmes had to be television drama mini-series or telenovelas: 
For this analysis, any drama that was not conceived as a serial was omitted, 
as were all programmes that did not classify as a drama narrative (for 
instance situation comedy, documentaries, or popular programmes such as 
game shows, etc. ). The logic for this choice was that this analysis aimed at 
examining popular entertainment, and that drama series are the most 
popular entertainment format in China (see Section 2.2. iii). 
2. The programmes had to have been aired on CCTV-1 or CCTV-8 during prime time: 
Limiting the analysis to CCTV drama programmes ensured that the series 
had undergone the most extensive censorship proceedings (18,39: 06 - 41: 37; 
112,32: 09 - 35: 34) and potentially reached the largest possible audience. 
Programmes solely produced for and broadcasted on provincial, municipal, 
or satellite stations were not included in this analysis, seeing as they were 
tailored to more specific and hence less representative conditions (see 
Sections 2.2. i and 2.2. ii for a description of the various Chinese broadcasting 
outlets and their relevance). 
3. The programmes had to have been aired between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2005: 
The selection of an arbitrary recent time interval was meant to limit the 
number of possible programmes, and offer insights of the discourses created 
at one point in time. 
4. The programmes had to have been among the most popular dramas aired in the respective 
year: 
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Since the aim of this analysis was to assess the political discourses on 
popular Chinese TV, it had to be ensured that the drama series had indeed 
been well received by audiences. For this reason, only programmes were 
selected that had been listed among the twenty dramas with the highest 
audience ratings for that particular year in the respective China TV Ratings 
Yearbook (Wang, 2004; 2005; and 2006) 33 
5. The three drama series had to cover a wide range of different genres and production 
backgrounds: 
In order to guarantee that the widest possible variety of discourse fragments 
was covered in this analysis, series were selected from three different genres: 
one historical drama, one modern teen drama, and one crime drama. Also, it 
was attempted to choose one programme that was entirely state-produced 
(a so-called 'main-melody' drama), one that was produced at least partially 
with state funding but did not aim to be a main-melody series, and one 
programme that was entirely funded and produced by private institutions. 
This was meant to offer insights into whether or not discourses were 
constructed differently depending on the institutional background of the 
drama series. 
6. The dramas had to deal with as many political discourse strands as possible: 
If various drama series equally fulfilled the criteria one through five, 
priority was given to the drama that most clearly and most broadly dealt 
with discourses of governance and its goals (see Section 2.3. v). 
33 The use of CSM data was owed to the fact that it is the only available statistical information on annual drama 
consumption. The data was not meant to provide exact quantitative information on how many viewers actually 
tuned in for a particular series (the questionable reliability of such data is discussed in Sections 2.2. iv and 3.4.1), 
but was instead used as a qualitative indication of whether a programme had been registered among the most 
watched series of a certain year. 102 
7. The drama series had to be available on DVD: 
Programmes were only considered for analysis if legal working DVD 
version could be purchased from an official distributor. This was meant to 
ensure the technical feasibility of the visual analysis and the highest possible 
quality of the visual material. 
After establishing these criteria, all available television dramas that ranked among the 
twenty most popular series aired on CCTV in 2003,2004, and 2005 were purchased and test- 
screened. The following three series were then chosen and prepared for the detailed analysis: 
the epic historical drama HWDD, the main-melody crime drama GAJZ, and the teen drama 
NCNM. 
2.6.11 Coding the Material for Political Discourses 
As a first step in my analysis, the visual material had to be prepared for detailed study. In 
order to ensure a systematic examination of the material, the three television drama series 
mentioned above were therefore each divided into sequences, and these sequences were then 
summarised in protocol tables (see DVD in the back of the appendix volume). These 
sequence protocols were arranged in a way that offered an easy overview of the personage 
presented in each sequence, the type of music used to underscore the drama, and the 
locations in which the individual sequences were set. Time codes are provided to simplify 
the process of finding certain sections of the visual material on the respective DVDs. 34 
Next, each sequence was coded with a variety of key words, relating to the discourse strands 
discussed in Section 2.3. v. To this effect, an evolutionary coding procedure was used (see 
Figure 7), based on the suggestions in Mayring (2002,120). This resulted in the following 
working steps: 
34 Time codes may vary slightly, depending on the hardware and software used to review the DVDs; for this 
analysis, a computer DVD drive and the Cyberlink DVD software were used. 
103 
1. A preliminary list of key words was drafted. This list was derived from the 
central discourse strands discussed in Section 2.3. v and was based on theoretical 
considerations of how each of the main discourse strands could be divided into 
further subcategories. 
2. The visual material was then screened with these theoretical concepts in mind, 
starting with the series NCNM. Each sequence was associated with the key words 
relevant to the respective context, and additional terms were created as new 
topics arose in the narrative. In this sense, the list of coding categories was 
significantly expanded, based on practical considerations. 
3. After the first cycle of coding had been completed, the original list of key words was 
revised to incorporate the new words. In some cases, words were 'collapsed' into 
one category, in others a single key word was divided into several codes. 35 
4. This process of expanding and collapsing the coding categories was then repeated 
with the next drama series (GAJZ), again followed by a revision. After the third 
series had been coded in this manner, the table of key words was reworked one 
last time to yield the final list of coding categories. 
Note how these codes encompass a wide variety of issues, most of which are not analysed in 
this research project. There were two reasons for adopting this very wide range of coding 
categories: First, to ensure that the juxtaposition and interaction of various discourse strands 
could later be assessed (for example when issues of security were repeatedly crossed with 
35 After the first coding cycle, an attempt was made to create a category tree that clearly attributed each of the 
codes with one discourse strand. This initial attempt was abandoned, however, since many of the codes did not 
clearly fit into one single discourse category. For Instance, sequences coded with the term "hierarchy" in some 
cases dealt with welfare issues (for example In NCNM, were numerous sequences showed hierarchical family 
relations or the relations between a superior and a subordinate In business ventures), In other cases they were 
related to security issues (for example dealing with the relation between a superior and a subordinate in the police 
force in GAJZ and NCNM, or with military jurisdiction in HWDD), and in yet other cases they could be associated 
with Issues of governance (for example relating to ruler-minister relations in HWDD, or the relation between the 
police commissioner and the party secretary in GAJZ). In order to avoid limiting the explanatory power of the 
codes, it was therefore decided to not forcefully relate the various categories at this stage, but to rather focus on 
the discursive function of the respective codes during the final qualitative analysis Instead (for example by 
examining how hierarchical relations are used to make statements about police work and public security issues, 
and to separately assess how such statements are linked with other issues, such as legitimacy or identity). 
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issues of nationalism, or when issues of ruler-subject relations appeared in connection with 
welfare issues such as poverty); second, to lay the basic groundwork for further research into 
other discourses presented in these series (for example concerning discourse strands such as 
gender, consumption, technological development, etc. ). 
Figure 7: Evolutionary Coding Procedure 
Theoretical 
knowledge 
i Definition of major categories based on theory 
l Definition of sub-categories 
based on theory 
Widening of 
theoretical knowledge 
1 
Application of categories to 
research material 
T 
Alteration of categories according 
to empirical findings 
Once the sequence protocols of all three series had been completed, the actual fine-analysis 
started. The sequences that offered the most information on the main discourse strands were 
selected, and detailed shot protocols of each were devised. The criteria for selecting certain 
sequences as starting points for the fine-analysis were the following: 
" Primary criterion: The discourse strand under scrutiny had to be prominently 
featured in the sequence. 
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" Secondary criterion 1: In cases where a large number of sequences fulfilled the main 
criterion, priority was given to those with central importance either to the main 
narrative, to one of the narrative arcs of the programme, or to the characterization of 
a main character. 
" Secondary criterion 2: Sequences that featured a wide variety of signs (i. e. visual, 
acoustic and verbal) were given priority over those that functioned primarily in one 
mode (such as dialogue scenes that focused only on verbal signs, and included only 
few visual signs). 
The information on the discursive statements made in these sequences and on the way they 
are made was then compared to other sequences that dealt with the same issues. If additional 
information could be gained from subjecting these other sequences to a fine-analysis, then a 
shot protocol was devised for that respective sequence as well. The collected findings of this 
research procedure are presented in the main chapter of this thesis (Chapter 4), and all 
relevant protocols are provided on the appendix DVD? 6 
38 The system used to reference the visual material functions as follows: first, the drama series is stated in 
abbreviated form; next, the episode number follows; third, the sequence number Is provided, and finally (where 
applicable) the shot number is added. For example: NCNM 01-02-03 refers to the tnira snot in the second 
sequence of the first episode in Nancai Nümao. 
106 
2.7 Summary: Towards an Integrated Methodology of Critical 
Visual Discourse Analysis 
It should be clear from the discussion above that recent research projects have indeed 
covered a wide area of communication practices that relate to mass-communicated media 
content. This includes the analysis of TV and television dramas in the PRC. I lowever, such 
analyses are still rare in the field of Chinese Studies, and certainly in the Western social 
sciences; also, past studies lack a consistent methodological approach. Considering the 
central role that television drama plays in Chinese society, this is a gap that needs to be fill0d. 
In order to do so, a comprehensive theoretical and methodological framework is required 
that addresses the question of what a television drama's content is, what institutional 
background led to its creation, and how the process of producing and disseminating such 
content is relevant to wider social and political practices. For this purpose I am proposing a 
qualitative approach that combines critical discourse theory with semiotics. A list of the 
major technical terms of such an approach is provided in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8: List of Technical Terms and their Definition 
Term Definition Source 
Aesthetic Text A message coded in such a way that it intentionally Eco 1979, pp 261-264 
leaves ambiguities with regards to the contents that the 
signs denote and connote. 
Anchorage Two or more signs in different modes used to Barthes 1977, p. 38 
disambiguate a denotation. 
Code A system of correlational rules linking signs to content, Eco 1979, pp. 33-38 
based on social and cultural conventions, & 191-199 
Communication The practice of coding a message and transmitting it from Eco 1979, p. 33 
a source to a destination, where it is decoded and 
interpreted. 
Connotation A complex sign-function in which a sign stands for the Barthes 1977, p. 37, 
content of another sign-function. Eco 1979, pp. 55-56 
Counter-Hegemonic Communication practices that contest the hegemonic Jager 2004, pp. 129-130 
Discourse discourse in a society and attempt to replace it with an 
alternative world-view. 
Denotation A simple sign-function in which a sign stands for a Barthes 1977, p. 37, 
content. Eco 1979, . 
54-57 
Diachronic The analysis of the changes in discourse over time. Jager 2004, p. 171 
Discourse Analysis 
Discourse Communication practices that construct our knowledge of Foucault 2005, pp 30 
reality over time. & 54; Jager 2004, pp. 129 
& 184; 
Potter 2005, p 86 
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Discourse A discursive statement, i. e. a statement that constitutes a Foucault 2005, p. 30-31 
Fragment claim to truth. A discourse fragment is part of one or more Jäger 2004, pp. 166-168 
discourse strands and is expressed In a certain discourse 
layer. It can be used to express a discursive position. 
Discourse Layer The institutional level or setting in which discourse takes Jäger 2004, pp. 163-165 
place, for example the academic layer, the political layer, 
the media layer, the private layer, etc. 
Discourse Strand A certain discourse topic, for example globalization, Jäger 2004, pp. 1630-163 
migration, crime, etc. 
Discursive Position Individual perspective of what is true, formulated through Jäger 2004, p. 163 
discourse frs ments. 
Hegemonic Communication practices that reflect the dominant world- Jäger 2004, pp. 129-130; 
Discourse view of society, kept stable through power relations. MacDonald 2003, p. 32 
Icon A sign that bears a similarity to its object. Eco 1979, p. 178; 
Peirce 1991b, . 239-240 Ideology The practice of arranging multi-modal signs in order to Barthes 1977, p. 40 
relay a certain discursive position. 
Index A sign that is the consequence of its object. Eco 1979, p. 178; 
Peirce 1991b, . 239-240 Mass A process of communication in which methods of Barthes 1977, p. 38 & 51 
Communication anchorage and relay are used to disambiguate 
messages, thereby guiding recipients to one pre-selected 
interpretation of that message. 
Message Content coded throw h signs. Eco 1979, p. 33 
Mode Levels at which signs can function, such as the visual, Barthes 1977, p. 34; 
acoustic, or verbal mode. Sometimes also referred to as Eco 1979, pp. 174-176; 
a channel. Kress & Van Leeuwen 
2001, p. 22 
Propaganda Discourse fragments constructed through ideology with Indirectly: Barthes 1977, 
the intent to promote the discursive position of a p. 40 
articular olitical agent or institution. 
Relay Two or more signs in different modes used to Barthes 1977, p. 38 
disambiguate a connotation. 
Scene A section of a narrative film that gives the impression of Phillips 2002, p. 554 
continuous action taking place In continuous time and 
space. 
Sequence A series of related consecutive scenes, perceived as a Phillips 2002, p. 554 
major unit of a narrative film. 
Shot An uninterrupted strip of exposed motion-picture film or Phillips 2002, p. 555 
videotape that presents a subject, perhaps even a blank 
screen, during an uninterrupted segment of time. 
Sign Anything that, on the grounds of a previously established Eco 1979, p. 16; 
social convention, can be taken as something (referent) Peirce 1991b, p. 239 
standing for something else (object) to someone else 
inte retant . Sign-Function The correlation between a sign and a content based on a Eco 1979, p. 191 
code. 
Synchronic The analysis of discourse at one point In time Jäger 2004, p. 171 
Discourse Analysis 
Symbol A sign that depends on its Interpretant and has no Eco 1979, p. 178; 
relation to its object. Peirce 1991b, . 239-240 
The critical discourse analytical aspects of this approach allow us to view television dramas 
as a type of communication practice, and explain how such practices not only reflect what is 
commonly accepted to be true concerning different issues throughout society, but also how 
these practices in turn reinforce and possibly restructure such truths. A critical discourse 
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analytical approach also provides a methodological framework: it enables us to isolate 
discursive statements (so called'discourse fragments'), and inquire how various forces 
(agents and structures) contributed to their formulation. 
By treating television dramas as communication practices, we are further able to integrate 
into the critical discourse analytical approach the theory and methodology of semiotics. We 
can then argue that discourse fragments consist of signs, which denote and connote certain 
content. In mass communication products such as television dramas, these signs are 
arranged in various modes (visual, acoustic, and verbal) to relay precise messages to the 
viewers. Since semiotic theory stands in close proximity to analyses of visual materials, the 
integration of semiotics into discourse theory allows us to utilise a wide range of tools 
devised for the purpose of motion picture analysis, such as sequence protocols, shot 
protocols and frequency graphics. This makes it possible to identify the various different 
signs that function within a television drama series, and interpret the discursive statements 
they make. 
The present analysis follows this logic. It first examines within which institutional setting 
television dramas are created in China, and what factors influence the production of the 
discourses communicated through such dramas (Chapter 3). Next, it analyses three specific 
popular Chinese television drama series that were aired between 2003 and 2005 in order to 
identify what discursive statements these programmes make concerning the two political 
discourse strands of governance and security (Chapter 4). 
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3 Factors in the Creation of Chinese TV Dramas 
In order to offer a coherent analysis of Chinese television drama discourse strands, the 
question needs to first be answered how various factors influence the production process of 
such discursive themes. The following chapter therefore analyses the personal and 
institutional factors that play a role in the Chinese TV drama sector. The analysis is based on 
qualitative interviews conducted with Chinese media experts in 2007 (for details on the 
process of selecting and interviewing the research subject, as well as on the methods used to 
analyse the interviews, see section 2.5), and is divided into eight sections. The first five of 
these sections focus primarily on the interviewees' factual knowledge of drama production 
procedures and the rules that govern the TV drama market: Section 3.1 examines the 
institutions (production companies and units), and the financial factors (investors, budget 
considerations) that play a role during the production process of Chinese television dramas. 
The subsequent Section 3.2 covers the evolution of TV dramas from story idea to final 
product and introduces the personnel involved in the relevant decision-making procedures 
of production (producers, directors, editors, etc. ). Section 3.3 focuses on the distribution and 
broadcasting of TV dramas. Section 3.4 concentrates on TV drama audiences in China, 
establishing to what degree audience measurements, viewing habits, and viewer feedbacks 
influence the production of television series. Section 3.5 then deals with issues of censorship, 
introducing the relevant state and party institutions as well as the policies that regulate the 
television drama market. The final two sections focus on the perceptions of the research 
subjects. They examine the way in which Chinese media experts describe the functions of TV 
(Section 3.6) and the potential influences of television on Chinese viewers (Section 3.7). The 
aim of this last part is to explore what explanations and justifications are used within the 
domestic system to describe the relevance of TV dramas, the role of censorship and the 
importance of market-economic mechanisms, and to establish to what extent such 
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conceptions influence the way in which TV dramas are created and distributed. Finally, 
Section 3.8 offers a summary of the research results. 
3.1 Production Companies and Investors 
The first factor that is relevant to the analysis of Chinese television drama discourses is how 
such discourses are created. This process of creating television dramas is most commonly 
initiated "top-down", starting with a production company (I3,13: 42 -17: 43). 37 The 
production company charges a creative producer with the creation of a marketable TV 
drama, thereby setting in motion the production process (ibid. ). Before examining the 
numerous phases of this process, it is worth taking a look at the types of production units 
that can initiate a drama production and the institutions that offer funding for such projects. 
3.1.1 State-Owned Production Companies 
In general, production companies fall into either of two categories (14,05: 19 - 08: 43): state- 
owned (guoyou or non-governmental (minjian Fla-J)" Despite the increased liberalisation 
of the TV drama production market, the number of state units that posses the government's 
approval to produce TV content is still substantial: According to one interviewee (12,50: 47 - 
52: 11), approximately 100 central state agencies are in possession of a general production 
permit (xukezheng iV Jt1E). Such units not only include professional production companies, 
for example the China Teleplay Production Centre (Zhongguo dianshiju zhizuo zhongxin rte(*j'4! 
iº Y"FrP, b), CCTV or the China Film Group Corporation (Zhongguo dianshi jituan gongsi rt' 
®EhW%®Op7), but also numerous production units of local or provincial TV stations 
(difang dianshitai dianshiju zhizuo zhongxin 12,49: 09 - 50: 46). In 
addition, various state agencies outside of the production sector also possess such a permit. 
" The alternative is the "bottom-up" approach, during which a writer with a story idea will attempt to sell his or her 
script to a production unit (13,00: 49 - 03: 05). However, such approaches are risky for the screenwriters and therefore not too common: If the screenwriter is not part of a production company or unit, he or she may face 
substantial difficulties when trying to promote an idea. Personal and family ties play a paramount role In this 
respect, and one of the interviewee emphasised this by calling China an "interpersonal society" (renxing shehui A 
t4±): Without personal contacts (guanxi AA) or the backing of a famous and influential screenwriter, a story 
idea is unlikely to be considered by Chinese producers (13,04: 46 - 05: 21). 
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Examples include academic institutions such as the CUC (113,65: 33 - 71: 07)), central 
ministries such as the Ministry of Public Security (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonganbu i 
%R# fl1I 1 r*K; ibid. ), as well as several groups of the armed forces, such as the Army, 
Air Force and Navy (13,52: 16 - 56: 26). 38 Formerly (14,05: 19 - 08: 43), the various production 
units used to be closely linked to their respective superior agency and were required to 
disseminate the propaganda content that these agencies devised. Today, however, most 
production units, particularly the professional production companies, operate independently 
(dull I`L) on the TV drama market and are increasingly profit-oriented. 39 According to the 
interviewees, the period in PRC history during which state-owned enterprises were required 
to produce content merely for propaganda purposes and without consideration of potential 
revenues are over (I2,18: 05 - 20: 42; 16,12: 58 - 15: 20). However, state-owned units are still 
influenced by government and party agendas (13,52: 16 - 56: 26; 19,37: 02 - 38: 21), which 
means that education and propaganda feature more prominently into their creative process 
of TV drama production than is the case with non-governmental companies. 
3.1.11 Non-Governmental Production Companies and the Risks of Drama Production 
An increasing competition for the state-owned production units comes from the non- 
governmental production companies (14,05: 19 - 08: 43). 40 Since the start of the market 
economic reforms in China, the number of non-governmental production units has steadily 
increased over the past years: According to one interviewee, eighty per cent of all Chinese 
production companies were non-governmental in 2006 (ibid. ). In contrast to the state-owned 
institutions, propaganda and education are rarely motives of the non-governmental actors 
38 For more examples of institutions that possess a production permit, see Li (2007,80-85); as well as Lu at al. 
c2008,21). 
9 For example, the production centres of most state-run TV stations (including CCTV and the provincial 
broadcasters) are required to sell their products on the open market like any private company; they are not 
automatically guaranteed that their host company will buy and air the TV dramas that they have produced (12, 
18: 05 - 20: 42). 40 The term non-governmental includes both private (siren Wk) and stock-owned (guten f&{1)) companies. For an 
overview of the non-governmental production sector see Yu (2005). 
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(112,01: 54 - 03: 04). Private and stock-owned production companies do not have to adhere to 
explicit ideological agendas, and can therefore produce a wider range of TV dramas (ibid. ). 
Most large non-governmental companies are organised as professional enterprises with a 
long-term involvement in the market, often continuously producing TV dramas of various 
genres (112,01: 54 - 03: 04). In order to generate profits, they will attempt to produce TV 
dramas that have a high appeal to viewers while simultaneously being as uncontroversial as 
possible; or as one interviewee put it: "maximizing profit while minimizing political risk" (13, 
47: 07 - 48: 36). 
In addition to the large non-governmental production companies, there are also smaller 
enterprises that only work on one particular project. These small firms, which one 
interviewee referred to as "guerrilla" companies (13,06: 33 - 08: 43), should not be confused 
with independent or avant-garde production companies in western countries: their intention 
is not to produce art or criticise society, but merely to generate profits with one isolated, 
specific production idea (13,08: 44 - 09: 07). They will subsequently attempt to secure the 
largest possible amount of investments while simultaneously lowering their expenses 
drastically. In many cases, these small production companies do not expect their 
programmes to be aired (I3,10: 57 - 13: 41). The conditions in the Chinese TV drama market 
have created a moral hazard, in some cases prompting such small firms to deliberately 
produce TV dramas of sub-standard quality (ibid. ). The companies will then keep the large 
bulk of investments for themselves, regardless of the final products fate; this is currently a 
common practice in China (12,46: 57 - 49: 08; 13,10: 57 -13: 41). 
Due to the dubious profit-making strategies of smaller enterprises, the large bulk of Chinese 
drama productions (approximately seventy per cent according to one interviewee) is never 
aired (12,45: 39 - 46: 56). This makes TV drama production (and the investment into the sector) 
a risky business (ibid. ). The situation is further aggravated by nepotism, personal ties, and 
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unprofessional management techniques throughout the production sector (both with respect 
to non-governmental and state-owned companies; 13,106: 41 - 109: 38), but also by unethical 
behaviour on the part of reputable directors and producers (who will at times take large 
amounts of money for their involvement in a project, without then fulfilling their end of the 
agreement) 41. In addition, investment speculations put an extra strain on the TV drama 
production sector: many private financiers will invest their funds into productions of one 
particularly popular TV drama genre (for example swordsmen dramas or crime series), 
hoping to make quick profits from a temporary trend (12,46: 57 - 49: 08). Such speculations 
may create an investment bubble; once over-production of that particular genre has caused 
the market to be saturated, the investment bubble will burst, leaving production companies 
unable to sell their products (ibid. ). 42 
3.1.1! 1 Budget Items 
The production costs for Chinese television dramas vary widely, depending on the genre, the 
length of the drama, and the quality of the production (12,7: 25 - 9: 06; 114,53: 41 - 56: 03): One 
episode will usually cost between 300,000 RMB (for dramas set in modern-day China) and 
600,000 RMB (for elaborate historical series), but extremely cheap productions (80,000 RMB 
per episode) and very expensive productions (1,000,000 RMB per episode) also occur (13, 
23: 44 - 25: 24). A drama series with twenty episodes will normally cost 
between 6,000,000 
RMB and 20,000,000 RMB (Il, 28: 27 - 28: 57,12,07: 25 - 09: 06). 
A large budget item is the salary of actors (14,44: 43 - 46: 06): Famous stars demand between 
100,000 and 150,000 RMB per episode (i. e. up to 3,000,000 RMB for a twenty episode drama), 
second rate stars are paid 80,000 to 100,000 RMB (i. e. up to 2,000,000 RMB for a twenty 
41 One Interviewee gave the example of a famous, successful producer, who was recently able to secure 
investments based solely on an investment proposal, without having to produce a story outline, script or actual 
product. The producer embezzled a total of 180 million RMB from his investors and fled China with the money in 
2006 (14,18: 42 - 20: 47). 42 Some interviewees justified government intervention into the TV drama market with this argument (for example 
14,37: 32 - 43: 28 and I5: 80: 42 - 82: 51): according to the Interviewees, the state 
has to regulate the genres that 
can be produced at any given time in order to prevent Investment speculations. This Issue Is discussed below in 
the chapter on censorship (3.5. ). 
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episode drama), third-level stars receive about 50,000 to 60,000 RMB (i. e. up to 1,200,000 
RMB for a twenty episode drama), and little known actors are paid 5,000 to 20,000 RMB per 
episode (i. e. between 100,000 and 400,000 RMB for the entire production). These numbers are 
particularly high when considering the salaries of some of the other production crew 
members: a director receives between 10,000 and 100,000 RMB per episode (i. e. between 
200,000 and 2,000,000 RMB for a twenty episode production; 12,66: 31 - 72: 59), a screenwriter 
approximately 4,000 to 15,000 RMB per episode (80,000 to 300,000 RMB for a twenty episode 
script; 18,52: 10 - 53: 44). 
3.1.1v Investors and their Motives 
The numerous risk factors in the Chinese drama sector prevent most production companies 
and producers from financing a drama solely with their own resources, or with the funds of 
one individual investor. It is technically possible to apply for a bank loan (yinhang daikuan 
fr ), but considering the high-risk environment that production companies face, most 
banks will only grant such loans to large, state-owned production units; non-governmental 
companies will not normally receive such loans (14,29: 15 - 31: 05; 110,39: 29 - 40: 56). Generally, 
these enterprises will instead attempt to spread the investment burden and risks across 
several partner companies (Ii, 02: 28 - 03: 37). Potential investors can be divided on one hand 
into state and non-state actors, on the other hand into institutions from either within the 
media sector (hangnei f`I'I J) or from outside that sector (hangwai 'i 3'F). Such a differentiation 
leads to four types of investors, which I have listed in Figure 9 (based on the interviews 
conducted in the summer 2007). 
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Figure 9: Types of Investors for TV Drama Series 
Category: 
State-owned television stations, 
state-owned production companies 
Examples: 
CCTV, Jiangsu TV, China Teleplay 
Production Centre, etc. 
Motives: 
" Profits from production sales 
" Securing future broadcasting rights 
" Didactic or propaganda intentions 
Category: 
Ministries or state agencies 
Examples: 
Ministry of Public Security, Army, Air 
Force, etc. 
Motives: 
" Profits from production sales 
" Didactic or propaganda intentions 
Category: 
Private production companies, 
private distributors 
Example: 
Beijing Xingguang International (. IL A )i'. ; 'L 
ýý fd1 Ti Ise ý` 1; main production unit behind 
the TV drama NCNM) 
Motives: 
" Profits from production sales 
" Distribution rights or copy-rights 
Category: 
Commercial enterprises 
Examples: 
Construction companies, computer 
companies, telecommunication providers, 
etc. 
Motives: 
" Profits from production sales 
" Product placement opportunities 
In most cases, the various investors will be professionally involved in the television sector 
and will pool their resources with the main production unit (114,31: 15 - 32: 59). For example, 
some investors may grant the main production company the rights to use their production 
permit; others (for example TV stations or distribution companies) may support the 
marketing effort or assure broadcasting (110,72: 21 - 73: 45). Such collaboration will usually 
take place at the domestic level; some production firms may decide to cooperate with 
enterprises or individuals from outside the mainland, but this will usually not extend further 
than involving famous directors, producers or actors from I long Kong, 'faiwan or possibly 
from neighbouring East Asian countries (such as South Korea; 12,02: 28 - 03: 35). Generally, 
the bureaucracy involved in more extensive international cooperation outweighs the benetits, 
and was described by one producer as excessively "annoying" (nnaMii I}#; bl; ibid. ). 
Investors do not always contribute to the actual production process with professional 
knowledge or contacts. Most often, the involvement of investors will be purely financial in 
nature, particularly if the financiers are not themselves part of the media sector (14,23: 19 - 
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25: 51). Such investors receive a share of the final profits, or (in the case of certain consumer 
product enterprises) are allowed to place their product in the TV drama for promotion 
purposes (I2,16: 37 - 18: 04). In return, investors offer financial support, supply the production 
team with equipment (mobile phones, computers, etc.; 18,23: 10 - 24: 29), or allow the use of 
their office space as a filming set (112,27: 28 - 28: 49). 
The main production unit defines the responsibilities and decision-making privileges of each 
investor and codifies the rights and responsibilities in individual contracts43 (12,14: 08 - 15: 39). 
A larger financial involvement will naturally be accompanied by more decision-making 
powers (15,37: 21 - 39: 42). In general, however, investors have little to no influence on the 
genre or content of the TV drama being produced (I1,27: 33 - 28: 26). 
Exceptions are state investors, who usually also have requirements concerning the TV 
drama's content as This is particularly the case if the production units are themselves state- 
owned: Despite the official independence of production units such as CCTV's China 
Teleplay Production Centre, they will de-facto still produce propaganda content for their 
superordinated TV station (15,41: 23 - 43: 20). The interests of TV stations and their 
production units are not as clearly separated as the market economic system would demand 
(13,37: 13 - 39: 20). This is due in part to the overlapping of personnel and responsibilities 
(ibid.; I3,106: 41-109: 38), in part to the fact that the production units (whether at the central, 
provincial, or municipal level) continue to financially depend on the host TV stations a5 
43 Although contractual agreements are becoming more common in China, many production companies still prefer 
to base their business ventures on personal bonds. As one Interviewee explained (14,20: 48 - 23: 18), many businesses are prejudiced towards legal contracts: the argument Is that a contract with a trustworthy partner is 
unnecessary (since such a partner will not attempt to betray the agreement), and that a contract with an 
untrustworthy partner Is useless (because such a partner will always find a way to circumvent the agreement). 44 A good example is the crime drama series GAJZ, which is analysed in Chapter 4.2: the production was initiated 
and in part financed by the Ministry of Public Security (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonganbu tP fA,, N. #l l(til ; 
Vr i). The ministry's motivation was to improve the Image of the police. It therefore had very clear propaganda 
(xuanchuan Jtf) guidelines that needed to be fulfilled (113,65: 33 - 71: 07). 48 One interviewee gave the example of a representative municipal TV station and explained how that station 
pays 10 million RMB to Its nominally Independent production unit every year, this amounts to fifteen per cent of 
that unit's annual production expenses (12,21: 48 - 22: 45). 
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3.2 Planning and Producing a TV Drama 
Whether the production of a television drama is initiated by a state-owned institution or by a 
non-governmental company, the actual procedure of developing a story and producing a 
drama are generally the same (I4,14: 55 - 16: 17). Since Chinese TV dramas are conceived as a 
closed story told in numerous episodes, similar to the Latin-American 'telenovelas', a 
standard format for a Chinese drama series has developed: the programmes usually include 
twenty episodes, each approximately forty-two minutes long (see Section 2.2. iii). This sets 
Chinese TV series apart from the continuous drama series popular in other societies. 46 Actual 
'soap operas' that are continuously produced over years are not produced in China, and 
neither are series that stretch over several seasons, featuring a continuously developing 
storyline and recurring characters throughout the individual instalments 47 
In general, the entire production process of an average twenty-episode TV drama, from the 
development of the story idea to the distribution of the finished product, will require one 
year (14,59: 33 - 59: 59). This process is supervised by a production team, which includes 
various producers with different responsibilities and jurisdictions, as well as the 
screenwriters (I have provided an overview of positions and their functions in Figure 10, 
based on the interviews conducted in the summer of 2007). The production can be divided 
into four individual phases (start-up; pre-production; filming; and post 
production/distribution; 12,85: 00 - 89: 30), which shall be introduced below. 
46 The reasons for this difference in TV formats are highly complex, and include institutional factors (for example 
government regulations and market economic Incentives) as well as cultural aspects (such as viewing habits or 
traditions of narration). These factors are analysed In depth In Chapter 3.4 and 3.5. 47 US American sitcoms and TV drama series such as Friends, Scrubs, Sex and the City, Prison Break, 24, CSI or 
Heroes are very popular with young Chinese audiences, who watch these programmes either over the internet or 
on (mostly pirated) DVDs (114,49: 29 - 53: 40). However, Chinese drama productions only rarely attempt to 
emulate these foreign formats (an exception is the Chinese adaptation of Sex and the City. Haoxieng haoxiang 
tan lianei Of ABOVE At, R, aired on the regional TV stations Tianjin TV and Southern Television Guangdong in 
2004). The reason Is, according to one interviewee, that the specific viewing habits of Chinese audiences do not 
make the production of such adaptations lucrative for producers (17,78: 58 - 82: 03). This issue is discussed fully in 
Chapter 3.4. 
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Figure 10: Central Members of the Production Team and their Functions 
Chinese 
Titl 
English Description/ 
e 
IIl 6lß 
Translation 
producer 
Function 
Usually the manager of the main production company, not involved 
(chupinren) in the actual details of production, responsibilities include 
" representing the company's financial interests, 
" acting as a legal agent for the project, 
" supplying the production permit. 
tA 44 editor "Responsible producer" (zeren zhipianren r; i ff liiJ) Y A) and direct 
(bianji) superior of the creative producer, mostly in charge of 
administrative duties; responsibilities include: 
" assuring that the production company's interests and 
requirements are met by the creative producer and his or her 
subordinates, 
" assisting in early decisions on content and choice of actors. 
11 i Jý creative The central person in creative control of the production process, 
(zhipianren) producer responsibilities include: 
" choosing a genre, 
" devising the story idea (xuanti Lt A), 
" presenting the story proposal to the respective production unit, 
" securing investments, 
" hiring a screenwriter to produce a script, 
" approving the script, 
" devising the project's budget plan (yusuan hi tl ), 
" hiring the director, the other members of the production crew, 
and the actors, 
" guaranteeing quality standards of production, 
" assuring adherence to censorship guidelines and production 
regulations. 
*lLl fL executive In charge of the operational level of drama production; 
(zhipian zhuren) producer responsibilities include: 
" managing the production schedule, 
" assuring adherence to deadlines, 
" enforcing the project's budget plan (yusuan lii! W11). 
iflil' lf" lý line producer Representative of the creative producer on set (in case of large 
(zhixing zhi ianren productions or multiple projects). 
11; $iJ production Today largely a prestige title (similar to "associate producer"; 
(jianzhr) supervisor lianhe zhipian lfX (hill f i) with no jurisdiction or decision-making 
competency. Formerly a media professional and (usually) Party 
representative in charge of production quality. Traditional 
responsibilities include: 
" assuring the contractual compliance of the production crew 
members, 
" assuring correct adaptation of script, 
" assuring plot continuity, 
" mediating in case of production-internal conflicts. 
IX() A distributor Responsibilities include 
(faxingren) " supervising marketing, 
" negotiating sales. 
In case of smaller production companies, these functions are 
fulfilled by the creative producer. 
tl«ift9 screenwriter Professional writer, hired to create: 
(bianju) " the story outline (5,000 characters), 
" the plot outline (1,000-2,000 characters per episode), 
" the script. 
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3.2. i Start Up Phase 
During the earliest phase of Chinese TV drama production, the story idea is devised and the 
main discursive themes of the drama defined (12,85: 00 - 89: 30). The primary decision-maker 
during this period is the creative producer (zhipianren $iJK A; 13,09: 08 - 10: 56). He or she is in 
creative control of the production (14,28: 51 - 29: 14). When devising the story idea, the 
creative producer essentially has three main options (I4,08: 44 -12: 57): 
1. The adaptation of a literary theme to the screen. 48 
2. The development of an original story idea, usually with a certain target 
audience in mind (in many cases, the producer will not create the idea 
himself, but will hire a professional screenwriter to present an original 
concept, often only providing guidelines regarding the genre of the 
drama). 
3. A production based on an upcoming festivity, such as a national 
commemoration day, anniversary or international event 49 
Once the story idea has been devised, the creative producer will hire a professional 
screenwriter (bianju i); in some cases a team of screenwriters will be hired) to produce a 
story outline (gushi ganggai V or gushi dagang f(*). The time required to create a 
story outline can be as short as half a month (18,30: 12 - 31: 56). This synopsis is usually about 
5,000 characters long (13,03: 06 - 04: 45) and is used to attract investors. After the outline has 
been written, the screenwriter(s) will summarise each episode in a plot outline, which can 
include between 1,000 and 2,000 characters per episode (13,03: 06 - 04: 45; 18,4: 59 - 5: 51). The 
time required to create a plot outline can be as short as half a month (18,30: 12 - 31: 56). Once 
48 This can include both topics of classical literature (gudai wenxue ü fti "*) or the adaptation of more 
contemporary novels. An example from classical literature Is the famous Dream of the Red Chamber, Hong lou 
meng *. I49 V (111,50: 00 53: 54): Currently, Hu Mel AR; , the director of HWDD, is producing a new TV drama 
adaptation of this Chinese classic (jingdian 8114); the series is scheduled to be aired before the Beijing Olympic 
Games in 2008 (the production details to this program can be found online on 
9ttp: //news. xinhusnet. com/photo/2006-08/22/content 4991242. htm (25.01.08)). 
For example, on the occasion of the ten-year anniversary of Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule, the drama 
"Hong Kong Sisters" (Xlanggang jiemei fF)* t. ) was aired in June 2007 (14; 05: 19 - 08: 43). Various productions 
are planned that directly or Indirectly focus on the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, and the 60th anniversary of the 
foundation of the PRC is already targeted by CCTV as a major event for which TV dramas need to be produced 
(16; 57: 04 - 59: 00). Themes centred on such events not only offer an opportunity to create didactical or 
propagandistic content, they also significantly Increase the possibilities of marketing a drama (14,08: 44 - 12: 57; 17, 
15: 44 - 17: 24). The potential commercial success of such dramas therefore makes them attractive projects, both for state-owned and non-governmental production companies (ibid. ). 
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this work step has been concluded and reviewed by the creative producer, the screenwriter 
creates the actual script (juben PJ*). 50 In this sense, the screenwriter develops the discourse 
strands of the TV drama, but only within the framework that the creative producer has 
provided 51 
When the screenwriter has finished the script, the creative producer and (in the case of large 
production units) the editor (bianji MR) will check if the finished text satisfies the company 
requirements (12,28: 32 - 29: 29). If no revisions need to be made, the production company will 
buy the script. This will usually include the rights to the drama's title and all of the 
characters 52 The script is rarely altered once it has been approved, and certainly not after 
filming has commenced, since that would be viewed as a serious disruption of production (II, 
08: 46 - 09: 44; 12,29: 30 - 30: 08). 53 Writing the script usually takes two months (18,30: 12 - 
31: 56)54 
50 One interviewee criticized this process of first writing a plot outline and then later developing the script as 
excessively restrictive (18,8: 58 - 8: 03), According to the Interviewee, this procedure is a new development in China: former generations of screenwriters would write the entire script chronologically, without a plot outline. 
Since the production companies had problems controlling that type of creative process, they introduced 
requirements such as the story outline. 51 The actual creative process of writing the script for a TV drama Is usually entirely in the hands of the 
screenwriter(s). There are, however, cases In which other members of the production crew influence the 
screenwriters work. One Interviewee complained that he had been asked on numerous occasions to include new 
characters or storylines Into his scripts (112,68: 24 - 72: 20). He stated that such requests were particularly 
problematic if they came from persons who had no experience with screenwriting, such as investors from outside 
of the media sector. According to the interviewee, the problem Is that requests from investors rarely reflect actual 
financial considerations (for example the inclusion of product placements); such considerations are either taken 
into account before the screenwriting process begins, or can be edited Into the story once filming has started. 
More commonly, requests reflect personal preferences. This may include ideas on how the story should evolve or 
how characters should be developed. Since such requirements do not consider the overall storyline, such 
demands can seriously damage a TV drama (ibid. ). They also make it difficult to pinpoint who, aside from the 
creative producer and the screenwriter(s), has Influenced the discourse presented in a script. 52 There are cases In which the screenwriter retains the rights to the programme's name and is paid by production 
companies If they wish to produce sequels, spin-offs, etc; however, this Is very rarely the case in China (112, 
22: 30 - 24: 09). More commonly, the screenwriter sells the rights to the story idea along with the script, The 
production company can then go on to produce whatever additional content it wishes to create. An example is the 
TV drama NCNM: the production company Beijing Xingguang International (ýt>;? }1LIpIýT(iA) bought the script 
and the copy-right to the series' concept for roughly 300,000 RMB. It has since produced a movie by the same 
title, a follow-up drama entitled Noce! Nanmeo 3't3-A1j, and a sequel to the original drama (18,17: 06 - 18: 23). 53 There are rare cases In which the script Is altered after it has been approved. A good example for such a case 
Is the production of the drama NCNM. According to two inside source (18,9: 19 - 11: 09 ; 112,14: 40 - 16: 54), the 
screenwriters had to heavily rewrite the script once production had started: the production company was able to 
hire the popular actor Lu Yi MIR to play one of the male roles, hoping that this choice would increase the 
attractiveness of the drama and facilitate promotion. However, since the original drama was devised as a story 
about three girls, the script only featured male support roles. When the producers realized that the actor Lu Yi 
would have only very little screen time (about ten scenes per episode; main characters usually have around thirty- 
five to forty scenes per episode) while receiving a relatively high salary (roughly 150,000 RMB per episode, 
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3.2.11 Pre-Production 
The purchase of the script concludes the creative process of the start-up phase and initiates 
the pre-production phase, which usually requires two to three months (12,85: 00 - 89: 30). 
During this phase, the creative producer hires the production crew and cast. The first person 
to be hired is the director (daoyan 44M). This brings an additional creative force to the pre- 
production process: The director offers advice when it comes to hiring the rest of the 
project's personnel (including the actors), and very often brings a pre-selected production 
crew to the project (for example cameramen or gaffers that the director has successfully 
worked with on past projects; 14,50: 25 - 53: 50). 55 In addition, the director is involved in the 
preparations of the actual production (I1,12: 22 - 14: 20), for example scouting locations 
(xuanjing A*, usually with the aid of the art director; meishu A*; 14,46: 07 - 47: 29) and 
overseeing work on the storyboard (fenjingtou juben ft%9-, 01*)56, thereby effectively 
defining what visual mode the various discourse fragments will later receive during the 
filming process. 
3.2.111 Filming 
The actual filming of the drama is usually a very fast-paced process: up to 140 scenes are shot 
each day (13,21: 01 - 23: 43). In total, an average production requires approximately three to 
four days for the filming of one episode (14,53: 51 - 56: 16). This means that the filming of a 
twenty episode TV drama will usually be concluded within sixty to seventy days, and will 
amounting to a total 1,200,000 RMB for the entire series), they had the script rewritten to include an actual male 
protagonist (the character of Qlu Shi üIl ). In order to accomplish this, the screen time of another character 
(Chen Xiaofang M+)5; played by the Shanghai actress Wu Jlani R( ffl) was extensively cut. Consequently, the 
commercial interests of the production company turned the drama Into a story about two girls instead of three, 
and introduced discourse strands (for example on entrepreneurial success and technology) that would have 
otherwise not been Included In the drama. 64 There are productions that require much more time for screenwriting. For example, it took the screenwriters of 
NCNM between five and six months to finish the script, Including all revisions that had to be made (112,60: 18 - 62: 29). The screenwriters of GAJZ worked on the script for the police drama for almost four years (113,71: 08 - 
72: 31). However, these are exceptions: normally, the script to a drama will be written in a relatively short period of 
time (18,30: 12 - 31: 56). 55 In China, production crews for normal-sized projects on average encompass approximately 100 persons (11, 
11: 38 - 12: 21). 56 For a Chinese instruction manual on how to create storyboards and organize pre-production, see Chen at at 
(2005,322-329). 
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only very rarely exceed eighty days (II, 14: 21-14: 49; I2,85: 00 - 89: 30). 57 During this entire 
period, the director takes creative control of the project and shapes the way in which the 
discourse fragments of the script are presented on screen. The director is responsible for 
arranging and shooting the individual scenes, managing the cast, and coordinate the 
interests of different production crew members (I1,24: 18 - 25: 16), such as cameramen 
(sheyingshi MV i ), gaffers (dengguangshi fft3), makeup-artists (huazhuangshi 1L )fi), 
sound engineers (luyinshi-; Rý ä uli), etc. If the project is a larger one, or if multiple projects 
need to be tackled at the same time, one person may function as the 'main director' (zong 
daoyan , lrt y), supported by a number of 'assistant directors' (%u daoyan All gi; 11,14: 50 - 
16: 38). In such cases, the main director is in creative charge of the filming process, has to 
assure general continuity, and generates the appropriate atmosphere for the TV drama (12, 
66: 31 - 72: 59). The assistant directors, on the other hand, oversee more practical details of 
production. This may include directors who are responsible specifically for the actors' 
schedules (so called'acting directors'; yanyuan daoyan managing at what time 
what actors will work on which set (I1,14: 50 - 16: 38). It may also include so-called 'on-site 
directors' (zuo xianchang daoyan {1Mt3, ý49i1'), who implement the main director's instructions 
on the set, i. e. instructing the production crew members and the actors (ibid. ). Based on the 
interview statements discussed here, I have presented an overview of the director's team and 
the function of each member in Figure 11. 
57 More elaborate productions may require five to six days of filming per episode (100-120 days for a twenty 
episode drama 14,53: 51 - 56: 18), but there are also cases of low-quality productions that will film one episode in two to two-and-a-half days (forty to fifty days of filming; 12,85: 00 - 89: 30). 
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Figure 11: Directors 
Chinese 
Titl 
English Descriptiord 
F ti e 
j, 
unc on Translation 
fifec! ()f III , Ii', I(I VI' , 
ýI, ll jl' 0 till IHr I. i t. H 7 1'ß. i . ý" 
(daoyan) include: 
" advising the creative producer with regards to personnel 
decisions, 
" creating the story board, 
" scouting locations, 
" overseeing the filming process, 
" supervising the editing work, 
" coordinating the interests of different production crew 
members and actors on set. 
main director In case of large productions, the main director will supervise 
(zong daoyan) filming at the macro-level, while various assistant directors 
(fu daoyan IJ V -M) will represent him or her on set. 
Responsibilities of the main director include: 
" supervising the filming process on multiple locations, 
" assuring general continuity, 
" assuring a congruent atmosphere throughout all scenes. 
Cii rill li°a acting A type of assistant director, responsible for coordinating the 
an uan dao an directors schedules of the respective actors. 
( fl, ß3 Ir- y on-site A type of assistant director, representing the main director 
(zuo xianchang directors on the individual sets; responsibilities include: 
daoyan) " Managing on-set logistics, 
" Coordinating production crew members on the set, 
" Directing actors' performances. 
art director Supervises all aspects of a production's art design and 
(meishu) advises the director with regard to location scouting and 
other artistic issues. 
In general, the jurisdiction over the filming process will lie with the (main) director, or as one 
interviewee put it: "the director has the last word" (daoyan slt) sums 12,11: 28 - 
13: 48). Simultaneously, the jurisdiction for the project in its entirety will lie with the creative 
producer ("the creative producer has the last word"; zhipianren shoo siian ; I; IJ) 13, 
09: 08 - 10: 56; 14,28: 51 - 29: 14). 
3.2. iv Post-Production 
When all material has been shot, the post-production phase will commence. During this tinie, 
the filmed material is edited (/ianji 1Aorjianjie ) and possibly (though only very rarely) 
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re-shot (Il, 14: 21 -14: 49; 14,59: 33 - 59: 59). This period requires between three and five 
months of work (ibid. ). 
All throughout the filming and post-production phases, the creative producer will already 
market the TV drama for distribution (14,56: 17 - 59: 32). He or she is also in charge of 
negotiating the sale of the drama. In this sense, each phase of production can be handled 
flexibly, and in most cases the different phases will to some extend overlap, particularly 
when it comes to marketing aspects (ibid. ). In general, the entire production process of an 
average twenty-episode TV drama, from the development of the story idea to the 
distribution of the finished product, will require one year (14,59: 33 - 59: 59). 
3.3 Selling the Drama 
According to the interviewees (I2,18: 05 - 20: 42; 14,56: 17 - 59: 32 & 76: 42 - 80: 25; 112,44: 11 - 
45: 20), as the creative producer attempts to market his product, he or she will take into 
account various potential sales models, as well as the requirements from possible buyers (i. e. 
what type of television dramas the TV stations will regard as a 'good' drama). However, 
even a production unit that creates TV dramas that fulfil the needs of buyers will still rely on 
a skilful distribution unit with an appropriate marketing strategy: As one interviewee put it, 
"the scent of alcohol is lost in a small alley" (jiuxiang pa xiangzi Shen >t j§' g "A), meaning 
that a good product will not be sold if it is marketed badly (13,27: 48 - 30: 50). This is why 
marketing issues already play a role during the earliest stages of production, for example 
when it comes to hiring production crew members and casting actors. For this reason, it is 
necessary to consider how sales considerations influence the production of TV drama 
content. 
3.3.1 Distribution: How TV Series Are Marketed 
Before turning to the various requirements posed by the Chinese TV drama buyers, it is 
worth taking a look at the actual prices that are paid for TV dramas, the sales models that 
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production companies use to distribute them, and the market dynamics that influence drama 
sales. 
As one interviewee explained, Chinese TV dramas are sometimes sold to broadcasting 
stations overseas (I10,19: 30 - 20: 00), but the impact of these programmes on foreign markets 
is not particularly high. The target audience for Chinese drama exports are mostly overseas 
Chinese, and for this reason the markets in South-East Asian, particularly Singapore, are 
most relevant (112,50: 51 - 52: 22). Some dramas are also sold to TV stations in Korea or Japan 
(for example, the family drama Chinese-style Divorce, Zhongguo shi lihun a'[ t AA , was sold 
to the Japanese station NHK), but the domestic market remains the predominant target for 
Chinese TV drama distribution (12,03: 36 - 05: 30). 
The sales process in mainland China is governed largely by market economic dynamics (12, 
76: 16 - 78: 17). There are still production units that will profit from their affiliation with state 
television stations, but the majority of production companies will have to sell their product 
on the open market (ibid. ). Broadcasting stations in the prosperous urban regions of eastern 
China (for example in the cities of Beijing or Shanghai, as well as in provinces such as Jiangsu 
or Zhejiang) may in some cases pay up to ten million RMB for the rights to air an entire 
series (I2,18: 05 - 20: 42), but for most stations in developed regions the rights to broadcast a 
twenty-episode TV drama will be somewhere in the vicinity of 1.5 million RMB (I1,20: 48 - 
21: 42). Even if a drama is sold to a TV station at a relatively high price, the returns from that 
one sale will rarely cover the production costs; production companies therefore need to sell 
their products to numerous TV stations, and will usually try to find at least ten different 
buyers (I2,18: 05 - 20: 42). 
Considering the size and different developmental levels of the Chinese market, TV drama 
prices vary widely, depending on whom they are sold to (12,25: 44 - 27: 34): TV stations in 
more developed parts of China (such as the Dongbei region, Shandong Province, Jiangsu 
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Province, Zhejiang Province, Beijing, Shanghai, etc. ) pay approximately 50,000 RMB per 
episode (ibid. ). A special case is the highly developed province of Guangdong; due to the 
strong influence that Hong Kong TV stations play in that region, broadcasters in Guangdong 
pay far less for an episode of TV drama than their colleagues in other prosperous regions, 
usually only 10,000 RMB per episode (ibid. ). Finally, broadcasting stations in 
underdeveloped regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, etc. ) pay very low prices, sometimes only 
a couple of hundred RMB per episode (ibid. ). Such sales consequently do not play a large 
role; production companies usually make about eighty to ninety per cent of their profits from 
sales to the developed regions (I2,18: 05 - 20: 42). This means that TV dramas will mostly be 
created with these markets in mind. 
According to one interviewee (14,76: 42 - 80: 25), there are generally two sales models for TV 
dramas: A programme can be sold at a predetermined fixed price to one (or more) television 
stations (for example, a broadcaster like CCTV, or a regional television station such as BTV, 
will pay 50,000 RMB per episode for the right to air a TV drama; ibid. ). A more common 
method is to sell the programme to TV stations at a price that depends on later TV ratings 
(for example five per cent prime-time ratings entitles the distributor to the normal 50,000 
RMB per episode; lower ratings decrease the profits, while higher ratings increase them; 
ibid. ). In some cases, the distributor may contractually agree to sell the broadcasting rights 
exclusively to one primary buyer until the drama has successfully been aired: This may be 
the case with large TV stations (such as CCTV) who want to assure that the drama's ratings 
are maximised (112,44: 11 - 45: 20). 
If a TV drama is received favourably by audiences, a DVD or VCD release shortly after the 
first broadcasting may create additional revenues (16,43: 06 - 45: 29). However, such a release 
is not handled by the respective production units themselves, but instead by independent 
distributors (I2,103: 40 - 107: 22). Such distributors 
buy the rights to DVD sales at a fixed price 
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(ibid. ). Due to DVD piracy and illegal internet downloads, the sales from this market 
segment have continuously decreased over the past years (I5,46: 06 - 47: 16). DVD editions of 
TV dramas used to have a nation-wide circulation of about 20,000 copies; today, production 
has dropped to about 2,000-3,000 copies per series (12,103: 40 - 107: 22). A legal copy of a full 
drama series on DVD is usually sold at a price ranging from 80 RMB to about 300 RMB, 
depending on the length and popularity of the programme. At a circulation of 3,000 copies, 
this would bring the revenues from DVD sales to somewhere between 240,000 RMB and 
900,000 RMB per series. Another very small distribution opportunity is to offer series for 
legal internet download. Such offers are also handled by independent distributors, who pay 
a small fee (roughly 500 RMB per episode; I2,103: 40 - 107: 22) for the right to offer the 
respective service. 
How the total profits from TV drama sales are divided between the various investors 
depends on the contractual model that was adopted at the start of the production process. 
According to the interviewees, there are two such models: The investors can either choose to 
receive a pre-defined, fixed amount of money once the product has been distributed (guding 
huibao ®5t? C#a, for example x% of their original investment; 15,39: 43 - 41: 22). Such an 
approach will minimise the investors' risk (I4,25: 52 - 27: 23). Alternatively, more risk-seeking 
investors may choose to receive a share of the final profits. This share will usually reflect the 
investor's financial involvement in the project (investing y% of a project's total budget will 
consequently entitle an investor to y% of the final profits; 12,14: 08 - 15: 39). As one 
interviewee stated, the total volume of revenues generated by TV drama sales in China 
amounts to roughly three billion RMB each year (114,27: 20 - 31: 14). The series NCNM is a 
good example of the revenues that a successful twenty-episode TV drama creates: the sales 
revenue for that particular programme totalled twelve million RMB; with a production cost 
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of seven million RMB, leaving the production company and the investors with five million 
RMB in profits (112,50: 51 - 52: 22). 
3.3.11 The Buyers: TV Stations and their Motives 
A main characteristic of the TV drama market is a noticeable over-supply: Roughly 10,000 
episodess8 of television drama are produced in China each year (16,28: 33 - 30: 40), which 
amounts to a total of 700 to 800 series, of which only about thirty per cent are actually aired 
(12,45: 39 - 46: 56). The massive over-production substantially increases competition on the 
side of the production companies (I5,71: 26 - 80: 00). This makes the Chinese TV drama 
market a buyers' rather than a sellers' market (19,43: 38 - 45: 42). It puts the TV stations in a 
very powerful bargaining position, enabling them, as one interviewee put it, to act as the 
"overlords" (bawangT_; 13,35: 21 - 37: 12) of the market: large TV stations in particular (for 
example CCTV) use the attractiveness of their prime time broadcasting slots (huangjin shijian 
# H1'laJ; 8-10 p. m. ) as pressure against production companies, dictating the terms of 
% Ä i; ibid. ) and purchase ("TV stations have the last word", dianshitai shuo suan *- 
driving the prices of TV dramas down. One effect is that TV drama quality is reduced (13, 
45: 16 - 47: 06); another that production companies censor themselves by avoiding 
controversial topics and tailoring the content of their productions to the requirements of the 
individual TV stations (13,35: 21 - 37: 12). 
This means that production companies have to decide early-on during the production 
process to what type of TV station they ultimately wish to distribute their product (114,33: 00 
- 34: 11): The preferred sales option will be to sell a series to CCTV; this will generate the 
maximum amount of profits and decrease the financial risks for the producers (114,27: 20 - 
31: 14). However, it may at first limit other distribution options (CCTV will usually request 
the exclusive rights to air the respective dramas; 15,43: 21 - 46: 05). As a second option, TV 
5e According to one interviewee, 13,800 episodes were produced in 2006 (14,3: 09 - 5: 18). 
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dramas will be sold to regional TV stations; however, the profits from such sales will be far 
less than if the product were sold to CCTV (12,18: 05 - 20: 42). A final option is to sell TV 
dramas to satellite stations (weixing dianshitai. E*, r p), but most production companies 
will only consider this market after all other distribution options have been exhausted (114, 
33: 00 - 34: 11): selling programmes to satellite stations eliminates any further chances of 
marketing the products, since it technically enables audiences all around the world to view 
the respective dramas. 
Considering the diversity of the Chinese broadcasting sector, the greatest challenge for 
production companies is, according to one interviewee, to create a drama that will satisfy the 
demands of as many TV stations as possible (110,58: 18 - 59: 28). Regional TV stations will 
emphasise entertainment (yule *'9 ), whereas CCTV (particularly CCTV-1) will require 
programmes with more serious (or'healthy'; jiankang NJ*) content and a distinct focus on 
education and ideology, preferably so-called 'main melody' dramas (110,21: 30 - 22: 29). 
The criteria that both production companies and TV stations adopt in order to define what 
constitutes a'good' or'healthy' TV drama are summarised by the slogan "unite the three 
qualities" (sanxing tongyi =' it-). These are (12,52: 47 - 53: 35; 16,03: 05 - 05: 37,17,11: 26 - 
12: 26; 110,04: 31 - 07: 54; 111,27: 23 - 29: 18; 113a, 56: 58 - 59: 44): 
1. Ideological quality (sixiangxing TVrjt), 
2. Artistic quality (yishuxing LW )Kf ), and 
3. Viewing quality (guanshangxing RAft). 
These phrases remain sufficiently vague, and most interviewees were hard pressed to 
formulate distinct definitions for each of these 'qualities' (ibid. ): Generally, ideological 
quality means that content is in line with the respective state guidelines, artistic quality 
seems to refer to camerawork, lighting, sound, acting, set and costume design, etc., and 
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viewing quality is equated with audience appeal, i. e. is measured in terms of TV ratings. I 
will return to the matter of ideological quality in chapter 3.5, and to the other criteria in 
chapter 3.7. 
3.4 The Chinese Television Drama Audience 
In order to successfully sell a TV drama, production companies need to take into 
consideration not only the various buyers' preferences, but also the potential target audience 
of their product. The interviews generally confirmed what other authors have already 
argued (see section 2.2. iii), i. e. that TV stations increasingly rely on advertisement profits: as 
one interviewee stated, small stations in particular sometimes receive sixty to seventy per 
cent of their revenues from airing commercials during breaks (14,80: 26 - 84: 48). This makes 
the question of what audiences watch at what time a major concern to the entire industry. 
3.4.1 Assessing Audiences: the Chinese Audience Measurement System 
As described earlier (chapter 2.2. iv), audience research in China is a relatively recent 
enterprise, and is to-date still highly imperfect. The dilemma is that TV ratings (shoushih4 tý$( 
Jam) do not reflect the actual reactions of audiences, yet are nonetheless the main instrument 
with which advertisers, TV stations and production companies assess the marketing value of 
drama series (12,31: 31 - 33: 24): the TV stations rely on the ratings in order to sell 
advertisement slots, and the production companies require ratings to sell (and possible later 
resell) their products to the broadcasters. 59 One producer voiced his frustration with the 
current system by stating that "the ratings completely dominate this programme market of 
ours, they completely dominate over me! " (shoushila wanquan zhuzai women jiemu de zhe ge 
shichang, wanquan zhuzai wo! 'Rtt*, $. -t*ViIfl tlhj^MJ*, n *54. ! 12,126: 51- 
128: 15). 
59 For producers, the ratings of the first broadcasting run are consequently the most important: they determine 
how much the respective N station will eventually pay for the drama and how likely it is that a TV series will later 
be bought by other stations (112,44: 11 - 45: 20). 
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Despite these objections, the demand for data on TV drama audiences is nonetheless so 
strong that turning to questionable statistics is still preferred over not having any data at all 
(114,36: 54 - 41: 10). The implications of this situation are considerable: the relevance of the 
available audience measurement data provides producers with incentives to create TV 
dramas entirely aimed at the viewers that are included in the statistical sample, instead of 
producing formats that would appeal to broader (but statistically unaccounted for) 
audiences (17,82: 04 - 84: 15). 
In this context, producers are presented with a series of major problems that arise from the 
way in which audience ratings are created in China: 
1. The two largest providers of audience ratings, i. e. CSM and AGB 
Nielsen (see Section 2.2. iv), calculate different types of audience ratings 
(15,47: 13 - 51: 09): for example, CSM will provide the highest ratings that 
any one episode of a specific TV drama series received, whereas AGB 
Nielsen will offer an average value (pingyue shoushilil T- jL&*) for the 
entire series. 
2. The fact that the CSM and AGB Nielsen base their calculations on 
different samples (yangben #*) ultimately creates different ratings' 
results (14,80: 26 - 84: 48; 16,30: 41 - 33: 21). 
3. Numerous interviewees have criticised that CSM and AGB Nielsen both 
used insufficiently large sample bases (I2,31: 31 - 33: 24; 14,80: 26 - 84: 48; 
15,47: 13 - 51: 09; 17,82: 04 - 84: 15) 60: whether 11,000 or 54,000 households, 
the data derived from this sample was regarded as hardly representative 
for the 1.2 billion Chinese citizens who potentially watch TV dramas. 
Instead, the sample base is said to represent mostly the urban, middle- 
aged, female viewers in China (16,30: 41 - 33: 21). 
4. The system according to which the ratings are calculated is not 
transparent (I3,109: 39 - 115: 33). 
5. The ratings are presented in tables that are structured along excessively 
large units of time, so that the data often only reflects highest values 
achieved throughout an entire year (ibid. ). 
6. The relevant data is not commonly available to the public (ibid. ). 
60 The problems described here merely relate the fact that the current measurement system does not accomplish 
what it promises, i. e. assessing what TV programmes are most popular. Some of the interviewees further 
questioned whether the most popular series are in fact also the qualitatively best series (12,35: 48 - 38: 00; 19, 
09: 20 - 09: 43). As valid as this objection may be, it shall not be debated here. 
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7. The quantitative data is not augmented by qualitative analytical 
criteria (114,36: 54 - 41: 10), so that the resulting data offers no 
information as to why audiences decided to tune in for a specific 
programme (15,47: 13 - 51: 09). 
8. In some cases, extremely high but unlikely ratings results suggest that 
the data were altered intentionally, and that the system may be subject 
to corruption (15,47: 13 - 51: 09). One interviewee, who did not want her 
comment recorded, pointed out that the proximity of CSM to the CCTV 
wholly-owned subsidiary CITVC invites misuse: according to the 
interviewee, China's central television station is essentially analysing 
itself and its competitors, and this does not produce reliable data. 
Researchers and analysts of the Chinese TV drama market are aware of these problems (13, 
109: 39 - 115: 33), which may be why Chinese academics predominantly approach the subject 
of TV drama from the content side and choose to ignore the perspective of audiences (ibid. ). 
Broadcasters and production companies are equally aware of the flaws in the audience 
measurement system and have in some cases started to conduct their own research of 
viewing preferences in order to assess which TV dramas are likely to be successful and 
should therefore be aired at times were advertisement revenues are highest (for example, 
Nanjing TV frequently test-screens TV dramas to a selected group of forty viewers in order 
to assess audience reactions; 12,45: 00 - 45: 38). However, individual surveys are still very rare. 
If broadcasters wish to assess the potential popularity of a specific TV drama, they usually 
turn to the solutions offered by the leading market research companies. According to one 
interviewee (17,59: 58 - 64: 24), CTR (in cooperation with CSM) offers specific research, 
tailored to the needs of individual broadcasters. According to the interviewee (ibid. ), the 
method is usually to invite a group of research subjects to a hotel and provide them with 
individual accommodation. Each room features a television set that shows the different TV 
dramas that are under scrutiny. The research company then measures what type of person 
watches which series for how long. After the experiment, each research subject is asked to fill 
out a qualitative questionnaire in order to assess the reasons why the different viewers chose 
certain programmes over others, and what aspects (if any) they found particularly 
133 
entertaining. The data gathered from these experiments is then used by the broadcasters to 
decide which TV drama they wish to buy, and how they should best promote the 
programmes. In general, however, these types of test-screenings are still the exception in 
China, and most editors, producers and television station executives are forced to rely on 
past experiences in order to assess the marketing value of TV dramas and their potential 
impact on audiences (17,64: 25 - 65: 05). 
3.4.11 The Target Audiences of TV Dramas 
Television drama, as a form of entertainment, is generally believed to appeal to audiences of 
all backgrounds and all ages in China (I6,10: 13 - 11: 39; I10,17: 46 - 18: 06). However, even 
though some television dramas like the ones analysed in Chapter 4 are able to attract a broad 
audience, most TV dramas are watched by a very narrow group of viewers. When asked 
who the typical Chinese TV drama viewer was, the interviewees largely confirmed the 
assessment provided by Li Jingcheng and his colleagues from the CUC (Li, 2007; see section 
2.2. iii). The conclusion from my research can be summed up as follows (12,38: 01 - 39: 28; 16, 
10: 13 - 11: 39; Ill, 33: 24 - 34: 40; 114,46: 49 - 47: 43): 
1. Drama viewers are believed to be predominantly female and generally 
older than 45. It is possible that this is due to the television content on 
offer, and that the majority of Chinese television dramas appeal 
primarily to older viewers than to the younger generation. However, as 
various interviewees have pointed out, the main reason for this age 
discrepancy is a general difference in life-style between the young and 
the old generation: Young urban viewers are usually occupied with their 
careers and have neither the time nor the interest to watch television 
dramas (13,115: 34 - 121: 30). What little leisure time this age group has is 
usually spent away from home: in KTV bars or clubs, watching films at 
movie theatres, or playing online computer games in internet caf6s (14, 
84: 49 - 88: 32). When these younger viewers do watch Chinese television 
dramas, they tend to download the programmes from the internet and 
watch them on a computer rather than tuning in for the actual television 
broadcast (111,33: 24 - 34: 40). Whatever the reasons 
for this difference in 
viewing habits, the result is that the television drama broadcasts do not 
aim at viewers under the age of 45, but instead at, as one interviewee 
put it, the "mama generation" (18,62: 01 - 64: 11), i. e. married older 
female housewives who spend their evenings (or generally their days) at 
home (14,84: 49 - 88: 32). 
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2. The major groups targeted by Chinese television dramas are believed to 
be viewers with low-wage jobs, laid-off workers, retired viewers, and 
migrant workers (13,115: 34 - 121: 30), i. e. viewers with low incomes and 
low levels of education (16,33: 22 - 35: 15). 
3. According to one interviewee, northern viewers generally tend to 
watch more television dramas than southern viewers; the reason for 
this is supposed to lie in the climatic differences between the regions (114, 
46: 49 - 47: 43). 
What is relevant in this context is that there is believed to be a general discrepancy between 
the audience that is measured by the ratings system (and hence targeted by advertisers and 
broadcasters) and the viewers who actually watch drama series, particularly CCTV dramas: 
As one expert stated, the actual group that is most likely to watch drama series is 
predominantly rural (I3,115: 34 - 121: 30). This means that the actual (rural) audience of TV 
dramas is not the same (urban) audience for whose consumption the dramas are produced 
(ibid. ). 
3.4.111 Viewing Habits: How Chinese Television Dramas Are Watched 
The above assessment has shown that TV drama series are produced primarily for an urban, 
female, middle-aged audience with low-levels of income and education. This begs the 
question of whether any particular viewing preferences of this particular target audience 
influence the way TV series are devised and aired. In order to answer this question, it is 
worth taking a short detour from the factual statements that the interviewees made 
regarding drama production and broadcasting, and to examine in more detail what 
perceptions and expectations they held towards audiences. My research shows that media 
experts in China believe the Chinese audience to have very different viewing habits from 
foreign audiences, and that these supposed difference are used to explain and justify the 
peculiarities of drama serials that were described in section 2.2. iii (12,129: 33 - 130: 12; 12, 
136: 40 -137: 39; 16,17: 34 - 19: 20; 17,78: 58 - 82: 03; 
114,49: 29 - 53: 40). In these lines of 
argumentation, two tropes are repeatedly used: 
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The first trope is that Chinese viewers are less patient than Western audiences, and that they 
demand an immediate continuation of the series they are watching. One interviewee 
summed this up as follows (I2,128: 14 -129: 32): 
12: As for Chinese television dramas, once you've started broadcasting you 
have to continuously broadcast. You broadcast everything quickly. The 
viewers want to watch continuously, they won't wait for you. 
The second trope is that most Western television series are 'slower' than Chinese 
programmes, and that Chinese viewers (supposedly in contrast to Western viewers) prefer 
fast-paced action and no loose ends. The following interview segment makes use of both 
these tropes (114,47: 44 - 49: 19): 
R: So why is it that Chinese television dramas are completely different from 
those in the West? Like you just said: every evening you have two 
episodes, and every day it's the same television drama, and then after 
one or two weeks the broadcasting has been concluded, right? This is 
completely different from the Western way of showing one episode per 
week. Why does China broadcast like this? 
114: There are reasons for this in China. The first reason is the human nature of the 
Chinese people. That is, Chinese people are much more impatient than 
Westerners. Chinese people want a very fast conclusion. They don't like a long 
period of suspense. The most suspenseful dramas will still sell in China... 
extremely suspenseful ones will sell. But Chinese people can't stand long 
waits. They'll stop watching. (... ) For example Prison Break: they will prefer to 
watch that, because every episode solves a particular problem 
comprehensively. Lost on the other hand they won't watch, because they feel it 
is too slow. They have to wait for that conclusion. They have to wait too long 
to understand the final conclusion. So if you showed Prison Break and Lost at 
the same time, then certainly Prison Break would have the higher ratings. Most 
certainly. Because Prison Break has a forceful ending for every episode. Such 
forceful endings are very important for serials. 
As the above example illustrates, the argument that Chinese audiences have particular 
viewing preferences is also made when it comes to the appeal of foreign television content 
appeal to Chinese viewers: it is argued that Western programmes are for the most part too 
exotic and too far removed from the experiences of Chinese audiences (16,49: 04 - 51: 59; 17, 
78: 58 - 82: 03) and that the cultural and language barrier would prevent the average television 
viewer from watching such programmes (15,61: 10 - 65: 39). This is also why Chinese media 
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experts generally believe that the government's restrictions of foreign content on Chinese 
television are largely redundant (16,49: 04 - 51: 59; 17,78: 58 - 82: 03): Chinese broadcasters have 
little incentive to invest in foreign series, and even if they did broadcast Western 
programmes, so the argument goes, the average Chinese viewer would not be interested in 
watching them. 
It is important to point out, however, that not all interviewees assumed that the preference 
for certain forms of drama presentation were a result of a specific Chinese personality trait, 
as is suggested in the interview excerpt above. The popularity of Western programmes with 
young viewers, for instance, is in some cases understood as proof of a generational difference 
in viewing preferences (17,78: 58 - 82: 03). The reason, for example, why Western series sell 
well on DVD but not as TV broadcasts is interpreted as a result of audience demographics: if 
a programme such as Prison Break or Lost was aired on Chinese television, so the argument 
goes, the average viewer (the urban female housewife, age 45 or above) would not be 
attracted by the series content, and the actual target audience (i. e. young viewers with more 
diverse viewing preferences) would not tune in because they had already watched the series 
on the internet (15,61: 10 - 65: 39). 
In this sense, it is debatable whether specific supposedly Chinese viewing preferences are the 
main factor behind the way in which Chinese drama series are produced and aired, even 
though many media experts in China seem to believe so (I2,129: 33 - 130: 12; 12,136: 40 - 137: 39; 
I6,17: 34 - 19: 20; 17,78: 58 - 82: 03; 114,49: 29 - 53: 40). 61 There are two other plausible reasons 
why Chinese television series are conceived as closed narrations and are broadcasted en bloc: 
First, the current method of producing and airing drama serials is a cheap way of providing 
large amounts of television content: As one interviewee explained, the production of 
°1 It is not the purpose of this analysis to establish whether these preconceptions are true, or whether they are 
particularly Chinese; the point here is that drama production team members and broadcasters believe these 
preconceptions and base their production and broadcasting decisions on them. 
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Western series requires more time than the much simpler Chinese programmes (especially 
when programmes are continuously produced over years) and hence involves high long- 
term expenses and no immediate lump-sum profit (12,30: 49 - 31: 30). Television stations are 
used to filling their broadcasting schedules with cheap domestic productions; the purchase 
of an expensive foreign series or a domestic drama modelled on Western programmes is not 
regarded as a feasible investment (16,49: 04 - 51: 59). 
Second, the Chinese production and broadcasting system is governed by an array of 
censorship regulations which is only able to function properly if drama series production is 
completed first, and the whole programme then submitted for censorship next; this issue is 
discussed below, in Section 3.6. 
3.4. Iv Drama Genres: What Audiences Watch 
As has already been mention in section 2.2. iii, various criteria exist to classify what types of 
television dramas audience watch. My research showed that numerous of the media experts 
interviewed for this project brought up genre categories of their own (15,00: 51 - 02: 40; 17, 
20: 53 - 26: 59; Iii, 05: 30 - 15: 35), for instance the'political drama' (zhengzhi 
ju (M 911), the 
'moral love drama' (qinqing lunliju 'h 1ýJNX1), the'adaptation of classic works' (jingdian 
gaibian t' *c ( ), or the'nostalgic family drama' (jiaxiang lunli ju At f However, the 
main categories that were repeatedly mentioned as the most influential drama genres were 
(14,88: 33 - 91: 05 & 93: 27 - 96: 47; 15,00: 51 - 02: 40 & 10: 45 - 21: 22; 17,20: 53 - 
26: 59; 18,64: 12 - 
68: 29; I11,11: 18-14: 19): 
1. The historical or costume drama, 
2. The family drama, 
3. The crime drama, and 
4. The teen drama. 
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Since 'main melody' themes can be associated with any of these genres, the term does not 
aptly signify a category of its own, but is much rather an overarching characteristic that can 
apply to any genre (for instance, GAJZ is a crime drama, but at the same time it promotes 
main melody themes; 113,05: 54 - 07: 55 and 23: 35 - 27: 44). 
When it comes to the distinction between the content of main melody dramas and purely 
commercial dramas, it is again useful to consider to the interviewee's personal perception; 
the interviewed media experts believed that there was a significant discrepancy between the 
two: main melody themes (i. e. content that conforms to the official criteria on ideological and 
artistic quality) were generally viewed as'good' television, and most popular dramas (i. e. 
themes that sold well) were regarded as 'unhealthy' (16,45: 30 - 48: 33; 110,21: 30 - 22: 29; Ill, 
15: 36 -16: 40; I13,23: 35 - 27: 44). The main concern seems to be that the most appealing themes 
are exactly the themes that the government views as potentially destabilizing to society (i. e. 
power, conspiracy and violence; 13,77: 22 - 81: 20). 
Considering these arguments, it is at first sight surprising that the ratings system nonetheless 
registers high numbers for such main melody dramas as GAJZ or Blank Sword (Liang jinn 1i 'J, 
which achieved the highest ratings among all television dramas broadcasted in 2005; Wang, 
2006,233). One interviewee explained that particularly well-filmed main melody dramas 
with a good script will still draw a large audience, and will appeal to more people than 
merely the average middle-aged female viewer (17,46: 13 - 47: 56). Another argued that 
famous actors and production crew members are able to increase the appeal of dramas 
substantially (I5,21: 23 - 22: 47). Finally, particularly 
historical main melody themes are 
believed to appeal to viewers' sense of nostalgia (19,31: 07 - 33: 49). Although all of these 
arguments suggest that main melody propaganda dramas still reach a large audience, one 
interviewee pointed out that just because main melody series are watched does not 
necessarily mean they are internalised (Ill, 35: 09 - 37: 10): CCTV main melody series are 
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generally broadcasted during prime time, which is when most families eat dinner while 
simultaneously having the television running in the background (ibid. ). This may generally 
mean that a programme receives high ratings, but says little about its actual viewer appeal. 
Most prime time television may well be watched out of habit rather than actual interest. In 
this sense, it is not so much the audiences who create a demand for main melody themes, but 
the broadcasters themselves. 
3.4. v Audience Feedback 
The reaction of Chinese audiences to television dramas has a different impact on the drama 
production and broadcasting system than it does in foreign markets. Chinese viewers discuss 
their favourite programmes on the message boards of entertainment portals such as sina. coºn 
(ent. sina. com. cn) or on the homepages of television stations such as CCTV 
(www. cctv. com/teleplay), but these debates can by default not influence the production of 
the respective drama (I3,121: 31-128: 20): Whereas discussions on Western fan sites or on 
message boards such as those of the International Movie Database (www. imdb. com) often 
accompany the production of a series, the discussions in China usually do not take place 
until broadcasting has started and production has long been concluded. A plausible reason 
for this is that the audience are only aware of the dramas that are broadcasted, but rarely of 
those being produced, unless the series in question is a high-profile production (I11,22: 39 - 
27: 22). The kind of production that is likely to incite debate, even in the pre-production phase, 
is the adaptation of literary classics or important historical themes (as an example, one of the 
interviewees referred to the debate in China on who should be cast to play the main 
characters in Hu Mei's adaptation of The Dream of the Red Cl: amber; ibid. ). 62 
There are, however, two channels of feedback that according to interviewees receive 
attention from broadcasters. The first is the Chinese press. The comments in newspaper 
82 For production details on this drama series, see http: //ent. sine. com. cn/f/v/newhlm/index. shtml [27.07.081. 
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editorials and the critiques of intellectuals published in the print media are used by 
broadcasting officials to assess whether the programmes they air are perceived as socially 
and politically acceptable by the Chinese elites (15,30: 14 - 35: 41). As is described below in the 
section on censorship (3.5), criticism in the papers can indeed cause television station 
executives to take a programme off the air, move it to a different broadcasting slot, or speed 
up the broadcasting in order to get rid of the problematic content without drawing too much 
attention to it (ibid.; 13,81: 21 - 84: 36). 
The second channel of communication that seems to be increasingly used by audiences is the 
direct viewer comment that has been described by the CUC research project on TV drama 
audiences (see Section 2.2. iv), i. e. feedback offered to the respective TV station's audience 
contact department (guanzhong lianxi chu A AIRA k) in the form of letters or phone calls, but 
increasingly also via email, mobile phone text message, or message board post (16,35: 16 - 
35: 55). Before turning to the question of how relevant the media experts interviewed for the 
present project found such feedback, I shall offer an analysis of the types of feedback that are 
commonly provided by Chinese viewers. For this purpose, I have translated below the 
sample feedback quotes that the CUC researchers use to exemplify audience reactions to TV 
drama series, and have treated these comments as a primary source for analysis (Li, 2007, 
229-231). It is difficult to say how representative these selected quotes are, and in how far 
they reflect viewers' actual opinions on TV dramas. However, from a discourse analytical 
perspective, the reproduction and presentation of these comments at the very least addresses 
two questions: 
1. What kind of feedback the CUC researchers regarded as relevant, and 
2. What form such feedback takes (i. e. what the focus is, and in what 
language comments are presented). 
First, the distinction that the CUC researchers make between positive and negative feedback 
deserves attention: more than eighty per cent of the viewer comment analysis is devoted to 
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appraising remarks. These remarks are then divided according to the genres they address, i. e. 
"realistic television dramas", "historical television dramas", "costume dramas", and 
"imported drama"; I have summarised these comments in Figure 12 (ibid., 229-231; author's 
translation). 
Figure 12: Positive Viewer Feedback as Presented by CUC researchers 
1. Realistic Dramas (tNg#441 R+1) 
Chinese original English translation 
1. (( Q l' 1, II11r 14'i i t, ýltl- t', r; I {ýJiYr "The Truth Can't Be Seen' is extremely moving 
ff and excellent, I hope for more such good dramas 
2. (*)xl, )) )iItItI1Ej , it 't Atyv*jV, yay, J, "Family Customs" has a well-knit plot, a healthy 
{yy, a ý¬ä, _PJ Vk fi. ff a atmosphere, and 
dense human interests The 
actors, the director, and the music are all really 
good. I hope it will be rerun. 
3. diiki lM1')) n; 17#f tlr. f-gb6tf1 ! 4>. ý: "Shengshui Hupan" stresses important issues 
ý. 1Rh'JFQL°tj(" such as the respect for the peasantry and the 
protection of cultivated land. It has great practical 
significance. 
4. a ýl< N1s i» Dr ý'I: iH. 7'(', , A*# J1, Pt1J "Shenghui Hupan" is rooted in life, exceeds life, 
rt`"Jl. ic , 1ATT rs M"i ZR -iz*! t 4/J" and possesses an 
intimate sentiment of life. It has 
both political significance and artistic influence. 
5. QfT. +Ej, s» #y; II 'ifs pý(tJSL%ýiRf#ý F. I 1tflt1 "Ren Changxia" is an outstanding work that 
pp, , 
AM promotes the main melody of our age It is truly 
VA JJ= 'i? Aff. % fltJA 4.43. fiJti7 dL. & moving and tear-wrenching, and possesses a 
t3'J4f Ait1I tßä bh% I; JA 5i.. itcJll! i#ki dx ý(., 
lively charm that moves people. The actress that 
Cf Kü» re-K rf' LJ t>v{1Q Fi<1fV rtii 
plays Ren Changxia vividly displays Ren 
' 
f fý! tf i'ý>ý fýhrff º 
Changxia s great demeanour as a good daughter 
" . of the party and a good cadre of the people Ren Changxia" moves China once more. It would be 
great to see more such programmes on CCTV. 
6. (RJ9Y: i L)) f! 'ý f ýfü{1ZSs fJ S( fý týýA 6 iJ, $k "A Sunny Rain Season" is a rare and excellent 
tft fllt j t%l }`, tyy 1: fKJ'c131 4(-f, it ft ff f:,: educational television drama, it reflects rather 
21Z h1irikl Nt lllý7 týllýe r#' #kýfi. + comprehensively the recent achievements and 
h: si! L (ItJAi! 1ý'1i t iy" 7ý? Ir problems of 
the supremacy of the school as a 
fýd1#iS >'1' 11#i #r i'1 tý '1'f'l: #II nJ. means of 
domestic and social education, and in 
fÄf rf SiiJ#'ltfýý'i(' : fiti[#ý7(lJJi %Xfl: 4u 
particular depicts the characters, plot. 
contradictions, and transformations of old, middle- 
fÄ itiX aged, and young teachers, cadres, and all sorts of 
students. It is scientific, realistic, and credible, and 
possesses significance for the present reform of 
education and teaching which is both enlightening 
and something we can draw lessons from 
2. Historical Dramas (Ui SL, V I1!. WIdSIJ1 
mamalum 
7 
i'; V1týýilii{{. '"7:. '1e. 1J, 
8. MAW fn (AMY. ) ffl: 6t a W$ , 1AA 5'. 
N. tL2iiýfiýzu<1^A. *. rw`1* 6il14 `hII"f1nlN, GT 
ht. Mlilo. 71WA 
131AiRLb rldit"7-tp. A "4: Mhfic)l0,0, i>! J 
flýýwti The plot of Blank Sw(n, l iti un1liil. il1"1I uid 
without decorum the tenyu, i, i m-iiI ,t ti,, - 
characters is distinctly moving. Li Youbins acting 
is authentic, vivid, and fresh 
"Xian Xinghai" and "The Eighth Route Army" are 
both main melodies and deeply moving. To in our 
day and age revive the untold hardship that our 
revolutionary predecessors had to endure during 
the revolutionary war, to show how they sacrificed 
extremely strong educational significance 
millions upon millions of viewers. This has an 
liberation of China, has truly moved the hearts of 
everything for the party, the homeland, and the 
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9. G1'ß""41 ° Ir! "LI 
'I' hl(, JiI II ii ii TheLighthfioulel\(ny icillsihod, iysof 
H Y. iE i14`nfYJ kii kj fl; } f. (Y14u tb'ý'19. " 
suffering of the 1930s and 40s. Wang Wufus 
l Hh? t UJifII4 011Wfil i"AAR S( acting 
depicts the kindness and honesty of Zhu 
De, and vividly unfolds Zhu De's military glamour 
and heroic disposition before our eyes. 
10. (iil fLt3Jiil: alJ)) i J' 1P I-IAC7'L JfiTfl « "Proof of Memory" offered the Chinese people a 
ß}i4 ý; 1>týRl)fK1ý4 + A-fIýJ realistic view of history and also gave the young 
viewers who watched the programme a realistic 
impression of history. 
11. QiR; it-' ;1 ft-fiiPfQlY=C fi(V4-LA%i lJ The form and content of "The Great Emperor Wu 
$ý"ý t; ldhýh Cf7 fy! I)J Y2 fJ! J n f't, rd; of Han" matches that of classical works. With 
)ý" ý} ý Li* Il ý- t1j) regard to the reproduction of history, it achieves a 
f1 fill. l fYJ= iik ill 1R iS5}: -R ft'Jh i 
high degree of authenticity, appreciation, as well 
i'hl ýfr&t fiJýýpJl l£#xTJ )j , icAr*ý 
as artistic exploration and pursuit. It is unmatched 
by previous historical dramas. The ideological 
quality of the contradictions and conflicts portrayed 
in the last part of this drama are strongly rousing 
and really set people thinking 
12. ü 1i K1 )) if)ýlýi'. t ýl ! *111J'd'7vffiJ "The New Work of Wang Baozhang" was great to 
)t ^It. f C-I . Ttaxdkfi]', týAJi]fiJ Iäll IA 
watch. We locals were particularly fond of Li 
fJI. Jiq ÄN 0* ito 0oe 
Baotian's acting in the role of Wang Baozhang. 
The characters' language had a particular flavour 
to it ... 13. At- (9Fi1n' -O 1R. A iJtFfýtýl Ifll, iý ^ Channel Eight's "Hanxue Baoma" did not only 
f"}, `' MQ Q J: 't- N9A A`I. rx Afft 
feature distinctive characters with rich 
personalities, but director Wu Ziniu's drama was 
also atmospheric and rich in humanity 
3. Costume Dramas 
Chinese 
14. 'Y ICI ;, kii i:, tK J 
English translation 
The Primary Theatre' broadcasting of "Wind and 
(L [Lf j. lý{i: ýý111. i1'd ithi f! it17fY1? 5i Clouds Part 2" was truly splendid (I came 
to this 
conclusion after having thoroughly investigated the 
reactions in my class). 
15. + 94(iJ Qk91: , fRi)> f itd4f Wang Yan's acting in "Si Da Mingbu" is really fantastic to watch. 
16.1- ft '1*J u' 4i frf(1lR M (ßfß I really liked "Heroic Tales from the Sui and Tang 
lMXM%) #L'iRAXk, sr ýl ýf ctKJpffit , 41t1;,: 
Dynasties" which you showed during last week's 
'great weekend broadcasting'. When the show 
was over, I really felt a sense of loss, 
17. al='ii'. '#'; ýý (1 ¬w fi #fF R» t+ t#ldllrh 4i I loved watching "Shang Cuo Hua Ciao Jia Dui 
.4 ýjlxýuo Lang" and thought that 
drama felt a bit like a 
Huangmei Opera [a type of opera popular in 
Anhui; author's note]. 
18. Oudf 'ffiüüld'J ' #? 4#BhhiLjoing11`1, kjf, The popular television dramas broadcasted during 
11'rß th ý . tU lt (ilm fý ]3 R Of r', A the recent 'Fine Works of Theatre' were great to " `-JillilXýiRi ffikY! Rtofill (YJ10 UR, 1, I: » was even 
better watch, That "Princess Huai Yu 
' " 
ý' ß; 1"J f'' flý7i$fiRtl l Jaekfi 1 ilk; 
s what all of my friends , 
that than "Hai Zhu Gage 
and I think. What I would like to ask is will there l4`LTlýldk oao if #$R1ltd I'. (IJI!; '. lKl be a sequel to "Princess Huai Yu"? Because that ilßlt+lfih)Lf /. I i'ii 11 f$- A ffl IN-N II "'i; i>18 drama is indeed fantastic; very light, and very 
, 5i.. 91 l; fU3Kf`lIV011,, humorous (... ) The main reason why I liked this 
drama was that the main actors were really good, 
the characters were incredibly beautiful, the male 
characters were all very handsome 
4. Imported Dramas 
ý 
''ý ' ýý 19 0: 1'i' ! i; N 
1\ft'1.1ýS? uliCý<nv, L'I Jü 1-LI 6r I1 
. 9, a 
20. ftf! T ý'rifýtAMFISRiA 04'k* F, lO , ýtfr 
ktW#I ! #}thýY, lýýkdh ýýýCöh#S1iý6#F'rJt F: 
nq , It X9o Xr1i , :4F. X* , Xfim , dY, filM[s9! ß'liýlel-1f0ftdl al-SARx. 
A delicate tasttr and continuous spi nt of stitr i tlr 
are things that will etem; illy mnvn Ilie entk' 
human race No matter how the times change, life 
has to incessantly be a struggle 
I watched the TV drama "Special Unit Flying 
Dragon". It was really fantastic. I particularly liked 
Hong Tianzhao, who played the role of Zhang Yi. 
He is handsome and cool, agile and courageous 
1 , 13 
Many of my classmates have watched the series, 
and they all loved it. 
21. ýýý t' F>Cýý113rJ' #iý fiGJ Rýý'! ß`ýý)) 
*; VýA Mv M) Aix>, ý1rp>i wfýlj 
Ever since I watched "Special Unit Flying Dragon" 
on 'Justice Theatre' I have been a great fan of this 
television drama, especially of the fighting 
sequences, which are astounding and shocking. 
Each one of the legal cases is complex, which got 
me more and more hooked to "Special Unit Flying 
Dragon". I particularly like Hong Tianzhao in the 
role of Zhang Yi. 
Two observations are immediately striking: 
1. The viewers' emphasis of the emotional impact that the respective television drama 
had on them. It is apparently a praise-worthy characteristic of'I'V dramas to be 
"moving" (ganren ! l-RA; comment 1), "tear-wrenching" (cui ren lei xia N1' Ail I N; 
comment 5), or "rich in humanity" (fit renxinghiui M1' A"Ni: t; comment 13). 
2. The majority of comments make strong use of hyperboles. Words or grammatical 
constructions that suggest "extremeness" or "awesomeness" are repeatedly used (for 
instance feichang or tai... le A... l; comments 1,5,17,18 and 20). 
In addition to these general observations, another more specific feature of these viewer 
comments is worth mentioning. There seem to be two distinct types of appraisals: 
1. The first are comments on main melody themes. 't'hese remarks make use of socialist 
metaphors and tropes, for instance evoking "the party", "the nation", "the people", 
"the revolution", and "the peasantry" (comments 3,5 and 8), or referring to a 
"healthy atmosphere" and content that is "rooted in lite" (comments 2 and 4). In 
general, the authors of such comments tend to emphasise the didactical impact and 
social significance of the respective dramas. 
2. The second are comments on television dramas that might be classified as 'pop' 
(costume dramas, crime dramas, swordsmen drammas). The remarks on such 
programmes seem to have been made by young viewers, for instance students who 
still attend class (specifically comments 14 and 20). The language is colloquial, makes 
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use of attributes such as "cool" (ku Rill) or "handsome" (sliuni 1111), and primarily points 
out the appeal that certain actors have had on the viewers. 
Although the CUC researchers do not provide any indication of the authors' background or 
age, the language that is used to describe the two different types of television programmes 
(i. e. main melody dramas vs. commercial dramas) suggests that they attract two distinct 
types of viewers: on the one hand those interested in ideologically orthodox mainstream 
content, and on the other hand those interested in 'pop' content, i. e. action performances, 
costumes, attractive actors, etc. 
In addition to the positive viewer feedbacks, the CUC researchers also present a small 
number of critical viewer comments, which are summarised in Figure 13 (ibid., 231; author's 
translation): 
Figure 13: Negative Viewer Feedback as Presented by CUC researchers 
Chinese original English translation 
22. (1I K)) di t4a l_ ? 1L lý ýk 1 Ugh z A careless mistake in "Ren Changxia" In the third 
*M, lilt r. t-MOf'P-1 . °V LA, : tits-, C episode, Ren Changxia receives the silk banner 
ILI { WýJf s 41'r- from the masses and immediately calls everyone ' t fit the together for a group photo. This doesn 
character of someone who does not wish to be 
famous. 
23.9'J LtAt Si ' ikES iiJ it%})kllk f it lii The depiction of the arrogance and fury of the 
3rd. I x1liyhl! Aý f J1-J7! +ß! villains [in "Ren Changxia"J is exaggerated. This 
unnecessarily suggests that our society isn't 
stable. I wonder if this will not give audiences 
overseas the wrong impression 
24. a icy r1'fiJ'r$ýlýýL Q i1P1i3ý yLrt! 4ilL', The young people in "Perfect" talk about love all 
'rüff: itl: IUi. 10i4,9iJMAh 1.91 r4 1.11;, 4. kk day long, run off to bars, and don't have any 
A Rh is JC o 
enterprising conscience at all The characters in 
the drama don't go to work because of love that is 
not a "perfect" life! 
25. Q 'ý41)) fY, tlýc 1;, iýtRf1 ý'St ii. J, lýl(1ý. t(( There are too many misspelled Chinese 
J lot 'ifil < )%# l ý7 uýl characters in "Blank Sword", please quickly correct 
this and then rebroadcast the drama It is really 
unacceptable that such a significant key 
programme should be treated carelessly 
26. ML 11 15 %A: U4ý: { t"r+ A /, t In episode 15 of "Famous Adjutants of the Sino- 
Wi1Q (IxJý'Ji'ex ff<J%vK-iüfRIth 'TI )j J" $' Japanese War", Peng Dehuai and his adjutant 
iJ#is'fYJ H n. iq Mr iktff refer 
to Tian Jun's military rank and say that he 
" . . This is had risen to the rank of marshal 
incorrect: three stars in the Japanese army 
marked the rank of general 
1, F) 
What is remarkable about these critical audience feedbacks is that the contrast to the 
appraising comments is relatively stark: the critical remarks appear much more modest, both 
with regard to quantity and the use of hyperboles. This impression is enhanced by the fact 
that the negative comments stand in no true opposition to the positive feedback; they do not 
fundamentally challenge what is being broadcasted on Chinese television. Among the 
examples above, only one remark truly attacks a television drama in its entirety (comment 
24), and the critique in that case is that the drama's content is not ideologically orthodox 
enough. The other comments are all concerned with detailed errors in certain television 
dramas, but do not criticise the programmes overall. As the CUC researchers themselves 
point out, criticism towards television dramas in China is primarily concerned with one of 
the following three issues (ibid., 231): 
1. Plot mistakes, 
2. Factual errors, 
3. Ideological problems (meaning: content that does not conform to CCP 
ideology). 
The fact that audience feedback has become part of the discourse may be regarded as an 
indication that the elites are increasingly trying to involve the 'masses' in the creation of 
China's television content production and broadcasting. However, whether the increase in 
participation that the CUC researchers have registered in their analysis is in fact a sign that 
China is generally becoming more pluralistic cannot be sufficiently assessed here; it is in this 
particular case equally likely that the elites are merely trying to purvey such a pluralistic 
impression. The selection of feedback excerpts presented by the CUC authors (ibid. ) as well 
as the comments from various interviewees during my own field studies suggest that only 
certain types of comments (and certain ritualised ways of voicing them) are accepted as 'true' 
feedback (I3,121: 31-128: 20; 111,22: 39 - 27: 22 ; 112,45: 21 - 46: 42; 113,74: 12 - 77: 39). 
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Furthermore, viewer feedback does not seem to have much influence on the general work of 
producers and broadcasters: the production crew members interviewed for this research 
project stated that they did not pay much attention to online debates or viewer comments, 
and instead relied primarily on the TV ratings to gauge the popularity of a programme (12, 
30: 09 - 30: 48; 16,35: 16 - 35: 55; 113,74: 12 - 77: 39). One reason for this are the issues that 
viewers raise in their comments: As one interviewee stated, he had repeatedly found that the 
viewer's discussions in online chat rooms were centred on topics that were very different 
from his own concerns as a production crew member, and that there was not much to be 
learned from viewers' concerns with the main actors' performances or the question of which 
characters they liked best (112,45: 21 - 46: 42). In this sense, viewer feedback is not a serious 
factor in the creation and broadcasting of television dramas in the PRC. 
3.5 Censorship and Government Regulations 
The production and broadcasting of Chinese television drama content is controlled by 
diverse mechanisms. The combination of hard institutional controls and soft mechanisms of 
content management that are adopted in the Chinese context create the need for a broad 
definition of the term censorship (see Section 2.2. v). Based on these considerations, I define 
censorship as any authoritative action that aims at actively promoting the construction of 
certain discursive positions while restraining others, either prior or subsequent to the 
expression of the discourse fragments. 
The following section attempts to explain how censorship in the Chinese television drama 
sector functions. I first examine which institutions regulate the discursive themes in 
television dramas (3.5. i). This is followed by an analysis of the forms in which these 
institutions exert influence on drama creation and distribution, and the stages during which 
their involvement occurs (3.5. ii). Finally, it is necessary to take into account what guidelines 
the censoring authorities apply to regulate television content (3.5. iii). 
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3.5.1 Important Government and Party Institutions 
According to the media experts interviewed for this research project, the main institution 
responsible for regulating the production, distribution and broadcasting of television drama 
content at the national level is the SARFI' (13,58: 37 - 72: 49; 14,70: 32 - 75: 51; 15,29: 01 - 30: 13; 16, 
21: 41 - 25: 01; 17,53: 16 - 55: 06; 19,37: 02 - 38: 21). The SARFT is generally charged with all 
issues relating to broadcasting, including technological issues such as the maintenance and 
development of the information network, whether through cable, wireless, or satellite 
transmission. As discussed in Section 2.2. ii, the institution shares certain jurisdiction with the 
MII, but according to the accounts of the interviewees it is primarily the SARFT and its 
equivalent bureaus at the provincial level (Guangbo dianshi ju r EMIN) that exert influence 
on how TV dramas are produced and broadcasted (12,54: 19 - 55: 29; 15,22: 48 - 27: 16; 16,21: 41 
- 25: 01; 19,37: 02 - 38: 21). Based on official documents provided by the SARFT (2007; author's 
translation), I have compiled the main eight functions of the institution: 
1. Research and formulate general and specific policies on propaganda and 
the production of radio and television programmes, thereby firmly 
guiding public opinion. Guide propaganda and the production of radio 
and television programmes, and coordinate content planning. Guide the 
structural reforms of radio, film and television. 
2. Research and draft the laws and regulations governing the radio, film 
and television industry. Formulate radio, film and television 
management regulations, as well as industry development plans. 
Supervise the management of radio and television programming as well 
as the programming of satellite television. Supervise the public 
dissemination of audio-visual programming through the information 
network. Manage the import of radio and television programmes, and 
censor content. 
3. Examine and approve the establishment and liquidation of radio and 
television broadcasting agencies, radio and television programmes and 
television drama production units. Organise the censorship of the 
content and quality of films, television dramas and other broadcasting 
programmes. Provide and revoke production and screening permits for 
films, as well as production and distribution permits for television 
drama productions. 
4. Manage the scientific and technological work in the radio, television, 
and film sector. Formulate the respective technology policies and 
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standards. Guide the usage of high-technology with regard to scientific 
research and developmental application in the sector of radio, television 
and film. Research the economic policies relating to radio, film and 
television. 
5. Conduct the concrete planning and management of the dedicated radio 
and television network in line with overall state planning, macro policy 
and legal regulations. Formulate the concrete policies, regulations and 
technical standards regarding the dedicated radio and television 
network. Guide the construction and development work at the different 
levels, thereby guaranteeing the safe broadcasting of radio and 
television programming. By commission of the Ministry of the 
Information Industries, organise the planning of designated radio and 
television network frequency bands and manage the channels, power 
and other technical parameters of the radio and television frequencies. 
Contribute to the formulation of an overall national information 
network plan. 
6. Provide guidance for China National Radio, China International Radio 
and China Central Television. Coordinate and inspect these institutions' 
significant propaganda work. Simultaneously organise and manage the 
transmission coverage of their programming. 
7. Academically formulate regulations pertaining to the radio, film and 
television system's foreign affairs. Manage and guide radio, film and 
television matters related to the exchange and cooperation with foreign 
countries, the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao 
as well as the Taiwanese territory. 
8. Undertake any other tasks assigned by the CCP Central Committee or 
the State Council. 
As the official documents show, the agency influences the development of the television 
drama sector by approving the establishment and liquidation of production companies, and 
by granting or revoking television drama production permits as well as distribution permits 
(ibid. ). It further devises censorship guidelines, drafts legislation that governs the television 
drama sector, oversees censorship procedures at the national level, promotes propaganda, 
plans what genres should receive priority in future productions and regulates at what time 
foreign content can be aired (ibid. ). 63 These tasks are divided over eleven departments, which 
°3 According to one interviewee, the reason that the SARFT restricts foreign content on Chinese television is that 
the Chinese government feels that the Chinese national identity has to be protected from foreign influences (13, 
64: 12 - 67: 35). Foreign programmes that are believed to exert particularly high influence in China include series from Korea, Japan and Latin American countries (ibid. ). 
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are presented on the homepage of the SARFT; based on the information provided there, I 
have summarised each departments' function in Figure 14 (author's translation).,, ' 
Figure 14: SARFT Organizational Structure and Main Jurisdictions 
Name 
E li 
Name Description 
( ng sh) 
General Office 
(Chinese) 
/yý; )t Responsibilities 
" Supervise SARFT decisions, 
" Coordinate individual departments, 
" Draft policy documents, 
" Manage SARFT files, 
" Answer petitions, 
" Supervise radio and television reform at the local level. 
Sub-Offices: Main Office Synergy (f; ° tI ), Secretariat (#QýSrt1), Research 
(fi)FIL uC), Finances (0143Yl tt), Confidential Network (rxxl? i f)L'V; t). 
Department of r f4lfT.. l+l 
Responsibilities: 
Propaganda " Implement propaganda work and art management, 
Management 
" Assist the SARFT Directorate with respect to the formulation of propaganda 
schemes and programmes, 
" Coordinate the propaganda efforts of the "three central stations" (CNR, CRI, 
CCTV), 
" Guide local propaganda efforts, 
" Prepare propaganda-related reforms, 
" Devise genre plans for radio and television dramas, 
" Define propaganda criteria for any audio-visual content, 
" Supervise reward ceremonies for broadcasting and television, 
" Function as the working body of the SARFT's editorial board. 
Sub-Offices: Synergy (ff lth), Propaganda ('O1iltf), Literature and Art 
Department of rg, a; J Y) Responsibilities: 
Film " Formulate policies and regulations for the long-term development of the film Management industry, 
" Manage production, distribution, and screening, 
" Direct and balance film genre plans and annual production plans, 
" Censor films, 
" Grant and revoke production and screening permits, 
" Approve the establishment and liquidation of production units, inter-regional 
distribution units, and screening units, 
Manage film technologies, 
" Manage international cooperation, such as the import and export of films, or 
collaborative film pro)ects, 
" Direct the dispersal and management of the special film fund. 
Sub-Offices: Main Office (1j' : «), Art ('L: t ld ), Production ($11 l!, itt), Distribution (1t 1b 
%i1 h1), International Exchange (IiilNr" 1ti4t t), Programme Statistics O'tkl li1tk if ttL) 
Department of 41 ft lti1 Responsibilities: 
Social " Formulate a programme concerning the overall arrangement and development of Management radio and television broadcasting organizations 
" Supervise and inspect regional broadcasting organizations 
" Approve the establishment and liquidation of broadcasting organizations, television 
programmes, and television drama production units at the county level and above 
" Grant and revoke television drama production and distribution permits 
" Supervise and manage the public broadcasting of audio-visual material via the 
information network 
Sub-Offices: Main Office charged with NGO management, K fill fit. 
Management of Broadcasting Organizations ($GlltflLf1. iflf'1! Itt), Programme 
Management (Ti II ö"'fVtt; charged with the management of visual and acoustic 
recording, attt: rtlRihlk t? P. kt), Network Dissemination Management (liii i, flfl '}Pp 
Department of f)) Responsibilities: 
Personnel and " Manage the appointment, dismissal, allocation, examination, reward, punishment, Education wages, organization, special duty evaluation, and personal training of cadres, 
" Manage the leadership of subordinated agencies, 
" Manage subordinated school and university education, 
" Promote reforms regarding personnel, education, and administrative management, 
64 The various web pages that this table is based on can be reached from the following URL: 
http: //www. sarft. gov. cn/catalogs/zjjg/index. htmI [17.01.08]. 
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" Direct human resource and qualification management in the radio, film, and 
television industry. 
Sub-Offices: Main Office (lt a` 5f. ), Cadre Management (I ; f'ia NI ht), Labour and 
Capital Allocation (-)MA AlRtrtI ; charged with labour protection, S; ' J11T#1'rk), Education 
(fit 0 1L). 
Department of H- Ij !r of Responsibilities: Financial " Formulate policies for the development of the radio, film, and television industry, Planning " Direct financial management in the radio, film, and TV sector, 
" Manage SARFT funding and report on financial activities, 
" Direct the auditing activities of the SARFT and its subordinate agencies. 
Sub-Offices: Main Office Financial Affairs (019 ) ltt), Project Development 
l if lij ), Capital Management and Industry Development ( i"i; `fy! fitr''lk%z)t ui ), 
Statistics (ffi iI Ott; charged with government procurement, A tiff K 27IT is 'r. ), 
Construction Management (i is kt), Auditing f(t). 
Department of OJ Responsibilities: 
Science and " Organise the implementation of long-term science and technology development Technology plans and policies for radio, film, and television, 
" Oversee the technological efforts of subordinate agencies, 
" Promote technological reforms in the radio, film, and television system, 
" Participate in the macro-planning of the national information network, 
" Direct the provincial and municipal development of wired broadcasting, 
" Manage broadcasting frequencies, 
" Approve all technical aspects of broadcasting at local stations, 
" Formulate all policies and plans regarding satellite transmission, 
" Supervise and evaluate technological projects relating to radio, film, and television 
broadcasting, 
" Manage technological norms, patents, measures, and quality control, 
" Plan and oversee international technological cooperation. 
Sub-Offices: Main Office Science, Technology, and Norm Management (f'Ifx 
5fd"'lll i±f'ltk)), Wireless Management (Tt )'f'l! kt) Satellite Management ( lti. ii"f'll 
( saýfä° tuf(t). Stt), Wired Network Management Department of FIlT ^(f hJ Responsibilities: 
International " Carry out radio, film, and television cooperation and exchange with foreign Cooperation countries as well as with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, 
" Formulate foreign affairs regulations regarding radio, film, and television, 
" Carry out delegation visits (from China as well as to China), 
Research broadcasting development outside of the PRC, 
" Manage the import of foreign programmes as well as the reception of foreign 
satellite stations. 
Sub-Offices: Main Office (i 'z ; responsible for passport and via issues, as well as 
for the work of foreign experts, ? lff? 5iiFltt. qN ," 't I: ff-fct), Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America (1k11fiY. rtt), Europe and America (Irk l: 4tt), Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
(&, Afih1), Synergy (fn ö ht). 
Department of 1(; W{(J^r; fy!. Responsibilities 
Television " Formulate policies and regulations on the production, censorship, and distribution Drama of television dramas, 
Management " Plan the development of the television drama industry, 
" Coordinate the drama genre management at the national level, 
" Oversee the day-to-day work of the SARFT censorship and re-examination 
committees, 
" Organise the censorship of state-produced television dramas, 
" Make recommendations on international drama cooperation, 
" Grant and revoke television drama distribution permits, 
" Regulate drama broadcasting at the national (macro) level, 
" Manage national drama award ceremonies 
Sub-Offices: Synergy (tlt -4t; responsible for laws and regulations, r!; kL' (k). 
Programme Management (Mi tilit5't'L' kt), Censorship Management (Ili fir, 'f I'll lit), 
Legal )£ fý ; i) Responsibilities 
Department " Prepare and draft all SARFT legislation, 
" Supervise the legal aspects of propaganda and education in the radio, film, and 
television system, 
" Receive legal suggestions and observe the implementation of SARFT legislation, 
" Oversee administrative hearings, redresses, and actions, 
" Direct, coordinate, and undertake measures in the radio, film, and television sector 
relating to the intellectual property rights and the WTO 
Department of 1y; p. Responsibilities: 
Security " Direct safety measures in the radio, film, and television sector, 
" Manage safety issues at the SARFT and its subordinate institutions, 
" Draft regulations regarding public security and fire prevention, 
" React to public security or fire emergencies, 
" Assure the protection of inter-departmental secrets and strategies. 
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As this figure shows, the main censorship responsibilities are divided primarily over three 
departments within the SARFT (ibid. ): the Department of Social Management (Shehui guanli 
si U,; WJM J), the Department of Propaganda Management (Xuanchuan guanli si 1M Vf 7) 
and the Department of Television Drama Management (Dianshiju guanli si VJ)RJ J). In 
addition, the import of foreign dramas and productions that involve foreign participants are 
handled by the Department of International Cooperation (Guoji hezuo si [A VT, Ä ('ý iä7 ). 65 
According to one of the interviewees (14,60: 00 - 70: 31), the institution within the SARFT that 
examines and censors drama content at the central level is the censorship committee (shencha 
weiyuanhui '). This committee consists of government officials and media experts 
(directors, university professors, etc. ), who assess the appropriateness of programmes in line 
with the relevant censorship guidelines (ibid. ). 66 
My conversations with the various media experts shows that although national legislation 
and its interpretation at the central level are, as one interviewee stated, relatively "strict" 
(yange iv*), regional implementation may vary widely (15,68: 52 - 71: 25). Such 
implementation is in the hands of the various Bureaus of Radio and Television that each 
province, autonomous region or municipality possesses (ibid. ). 67 The unit within those 
Bureaus responsible for TV content management is the propaganda department 
(xuanchuanchu ill ; 12,54: 19 - 55: 29). This department oversees all stages of TV drama 
production, from the general plot outline to censorship and final distribution, and is 
responsible for approving the final product (ibid. ). The interpretation of SARFT guidelines at 
the regional level is extremely subjective: in some cases, production units will submit their 
drama series to different Bureaus throughout the country, knowing that their product only 
86 In addition to the departments (J) presented in this figure, the SARFT also possesses an internal party 
committee () iULAIt ), a union a unit for retired cadres (AiII14+ 600), a disciplinary and 
supervision group ( j$f$, IRON) and a separate audit office (lit) ; ibid. ). 66 The names of the committee members are publicly available on the following Internet page: 
http: //www. asiatvbiz. com/news/list. asp? ld=301 (22.01.07). 87 For a list of Bureaus, Including links to their respective Internet homepages, see: 
http: /Avww. sartt. gov. cn/catalogs/zjjg/index. html (22.01.07). 
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needs to pass the inspection of one institution, irrelevant of how many other agencies may 
have objected to its content before (I2,55: 30 - 57: 05). 
In addition to supervision by the Bureaus of Radio and Television, some productions require 
additional approval from other state agencies (19,38: 22 - 38: 52): For example, if a drama 
deals with an issue such as ethnic minorities and education, it will also be reviewed by the 
respective authorities, i. e. in these cases the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Guojia minzu 
shiwu weiyuanhui M* =) and the Ministry of Education (Jiaoyu bu ( AN; ibid. ). Ift 
This means that both the production and broadcasting of television drama content is subject 
to three types of controlling institutions: 
1. The propaganda departments of CCP Committees, which prepare the 
content of all relevant legislation in China, 
2. The state agencies directly responsible for radio, film and television 
administration, which devise and implement the relevant legislation in 
line with CCP instructions, 
3. State agencies outside of the production and broadcasting sector, but 
with jurisdiction over certain content matters (i. e. the Ministry of 
Education, etc). 
These three types of institutions exist at all levels of the Chinese nation (i. e. at the national, 
provincial, district and village level), and the work at the national level is duplicated 
throughout all tires of the system. The relations in the television content production sector 
are similar. 
What is important to realise is that the inspection and approval of television dramas by a 
state agency is only relevant to non-governmental production companies; the large state-run 
units with a general production permit are not censored by state agencies (19,37: 02 - 38: 21). 
Instead, the censorship mechanisms are already integrated into each of these institutions: 
Production units such as the China Teleplay Production Centre, CCTV or the China Film 
Group Corporation possess internal Censorship Departments (Shencha bu WA all) that 
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monitor content (ibid. ). The cadres responsible for content in these departments are usually 
former screenwriters, directors or producers who have climbed the administrative hierarchy 
to receive an influential desk post (I3,52: 16 - 56: 26). 
A final institution that exerts macro-control over the TV drama sector is the annual TV Genre 
Planning Conference (Quanguo dianshiju ticai guihua hui ýý k$ #ý1##q ), which is 
subordinated to the SARFT (I11,19: 19 - 22: 38). This conference regulates broadcasting by 
planning what share of air time shall fall to the different TV genres in the coming year (ibid. ). 
According to one of the interviewees, the purpose of the conference is to prevent the 
overproduction of one particular type of television drama (ibid. ). Another interviewee 
argued that such regulations are meant to control what is shown during prime time, thereby 
preventing the largest part of the audiences from being influenced negatively by certain 
types of dramas, such as crime series (13,67: 36 - 72: 49). The effect is the same in either case: 
the conference's decisions provide incentive for the production of certain genres, thereby 
effectively regulating the market (I11,19: 19 - 22: 38). 
3.5.11 The Tools Used to Control Television Drama Content 
In general, the censorship process has become increasingly less centralised in recent years. In 
May 2006, a regulation was passed that now allows local authorities to pass TV dramas for 
inspection without having to report back (shenbao FP Ai) to higher agencies; this effort to 
streamline the administration affects all aspects of content control, from the issuance of 
permits to the actual censorship process (I11,16: 41 - 19: 18). According to one interviewee, it 
has made the inspection of most TV dramas more of a formality, so that today only 
programmes that directly deal with party and state traditions (such as revolutionary history 
dramas) still receive full government attention when it comes to censorship (ibid. ). 
Nonetheless, my analysis of the interviews suggests that the production and broadcasting of 
TV drama series is far from being deregulated. According to the interviewees, the main tools 
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used by the authorities to control what drama content is produced and aired in China are 
three types of permits that regulate production and distribution, as well as various 
broadcasting regulations that function as incentives for producers to create certain contents 
while avoiding others. 
Production permits: Production permits come in two forms (12,50: 47 - 52: 11): The first type 
is the general permit to a production unit (danwei xukezheng . 1itii. F Kill, which is issued to 
large (mostly state-run) production companies and entitles the respective unit to produce 
any content they see fit (13,52: 16 - 56: 26). This is made possible by making the respective 
units responsible for their own internal censorship (ibid.; 19,37: 02 - 38: 21). Companies that 
do not possess such internal censorship mechanisms do not receive general production unit 
permits, and hence need to register their filming projects with the SARFT or the local Bureau 
of Radio and Television (I2,52: 12 - 52: 46; 13,06: 33 - 08: 43; 14,37: 32 - 43: 28; 16,21: 41 - 25: 01). If 
the project is approved, the production company will receive the second type of permit: an 
individual permit for the production of that particular television drama (ibid. ). The issuing of 
these television drama production permits (dianshiju zhizuo xukezheng *1#. 111*'1It-iT-P-T iJE) is 
usually a formality based on the plot outline; according to one interviewee, it used to be a 
method of assuring proper propaganda content in TV production, but has largely lost that 
function due to the increased commercialization of China's TV drama market (14,37: 32 - 
43: 28). Today, as another interviewee argued, it serves the government to keep track of the 
number and types of dramas being produced throughout the country, as well as the 
financing details of each project (I12,73: 46 - 75: 19). The individual production permit is 
therefore said to have become a filing and recording tool (bei'an $rx), which is intended to 
prevent an over-saturation of the market with certain types of dramas, as well as the 
potential duplication of drama concepts (ibid. ). In this sense, production is no longer seen as 
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a censorship issue by media experts; or as one interviewee put it: "you can film any topic" 
(shenme ticai dou keyi paiOWN-Pf M 17,57: 47 - 59: 57). 
Distribution permits: According to my analysis, the actual process of 'hard' censorship takes 
place once production is complete and the individual dramas need to be distributed (14, 
60: 00 - 70: 31): In order to be able to sell a drama, the respective production company must 
apply for another certificate, the distribution permit (faxingxukezheng%TTtF TiiE). This 
permit is issued after the final product has been evaluated by the SARFT or one of the 
Bureaus of Radio and Television (ibid. ). If a drama is rejected by the censorship committee, 
the production company is usually informed how the product needs to be changed in order 
to be approved. 
Broadcasting Regulations: Aside from production and distribution permits, certain 
broadcasting regulations also influence the production of television drama content, although 
this influence is exerted more indirectly; the national legislation devised by the SARFT 
defines at what times during the day certain types of content can be aired by Chinese 
television stations (I1,33: 14 - 35: 18): For example, dramas that feature suspense, 
horror or 
crime themes cannot be shown until after 11 p. m. For producers, the regulations on what can 
be shown during prime time (literally'the golden time'; huangjin shijian *Bt i )) have a 
direct effect on their profits (Il, 38: 12 - 39: 36): prime-time advertisement yields the 
largest 
returns for television stations, which means that the stations are willing to pay more for a 
programme suitable for broadcasting during that time (15: 80: 42 - 82: 51). In this way, 
government decisions on what constitutes suitable television content is relayed via market 
mechanisms and indirectly affects what is produced in China. A good example is the 2004 
national directive that banned the broadcasting of crime series during prime time, which was 
mentioned by several interviewees (15: 80: 42 - 82: 51; 17,55: 07 - 55: 57,110,42: 31 - 49: 21): the 
directive has made the production of crime series unprofitable for most producers, who need 
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to sell the rights for re-runs outside of prime time to a large number of broadcasters in order 
to recoup their expenses. 
3.5.111 The Guidelines Governing the Censorship Process 
At the most fundamental level, the censoring of television dramas in China is regulated very 
precisely by guidelines that are publicly available on the SARFT internet website (13,48: 37 - 
52: 15)68 In order to establish what these guidelines are, an analysis of the relevant legislation 
is first in order. 
The policy document most relevant in this context is the "Regulation on Television Drama 
Censorship Management" (Dianshiju shencha guanli guiding º NTI ilW1*3105t) devised by 
the SARFT on 7 April 2004 (SARFF, 2004), and implemented on 20 October of that same year 
(see Appendix 1 for a full translation of this document). The legislation is very clear on who 
can produce (SARFT, 2004, article 7) and distribute (ibid., article 30) drama content, under 
what conditions this content may be broadcasted (ibid., article 31), what production units 
need to do in order to receive the relevant permits (ibid., articles 8 and 21), which state 
agencies are responsible for censorship (ibid., articles 16,17, and 18) and how these 
institutions are supposed to handle the censorship proceedings (ibid., articles 24 and 25). 
However, when it comes to the topics under restriction, the guidelines are kept abstract, as 
article 20 in chapter 3 of this document shows (ibid. ); the article states that content shall be 
band if it (author's translation): 
1. Stands in opposition to the basic principles of the constitution; 
2. Endangers the unity, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the state; 
3. Divulges state secrets, endangers state security or harms the honour or 
interests of the state; 
4. Incites ethnic enmity or prejudice, violates ethnic unity or disrespects 
the local customs of ethnic minorities; 
The guidelines that the SARFT issues are accessible on: http: /twww. sartt. gov. cn/index. html [22.02.08]. 
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5. Promotes paganism or superstition; 
6. Disturbs the social order or violates social stability; 
7. Propagates obscenity, gambling or violence, or instigates criminal 
offences; 
8. Insults or humiliates others, or violates others' lawful rights and 
interests; 
9. Endangers social ethics or the excellent cultural traditions of the ethnic 
minorities; 
10. Is prohibited under any other law, or violates any administrative or state 
regulation. 
A likely reason for the vagueness of these criteria is that the authorities wish to retain their 
flexibility when deciding what content is acceptable or not. The key points therefore leave 
much room for interpretation. 
When confronted with this imprecision of the censorship guidelines, numerous interviewees 
stated that these vague censorship criteria made the creation of acceptable drama content 
difficult for them. Three interviewees stated that it was not easy to know what exactly 
phrases such as "disturb the social order" or "propagate obscenity" were referring to (12, 
53: 36 - 54: 18; 14,70: 32 - 75: 51; 112,35: 35 - 36: 48). Other interviewees explained that the 
detailed concepts that the state and party apply when censoring content is not revealed in 
official documents, but is instead either derived from many years of experience in the 
business (17,57: 47 - 59: 57; 18,37: 52 - 39: 05) or from personal contacts to officials (110,20: 01 - 
21: 29). The question then is: what criteria do production crew members themselves apply in 
order to avoid being censored? 
In order to answer this question I asked the interviewees what topics they believed would or 
should be censored. This is again a matter of perceptions. According to the interviewees, 
unwanted topics generally fall into two categories (13,48: 37 - 52: 15): so-called 'black' content 
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(hei X), meaning politically sensitive issues, and so-called 'yellow' content (huang it), i. e. 
pornography. 'Yellow' topics primarily refer to the following three issues: 
1. Sexuality: Anything that has a sexual connotation (seqing t, f*). One interviewee 
described the limitation of sexual content on TV as follows (18,39: 06 - 40: 40): It is 
possible to produce scenes in which a man and a woman are filmed lying in the same 
bed; however, the actors need to be under the covers, and no explicit sexual content 
can be shown (ibid. ). 
2. Brutality: Anything that is excessively violent (baoli 407'; 14,70: 32 - 75: 51). For 
example, any scene that shows blood is likely to be censored (I10,42: 31 - 49: 21). 
3. Gambling & Drugs: In addition to sexuality and violence, 'yellow' content in the 
widest sense also includes gambling (du l) and drug abuse (du ; 18,83: 59 - 86: 16). 
According to one interviewee, these two issues are handled much harsher by the 
central authorities than by regional agencies (112,35: 35 - 36: 48). The interviewee gave 
the example of a television drama that he had worked on, which included a sub-plot 
that dealt with a character having drug-related problems. The production company 
was instructed by the SARFT to edit-out the entire section, despite the fact that the 
drama took a critical approach to drug abuse. The interviewee argued that the sub- 
plot would probably not have been censored by a regional agency, but that at the 
national level (the programme was aired on CCTV-8) any type of drug-related issue 
is likely to be banned. 
Note particularly from this last example how it is not sufficient to show unwanted behaviour 
as deviant, for instance by depicting how a person abusing drugs is punished in the end; the 
mere depiction of a deviant act already makes it unacceptable to the censors (the reasons for 
this are discussed in Section 3.6). 
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The field of 'black' topics is handled in a similarly subjective way. When asked what issues 
they considered to be 'black', the various media experts stated that this included content that 
" Attacks the state (15,29: 01 - 30: 13), 
" Criticises the party leadership (I1,28: 58 - 31: 46), 
" Voices religious opposition (15,29: 01 - 30: 13), 
" Supports dissident groups (I1,28: 58 - 31: 46), 
" Advocate the independence of certain Chinese territories such as Tibet 
or Xinjiang (15,29: 01 - 30: 13), 
" Suggests in any way that Chinese society may be unstable (18,83: 59 - 
86: 16). 
For this reason, topics such as crime or corruption were viewed as highly sensitive by the 
interviewees: the argument was that such issues might give viewers the impression that 
Chinese society or culture was flawed (17,65: 06 - 70: 29), impair the authority of state officials 
(14,70: 32 - 75: 51; 19,41: 55 - 42: 34) or inspire malicious viewers to imitate unwanted 
behaviour and commit crimes similar to the ones shown on TV (these issues are dealt with 
more comprehensively in Section 3.6). This is, according to one interviewee, the reason why 
it is not allowed to show on Chinese television how a crime is planned or committed (19, 
39: 36 - 40: 26). 
Drama content is also required to depict behaviour that does not infringe upon any state 
regulations. A good example is the subject of driving under the influence of alcohol. In the 
television drama GAJZ, the main protagonist is repeatedly shown drinking alcohol, and later 
driving his car home (113,59: 45 - 62: 11). As one interviewee who had been involved in the 
creation of that drama argued, this type of behaviour was not yet illegal when the series was 
produced, and therefore passed the censorship inspection (ibid. ). Today, state regulation 
prohibits driving under the influence, and the same scene would probably not be accepted 
by the censors again (ibid. ). 
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As much as contemporary dramas are subjected to censorship, the strongest attention is 
given to programmes that deal with periods in the PRC's history, i. e. with events that are set 
after 1949 (110,42: 31 - 49: 21). Events or periods that are directly linked to the legitimacy of 
the CCP's rule over China, such as the Cultural Revolution, the Hundred Flower Movement, 
or the so-called Tiananmen Incident, may currently not be adopted into television dramas (12, 
57: 06 - 58: 16). Periods before the foundation of the PRC are viewed as less problematic (110, 
42: 31 - 49: 21). The production of historical TV dramas depicting heroic episodes in Chinese 
history is generally viewed favourably, since such dramas help increase viewers' patriotic 
sentiment (15,90: 37 - 92: 41). However, historical themes from before 1949 may still cause 
controversy. For instance, themes from imperial times may be too "feudalistic" (19,19: 43 - 
21: 16), i. e. may promote values that are in conflict with Communist ideology. This may, for 
example, be the case if a feudal ruler is portrayed too positively (see Section 3.7). Also, 
throughout China's history, themes from the past have time and time again been used by 
intellectuals to criticise contemporary politics (one need think only of the theatre play Hai 
Rui Dismissed from Office, Hai Rui ba guan W3'', which was one of the factors that started 
the Cultural Revolution because it was believed to be an allegorical critique of Mao Zedong 
dismissing General Peng Dehuai from office; Eberstein, forthcoming). The authorities in the 
PRC are therefore very sensitive to any historical themes that may voice hidden criticism on 
how China is currently ruled. To account for the importance of such historical themes in 
television dramas, the SARFT has charged a special working group with the supervision of 
such content: the "Small Leadership Group Concerning the Creation of Main Historical and 
Revolutionary TV Genres" (Zhongda geming he lishi ticai yingshi chuanzuo lingdao xiaozu 
nlý ý# ls ýý1fVW%/J f.; 19,37: 02 - 38: 21). 
According to the interviewees, all of the above issues are considered by the responsible 
censorship organization before it will issue a distribution permit; if the television drama 
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under examination does not fulfil the censors' criteria, it will be sent back to the production 
company with notes on how the programme needs to be amended (14,60: 00 - 70: 31; 15,27: 17 
- 29: 00). This process is described in the relevant legislation (SARFT, 2004, article 24). In line 
with these official guidelines, producers have the right to object to censorship through the re- 
examination committee (dianshiju f ashen weiyuanhui tRINX §M 1=) at the SARFT (ibid., 
article 25). If a drama has been approved by the censors, it may not in any way be altered 
(ibid., article 26). Furthermore, the SARFT is authorised to "order the revision of a television 
drama or the suspension of its distribution, import, export or broadcasting even after the 
programme in question has been issued a 'Television Drama (Television Cartoon) 
Distribution Permits', if the public interest calls for such actions" (ibid., article 32). 
According to one interviewee, there are three reasons why the authorities may change their 
minds about a TV drama after it has been cleared for distribution (15,32: 28 - 35: 41): 
1. Officials may follow the audiences' reactions and discussions on the 
internet and be discontented with the feedback. 
2. Officials may receive letters from viewers voicing discontent. 
3. Renowned public figures (politicians, intellectuals, etc. ) may draw 
attention to a TV drama's alleged inadequacy by publishing articles in 
the papers or on the internet (this is the most common case). 
Two examples illustrate this type of belated censorship (15,30: 14 - 32: 27): 
1. In 2001, the Taiwanese teen drama Meteor Garden (Liuxing huayuan 7lrtv- 
It IU) was approved for broadcasting in the PRC and was partially aired. 
However, broadcasting was suspended when it became clear that the 
programme was becoming too popular with young audiences. The 
authorities feared that the hedonistic content might have a bad influence 
on such a large number of young viewers. 
2. In 2005, Chen Kaige's TV drama adaptation of the Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms (Sanguo yianyi -M $X) passed the censors, but later had to be 
edited because the authorities changed their mind about the literary 
accuracy of the adaptation. 
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In general, however, TV programmes are rarely edited or banned once broadcasting has 
commenced (15,32: 28 - 35: 41). One interviewee argued that the authorities had realised that 
it draws far more attention to a TV drama and its content if the series is cancelled, than if it is 
allowed to continue; the officials fear, so the argument goes, that viewers will only be more 
interested in a banned programme and will watch the series on pirated DVDs or on the 
internet (ibid. ). 
Even though the ambivalence of China's censorship criteria may at times cause problems for 
production crew members, and some programmes may even be banned after they have 
initially been approved, the producers of television dramas only rarely test the limits of what 
can be created (15,30: 14 - 32: 27). As the interviewees explained, the intention of producers is 
to distribute their product, and they know what topics to steer clear of if they wish to achieve 
this goal (112,35: 35 - 36: 48), or in the words of one interviewee: "none of us would think of 
producing anything about Falun Gong" (women kending bu yao zuo Fanlun Gong de dongxi iiilfJ 
*5tTN1i(Yik 
. TbM3 x; 17,53: 16 - 55: 06). 
3.6 The Chinese Perspective on the influence of Television 
After having examined to what extent and with what methods the state and party control 
television content, the following chapter analyses what opinions officials and media experts 
hold towards television entertainment. The intention is to show how these opinions 
influence the production, control and broadcasting of popular television dramas. To this end, 
the following two sections (3.6 and 3.7) both attempt to identify recurring themes (tropes and 
metaphors) in the way that Chinese media experts and officials talk about the subject of 
television drama in the interviews conducted for this research. My analysis of these 
perceptions shows that what is held to be true about the media, its functions and its 
influences on consumers is a crucial variable in the production of television content. Hence 
an understanding of media experts' opinions on the subject is essential in order to 
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understand why television dramas are produced the way they are in China, and what social 
relevance they have. 
Chinese media experts are divided over the question how much influence the media exerts 
over audiences. Discursive positions range from the notion that viewers are essentially 
passive recipients who readily adopt the views presented on television, to the opinion that 
television is merely one of many factors that influences people's behaviour. The following 
section presents these different positions. It addresses the question of how influential 
television content is believed to be (3.6.1 and 3.6. v), what effect it may have on viewers (3.6. ii), 
which types of viewer are regarded as particularly prone to such effects (3.6. iii), and how 
television's potential influence is used to justify the government's control of the media 
(3.6. iv). 
3.6.1 The Official Position: Media Content's Impact on Viewers 
In the Chinese debate on televisions power of influence, the viewers are mainly regarded as 
susceptible to television content. For instance, the political leadership attributes a very high 
degree of influence to television in general, and to television dramas in particular (Il, 36: 31 - 
38: 11; 13,48: 37 - 52: 15). So before turning to the opinions of media experts on the subject, a 
look at the official position is in order. The faith that officials place in media content as a tool 
to influence the public, as well as the fear that this potential influence simultaneously instils 
in the leadership, can be best demonstrated by quoting from the rules, regulations and 
decrees concerning television and film. The following three excerpts each feature at least one 
of the popular tropes used in official statements on media influence (author's translation): 
1. The censorship of television dramas should insist on serving the people and 
serving socialism, should conform to the principle of 'letting a hundred 
flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend; should be close to 
reality, close to life and close to the principles of the people, and should 
guarantee the correct guidance of public opinion. 
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0 1. (SARFT, 2004, article 19) 
2. The Bureaus of Radio and Television at all levels should positively guide and 
encourage film and television programme production organizations to 
produce film and television dramas that are suitable for web broadcasting 
and that feature positive and healthy content. 
-i&01- *-, % PC VIW 14#31 a) VIRIV H $I] MRR I; tplý it I*J a #: b't OM %RS1. (SARFT, 2007) 
3. The state encourages the creation of excellent films that unify ideological 
quality, artistic quality and viewer appeal; are close to life, close to reality 
and close to the masses, and protect and benefit the healthy development of 
minors. (Films) should vigorously develop and advance culture, sustain a 
healthy and beneficial culture, work hard to reform backward culture and 
firmly resist any degenerate culture. 
ý1 1ý1Jý11ý, lit Silt? RT. Midti . Midlll`- 1ý, Jý4 '#ýh 1ý111ýi it lýHh ý ;o *)]%Ä Sci ýCýt, #1F 
l'. 93M, gt7 AA FýC(k M7k#EE*ý1JXfi5M. (SARFT, 2006, article 22) 
I shall return to these statements throughout this chapter in order to establish how such 
official positions relate to the perceptions of the media experts interviewed for this project. 
To start with, the first trope is that the media guides public opinion (yulun daoxiang 04 %E-9 0]), 
which is used in example one. Another closely related trope can be found in example three: 
the idea that media content advances, develops, sustains or reforms "culture" (wenhua Mt), 
and has the potential to resist or repel "degenerate culture" (fuxiu wenhua 1 #h-CTt). Both 
these tropes are evidence of the influence and even constructivist potential that the media 
possesses according to the official Chinese position. What exactly the public is meant to be 
led towards, or what kind of culture is meant to be created, remains unanswered in the text 
examples; the SARFT merely demands "correct" (zhengque DA) guidance and "healthy" 
(jiankang i M)*) culture. 
This brings us to another recurring theme used in Chinese media discussions: the metaphor 
of 'healthy' content, which is employed both in examples two and three. The health- 
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metaphor is not only used throughout official Chinese documents, but also by media experts 
themselves. As an example, consider the following interview excerpt (I9,18: 27 -18: 48): 
R: How does one know what counts as good didactical content, because 
this is also debatable, right? The director, the creative producer, and the 
screenwriter all have to decide what to film, so... 
19: My position is this: a television drama, and I am not talking about 
communism, socialism, the communist party, I am not talking about any 
of those things. But there is such a thing as a base line. So what is that 
base line? You have to help promote people's mental and physical health 
and the developmental progress of this society. 
I will return to the concepts of progress and development that the interviewee mentions 
below. For now, it is noteworthy that terms like "health" or "healthy" were used repeatedly 
with regard to television content by various interview subjects (I9,19: 43 - 21: 16; 110,21: 30 - 
22: 29; 111,34: 41 - 35: 08; 112,40: 34 - 42: 02). The implication is that media content literally has a 
physical and spiritual effect on the audience's wellbeing. A similar argument is made in text 
example 3 above, which attests that the content of films has the potential to "benefit the 
healthy development of minors"(SARFT, 2006, article 22). It also suggests that media content 
can potentially harm the audience, and that particularly young viewers need to be 
"protected" (baohu IMF'; ibid. ). This is the fourth important recurring theme: the idea that the 
state has a responsibility to protect its citizens from harmful media content (12,58: 17 - 60: 38; 
13,48: 37 - 52: 15,16,25: 02 - 26: 52). 
The question then is: what kind of harmful content do the Chinese elites feel they need to 
protect the audience from, and what effects are such harmful elements believed to have? 
3.6.11 Possible Effects of Harmful Content 
There are four recurring arguments that are used by media experts to describe what harmful 
effect television content may have on viewers and on society. The first two of these 
arguments are made in the following interview segment (I7,65: 37 - 67: 10): 
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R: Currently, many television dramas discuss the problem of corruption. 
Which is important, but also probably a bit complicated. If too much 
criticism is expressed, that wouldn't be good either. So how do you 
choose... 
17: In the past couple of years such dramas were quite common, but now 
they have become relatively rare. Because television dramas that deal 
with corruption are, as a matter of fact, what we call a double-edged 
sword, which is unlike a knife. A knife normally has one edge that cuts, 
and one edge that doesn't. But swords have two edges. At least Chinese 
swords do, I don't know about Western swords. So both sides of a 
sword can cut, they are both sharp. It has two sharp edges. That is a 
double-edged sword. So when you show corruption or the fight against 
corruption to the people, then at the same time it might have an adverse 
effect. It may cause people to think: "wow, such corruption", and 
instead this will stir up factors that make society unstable. For example, 
maybe some of the crime dramas we just talked about deal with public 
servants and police officers solving a case. They can't help but also show 
how policemen solve the case and how criminals commit crimes. 
Actually, in some cases, in foreign countries as much as in China, 
someone might get caught for a crime and then say: "I learned that from 
TV. " That is to say, there are many precedents were someone learned 
(such methods) from TV dramas. That's why, as far as possible, we need 
to be cautious when dealing with such sensitive topics. 
In this excerpt, the interviewee states that criminal behaviour to some extent results from 
viewers emulating bad behaviour shown on television, and that malicious viewers may copy 
the criminal methods shown in television shows; an argument which is also made in II, 33: 14 
- 35: 18 and 19,39: 36 - 40: 26. A similar logic fuels the arguments against violence, sex and 
drugs on television: as mentioned in Section 3.5, the fear is that audiences might be inspired 
to copy such behaviour. This idea that people emulate behaviour is a core belief in China's 
communist ideology. Ample proof of this is the repeated evocation of model workers, 
peasants and soldiers by the party and government since the establishment of the People's 
Republic (Thoegersen, forthcoming) 69 It should, however, be noted that the importance of 
role models is not a communist novelty. Much of traditional Chinese thought is built on the 
ee One of the most famous of these role models is the legendary communist martyr Lei Fang ('iliillt); for an 
evaluation of Lei Fang's relevance in post-Mao China see Zhang (1999). 
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axiom that the individual emulates the actions of others, and that for this reason the sage has 
to set a positive example for others to follow 70 
Whereas this first argument is mostly linked to social concerns (i. e. a possible increase in 
criminal behaviour, drug use, sexual misconduct, etc. ), the second argument is concerned 
more with legitimacy. Consider again the above interview segment: The interviewee explains 
that displaying the morally wrong conduct of officials may give viewers the impression that 
their government is unstable. This, in turn, may undermine the authority of the party and 
government. Very similar statements were also made by other interviewees (14,70: 32 - 75: 51; 
19,41: 55 - 42: 34). 
The third argument is concerned with the depiction of historical events and figures on 
television. According to this line of argumentation, historical television dramas may cause 
viewer to adopt unwanted attitudes towards Chinese history. This may in some cases mean 
that the authorities are worried the audience will reject the official position of party and state 
towards history in general and the nation's progress under party rule in particular (19,19: 43 - 
21: 16): 
19: Like the drama series Han Wu Da Di, why was it criticised? It's historical 
perspective was problematic. The Emperor Wu of Han... such a 
prominent individual existed in history, there's nothing wrong with that. 
But history was not about this one person alone. If you now say that 
Emperor Wu of Han was a brilliant authority, brilliant and great and 
perfect... a perfect individual (... ), then what about the historical 
perspective? He has to have been a feudalistic emperor, so he had many 
bad aspects. 
R: Right, so the drama didn't point out these bad aspects. 
19: Exactly. So it's like this: in the title song, the director states that she 
wants to treat him as a model of brilliant authority. So what is wrong 
with that? It's wrong. Think about it: if an emperor is good, and we 
admire the emperor that much... what do we still want with democracy 
then? What do we still want with republicanism? Do we Chinese people 
70 Donald Munro (1969) shows this in his research on the relevance of virtue (de W) in early Chinese society. He 
writes: in the Western Zhou, ancestors were frequently cited as models whose de must be emulated. (... ) 
Eventually, living men who embodied the norms also came to be regarded as models" (ibid., 190). 
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still want to progress forward? We don't want to go down the road of 
the imperial age again, right? This then is the negative influence of this 
drama: Culturally speaking it promotes backward ideas. If you teach 
that this emperor was great, if you admire that emperor... we can admire 
him, but historically I look at his function, look at his contribution, and I 
subject him to a political evaluation. So if today he is still great, if we still 
call out "forever live the emperor, " then what hope do we have? Can 
this society of ours still progress? What do our people still need 
democracy for? 
The argument here is that the PRC is a republic and a democracy, progressing forward 
through history, and that the positive depiction of feudalistic times would cause China to 
regress into a dark age. This, again, is an important trope: the progress that Chinese society 
has achieved needs to be protected against backward-oriented forces. This perceived 
potential to negate historical progress explains why the government places such a high 
priority on the control of historical television series (Ill, 11: 18 - 14: 19; see also section 3.5. iii). 
One example of a popular television series that received harsh criticism for depicting 
unacceptable historical content is the drama Towards the Republic (Zouxiang gonghe t fp] 4f 1l; 
2003). The programme received so much disapproval for its allegedly uncritical portrayal of 
the historical figures Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai, and Empress Dowager Cixi (19,33: 50 - 
35: 34) that CCTV was forced to accelerate the broadcasting of the fifty-nine-episode series in 
order to remove the programme from the air as fast as possible, without simultaneously 
drawing unwanted attention to the series, for instance by banning it (13,81: 21 - 84: 36). 
At first sight it may seem that this argument is again related to the problem of legitimacy, 
and that the depiction of pre-communist periods might call party and state politics into 
question. However, the fear of "feudalistic trash" (engjian zaopo f# '1'p; 13,87: 23 - 91: 00) is 
not merely a propaganda issue; it also has a didactical dimension that goes beyond questions 
of state and party legitimacy. The concern is that the portrayal of certain role models may 
cause viewers to accept outdated social concepts, for example by adopting the patriarchal 
attitudes of past centuries and rejecting gender equality (ibid. ). In this context, some experts 
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demand a more socially responsible (i. e. didactical) approach to TV drama, as well as 
additional 'healthy' TV education on different aspects of Chinese history and traditional 
-ff thought, such as offered by CCTV's education programme Lecture Room (Baijiajiangtan 
i#tz; ibid. ). 
This then is the fourth effect that media experts in China associate with potentially harmful 
television content: the distortion and decay of Chinese values. The following, slightly longer 
interview excerpt offers two such examples (I3,94: 12 - 97: 24): 
13: Well, for example, Korean television dramas are broadcasted quite a lot, 
but they are not sensible about ethnical culture. You personally wouldn't 
think, for example, that *Confucianism* was Korean, yet some people 
think it originated in Korea. 
R: (laughs) really? 
13: Yeah yeah yeah! This is currently propagated in South Korea. So some 
people will think that these early Confucianists were born in Korea. 
Such problematic opinions are being voiced. So under such 
circumstances, television's influence on the masses really can't be 
ignored. Well, whether or not the masses have a particularly strong kind 
of discriminatory power, a capacity, an *ability* to choose, that has to do 
with age, knowledge, background, with each person's *educational 
background*... it has to do with all these aspects. Among young people 
whose character isn't fully developed yet, this ability is still weak. I think 
if we conducted a sociological or psychological survey, and this is of 
course my slightly subjective view, but I think if we conducted a survey 
in... what is it called... *cultural psychology*, we would find that such 
influences exist. So under these circumstances moderate restrictions and 
protections are still required. *1 think it's necessary*. We can't say it 
doesn't matter, just broadcast whatever you want to broadcast, 
including those black and yellow and ethical issues we talked about 
earlier. One of my students... what was it she said? She said: "ma'am, do 
you know what we currently... " These are eighteen, nineteen year old 
kids, and I was asking them: "What are your criteria for finding a 
partner? *how do you choose your boyfriend or girlfriend*, what is your 
*criterion*. They said something that almost made me die laughing. 
They said "with car and apartment, no mother no father. " 
R: I've heard that, yeah. 
I3: You've heard that, right? (laughs) 
R: Right, right, I've heard that. 
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I3: I said that from an ethical perspective this is immoral. Really terrible! 
"With car and apartment, both parents deceased. " That means the 
parents are both dead. After that I said: "not only is that unethical, but at 
the same time it is also extremely" ... what was it I said to them... "also 
extremely deranged, extremely unwise. " By unwise I mean that that's 
really stupid. *Foolish*! Extremely *foolish*. If the boyfriend's parents 
pass away while he is still that young, then don't they have this... what 
is it called? *Heritage*, these genes, this genetic... 
R: Oh, you mean * eg netic*. 
13: Yeah yeah yeah: *genetic*. There's a genetic factor, an *influence*. Well, 
will this *boyfriend* then not also die very young? Do you understand? 
R: I understand, I understand (laughs). I understand. 
I3: This is really an extremely *foolish* thing. How can you not want your 
*parents* to have a long life? 
R: Old age. 
13: Right! (R: laughs) That is to say they have an extremely terrible moral 
perspective (R: hm). Extremely terrible. 
I have reproduced this interview passage in full because it demonstrates that the call for 
stricter media control is fuelled not so much by a threat to state and party legitimacy, but by 
genuine concerns about the erosion of social values in China. In the above excerpt, the 
interviewee is worried that: 
1. Chinese audiences may forget their historical heritage (in this case 
believing that Confucianism originated in Korea), and that 
2. The moral values of young viewers are becoming increasingly deranged. 
Such concerns are sometimes voiced towards family dramas (13,69: 54 - 72: 20), but typically 
also towards teen soaps, which by default target a young audience, and mostly depict stories 
of consumption and economic success (Ill, 60: 19 - 64: 44). For this reason, some critics refer to 
this particular genre of television series as "vomit drama" (outuju RKI LHIJ, a play on the 
Chinese term for "teen drama", ouxiangju 111; ibid. ). An example of a teen drama series 
that was banned from television after broadcasting had started is the Taiwanese telenovela 
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Meteor Garden (Liuxing huayuan fit&®; 19,40: 27 - 41: 54) that was mentioned above: 
parents complained that their children were being corrupted by the programme's hedonistic 
depictions of adolescences; the critique was that the series' endorsement of consumption, 
parties and fights with other teenagers caused young viewers to act in similar fashions, 
thereby encouraging them to neglect their school education (ibid. ). 
3.6.111 Risk Groups 
The above description shows that one group of viewers is believed to be particularly 
susceptible to the potential negative effects of television: Chinese youths. As stated earlier, 
the government feels that the media should promote "the healthy development of minors" 
(SARFT 2006, article 22). This view is shared by Chinese media experts. The rationalization 
that underpins the call for media control for the sake of China's young viewers is explained 
by one interviewee as follows (13,93: 01 - 94: 11): 
13: Well, in my opinion, the influence of television is different for people of 
different ages. For young people, the influence is... their mental age is 
different, their physiological age is different, each person's attitude 
towards outside influences is different. For example on teens, what are 
they called... 
R: *Teenagers* 
13: Right, *teenagers*, and this... what is that called: *ad... * 
R: *Adolescence* 
13: Yeah, *adolescence*. People of that age, such kids, well they can be 
spoiled quite easily. (... ) So for the sake of those people, I really feel 
television dramas should have a ratings system. That is something that 
the entire world is demanding. With regards to this *art form*, everyone 
is considering this problem. Adults, middle-aged people, and those who 
are of relatively mature age, they all already possess the ability to 
*choose* and *judge*, they possess their own value system. They won't 
be so easily subjected to outside influences. I mean, influence or no 
influence, maybe they are influenced as well. But these people may 
possess stronger judgement, whereas children of young age may be 
influenced more strongly. 
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The concern for adolescents is often linked to the argument that China does not possess a 
system of parental guidance, and consequently requires the government to control what is 
aired. When asked why the Chinese guidelines were stricter than those adopted in other 
countries, one interviewee answered: "well, that is because we do not have a parental 
guidance system" (na, jiu shi yinwei meiyou fenji zhidu 9, OtA®174'3)'90141"; I9,38: 53 - 
39: 09). Another interviewee emphasised the relevance of such a guidance system the 
following way (17,67: 11 - 67: 50): 
I7: Because to this day China does not have a system of parental guidance 
for film and television. It would seem that foreign countries all have a 
very clear parental guidance system. 
R: Yes, right. Right. 
17: There, anyone accompanied by an adult can watch a programme, and 
otherwise only those who are older than 18 may watch it. For many 
years, China has developed in a way that now everyone watches 
television, it is a type of universal entertainment, a type of universal 
consumption. And in addition, a household may have only one 
television set or two television sets, so that everyone at home, whether 
young or old, all watch the same programme. 
Teenagers are certainly a major group believed to be at risk when it comes to television's 
harmful effects. However, the concept of the passive audience, and hence of the susceptible 
viewer, is sometimes extended from young people to the broad 'masses' in general (dazhong 
kg). This is again a common trope in the Chinese discussion on media influences: the idea 
that, as one interviewee put it, the audience has "varying levels of education, morality, and 
culture" (butong de jiaoyu zhidu, daode shuiping, wenhua suzhi TJJHh#` *V , 
1411E F. ýC 
1kl; 16,40: 22 - 43: 05), and that the average viewer is generally uneducated (12,38: 01 - 
39: 28; I3,115: 34 - 121: 30; 112,46: 43 - 49: 43; 114,46: 49 - 47: 43). This trope is closely linked to 
the perceived unique economic and social level of development in China. It is therefore often 
used to explain other social shortcomings in the PRC as well. A good example is the 
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following interview segment, in which the interviewee argues that the public conduct of 
most Chinese citizens demonstrates their inability to act responsibly (14,66: 38 - 67: 53): 
I4: Because at the moment our society's development has not yet reached 
this level. We don't have an effective level of supervision. It's not like 
China didn't have any laws, but the common Chinese people's legal 
consciousness has not yet reached this level. Their knowledge of these 
laws has not yet reached this level. They do not yet possess the 
consciousness and the mentality. Their cultural quality, to speak plainly, 
has not reached this level. Take, for example, standing in line when 
getting on a bus. Everyone knows that is a very good thing to do. Yet 
some people don't abide by this rule. So, when one person does not 
abide by this rule, then others will also not follow it. But when people 
don't abide by such a rule, there's no way to punish that. So it just 
becomes a chaotic situation. However, if the common people, if we all 
stood in line on our own initiative like foreigners do... I don't need to 
tell you this, right? So that's why I think this is not an institutional 
problem, but one of transforming the quality of the citizens. 
The trope of the uneducated masses is used by intellectuals of all political orientation in 
China: both those arguing the socialist position (14,60: 00 - 70: 31) as well as those demanding 
more political participation (I14,12: 37 - 16: 17) point out that the masses require the guidance 
of the more educated. The reason why the same trope is used in both cases is that the idea of 
an educated and benevolent elite governing an uneducated and underdeveloped society is 
not rooted primarily in contemporary political culture, but in much older traditional Chinese 
thought (Pye, forthcoming). 
3.6.1v Justifying Censorship and Government Control In China 
The perception that certain social groups in China are particularly affected by 'unhealthy' 
media content is central to the justification of government censorship and media control. The 
first form of justification has already been mentioned above: it is the wish to protect China's 
youth from harmful media effects, particularly in the absence of a parental guidance system. 
However, the lack of a parental guidance system is not the main argument that is used for 
justifying government censorship. Instead, it is the perception that the systems which are 
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enforced in other countries would not suit the Chinese context, and that the government 
therefore has no choice but to supervise media consumption (14,65: 33 - 66: 37): 
14: So why do you need to pay attention to this issue? Because at the 
moment China does not possess a system of parental guidance. This is a 
real problem. We don't rate our television dramas and films. We haven't 
rated any of them yet. And shouldn't they be rated? Once social 
development has reached a certain level, we can rate them. Parental 
guidance is also related to another problem, that of supervision. Right? 
That is to say if you don't have supervision and you rate films, it's as if 
you hadn't rated them at all. Do you understand what I'm saying? 
R: I understand, I understand. 
14: For example if I classify, let's say, dramas with sex and violence as 
content that can't be broadcasted at a certain time. 
R: So that only children older than 12... 
I4: Right, right, right. The cultural quality of your common Chinese 
household still hasn't reached that level. If the requirement for a 
programme is that only viewers over 20 may watch it, but my child is a 
teenager, and I'm not at home that day, then if my child watches that 
programme, what can I do about that? So this type of supervision, 
including cinema supervision.., for example a certain movie is only 
suitable for children over the age of 13, and others shouldn't watch it. 
Well, say the head of a household goes out with his child and buys a 
ticket for that film, then the cinema personnel is thinking "one more 
ticket won't make a difference", so they sell him the ticket. If you can't 
enforce supervision, such a parental guidance system is useless. Right? I 
think that's the way to look at it. There's nothing else we can do. (laughs) 
The second justification draws from the trope of the uneducated average citizen mentioned 
earlier. To evoke the image of a socially underdeveloped China populated by uneducated 
'masses' serves a specific function: it justifies a paternalistic attitude, according to which the 
Chinese people (renmin AK) require guidance and protection by the elites (Heberer, 
forthcoming). The argument for media control is in that sense not so much driven by the 
concern that the wrong content might contest China's one party rule or otherwise facilitate 
political dissent (although this is certainly one aspect of media control in the PRC, as the 
official censorship guidelines show) but is instead fuelled by the perception that the Chinese 
elites have a responsibility to guide the uneducated masses towards welfare. 
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The concern for China's welfare is closely linked to the third justification of media control: 
the idea that certain television content may endanger social stability (shehui wending #t t 
äý). The stability trope is central to the Chinese media debate. Consider the following excerpt, 
in which an interviewee explains why certain periods in recent Chinese history are still taboo 
(114,09: 27 - 09: 53): 
R: And what other things can't be broadcasted, or are prohibited? 
114: Prohibited? It's like this: each period of time is different. For example, 
during this current period you can't talk about the ten years of the 
Cultural Revolution. So dramas on the Cultural Revolution should best 
not be produced. Because that's a sensitive issue. Doesn't the 
government say... they only use one word: stability. Anything that isn't 
*stable* is not alright. So that's why they say "Cultural Revolution 
dramas can be produced next year. They can be aired next year. " That is 
precisely because of stability. 
The reason why social stability has such a high priority in Chinese discourses is that it is 
associated with economic development. Without social stability, so the argument goes, China 
cannot prosper (14,72: 42 - 73: 51): 
I4: I think with regard to the government... why will the government 
consider the question of officials' authority? Because when we talk about 
Chinese society, currently the most important thing is stability. Social 
stability. Because only if this society is stable can the economy develop. 
This is the government's reasoning. Because we currently witness that, 
in many countries, if the government and society aren't stable, the 
economy has no way to develop. For example Yugoslavia. 
R: The economy doesn't work. 
14: The economy doesn't work. Nothing works. So that is why I think that 
especially with a country of this size, society's stability is very important. 
Because only with social stability can the economy develop. If society 
isn't stable, the danger to the economy is huge. Huge. So I think our 
government is looking at it from that angle. It will restrict you from 
broadcasting on television and through the media any content that 
threatens the stability of society. The government needs to regulate the 
situation. 
Finally, the advocates of media control in China argue that Western countries censor 
television content as well, particularly when it comes to themes such as violence, sexuality 
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and drug abuse (I6; 25: 02 - 26: 52; 19,22: 25 - 23: 34). Despite the political, social and cultural 
uniqueness that is so often claimed for China, the references to other country's censorship 
guidelines are an attempt to equate the principle concerns on which censorship in the PRC is 
founded with the principles that are believed to apply in Western countries. Furthermore, 
the fact that television dramas are rarely rejected entirely by the censors but are instead sent 
back to the producer with the option to re-edit the programme was viewed by one 
interviewee as proof that foreign criticism of the Chinese censorship system was unjustified: 
censorship was only seen as unjust by the interviewee if it meant that a finished product was 
completely banned (14,60: 00 - 70: 31). 
3.6. v Putting the Official Position Into Perspective: Society and the Viewers 
The debate on television's influence and on media control that has been discussed so far can 
be viewed as hegemonic discourse in the sense that it is adopted by the Chinese leadership 
(i. e. in the official discourse) and frequently reiterated by media experts. However, this is not 
to say that this dominant viewpoint is not contested by diverging positions. Particularly the 
level to which television is often believed to influence audiences is questioned to some 
degree. Consider the following interview segment, in which the interviewee hypothetically 
quantifies television's impact on viewers in comparison to other factors of influence (17,70: 30 
- 72: 06): 
R: I would like to ask you about your personal opinion in the following 
matter: what kind of influence does television have? 
17: 1 think it's quite... you say it has an influence, and it's possible that this 
influence... if we're talking about quantity, and of course I have not 
done a survey, but it shouldn't exceed ten per cent. 
R: Ten per cent. 
17: No more than ten per cent. A larger part, maybe ninety per cent, is 
society's influence. Because the influence of television and the media, 
and the media is not only television but includes television as well as the 
internet and possibly other things, the media's influence won't exceed 
ten per cent. More important is the influence from society and the family. 
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It's the influence of the people they come into contact with, of the family 
they live in, of the work they do, and of their living environment that 
influences people. However maybe some person on some occasion, just 
like we just said, they might commit a murder. That may be a problem 
caused by social reasons, but that person learned the method from 
television or the internet. So he suddenly had a mental flash (on how to 
commit a crime), but what really influenced him is not television at all. 
Particularly noteworthy is that this statement still makes use of the trope that criminals 
potentially learn the methodology of crime from the media. The interviewee acknowledges 
this dominant position, but suggests that the reasoning behind it (i. e. the conception that 
television is the cause of criminal behaviour) has to be put into perspective. The use of 
hegemonic discourse fragments in counter-hegemonic arguments becomes even more 
evident in the following excerpt (112,36: 48 - 39: 32): 
R: What function do you yourself believe television and television dramas 
have? What influence might they have on audiences? 
112: Actually, I believe that in many cases their influence is exaggerated. 
R: may be exaggerated... 
112: Their influence may be exaggerated. Because, I believe it's a bit like... I 
have a little child myself. My child is still very small. 
R: Really? 
112: Sometimes I worry that my child might learn this or might learn that... I 
worry a lot. Well, in reality many of these worries are unnecessary. 
Because your little child may find its own way to grow up. It has its own 
way to distinguish things. But grown-ups will always be fathers. Parents 
always want to keep their children away from harm. They don't want 
them to see this, don't want them to see that, don't want them to 
encounter any danger, don't want them to encounter any harm. Parents 
probably are in such a state of mind. I sometimes think that these 
officials probably also have such a mentality. 
R: Oh, really? Like parents? (laughs) 
112: Yeah yeah yeah! They think "I'm responsible, I have the duty to help 
people choose. " That's the type of mentality that parents have. And I am 
not saying that such a mentality is wrong, but such an approach is not 
very scientific. It's not an entirely scientific approach. Sometimes these 
worries may be excessive. It's that kind of choice, that kind of attitude 
that they may exaggerate. They may think that the function of television 
and of television dramas... well, there are still people who watch a 
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kidnapping on television and, well, imitate that and commit a similar 
kidnapping. Also, there may still be people who watch something on 
television concerning some historical period and then think that that 
historical period was exactly like shown on television. That sort of 
situation may nonetheless occur. But this will normally be something 
that a very disturbed person will do. A very peculiar person might act in 
such a fashion. A peculiar person may have such notions. He may be 
completely consumed by television. But most sane people will not be 
consumed by television. This is my personal opinion, but maybe those 
who work for an administrative agency feel they have some kind of 
responsibility to filter out anything that might consume the audience, so 
they won't allow you to show too many historical details, or crime, or 
drug abuse. They fear that people may imitate those things. I think that's 
like the excessive worries that parents have towards their children. 
In the example above, the interviewee uses the traditional trope of the paternalist 
government and turns it against the hegemonic position: the argument here is that the 
government indeed feels it needs to protect its citizens like parents protect their children, but 
that the government's concerns consequently are similarly exaggerated as those of parents. 
It is important to note, however, that in both of the above counter-hegemonic statements 
media control is not outright rejected. The importance of social influences is emphasised, but 
the potential of television or other media forms to inspire malicious behaviour are 
nonetheless acknowledged in both excerpts. This demonstrates how even discursive 
positions that challenge the dominant conceptions of the media's influence on consumers are 
still confined by the boundaries of the hegemonic discourse (additional examples are 13, 
91: 01 - 98: 03 as well as 17,65: 06 - 70: 29). 
3.7 The Chinese Perspective on the Functions of Television 
The degree to which Chinese media experts believe television influences viewers' behaviour 
raises the question what functions television drama is supposed to have. These main 
functions that are attributed to popular television series in official statements are 
propaganda, education and entertainment (I5,56: 53 - 58: 15). In addition, television is also 
believed by some to serve as a form of social and psychological release (17,72: 15 - 73: 26). The 
following section analyses what interviewees associated with these functions. 
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3.7.1 The Official Position: TV Drama as a Propaganda and Education Tool 
Propaganda and education go hand in hand in China's production of television content. The 
reason for this is that propaganda is not merely understood in the sense of promoting 
Communist ideology and improving the image of party and state. This is of course a major 
aspect of propaganda, and television drama content is ideally meant to reflect the 
government and party position concerning the Chinese modernization endeavour, thereby 
facilitating the viewers' confidence in their leadership (15,97: 58 - 99: 23). However, and this 
has become evident from the importance that the government attributes to drama content, 
television propaganda is more importantly meant to provide "guidance" (daoxiang 01; 12, 
93: 14 - 95: 40). As mentioned earlier (Section 3.6. ii), television drama is regarded as a medium 
that supplies viewers with role models. Just like the depiction of questionable morals and 
values is believed to inspire malicious behaviour in audiences, so is the depiction of positive 
roles seen as a way of teaching viewers how to behave properly (I9,15: 22 -17: 09). 
The most explicit form of propaganda in TV entertainment is the main melody propaganda 
drama (zhuxuanlu dianshiju tÄ 1t*01). The key intention of these dramas is to either 
glorify the revolutionary history of the party, or promote the image of party and state. 
Usually, main melody dramas are produced with the financial and institutional backing of 
the state. A prime example of such a drama is the well-received GAJZ (I13,23: 35 - 27: 44), 
which will be analysed in detail in Section 4.2 of this thesis. 
However, political content does not necessarily have to be explicitly propagandistic. 
Discursive positions also find their way into more commercial drama productions through 
the multi-layered control mechanisms which are enforced throughout the television drama 
market. As one interviewee pointed out (17,42: 46 - 46: 12), even teen dramas and similar 
apparently mainly entertaining programmes will have a didactical dimension in China. 
According to the interviewee, the reason for this is that the government is essentially in 
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control of all drama production processes and will always encourage that the ideological 
requirements of state and party are met (ibid. ). The interviewee explained that in such cases 
the educational content will be embedded in the entertainment aspects of the drama: the 
famous, beautiful actors and the dazzling set locations are meant to attract viewers, and the 
values depicted in the drama are meant to teach the audience how to properly lead their 
lives (ibid). 
While both these didactical approaches (the explicit as well as the implicit) construct 
discursive positions, not all didactical content has to necessarily promote a political message 
designed by the leadership. For instance, one screenwriter expressed the opinion that 
television drama should critically depict contemporary social problems. She described how 
she devised her own scripts with a didactical motivation in mind, but that the educational 
content presented therein was derived mainly from her own personal experiences with 
China's drive for modernization (I8,86: 17 - 91: 52). The same interviewee in fact questioned 
whether the propagation of the main discourse on modernity (i. e. of content that promotes 
economic and urban development) was the best didactical approach (ibid. ): she argued that 
the generation of Chinese viewers who grew up during the reform era was already used to 
modernity and did not require lectures on how to further develop the nation; instead, so the 
interviewee, television drama should aim to educate people on how to deal with the social 
pressures that the rapid development in China has created (for example the lack of social 
security, urban isolation, etc; I will return to this non-official position below). Particularly the 
target audience for teen dramas, i. e. younger viewers, needed to learn that concerns over a 
lack of social status or of consumer opportunities did not qualify as a "social problem", and 
that their commercial aspirations (described aptly by the catch phrase "monthly wage of 
over 10,000 RMB, car and apartment"; yuexin guo wan, you the you fang Ari T, Ii r'! %) 
needed to be replaced with moral values and ethics (daode j; 18,91: 53 - 95: 03). 
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Whether the purpose of didactical television content is to promote official discourses or other 
values, the respective television dramas are in either case believed to only achieve their 
purpose if they fulfil two requirements. First, the discourses and their on-screen presentation 
are required to be'close to the people', i. e. reflect the every-day social, cultural and economic 
reality of the viewers. The idea of 'close-to-life' television content was brought up by 
numerous interviewees (I1,42: 14 - 44: 34; I2,97: 36 - 99: 57; 111,33: 24 - 34: 40), and is also 
mentioned in SARFF documents (see the quotes from SARFT, 2004, article 19, as well as 
SARFT, 2006, article 22, provided at the beginning of section 3.6. i). In fact, the'close-to-life' 
concept is another trope that is rooted in recent Communist ideology, and that is based on 
President Hu Jintao's demand that CCP politics should be "close to reality, close to life, and 
close to the masses" (the so-called 'three closes'; tiejin shiji, tiejin shenghuo, tiejin qunzhong Ili 
irM1V7. QSiü Mif[ A; Ren, 2004). 
The second requirement that has to be met by television drama in order for it to unfold its 
didactical potential is that its content has to be popular. This brings us to the entertainment 
function of television drama. 
3.7.11 The Alternative Position: Was an Entertainment Enterprise 
In the official position, the propaganda and educational functions of television drama are 
linked to television's entertainment functions (16,05: 38 - 06: 44). The reasoning is that 
propagandistic and didactical content will only reach viewers if the vessel for that content 
(i. e. the television drama) appeals to viewers' sense of aesthetics and to their entertainment 
needs (Il, 42: 06 - 43: 13). A manifestation of this logic is the already mentioned slogan 
"unite 
the three qualities" (i. e. assure ideological quality, artistic quality and viewer appeal). 
Various interviewees have pointed out this official viewpoint (for instance I4,96: 48 - 97: 51; 15, 
97: 58 - 99: 23; 16,05: 38 - 06: 44; 113,56: 58 - 59: 44), with one 
director saying: "first you need 
entertainment, only then can you accomplish that [didactical] function" (xian 
bixu yule 
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caineng caicheng zheyang de zuoyong SýJGý% l; F: 7t ýGf>f'Gä$$jT'ý1ý; 11,42: 06 - 43: 13). This 
position clearly acknowledges the predominant role that market dynamics and viewers' 
preferences play in the production and distribution of television content. One producer, for 
instance, corrected the researcher's assumption that the creative process of producing 
television dramas was strongly influenced by government regulations and propaganda 
targets, and instead stated that the main influence were market dynamics. According to the 
interviewee, production companies had no choice but to create programmes that featured as 
little explicit political content as possible; he argued that if producers created programmes 
which explicitly dealt with political issues, "no one would want to watch that" (meiyou ren 
yao kan &IfARV; 12,78: 11 - 78: 27). 
While the dominant position seems to be that this degree of commercialization is regrettable, 
and that it decreases the amount of 'healthy' content that is broadcasted (18,56: 42 - 59: 41; 19, 
26: 21 - 27: 50; 111,74: 32 - 75: 40), another line of argumentation questions the educational and 
propaganda function of television altogether. Particularly those involved in privately funded 
television drama productions argue instead that TV dramas are merely meant to entertain, 
and should be primarily seen as a business enterprise. For instance, one interviewee voiced 
the opinion that "television dramas, as well as films and literature, are not schools" (xiaoshuo, 
dianying, dianshiju dou bushi xuexiao'1'i , ,R't 
VI1#5TX' &) and therefore "do not 
have the power to solve social problems" (ta meiyou liliang jiejue zhexie wenti 1=, i4f]At$7A 
' OI J; 112,59: 58 - 60: 17). A section from the same interview further demonstrates the 
commercial function of television dramas (I12,47: 04 - 50: 23): 
R: Has there been a case in which you felt you wanted to tell a story but it 
wouldn't sell? 
112: Possibly. Such a case is possible, but if such a case occurs in the 
television drama industry then I think that's just the way it is. Because in 
the television drama industry the story is supplied by screenwriters. 
They are part of the assembly line. I believe that with television dramas, 
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their commodity value is more important than their creative value. 
Drama series are products and not works of art. Because television 
dramas are meant to be sold. They are not like films, which is why I have 
always told my students in class.., and of course this is just a joke: "I 
hear they make underground films and art-house films, but I have never 
heard of such a thing as an underground television drama or an art- 
house television drama. " (laughs) Because underground and art-house 
films are types of movies. But there are no underground television 
dramas and art-house television dramas. Television drama only has one 
purpose, and that is to be shot, sold to a TV station, and broadcasted. It 
only has this purpose. So considering this, you have to obey the 
requirements of the market. I believe that if you... I often tell my 
students in class: "If you have some story or some message you feel you 
really need to impart, then you should go and write a novel. But if you 
are writing a television drama you have to consider two issues: the first 
is that you need to come up with a product plan; and I believe that the 
purpose of the product plan is not to please me, but to convince others to 
buy the product; the best thing is if I like the product and there's also a 
buyer, that would be the best option. But aside from that, if I actually do 
not like the product, yet someone buys it... well from the perspective of 
the product I believe that is still something worth considering. This is 
the first issue: you have to consider making a product. That's the first 
issue. So the second issue is that you have to consider that your 
television drama is meant to be aired on television, and many viewers, 
including viewers of different age levels, will all watch it. A television 
drama that is aired during prime time will have viewers of all ages, 
cultural backgrounds, and educational levels. So if you are broadcasting 
it at that time, you also absolutely need some sense of responsibility. 
You will still hope that this television drama will reflect the interests of 
average people. Maybe that's the one thing to consider. But if you want 
to express other ideas you should write a film or a novel. 
R: Yeah yeah yeah. So we can say that the most important thing is still the 
market, not political censorship... 
112: It's not about politics. The issue of television drama censorship... it 
would seem that at the moment this is not a particularly urgent problem, 
because when it comes to government control, they'll tell you in the 
beginning: "If you write a homicide drama we will not allow you to 
broadcast it during prime time. " So if at this time I still want to go ahead 
and shoot the drama, then you already know the result: did they not say 
"if you write this then we won't let you broadcast it"? It seems that it is 
very rare that a television drama is not broadcasted because of 
censorship issues. That seems to be very rare. 
According to the above position, television drama is meant to generate profits. In the 
interview segment above, this is achieved through the sale of a product to a broadcaster. 
However, the commercial 'spill-over' created by product placement in television dramas is 
also seen as a positive function of this media format. The following is an excerpt from an 
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interview with a TV drama director, who was asked what type of television series he would 
like to produce in the future (I1,47: 04 - 48: 51): 
I1: I think that afterwards I might focus on the things that young people 
enjoy watching. 
R: Why is that? 
11: Well, because I think that this medium of communication is closely 
linked to the advertisement industry. If I create an interesting television 
drama, the ratings will be exceptionally high. However, the viewers who 
watch that drama are older than forty, and their consumer mentality is 
already set. They are not impulsive. So when they watch they won't go 
and buy the advertised product. However, if you look at young people, 
thirty-something and younger, they might see a new type of car in a 
television drama and they may suddenly think "I want that, after a few 
years of hard work I will want to buy that car". 
Throughout the various interviews, the importance of television drama's commercial 
function has repeatedly been emphasised, and one interviewee summed up the debate on the 
economic dimension of drama production by stating that "the market comes first" (shichang 
di yi r1 ,*-; 12,78: 11 - 78: 27). 
3.7.111 Additional Functions: Psychological and Social Relevance of TV Drama 
Aside from the propaganda and educational function of television drama that is so deeply 
imbedded in the official position, as well as the commercial function attributed to television 
by entrepreneurs and officials alike, Chinese media experts frequently refer to another 
function, which is not mentioned in official documents. This is the idea that Chinese 
audiences need television drama as a form of social release, as a way of compensating for the 
hardship of life in post-reform China. An example is the popularity of Korean family dramas 
in the PRC, which are more conservative in their depiction of values than the average 
Chinese programme (15,04: 26 - 06: 15). One interviewee explained the reason for this 
popularity of traditional themes as follows (ibid. ): 
15: Well, currently many people in China who watch Korean television 
dramas will be able to find in them certain things that they themselves 
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remember fondly; things that we had in the past, but which we don't 
have any more. But to be more precise, it's like this: in Korean family 
dramas, old people are highly respected. Even if what they say is wrong, 
they are still ... <background noise> 
R: They have to... <background noise> 
15: But they rely on their children, including their daughters-in-law. But 
what is it currently like in mainland China? Old people's status is not 
that high in the eyes of their children. I am not saying that they 
completely lack status, but it is definitely not as high as in Korea. 
Consequently, when old people in China watch these Korean dramas, 
they will easily find them appealing. For instance they may derive some 
kind of satisfaction from them that they cannot get from their own lives. 
Old people certainly long for respect, and I wouldn't say that currently 
the young people in China don't respect the elderly, but definitely not as 
much as Koreans. Also, actually, in most households the relationship 
between the father and the daughter-in-law is not that good. In 
traditional Chinese society, for example before 1950, before 1949, many 
Chinese daughters-in-law did not have much status. They had to obey 
the elders. However, today, many old people don't have many rights in 
the eyes of their daughters-in-law, so that is why when they watch 
Korean dramas they will easily find them appealing. 
According to the argument above, Chinese viewers feel that part of their cultural heritage 
and their traditional (particularly family) values have been lost during the process of 
modernizing China. Another interviewee makes the same point (I12,57: 05 - 58: 25): 
112: Actually, in a society like China's, it has probably gotten better during 
the last year or two, but in the period before that everyone felt that many 
personal relations that had been stable in traditional China, very 
intimate relations... that young people do not have such relations 
anymore. The family has always been a very important bond in China. 
However, during the 90s such family bonds have gradually collapsed. 
That's because people's desire for material wealth has become stronger 
and stronger, and material possessions have grown more and more. So 
the family bonds collapsed, and everyone felt lost. Everyone thought 
that as soon as they had money, drove a car, and had an apartment, they 
would be in control of their lives. But since we also got rid of our family 
sentiments at the same time, we felt saddened. I believe that at that time 
relatively many dramas were written that depicted such family relations. 
Relatively many dramas dealt with those themes. 
One function of television, then, is to assuage the loss that many viewers feel in light of the 
perceived corrosion of traditional family values and morals. According to the media experts I 
interviewed, television dramas fulfil this function in three ways. 
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The first of these is to appeal to the nationalist sentiment of viewers. This is particularly true 
for television dramas that deal with historical aspects of Chinese culture. Such series tend to 
depict stories from the "golden ages" of Chinese civilization, for example depicting the 
height of the Han, Tang or Ming dynasties (I5,92: 42 - 97: 57). One such example is the series 
HWDD, which is analyzed in Section 4.1 of this dissertation. The achievements of the Han 
Emperor Wu (for example his consolidation of Confucian values, his management of ethnic 
conflicts and his expansion of the Chinese Empire) are viewed by Chinese audiences as 
inspiring and reassuring (110,23: 46 - 25: 01). Without the knowledge and pride of their 
history, Chinese viewers are believed, as one interviewee put it, to suffer "from an empty 
heart" (xinli shi xu de ',, 14,18 ; 17,41: 06 - 42: 46). 
Secondly, television dramas attempt to appeal to audiences' feelings (xingan L,! ; 16,38: 21 - 
40: 21). They allow viewers to identify with the loss and suffering of the characters, and 
thereby give them the opportunity to grow emotionally through a cathartic experience. In 
this sense, television dramas (as well as media outlets such as the internet) have a 
therapeutically function: they offer psychological and social release, especially for those who 
have been otherwise marginalised by modern-day Chinese society (17,72: 15 - 73: 26): 
I7: I think television, in fact regardless of whether we're talking about 
Chinese or foreign audiences, many television programmes evaluate 
such problems. For example, under conditions such as the current strong 
trend towards more entertainment and leisure, something arises that... 
it's not about aesthetics, people are not trying to find beautiful content 
on television or on the internet, but instead are looking for ugly details. 
That is to say in China, and you have also spent some time in China, you 
will come across such women as Furong Jiejie on the internet, 
unattractive people like Mu Zi Mei who take all their sexual experiences 
with men, write them down, and put them on the internet. Or that 
Furong Jiejie trying to figure out how to deal with her unattractiveness. 
In the end, many feel that life is exhausting. In our current type of 
explosive developmental period many don't know who they are and 
may feel that status is relatively hard to come by. So at such times, 
because the pressure from society is relatively high, they require some 
kind of psychological release. 
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The third method is closely related to the educational function of television dramas. By 
depicting everyday social situations, dramas offer viewers hypothetical situations that they 
can analyze and then base their own behaviour on, or as one interviewee stated (I14,24: 05 - 
24: 19): 
114: When it comes to television dramas, the common Chinese people really 
enjoy analysing the social problems that they themselves grew up to 
experience. 
It is difficult to establish how far these arguments on television's function as a compensator 
for social problems in China are integrated into the hegemonic discourse. It is likely that the 
psychological functions of popular entertainment, i. e. its opiate-like effect on the masses, are 
accepted and possibly even encouraged by officials. The depiction of social problems on 
television is certainly not prohibited by the authorities, as long as it does not endanger 
China's stability. However, the dissatisfaction that media experts believe many viewers feel 
towards the economic and social development of their country, as well as audiences' 
perceived need to compensate for these inadequacies by either becoming emotionally 
introspective or turning to historical (i. e. 'feudalistic') traditions, is not likely to be what the 
Chinese leadership has in mind when it refers to television's purpose of "appealing to 
audiences" (SARFT, 2006, article 22). In this sense, television drama's social release function 
should be considered part of the counter-hegemonic discourse. 
A similarly unofficial position is the idea that television should facilitate public discussion of 
everyday problems, thereby promoting pluralism. The basic notion that television dramas 
provide talking-points for audiences is itself not necessarily counter-hegemonic, and is in 
some cases associated with the educational function of television (Ii, 42: 14 - 44: 34). However, 
as one interviewee explained by referring to the American sociologist Daniel Bell, television 
in China also functions as a place where different conflicting social aspects (economics, 
politics and culture) are negotiated and coordinated (13,72: 50 - 76: 07). In this interpretation, 
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television drama is regarded as much more than entertainment; it is viewed as a forum for 
the negotiation of fringe opinions that can otherwise not be voiced (13,76: 08 - 77: 21). Such an 
argument implies that the discourses that television disseminates and encourages facilitate 
pluralism and allow viewers to participate in the construction of China's social and political 
reality; a position that inherently questions the recurring theme of a passive audience. 
3.8 Summary: The Commercial Interests and Political Targets of 
Television Entertainment 
The above analysis shows that numerous factors influence the creation of discourses during 
the production process of Chinese television dramas: the discursive elements of a drama 
depend on the type of production company that initiates the project (state-run or non- 
governmental), on the types of investors involved in the project (from within or from outside 
the media sector; state-run or privately owned), on the production and marketing strategy of 
the creative producer, on the work of the screenwriter(s) and ultimately on the director's 
vision of the final product. 
In addition, the interviews have shown that the Chinese television drama market is a highly 
regulated sector. The creation of discourses is monitored closely by the authorities during all 
stages of production and distribution. This includes 'hard' censorship tools such as the 
distribution permits (which are granted only after the detailed content of dramas has been 
minutely examined by the censorship authorities). However, the conversations with 
production crew members suggest that the full range and force of the censorship system is 
rarely applied to curb unwanted discourses and promote politically acceptable content. 
Instead, a series of 'soft' censorship tools such as production permits or prime-time 
broadcasting regulations are used; these do not exert direct control over the production 
process but instead merely provide incentives for the creation of certain content. This 
generates an environment in which only certain discourses are worked into the drama series: 
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screenwriters, producers and directors self-censor the content they produce, knowing that 
they will only be able to sell and later broadcast products that do not upset the power 
relations in China's society. In this sense, the political self-censorship is mainly driven by 
commercial considerations: only content that fulfils broadcasters' aesthetic and technical 
standards, and appeals to audience viewing habits, will be profitable. An apt summary of the 
three aspects that define the production of television drama content is provided by the 
interviewees' much quoted slogan "unification of the three qualities" (san xing tongyi HE f'-f#t 
-), the three qualities being: ideology (sixiangxing . '. 
Vit), artistic quality (yishuxing -E*ft), 
and viewer appeal (guanshangxing NMI). 
My analysis of media experts' perceptions further shows that, in the eyes of those who are 
involved in television drama production, television series have a profound influence on 
viewers, and should consequently function as a social and political tool. The notion that TV 
content exerts such a strong influence on viewers is overwhelmingly agreed upon by 
Chinese experts. It is this belief in the media content's potential to affect behaviour which 
defines the way that television dramas are produced, censored and aired in China. This 
shows what relevance discourse has: the government's control of the media is supported by 
a network of concepts, ideas, tropes and metaphors concerning television's social function, 
its influence on viewers, and its possible harmful effects, which ultimately assure the 
acceptability of hard as well as soft media controls, and make these controls difficult to 
contest. 
However, the analysis has also shown that the didactical and propaganda functions of 
television are increasingly augmented (though not truly challenged) by commercial interests. 
The fact that the television drama market has become more liberalised is substantially 
influencing the production of content in various ways. The relevant factors include the 
audience rating system, the television stations' need to make profits from advertisement 
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sales, and the government's regulations on production and broadcasting. The feedback that 
audiences provide concerning television drama content does not actually 'feed back' into the 
production process in any significant way, but the preconceptions that production crew 
members and broadcasters have of their target audiences and their viewing habits 
nonetheless strongly influence the planning, creation and broadcasting of drama content. 
4 Chinese TV Dramas and their Discursive Contents 
After having analysed the factors that lead to the production of discourses in popular 
Chinese television dramas, this chapter now turns to the main part of this thesis: the visual 
political analysis of three specific television dramas. Each of the following sections deals with 
a particular Chinese television drama: the historical drama HWDD is analysed in Section 4.1, 
the main-melody crime drama GAJZ in Section 4.2, and finally the metropolitan teen drama 
NCNM in Section 4.3. For each of these television programs, two particular discourse strands 
are analysed: first, the discourse on governance (focusing on the authorities that govern, as 
well as the subjects that are governed); second, the discourse on the classical first goal of 
governance, i. e. security (for GAJZ and NCNM, this means an analysis of public security 
issues; in the case of HWDD, the analysis focuses on foreign security). Throughout the 
analysis, additional attention will be given to the question of how government actions are 
justified, and what role patriotic or nationalist themes play in the depiction of the respective 
discourse strands. The findings are summarised and evaluated in Section 4.4. 
4.1 Visual Political Discourses In a Historical Drama 
The first series under scrutiny here is the historical television drama HWDD (Hu, 2005), 
which started broadcasting in early January of 2005 and was aired consecutively on CCTV-1 
each evening at 20: 00 p. m. The 60,000,000 RMB production was filmed by renowned director 
Hu Mei 9ZC under the creative production guidance of Han Sanping LEVI. The fifty-eight- 
episode epic was produced by the Literature and Art Department of CCTV (Zhongyang 
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dianshitai wenyi zhongxin 'A 'LfCZ43, C, ), in collaboration with various private investors. 
The drama is based on a script written by Jiang Qitao iz*$4, and features a cast of famous 
actors, most notably TV star Chen Baoguo MIM in the role of Emperor Wu. The series was 
promoted as a "realistic historical drama" (lishi zhengju ff7-*iE 'J; Zhang, 2005), and ranked 
12th most popular television drama of 2005 (Wang, 2006,249). It tells the story of Liu Che (t'J 
$111), who later became known as the Han Emperor Wu, and consecutively deals with Liu's 
childhood, adolescence, his accession to the throne, his military struggle against the Huns (in 
some of the resources referred to by their Chinese name: Xiongnu ýUZZ) as a young and 
middle-aged emperor, and finally with his latter days as a paranoid and authoritarian old 
man. The drama includes strong references to imperial rule, as well as foreign security issues, 
which shall be analysed below. The discursive statements identified in this analysis, as well 
as the signs used to construct these statements, are summarised in the corresponding tables 
in Appendix 3. 
4.1.1 The Humane Ruler 
The discourse strand on governance is featured prominently in HWDD. Due to the drama's 
focus on imperial rule, governance here primarily refers to governance through state rule. As 
mentioned earlier (Chapter 1), the drama in fact concentrates so strongly on Emperor Wu as 
a personification of the state that it led one Hong Kong journalist to conclude that it was 
meant as an allegory to present-day politics, commissioned by the Chinese state (Yan, 2005). 
Although there is no evidence to support the claim that the Han Emperor Wu here serves as 
a propagandistic personification of the current Chinese leadership (the amount of criticism 
launched against the drama series by Chinese officials and intellectuals alone makes such a 
conclusion questionable; I9,19: 43 - 21: 16), however reference to the state and its ruler 
nonetheless dominate throughout the drama. 
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The following visual discourse analysis shall first focus on a sequence from the last episode 
of the drama, which combines the discourse strand of governance with the discourse strand 
of being governed (HWDD 58-03). The sequence occurs after the Emperor Wu has lost both 
his first son, crown prince Liu Ju, and Liu Ju's mother Lady Wei to the power struggles at 
court. Increasingly paranoid and isolated, the aging emperor starts to doubt his rule and his 
accomplishments. Before this backdrop, the emperor travels to the countryside with his 
young son, the new crown-prince Fu Ling, in order to educate him on the achievements of 
the people there. As the emperor's carriage arrives in the village, the inhabitants gather 
together in excitement to greet the ruler, lauding him for his success, and inviting him to 
their homes. The following six central, interrelated discourse fragments can be identified in 
this sequence: 
1. The ruler is close to the people (Figure 15). 
Sequence 58-03 shows emperor Wu as an approachable ruler who is in touch with the 
masses. This is primarily achieved through the setting of the scene: the mere idea that the 
supreme ruler of the Han would travel to a small village to personally interact with his 
subjects is a discursive statement that stands in stark contrast to the proclamation by this 
drama's producers that the series is a 'realistic' historical representation of the Han 
dynasty. This fictional encounter in itself therefore functions as a sign, connoting the 
ruler's proximity to the people. In addition, other signs are used to reinforce this 
closeness: the use of mise-en-scene (that is: the arrangement of personage and objects in 
the shots) as well as the language used in the dialogues all point towards an intimacy 
between the ruler and his subjects: As the emperor mingles with the people, he is set in 
the midst of a crowd of peasants (shots 28,35 - 38), is shown patting villagers on their 
backs (shot 37) and is placed in close proximity to a child in the private home of one of 
his subjects (shots 29-34, which make use of OT5-shots to increase the impression of 
193 
intimacy). The feeling of familiarity is further enhanced by the fact that the emperor and 
the people converse in colloquial Chinese (as opposed to the formal language used in the 
court scenes of the drama). In addition, the ritualistic bowing to the ruler that is 
emphasised in almost all other sequences of the drama (for examples in this last episode, 
see HWDD 58-10 or 58-12) is handled here as a mere formality, with the emperor urging 
his subjects to their feet (shot 24). This series of visual and verbal signs can be 
paraphrased to form the discursive statement: 
" The ruler is a man of the people. 
Figur, 15 The Ruler as a Mari of the People 
HWDD 58-03-28 HWDD 58-03-35 HWUI) : )ti 03 36 IiWI)() . "8 i). { 31' 
2. The ruler is a fatherly figure to the people (Figure 16). 
The personal relation between the ruler and his subjects is further emphasised by various 
sings that mark the emperor as a paternal figure. First, a combination of nrisý rn scCnc 
arrangements and medium close-up shots with low camera angels is used to place the 
emperor physically in a position above his subjects, looking down on them with a kind 
expression on his face (shots 20,22 and 26). A verbal sign is then used to further relay the 
ruler's care and affection for the people: as the emperor leans forward, he asks in a low, 
mild voice "is everyone alright" (dou hao ba? shot 26). A third sign is then twice 
used to steer the viewer towards an understanding that the emperor is a fatherly figure: 
two scenes in this sequence juxtapose the aging ruler with children. First, the emperor 
visits one of the villager's homes, where he caringly interacts with a crying boy (shots 2.1 
- 32); second, in the final series of shots, the emperor picks up 
his son Fu I . 
ing and carries 
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him in his arms (shots 53 - 58). All of these signs come together to form the discursive 
statement: 
" The ruler cares about his subjects like a father cares for his children. """ 
3. The people love and respect their ruler (Figure 17). 
Another important aspect of this sequence is the enthusiasm with which the villagers 
greet the emperor. The first part of the sequence consists of a juxtaposition of shots 
showing on the one hand the arrival of the imperial carriage (shots 02,03,04,06,07,10, 
12 and 13), on the other hand the villagers gathering for that arrival (shots 01,05,08,09 
and 11). The coming-together of this smiling, happy peasant crowd is further accentuated 
by visual signs (a one-armed man waving frantically with his healthy arm; shot 15), 
verbal signs (the one-armed man calling "quickly, cone look! fellow villagers, the 
emperor has come! "; the people cheering "your majesty! "), as well as by an acoustic sign: 
the musical score here is a majestic imperial theme, that rises in intensity and reaches its 
climax as the emperor emerges from the carriage in shot 16. Two of the villagers then 
directly address the emperor (medium close-up of the men, from high angles), explaining 
that they fought for him with valour in the great northern desert battle (one of the men 
states that he personally received a medal from the emperor; shots 19 and 20), and very 
colloquially praising the emperor as a great and "resolute" man (Intangshattg, Hirt keshe hm 
71 The idea of the ruler functioning as a paternal figure is one that is deeply rooted in Chinese traditional thought 
As an example, consider the Confucian work "The Great Learning" (Daxue which comments on rule by 
stating that: "those who love what the people love and hate what the people hate are called the parents of the 
people" ([QZP)ji f4fWYJ kZ iV111 'tJ; 10.3). Another example is the work Zhanguo Co', 1.1I! 
which argues that the ruler should "make all men his children" ( 1' 'L n.: 3 2) 
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han le! 0J of R -T! shot 21). "1 he villagers then carefully help the emperor down 
from his carriage (shot 25), and when asked how everyone is doing, they cheerfully 
proclaim that all is well (shot 27). They go on to tell the emperor how much they have 
been thinking of him, and then welcome him to their homes (shot 28). In this sense, the 
sequence states quite unambiguously: 
" The people love their emperor. 
4. The people are suffering (Figure 18). 
The next discursive statement concerns the villagers shown in this sequence. '[he crowd 
that gathers to greet the emperor is impoverished (dressed in rags) and largely physically 
disabled: the main village character with whom the emperor interacts is the old man with 
only one arm; another man has only one leg, yet another walks on crutches, and others 
wear bandages. The villagers generally consist of women, children, the elderly and the 
disabled (shots 01,08,09,11,36,37,38 and 49); there is no single young, physically able 
male among them. The poverty of these people is further emphasised as the emperor 
visits one of the villager's homes: not only is the room itself bleak and scarcely furnished 
(featuring only a simple bunk bed and some baskets), but the child that the emperor 
encounters there is clothed merely in a piece of cloth, and is clutching a feeble piece of 
corn (shots 29-32). Probably the most significant aspect in this context is the combination 
of the visual signs of poverty and distress (note the close-up of the boy's pained face in 
shot 33) with a verbal sign: the child starting to cry. This outcry by the boy is relevant in 
two ways: first, it stands in contrast to the villagers' verbal assurances to the emperor that 
they are "all alright" (women doit hoe! zhen don line! Jk1i J Uf ! hPftf ! shots 26 and 27); 
while the older villagers are trying not to let their suffering show before the emperor, this 
child cannot help but betray the idyllic scene by crying out in hunger. Second, this 
moment marks the climax of the sequence: the plot up to this outcry was dominated by 
the apparent cheerfulness of the villagers; only as the child cries out does the emperor 
grasp the true extent of his people's suffering (acoustically further underscored by the 
introduction of a slow, slightly melancholic imperial melody). The remainder of the 
sequence is then devoted to this theme of hardship. The discursive st, itenient here is: 
" The people have suffered severely. 
M397=1 
Figure 18: The People's Suffering 
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5. The people support their leader's rule (Figure 19). 
What is particularly relevant with regard to the villagers' hardship is that the people are 
not complaining about their suffering, but are in contrast willing, even eager to endure 
more. After the climax of the sequence in shot 33, the people's cheerfulness declines and 
a general sullenness descends upon them. As the emperor and his entourage make their 
way to the desert battle memorial, the people follow their ruler (shots 35 - 40) and drop 
to their knees as he reaches the monument (shot 42, showing the kneeling people f rain a 
high angle and an extremely long distance to give an impression of the crowd's sire). A 
series of shots then follows, showing old crippled men bowing to the emperor, with tears 
in their eyes (shots 45,46 and 47). These images, still underscored by the melancholic 
imperial theme, are linked to the verbal sign of the villagers calling out to the emperor 
"we want to fight the Xiongnu with you again! " (700111 01 hai i/ao gen nisi da Xiongnu! 4ý f11 
1 97 
iPVYV1 fT Lx X! Shot 46). At the same time, another visual method is used to Iiter, dIv 
place these men and women behind the emperor: shots 43 and 49, as well shots 51,52,55 
and 56 (now underscored by the tune of a single melancholic trumpet) are arranged in it 
way that shows the face of the emperor in close-ups and medium close-ups, with the 
crowd of villagers forming the background. The discursive statement made here then is: 
" Despite their hardship, the people fully support their ruler. 
Figure 19: The People's Support for their Ruler 
HWDD', ti(ýi-1. ' I11V1, i, '., , IIv? 'IIP, IIw()I) f, ti(l3', ; 
6. The ruler is personally moved by his subjects' suffering (Figure 20). 
Finally, the discursive statements on the ruler and his subjects culminate in the emperor's 
display of affection towards the suffering masses. Starting with the climactic shot 33, the 
emperor is shown deeply moved by his subject's hardship and their unwavering support 
for his rule. Again, various different signs work together to prevent any 
misinterpretation of this theme: visually, the emperor's anguished face is shown in close- 
ups and medium close-ups throughout the last part of the sequence (shots 34,39,43,49, 
51,52 and 56). Also, the mise-en-scene visually places him before the war memorial in 
the village (shots 42,48,50,53, and 58) with the suffering people kneeling behind him 
(shots 43,49,51,52,55, and 56). Acoustically, these shots are first underscored by the 
melancholic imperial theme, and then by the highly melodramatic trumpet tune that sets 
in during shot 50. Shots 51 and 52 then show the same angle of the emperor's face as he 
starts to cry, first as a medium close-up, then as a close-up-Two verbal signs are used to 
set the ruler's crying face into perspective: in shot 51, the emperor responds to his 
subjects offer to go to war for him again by saying "we can't fight them again" (hit 11, 'n. 
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zai dale ThG441T7); in shot 52, as the camera moves closer to the ruler's face, someone in 
the crowd calls out "the emperor is crying" (hnangshang kn la! ; i. I. 'I'. ! ). To further 
relay the sentiment of these shots, the emperor's young son Fu Ling is finally brought 
into the arrangement, telling his father not to cry (fnhuang ni zemne kn Ie? hie kn! X i!. (%I;, Z:, 
X-- T? -»i ! ), and wiping the emperor's tears away (shot 56). The statement made 
here then is: 
" The emperor is a humane ruler who cares strongly about his people. 
Figure 20: The Emotional Impact of the People's Hardship on their Ruler 
HWDD 58-03-34 1 IWUD 58-03-39 HWDD 58-03-56 1 IWDD 58-03-58 
This sequence is unique in its explicit portrayal of the ruler's relationship to the people, but it 
is by no means an isolated case in HWDD when it conies to the discourse on ruler-subject 
relations. The discourse fragments identified above, particularly the statement that the ruler 
is a man of the people who cares strongly about his subjects and their hardship, appear in 
slightly alternate form in other sequences as well (see I IWDD 24-08; 35-02; 38-02; 40-13; 44-I0; 
55-05; 55-06; 58-07; and 58-08). A good example is HWDD 45-19, which concludes a story arc 
that deals with Zhang Qian's voyage to the West (this narrative arc is analysed in detail in 
Section 4.1. ii). In this particular sequence, "Zang Qian returns after thirteen years of 
hardship and struggle, and is welcomed by the emperor in the great hall of the imperial 
palace. Again, the emperor is shown as a matt who is close to his subjects (in this case to the 
emissary Zhang Qian and his entourage), cares about their suffering and respects their 
accomplishments. This is achieved in this particular sequence in a similar fashion as in 
HWDD 58-03. First, the degree of hardship that the subjects had to endure is emphasised. I'o 
this effect, a series of shots is cross-cut, showing on the one hand the battered /hang Liar 
I yy 
arriving before the emperor and on the other hand flashback scenes from /, hang's odyssey to 
the West (shots 33 - 68). The shots are all extremely short (on average 1.7 seconds per shot), 
and are linked to each other through a montage of shots with similar camera angles: an 
extremely long shot at a high angle of Zhang Qian's entourage leaving the imperial capital of 
Chang'an along a long and dusty road (shot 34) vs. an extremely long shot at a high angle of 
Zhang Qian arriving in the great hall (shot 35); a medium close-up of Zhang Qian's legs as he 
falls to his knees in the Western outback (shot 61) vs. a medium close-up of Zhang's legs as 
he falls to his knees before the emperor (shot 62); a medium close-up of Zhang kneeling in 
the Western outback (shot 67) vs. a medium close-up of "Zang kneeling before the emperor 
(shot 68). The increasing shot frequency during the last ten shots of this section (Figure 21) 
leads up to the instant when Zhang Qian finally kneels, speaking the words "1 kneel before 
the emperor" (Zhang Qian koujian bixia! IT 9il (1 I'! shots 63 - 66). 
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Figure 21: Shot Frequency and Dynamics in HWDD 45-19, Shots 33-68 
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The visual and verbal signs together suggest that the story arc in the West and all the 
suffering it caused led up to this one moment. Shot frequency, camera angles and montage in 
this sense form a unit, reinforced by Zhang's words, to make it clear that his hardship was in 
the service of the ruler (Figure 22). 
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Figure 22: Thirteen Years of Hardship for the Ruler 
The ruler then rushes down from his thrown (shot 78), embraces the crying "Zang Qian as 
tears well to his eyes (shots 79-80), and the two men assure one another of how much they 
have missed each other over the past thirteen years (shots 81 - 90; note the OTS perspective 
as a method of creating a feeling of intimacy between the two characters). All throughout the 
sequence, the ministers in the great hall are weeping (explicitly in shots 71 and 91), and 
melodramatic music is playing (first a dramatic theme that bears a striking resemblance to 
the theme from the movie Pirates of the Caribbean, then a slow imperial theme, and finally 
romantic music). Again, the emperor is showing a deep emotional appreciation for his 
subjects' service (Figure 23), and in order to ensure that the paternal aspect of this affection is 
not missed, the scene ends with Zhang Qian's young son appearing at the entrance of the 
hall (shots 92 - 98). The last shots then show the emperor as he picks the little boy up in his 
arms, while an off-screen narrative voice sums up the importance of Zhang's journey to the 
West (shots 99 - 102), concluding that the Silk Roads that this journey established "would 
shine brightly in the historical annals for two thousand years" (hui ping spice hang gian nian de 
Sichouzhilu i }j P-f}f}A-ýFIf `Jkk9 .$; shot 
102). The sequence ends with the emperor 
standing at the steps of his hall, saying: "A hero! You are a hero of our great flan dynasty! " 
(Yingxiong! Ni shi wo da Hanchao de yingxiong! tit. ! 1u*, k- C; ix )lfl`J 
4. ßt.! shot 102). 
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Figure 23: The Paternal Ruler Caring for his Subordinates 
To sum up my analysis of the visual discourse on ruler-subject relations in HWDD, the 
emperor Wu is depicted as a passionate humane leader who rules for the people, and for 
whom his subjects are willing to endure outstanding amounts of suffering. What is 
remarkable here is that the discourse strand on governing is crossed with the strand on 
patriotism and national identity; both the sequences analysed here are imbued with an 
exceptional degree of pathos. I will return to this finding later. First, allow me to turn to the 
foreign security discourse presented in HWDD. 
4.1. ii Foreign Security and the Establishment of International Relations 
As explained in Section 2.3. v, the state goal of security has two sides: a public security aspect, 
and a foreign security dimension. The first of these, public security, is not a main feature in 
HWDD. There are references to the law and to law enforcement, but such themes are usually 
presented in the context of court intrigues (for example the witch-hunts that consume the 
Han court towards the end of the drama in HWDD 56-08 & 09 and I IWDD 57-03, or the 
punishment of officials in HWDD 05-17,37-06 & 07; and 46-12 & 16); they do not stand in 
relation to society or the nation as a whole, and do not possess a 'public' security dimension 
as such. The security issue that fundamentally affects the entire state in HWDD is that of 
foreign relations; arguably the central theme of the drama (my coding procedure identified 
85 sequences that dealt with issues of foreign relations, and 279 that dealt with war). For this 
reason, the following analysis excludes issues of public security, and focuses instead on the 
security discourse presented in sequences that deal with diplomacy and war. Since themes 
such as war, peace, the importance of foreign alliances and the threat posed by foreign 
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enemies are represented in a large number of sequences, I am analyzing here one particular 
narrative arc (the planning and execution of Zhang Qian's diplomatic mission to the West; 
HWDD 26-08/12/17, HWDD 44-01/02/03/07, and HWDD 45-19), as well as one 
representative sequence that deals with foreign policy (HWDD 54-12). 
What is striking is that these sequences present slightly contradictory discursive fragments 
concerning foreign security issues: On the one hand stands the discursive position that war is 
destructive and should be avoided, on the other hand the position that war is necessary to 
counter foreign security threats and to expand the nation. At the Han court, the main foreign 
security threat, i. e. the war against the Huns, is alternately handled in two different ways. 
The first of these is an appeasement strategy based on the marriage of royal Han princesses 
to the leaders of the Huns. Prime examples of how this theme is developed in narrative arcs 
are the key sequences HWDD 09-14 and 32-04. Such sequences make the discursive 
statement 
" The Han women being married off to the Huns are kind-hearted and 
courageous, and they are committing a great patriotic sacrifice for the sake of 
their nation's safety. 
These sequences are not analysed in detail here, but it is worth pointing out how visual signs 
such as low camera angles and slow-motion shots are reinforced by acoustic signs such as a 
melodramatic soundtrack to maximise the pathos of these sequences and relay their 
discursive statement (Figure 24). At the same time, the sacrifices of the Han women and their 
families are depicted as largely useless against a 'barbaric' aggressor such as the Huns, and 
the struggle against this northern neighbour is consequently resolved primarily through 
military action (evidence of this are the elaborate battle sequences of this drama, for example 
HWDD 01-04,07-13,28-06,32-12,34-04,41-19,43-14,45-09,48-11,51-10,53-01, among others). 
Again, the central feature of these sequences is pathos. The mise-en-scene is dominated by 
vast amounts of soldiers and riders, often edited together digitally to reinforce the sense of 
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sheer force. Camera movements across the battlefield (often looking up at riders and soldiers 
from a low angle, or overlooking the battle from a high angle), slow-motion filming and the 
ostentatious soundtrack further contribute to the grandeur of these sequences (Figure 24). 
Figure 24: Pathos-laden Foreign Security in HWDD - Marriage Diplomacy and Warfare 
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The discussion of whether warfare or marriage diplomacy constitutes the better way of 
dealing with the Hun security threat occupies much of the drama series. Through the 
presentation of the appeasement and warfare strategies as well as their outcome, two rivaI 
discursive positions are constructed concerning the way in which a foreign aggressor should 
be treated. A key sequence that pins the two discursive positions against each other is 
HWDD 54-12. Positioned relatively late in the series, this sequence sums up the respective 
arguments and presents, both visually and acoustically, the debate's conclusion. The 
sequence is divided into two scenes: First, the Emperor is shown asking his generals and 
advisors for their opinion on the foreign security policy (shots 01 - 97). 'T'hen the fate of a 
scholar is shown who opposed the martial foreign policy of the Emperor , 111d suggested an 
appeasement strategy (shots 98 - 118). 
Let me first turn to the argument for a martial foreign security policy, which is supported in 
this sequence by the emperor's generals, and is verbally presented by General I. i Guangli 
1-411 as follows (shots 04 - 08): 
Li Guangli: You majesty, the Xiongnu's actual strength is already thoroughl\V 
weekend. I believe that to resume our marriage diplomacy 
would make all previous progress null and void. The I Ian court 
should continue its punitive expedition against the Xiongnu, 
should make them pledge their allegiance to us, and have them 
surrender. 
20.1 
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When asked what General Li thinks about the opposition's pacifist arguments, he responds 
(shots 56 and 57): 
Li Guangli: I believe these are merely the words of a blind and ignorant 
scholar. 
-4ý I`'-flJ: ff WW$? iISM-MAJiM)EMMä iQ. 
General Li essentially makes three discursive statements here: 
" Peace only gives a weakened enemy the opportunity to regain his strength. 
"A weakened enemy should be annihilated. 
" The notion of pacifism is for ignorant scholars. 
That these statements also represent Emperor Liu Che's views is signified by the Emperor's 
tone of voice as well as by his gestures (smiling, nodding and leaning back in a satisfied way 
when the generals are speaking in shots 05,11 and 55, while leaning forward and frowning 
or dosing off slightly as the crown prince and his supporters are speaking in shots 15,17,33, 
41,53,65 and 70). 
The pacifist argument is more elaborate and is presented by two characters in this scene, the 
crown prince Liu Ju ßi1 and, more importantly, his advisor Di Shan Ikiii. The core 
argument is summed up in the following verbal statement by the crown prince (shots 14 - 
18): 
Liu Ju: I have always thought: the war against the Xiongnu has already 
lasted for so many years, and they already abandoned the region 
north of the Gobi desert; we should cherish this hard-earned 
peace. I believe we should let the people rest and should cement 
our relations with the Xiongnu through royal marriage. 
Aý1m: 
ll, ýýkh, 5K-4kP ? * 111; 11 -- tj NAX411 
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The main discursive statement made here is: 
" War causes suffering for the people. 
Prince Liu Ju is supported in this argument by the scholar Di Shan, who first nervously states 
that the crown prince's position on marriage diplomacy is correct (shots 21 - 23), before then 
stuttering essentially the same statement (shots 38 - 42): 
Di Shan: To resort to arms and fight wars has always been an extremely 
inauspicious malign matter. It should not, not, not be undertaken 
lightly. Our dynasty has been at war with the Xiongnu for 
decades, and the people now long for stability. 
ýa -ff # Z, 0,01.: ýJV 5ýý 
After a failed attempt to impress the emperor with a historical reference to the early, more 
peaceful Han period (shots 44 - 46), Di Shan continues as follows (shots 50 - 52): 
Di Shan: Ever since your majesty dispatched his army on a punitive 
expedition against the Xiongnu, the riches that our state had 
saved have been depleted and are almost wiped out. And what is 
more, the border regions are suffering unspeakable misery. The 
current marriage diplomacy wouldn't be the same as the one of 
the past. In the past it was a humiliation (to the Han), but now it 
is a favour (to the Xiongnu). 
IkW: MART F 'f 4M1 KMf ANINMR ', P-tIR EJAMa 
it** X39ANTAä. f21 EMü - nilt-zTf ]T, 11-1-0-Urif 
MWEAMRS. 
Again, the discursive statement that war causes suffering for the people is repeated 
(although this statement is an entirely verbal one here; recall the presentation of the 
impoverished villagers in HWDD 58-03 for a visual and acoustic representation of this 
discourse fragment). In addition, an economic argument is tied into the discourse, i. e. that 
wars deplete the state's budget. Finally, the idea of marriage diplomacy is given a new angle 
through the argument that the general situation has changed since such a strategy was last 
employed. 
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The sequence continues with General Li alienating the scholar Di Shan, and the latter lashing 
out against the military leader. In this final lengthy section of dialogue, Di Shan further 
develops the discursive statement that war causes suffering to the common people. In 
addition, he adds the accusation that the military is not concerned with the average citizen's 
fate and states that good governance is for the people (shots 58 - 73): 
Di Shan: You, you, I am no doubt a bit blind, but that is only because I am 
blind with devotion to the emperor. You, you, Li Guangli, 
where's your intelligence? For what reason are you a general? 
You have no significant military talent and no significant 
achievements. You only know how to speak lightly of war, and 
then take credit for other's achievements during battle. The state 
has deployed its armies for years and years. The people are 
suffering heavy casualties. The population size has decreased by 
almost half, and what is more the Mount Tai region has been 
troubled by natural disasters this year. The army is a lethal tool 
and the sage would not use it unless it was necessary. In my 
humble opinion the current task must be to let the people rest 
and to implement a benevolent government. How can you not 
show loving sympathy for the suffering of the common people in 
the world? How can you ignore it and show no interest? To 
merely flatter those above like you are doing, general, is nothing 
else than false loyalty. 
lkLh: tir, tir, ® 4419, 
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The reason I have reproduced Di Shan's dialogue passages in full is that from the verbal 
statements alone the viewer might receive the impression that the pacifist position includes 
reasonable arguments. The verbal reactions of the emperor and his generals mark the 
speaker Di Shan as a nervous academic and may to some degree question the validity of his 
position (for instance, the emperor stating: "We only see you bragging and spouting empty 
verbiage" zhen kan ni cai zhi hui shuo dahua, shuo konghua 
AA#, *%d $aAki, iA7 üfi; shots 
77 - 78), but at the most the sequence would seem to contrast 
two equally viable competing 
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positions with each other. However, this is not the case. Through various visual and acoustic 
signs, the statements presented by the crown prince and his advisor are ridiculed, and it is 
made very clear that the pacifist position is one that only a fool would hold. 
First, the crown prince himself is shown as a submissive and weak person, who averts his 
eyes when speaking with the emperor (shots 14 and 18), who requires the support of an 
academic to present his argument, and who flinches nervously as he realises that his father is 
becoming less and less patient with the pacifist arguments of scholar Di Shan (shot 72). The 
insecurity of Liu Ju is particular emphasised by low camera angels of the crown prince as he 
is kneeling before the emperor (shots 39,45,54,58,66,72,80,90 and 97; while such low 
camera angles are often used to signify heroism or glorify characters, the use of this angle 
here has the crown prince practically crouching down towards the camera, thereby 
highlighting his submissive and meek character). However, as feeble as the crown prince 
may appear here, the most important factor that calls into question the pacifist position in 
this sequence is the presentation of the scholar Di Shan, who is depicted as a thoroughly 
dislikeable character. 
This is achieved first through the make-up and the performance of the actor playing Di Shan: 
the man is shown with a series of physical defects, such as a nervous twitch of the mouth, 
extremely bushy eyebrows, beady eyes, badly groomed facial hair, bad teeth and the hint of 
a cleave in the upper lip. In addition, Di Shan at times speaks with a stutters and generally 
stands slightly hunched. All in all, this pacifist is shown as a truly deformed figure. The 
mise-en-scene and the camera operations further stress this fact: When the character of Di 
Shan is introduced, he is positioned practically crouching behind the crown prince (shots 19, 
21,23,25 and 27). Also, throughout the entire dialogue with the emperor and his generals, Di 
Shan is consistently shown from a low camera angle (all shots of Di Shan from shot 32 to shot 
88; again, the angle here gives full emphasis to the hunched posture of the character and 
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therefore functions as a pejorative sign). To further assure that the viewer truly grasps that 
this character is not meant to be taken seriously, an acoustic sign is used to reinforce the 
various visual signs: Di Shan's speech is in large parts underscored by a comical melody 
(shots 30 - 55 and 78 - 97). 
This comical tune is particularly significant to the conclusion of the scene. After Di Shan has 
finished his speech, the emperor states with a sarcastic tone that since the scholar has such a 
favourable opinion of the Huns, he shall receive command of an outpost at the northern 
border. As would befit a dislikeable character such as Di Shan, the academic starts to haggle 
with the emperor in order to avoid being transferred to the warzone. After a humorous 
dialogue between Emperor Liu Che and Di Shan, the ruler gives the scholar a rather 
insignificant post at the frontier so that he shall prove his worth outside of rhetoric debates. 
This entire discussion is again underscored by the comical musical theme. 
The second scene of the sequence then shows Di Shan's fate: the academic arrives at the 
border, meekly cowering on the back of a carriage, and is quickly involved in a skirmish 
with the Huns. The scene is filmed as an action sequence, similar to the ones that reoccur 
throughout the drama when battles are shown. A high level of camera movement is used to 
simulate the turmoil of battle, while very short shots are employed to increase the speed of 
the scene. In general, the dynamics rise throughout the fight, and then sharply drop at the 
scene's conclusion (Figure 25): Di Shan being slain by a Hun rider. 
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Figure 25: Dynamics in HWDD 54-12, Culminating in the Death of a Pacifist (Shots 98 -118) 
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Again, the scene is underscored by the same comical music theme used before. What i mild 
otherwise have been interpreted as a tragic or heroic death is then thereby constructed as a 
satirical event, signifying that the dislikeable pacifist Di Shan found the end that he deserved 
(Figure 26). In addition, the brutal death of the scholar also functions as an allegory, 
suggesting that a pacifist sentiment will not hold up against a violent foe such as the I tuns. 
The sequence can therefore be said to make the following two discursive foreign security 
statements against appeasement strategies: 
" Appeasement is a worthless strategy against a foreign aggressor. 
" Pacifism is a sentiment that is only shared by the week. 
I ý 
I- 
.- 
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Figure 26: Visual Presentation of a Pacifist and of his Demise in HWDD 
In this sense, the discussions at the Han court clearly favour the martial strategy over a 
peaceful approach (other examples for this are the discussions on foreign security policy in 
sequences HWDD 29-15,30-04,32-08,40-16,43-18,46-01,51-22 and 52-01, among others). 
What is then at first sight surprising is that the discourse on war and peace is treated rather 
differently in the narrative arc that deals with the Han emissary Zhang Qian's mission to the 
West. This mission, including its planning and its aftermath, constitutes one of the central 
storylines in HWDD, and is among the longest narrative arcs of the drama (spanning from 
episode 28 to 46; only Emperor Liu Che's war against the Huns and various court intrigues 
involving Princess Liu Ling AIJ and the Emperor's uncle Tian Fen M S1 are treated as 
expansively). Throughout this storyline, the martial Han position is first developed and then 
later reiterated numerous times, but in general a pacifist notion appears to be dominating. 
But before turning to the pacifist discourse fragments in this narrative arc, let me first discuss 
what goals are defined for the mission. 
The voyage to the West is planned and prepared in a series of sequences in episode 26. First, 
the emperor receives permission from the empress dowager to send an envoy to the West 
(HWDD 26-07). He then plans his foreign policy with his advisor Dou Ying V9 (HWDD 26- 
08). When the recruitment notification is posted in town, Zhang Qian takes the 
announcement off the wall and marches to the palace (HWDD 26-09). He then offers the 
emperor to take on the commission (HWDD 26-10), and in the following sequence chooses 
his escort from the ranks of Han's elite soldiers (HWDD 26-11). Finally, the emperor briefs 
Zhang Qian on his mission (HWDD 26-12). For the purpose of isolating the discursive 
fragments on foreign security, I have analysed the two central policy discussions in this 
series of sequences: the conversation between the emperor and his advisor Dou Ying 
(HWDD 26-08) and the emperor's mission briefing for Zhang Qian (HWDD 26-12). 
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The first of these sequences employs a series of relatively lengthy shots (particularly shots 01 
- 04) to establish the scene and start the discussion between the emperor and Dou Ying. 
During the first two shots, the emperor and his advisor walk from one of the halls to a 
pavilion. Dou Ying brings up the topic of the Hun threat, while a dramatic music plays in the 
background. When the emperor agrees to hear Dou Ying's opinion on the matter, the music 
fades out and is replaced by bird sounds and a romantic theme (shots 03 and 04). Before this 
acoustic backdrop, Dou Ying now starts to present his argument (shot 03), and as the 
emperor and his advisor arrive at the pavilion, a very lengthy low-angle shot (shot 04, with a 
length of eighty-five seconds) shows Dou Ying standing behind Emperor Liu Che, 
convincing the emperor of his new diplomatic strategy. This is their dialogue in shots 03 and 
04: 
Dou Ying: Your highness, the Xiongnu have been threatening our frontier 
prefectures, repeatedly killing the common people and 
plundering our properties. Our imperial court should give them 
a beating! However, your highness should first try to seek for 
peace through royal marriage since you are just in power. I 
believe that in the long run the court requires its own strategy for 
stopping the Xiongnu. 
Liu Che: We have long since wanted to put them in their place. What 
sound strategy does our minister have? 
Dou Ying: Most recently, the Xiongnu prince Ah Hur surrendered his 
troops. He said that the Xiongnu had already beaten the king of 
the Indo-Scyths. They cut off the king's head and used his skull 
as a drinking vessel. Even though the Indo-Scyths fled far away, 
they nonetheless hate the Xiongnu bitterly and have been 
continuously waiting for an opportunity to seek revenge. Only 
they did not have an ally who would help them beat the Xiongnu. 
I believe that if we dispatch an envoy, contact the Indo-Scyths, 
and arrange to beat the Xiongnu together, then controlling the 
Xiongnu in the future will not be hard. 
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A number of relevant discursive statements are made here verbally: 
Foreign security policy should be concerned with the safety of the 
common people (note how the suffering of the common people spins 
both ways, here supporting the position that warfare is the best solution 
to a foreign security threat). 
" The Han have the right and the obligation to punish foreign evil-doers. 
" Appeasement can only be a temporary solution; in the long run, foreign 
security threats need to be answered with military force. 
" The Huns are violent and uncivilised barbarians. 
" Other Asian nations also despise the Huns, and since the enemy of my 
enemy is my ally, an alliance with such an ally can help win the war. 
The rest of this sequence then has the emperor order Dou Ying to launch the new diplomatic 
efforts by drafting a recruitment statement, and to simultaneously continue the appeasement 
strategy towards the Huns. As the two men discuss what qualities an envoy to the West 
would have to possess (courage, insight, a firm and tenacious disposition, health, strength 
and loyalty), the shots of the emperor now show him from a low camera angle. To combine 
these verbal statements with this choice of angle, with the romantic music as well as with the 
general raise-en-scene (servants standing behind the emperor, bowing; also the positioning 
of the character Dou Ying, i. e. either standing behind the emperor or bowing to him from the 
lower right-hand side of the frame) not only contribute to the sense of majestic grandeur but 
also functions as a premonition for the heroic themes that will later strongly dominate this 
narrative arc. Finally, an acoustic sign is used to complete the emperor's policy choices: as 
Dou Ying bows and confirms the emperor's orders, the sound of a gong concludes the 
sequence (shot 13). 
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The discursive fragments on foreign security in HWDD 26-08 are then repeated and further 
developed in HWDD 26-12, as the emperor informs Zhang Qian of his orders. Even though 
my intention is not to criticise the film-making methods adopted to create the dramas 
analysed here, it should nonetheless be pointed out that this particular sequence is an 
example of faulty cinematography and editing. The sequence is arranged as a standard 
dialogue scene, with the two characters sitting across from one-another at a slight angle. 
After an extremely long high-angle shot that shows the general setting, the line-of-sight 
between the emperor and Zhang Qian is established in shot 2 (main shot), and the 
conversation is then largely shown through juxtaposed OTS shots. There is nothing wrong 
with the sequence up to this point, except maybe for the rather low level of lighting. 
However, the camera then repeatedly moves across the line-of-sight, and images from 
various contradictory angles are edited together (for instance shots 07 vs. 08,11 vs. 12, and 
the entire section 16 through 23), giving the sequence a rather confused appearance. Such a 
break with conventional film-making techniques could of course be intentional, in which 
case it would be meant as a specific visual sign (such an approach could, for example, be 
conceivable for certain avant-garde or art films). However, my analysis of this sequence was 
not able to identify any content-related reason for adopting such a visual sign, and my 
conclusion is that whichever director or assistant director was in charge of filming this 
sequence was either not aware of the standard convention on dialogue 
filming which apply 
to all other scenes of the drama, or thought that the cinematographic rule of never crossing 
the line-of-sight could be ignored here. 
Be this as it may, my analysis was still able to isolate four visual signs that function despite 
the otherwise slightly corrupted arrangement of shots: 
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1. The dominant use of OTS shots (even at contradictory angles) suggests an intimacy 
between the emperor and his subject, Zhang Qian. In this sense the camera angle 
reinforces what the viewer has already learned earlier in the drama (that the two men 
are childhood friends) and what is being stated verbally during the first part of the 
conversation (that they share childhood memories of the earlier diplomatic strategies 
towards the Huns; shots 02 - 07). 
2. Similarly to the sequence discussed above, the emperor is again shown from low 
angles (shots 08,11,14,17,19 and 21). These shots all show the emperor's profile and 
are backlit with candles, shrouding the emperor's face in a magnanimous glow. 
3. Both during the first and the last arrangements of shots, one particular perspective of 
the emperor is slowly zoomed in over an extended series of shots. The first case is the 
series of shots 02,04,06 and 13 which leads to the medium close-up of the emperor 
used in shots 16 and 23. It spans across the first part of the dialogue, in which the 
emperor and Zhang Qian recapitulate the past, and gives emphasis to the emperor's 
memories of his sister being married off to the Huns for diplomatic reasons. Similarly, 
the second series of zooms consists of the four shots 24,26,28 and 30, which again 
lead to a medium close-up of the emperor (shot 33). In this case, the shots tie together 
a piece of dialogue in which the emperor explains that he is placing his trust in Zhang 
Qian, concluding with the image of the pleased emperor after Zhang Qian has vowed 
his loyalty to the Han cause. 
4. Three flashback-shots are used to dramatize the verbal account of the emperor's sister 
being sent off to the Huns (shots 09,10 and 15, which are taken from sequence 
HWDD 09-14). 
215 
In addition, two acoustic signs are relevant: First, the persistent sound of a watermill 
working in the background; this gives the sequence a tranquil feel and reinforces the 
intimate nature of the conversation between the emperor and his subject (who are having 
their military briefing not in a strategy room at the palace, but at a lush scenic spot in a 
garden at night). Second, as the flashbacks set in, a melodramatic music theme starts to play; 
this further underscores the emotional impact that the memories of his sister have on 
Emperor Liu Che. What is then stressed here through visual and acoustic signs is that: 
1. The emperor and Zhang Qian have an intimate and friendly 
relationship; 
2. The emperor is a magnificent figure; 
3. Zhang Qian is loyally devoted to the emperor; 
4. The emperor suffers from the memories of his sister having been 
forcefully married to one of the Huns. 
These sentiments provide the frame for the following lengthy speech by the emperor: 
Liu Che: The most profound memory of our life was when we saw our 
older sister Princess Nangong off as she left to be married to the 
Xiongnu. From that moment on we understood what suffering 
was. While the Xiongnu were clearly burning and killing our 
soldiers and civilians, and looting the frontier regions, our father 
was worried about the domestic situation. In order to avoid a 
war, he not only avoided dispatching troops to resist this 
humiliation, but instead married his biological daughter off to a 
far-away place. On the night before her departure, our older 
sister was crying as she weaved a string of chimes. We asked our 
sister why she was doing that, and she said: 'If our father has a 
long life, our family will have the chance to be reunited one day. ' 
She was truly pure! She couldn't know the hardship of human 
life. 
We can never again tolerate that the safety or danger of our 
nation be placed on the shoulders of women. Appeasement 
through marriage... we have always wanted to one day change 
all of that! Change all of that. From now on diplomatic efforts 
shall be equally important to military affairs. 
Zhang Qian, we place our hopes in you! The rise and fall of the 
great Han and the safety or danger of our nation rests with your 
diplomatic mission to the western regions. We originally wanted 
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to present you with a map of the western regions from our secret 
archives at Lingtai but in the end we could not find one. It would 
seem that the exploration of this poor and desolate route 
depends entirely on you. Out there you shall raise the national 
prestige of the great Han and shall behave in the manner which 
can present the magnificence of this great nation. Do not let the 
northern tribes look down on us! 
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The first paragraph expresses the emperor's pain about the loss of his sister and again makes 
the discursive statement mentioned above: that the women being married off to the Huns are 
kind-hearted and courageous, and that they are committing a great patriotic sacrifice for the 
sake of their nation's safety. The last paragraph clarifies the importance of Zhang's mission 
by making the following discursive statements: 
" Opening-up the West is an extremely dangerous undertaking. 
" Opening-up the West will contribute to the greatness of the Han nation. 
What is particularly important is the second paragraph. Here, the emperor first states that 
from that point on the appeasement strategy towards the Huns (i. e. marrying royal women 
to Hun leaders) shall stop. Note how the foreign security discourse is here crossed with the 
gender discourse: the emperor suggests that his father was weak and indecisive in his 
foreign policy, so that women had to make patriotic sacrifices for the nation's safety; now, in 
order to spare the Han women, it is time for the Han men to take action and organise their 
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military opposition against the Huns. In this sense, the appeasement notion is giving a 
feminine touch, opposed to the male connotation that military action receives. The emperor 
then continues in his speech, stating that diplomacy shall now be viewed as similarly 
important as military activity. This would normally be a contradiction, seeing as the 
previous appeasement strategy was a form of diplomacy as well. However, the term 
"diplomacy" (waijiao 'E)E) is here redefined to signify alliances with other foreign nations in 
order to wage war against the Huns, while appeasement strategies are no longer categorised 
as diplomatic measures. In this sense, this sequence lays the groundwork for the martial 
foreign security strategy that is then presented and further developed throughout the rest of 
the drama. 
Zhang Qian's actual mission to the West and its discursive content shall be exemplified by 
four sequences in episode 44. First, in sequence HWDD 44-01, Zhang and his battered 
entourage arrive in the Central-Asian state of Fergana (Dayuan Guo Z IM) and are 
astounded by the wonders that the bustling market streets hold in store. Second, Zhang Qian 
speaks to the minister of Fergana; he establishing trade relations between the two nations, is 
offered help in finding the Indo-Scyth nation and finally makes his way to the Indo-Scyths' 
border (HWDD 44-02). Third, Zhang has an audience with the queen of the Indo-Scyths 
during which he presents the Han cause (HWDD 44-03). Finally, he attends a meeting of the 
Indo-Scyth elders, during which the foreign policy towards the Han empire and the Huns is 
decided (HWDD 44-07). 
The dominant foreign relations theme throughout these sequences is not so much war, but 
much rather trade, as is amply demonstrated upon Zhang's arrival in 
Fergana: the Central- 
Asian region is depicted in the sequence HWDD 44-01 as an exotic place with an abundance 
of valuable commodities. Allow me to summarise the signs used to construct the trade- 
nation Fergana: 
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1. Acoustic sings: shots 01 through 33 are underscored by a lively electronic (! ) oriental 
theme and feature constant shouting as well as the sounds of animals (camels and 
horses). 
2. Visual signs: the sequence is characterised by a high degree of camera movements 
(shots 01-04,06-07,11-14,16-17,19,21- 23,26-29,31-33 and 37-41), in at 
least one case achieved by using a crane (shot 02). High angles are repeatedly used to 
establish a sense of the surroundings (shots 02,11,18,30 and 34). Dynamically 
speaking, the average shot-length of the sequence is 4.6 seconds, but numerous series 
of shots are nevertheless much more fast-paced (for instance shots 12 - 15 and 22 - 32, 
which are all significantly shorter than four seconds; the high average shot-length is 
mostly due to a few exceptionally lengthy shots, such as 02,21 and 33). Finally, the 
raise-en-scene repeatedly places exotic animals and goods in the frame (shots 01,02, 
04,07 -10,12 -16,18 - 23,24,25 - 30,31 and 32 - 33), often captured 
by the camera 
in close-ups. 
3. Verbal signs: Throughout the sequence, Zhang Qian makes very colloquial 
statements to his friend Can Fu and to his family members such as: "Look over 
there! "(kan nabian 'flllitl; shot 02), "How lively! This isn't bad! " (duo renao all! zhe ge 
bu cuo ah! 11 "I ! i$^I TPI ! shot 03), "Look at this! " (ni kan zhe ge G'J, r'i ' ^; 
shot 07), and "Go over there. Look, what is that they are selling? " (ni qu nabian, kankan 
na mai de shi shenme? 0*11 iii ,ý ilR týh 
i ý4 ? shot 11). In addition, Zhang 
repeatedly asks the local merchants what they are offering ("what is this", zhe shi 
shenme? iik' i? shots 8 and 11, and in slightly altered form in shot 19). He and his 
entourage then express their appreciation for the exotic foods ("It's really fragrant! " 
zhen xiang ah! X *f ! shot 7; or "sweet", fiande MM; shot 10), or laud the beauty of a 
particular type of horse ("It's so pretty", zheme piaoliang 
i$'4i*A; shot 19, or "the fur 
is really nice", zhe mao zhen haokan i$ A(Fff; shot 28). In addition, the 
local 
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merchants respond with friendly statements, offering Zhang and his entourage to try 
their food ("Try them! " changchang! r! shot 12), and even giving away samples 
for free ("Take it. You don't have to pay. " nazott ba! bu yno gian! . Wk-uL' ! 111, "W ! shot 
17). 
All in all, the sequence makes the following discursive statements (Figure 27): 
" The Central-Asian state of Fergana is a bustling and exotic nation. 
" The Central-Asian people are merchants who sell exotic goods. 
" The Central-Asian people are hospitable and friendly. 
" The Han envoy and his entourage are curious and willing to try exotic 
new things. 
Figure 27: The Exotic Commodities of Han's Central Asian Neighbours (HWDD 44-01) 
HWDD 44-01-01 HWDD 44-01-04 HWDD 44-01-08 f IWI)I) 44 01 14 IiWOO 44 01 33 
These discourse fragments essentially justify the diplomatic effort that is to follow. Towards 
the end of the sequence, the Han envoy and his people are stopped and questioned by 
Fergana soldiers; at this point, Zhang Qian produces the seal of the emperor and demands to 
see the king of Fergana (shot 37; this shot establishes the authority of the I Jan envoy verbally, 
acoustically through a suspenseful musical theme and visually through the pronounced 
position of the red seal in the frame). Zhang's encounter with the king is not shown in the 
drama series, but the next sequence shows that meeting's conclusion (I I WUI) 44-02). 
In this next sequence, Zhang has a conversation with the minister of Fergana, asking him for 
help in finding the Indo-Scyths. At the same time, the two men talk about the I fan dynasty's 
silk products and about the precious I Ianxue horses (hanxrwe ma 7I IIII. 'ý) that are bred in 
Fergana. Before Zhang rides on to his next destination, the two men agree to establish 
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amiable trade relations (Figure 28). Their conversation is set in the exotic streets of Fergana 's 
capital (note the establishing shot of the market, with a camel in the frame; shot 03) and is 
given a tranquil touch by the romantic music theme, by slow camera movements and by at 
times lengthy shots (particularly at the beginning, with shots 02,04 and 06 each being longer 
than 10 seconds). The relaxed and friendly atmosphere is further emphasised by images of 
Zhang Qian's little son playing with a toy drum (shot 16; note also the continuation of the 
drum sound off-screen in shot 17), and by the demeanour of Zhang and the minister, both of 
who are smiling or laughing throughout their interaction (see in particular the concluding 
shots of the scene, shots 21 and 22). Also, the conversation between Zhang and the minister 
consists in large parts of OTS shots, suggesting an intimacy between the two characters 
(shots 07 -10,12 - 15 and 17 - 22, OTS perspectives therefore making up sixty per cent of the 
conversation). The section of the dialogue between Zhang and the minister that deals with 
trade goes as follows (shots 04 - 07): 
Minister: Ferghana is a land of grapes, alfalfa, and precious horses. 
Ferghana's merchants would very much like to sell these things 
to the Han dynasty and trade with you, bringing back in 
exchange that beautiful silk. 
Zhang Qian: Alright! When I return to the Han, I will certainly report your 
king's wishes to our emperor. I believe that our emperor will 
definitely also wish to trade with your honourable state. 
Minister: I hope that day will soon come! 
-11"-ý''1ý11']MM, AClA05199MK ok 
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These verbal statements tie into what has already been established in the previous sequence: 
i. e. that the Central-Asian people are eager to trade their exotic goods. Considering the 
discursive statements made in that sequence, this section now adds the discourse fragment: 
" Trade is a mutually beneficial exchange of rare goods between friendly 
societies. 
Figure 28: Establishing Trade Relations in an Exotic yet Friendly Surrounding (HWDD 44-02) 
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The rest of the following dialogue has two functions: first to establish how precious the 
Fergana horses truly are, and then to prepare Zhang Qian for his visit to the nation of the 
Indo-Scyths. Here, the minister is given a line of dialogue which rather suddenly moves the 
focus away from trade-related issues. When asked by Zhang where he would be able to find 
the Indo-Scyths, the minister replies: 
Minister: West of the ridge of Asia, on the northern banks of the river Gui. 
The great Indo-Scyths are a great nation with a population of 
over one million people and two hundred thousand crack troops. 
Mtn: N0R, m 7kA L W-o ýI-1 EETS; Iý- jIkl. 'kl1 II Y1J, ýiýJ! ': 
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Considering that the minister was not asked about the size of the Indo-Scyth state, and 
certainly not about their military strength, the second sentence in this reply may seem 
slightly out of place here. It is, however, a logical (though possibly awkwardly placed) verbal 
statement: the viewer is reminded that despite the discourse on amiable trade that has been 
developed in the scenes since Zhang's arrival in the West, the main purpose of the mission is 
to recruit military allies for the war against the I Tuns. It is with this information in mind that 
we now witness how Zhang Qian leaves Fergana, travels to the borders of the Indo-Scyth 
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nation (shown in the second scene of this sequence; shots 24 - 51), and finally arrives before 
the queen of the Indo-Scyths to present his commission (HWDD 44-03). 
This next sequence then essentially presents the two frequently reiterated discursive 
positions on war and peace, i. e. the statement that war is strenuous for the people (here 
taken up by the queen) vs. the statement that a barbaric enemy such as the Huns can only be 
dealt with through military force (here supported by Zhang Qian). The discussion between 
Zhang and the queen of the Indo-Scyths (and hence the conflict between these two discursive 
positions) escalates in shots 25 - 42, and culminates in Zhang convincing the queen of his 
argument. This is the respective section of dialogue: 
Queen: What I am trying to tell you is that the Indo-Scyth people no 
longer wish to see any warfare! How glorious is peace time! The 
great Indo-Scyth people would rather forget the painful past. 
Zhang Qian: I am shocked by what your majesty is saying! What about that 
year when the Xiongnu acted in bad faith and launched a 
surprise attack on you forcing 700,000 of the Indo-Scyth people to 
migrate westward from the Qilian mountain range. 200,000 
people were buried under the vast sands of the deserts and 
prairies. When you reached the northern mountains, (the Hun 
leader) Yi Zhixie cought up with you. It was that battle during 
which the former king of your noble nation was murdered by the 
Xiongnu. The Xiongnu were savage to the utmost, using the 
king's skull as a drinking vessel. 
Queen: Please say no more! 
ýýýýº, iftj+L-t--TAGCAI>h#RAtla*Anilo iiý- MAR 
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Throughout this section of dialogue, the shot frequency continuously increases (Figure 29). 
So, also, does the dramatic musical score, which undergoes a crescendo towards the end of 
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this section. Both signs emphasise what Zhang Qian is expressing verbally: that the 1-funs are 
savages. An additional visual sign is used to signify that Zhang Qian's words are indeed 
conjuring up the queen's memory of past defeats at the hands of the Huns: shots 32 and 34 
show Hun riders storming across the prairie. The symmetry of the shot arrangement reflects 
the impact that Zhang's words have: shot 31 shows Zhang, shot 32 the Hun riders 
(presumably attacking the Indo-Scyths), shot 33 shows the queen contemplating Zhang's 
words, shot 34 again shows Hun riders, and shot 35 has Zhang Qian continuing his speech 
(Figure 30). 
Figure 29: Dynamics of Zhang Qian Convincing the Queen in HWDD 44-03 (Shots 25 - 42) 
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All of these signs here give validity to Zhang's argument, and make it conceivable that the 
queen would change her originally pacifist position to a martial one. 
Figure 30: Zhang Qian Conjures up Images of War to Convince a Pacifist (HWDD 44-03) 
HWDD 44-03 1; i IWDD 44-03-3. + I i',. c1ý, 1 ). 1.1 ý, ..,., I tiWDD 44-03-35 
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Following this piece of dialogue, the queen agrees to call in a meeting with the royal elders to 
discuss a possible alliance with the Han. This meeting is devised as a lengthy dialogue 
sequence between the various royal elders, set at the court of the Indo-Scyth queen (fIWUU 
44-07). The sequence is arranged without strong visual signs: shots of the various elders are 
juxtaposed with each other to show who is speaking and what the other discussants' 
response is, and medium close-up shots of the queen and Zhang Qian are used to show the 
two characters' reaction to the ongoing debate (Zhang's support for the pro-war arguments 
is demonstrated by corresponding gestures and facial expressions, while the queen's support 
for the same arguments is signified by her audibly sighing when the opposition makes their 
case). At random intervals, extremely long shots show the hall in which the debate is taking 
place. The dynamics generally follow the conversation, and the acoustic signs (two sections 
of oriental music as well as bird sounds throughout the first section of the sequence) merely 
provide atmosphere, but do not contribute to the discussion on war and peace. In this sense, 
the maximum stress is placed on the verbal statements made by the five discussants, which 
are reproduced in Figure 31. 
Figure 31: The Debate on War and Peace at the Indo-Scyth Court (HWDD 44-07) 
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225 
3237 fA14i: tZßkýi13 . 'tt Marquis 1: Marquis of Shuangmi, we " Peace is not a permanent 
w, fc, kXý have to be vigilant in peace times. The state. it is fragile and must 
rýCü1TSCdi1l 1. düý Xiongnu did not attack us only once, be guarded constantly 
tffrh9lýc 1tl fflýff but relentlessly. They have twice " The Indo-Scyths have 
Gt fffli7xJo already caused us massive calamity. If suffered humiliation at the we want to prevent the start of a third hands of the Huns 
t}h3t lt¬i 1ýi ih tf 
great calamity, now is the right " The Han dynasty's war 
. opportunity. You should not assume against the Huns is an ý$ti7Lo %J; T J9'ýQV that all is well just because the Xiongnu opportunity to exert 
ff ]i&i are far away. Xiongnu riders have again revenge 
výýGfil_ X Jfhn, been sighted in the west of the Ridge of " The Huns are always 
f WAX ý.. a 
Asia. dangerous, no matter how 
Peace S upporters 
far away they are 
Shot Chinese English Main 
No. Original Translation Arguments 
14-31 RFýIf k }-. 4 _, Marquis of Shuangmi: Your majesty To avenge a past 
s f1 Jl,; fýillfj has often said that to be a Marquis one humiliation would only 
LL7`3+ r, ] 44f ýa has to consider posterity. I take it you serve to right a historical 
JJ#t2izS#i; ý. ýfi majesty did not only mean that we wrong, but would not 
should consider the future, but also that benefit the people of the 
#ýý JA EEfhýtitt 
we should consider the present. To present 
° gather our crack troops and attack the "A war would cause A ýF ý6r, i; fxdhX. Xiongnu in the east to avenge the suffering for the Indo- 
#6t5+: PL, A+.. former king and right his humiliation Scyths 
), i$ Y71j tL0 ]h would be a historic tribute for which the " History cannot be 
14, LP, Ifitlyilfif1 . i$Jf--j1bl 
Indo-Scyths would pay in blood. Not changed 
1X (ýýýStlti {{ýi only would such an action not change A war would destabilise 
KM IV ý- T)H history, it would also not bring the domestic relations with 
ýýL41ýý 44 ros erit and happiness to the 
Indo PPY local ethnic minorities 
, a Scyths. History lies in the past, and no 
LI32SC'S TT1 IT'J A0 in one can change it! Furthermore, to 
ff., a 'ff LL IIi* dispatch troops on an expedition would 
>t j1? iäfifüiý+, bring calamity to the Indo-Scyths. Sirs, 
fk fJ t(; ßß Jh, jy you all know that the territory that the t$W19-*, k Indo-Scyths occupy is the Daxia 
!Ih. l2 f Afn territory. 
The ethnic people in the 
fiJkCskI lýAf border regions of Daxia have a 
ff iff11ý LL Ck7 
population of over 1,000,000, which we 
. all enslaved. The people in the border J.. t ffIoZ, k#1L regions could at any time unexpectedly 
rýl fil3llf4l IiJA K, 14 attempt to reclaim their nation. Should 
fji. * i k=MJ t, Aifü`k we move our troops eastwards, they 
k. L C}II , would most certainly cease 
the 
opportunity and rebel. In that case, we 
Indo-Scyths would be vanquished by 
the border people, thus losing our 
foothold. 
38-42 Asaft; W4 kiE Marquis of Shuangmi: As the queen " If the Huns are occupied 
kýjjý f, N#X-ff , L1aV has already said, the Xiongnu are at with their war against the 
f1 PqypH ,o 14. R war with the Han troops. It is a fight Han, they will not attack 
ftffeY)TAf1le i$Hll# between two great powers. 
How could the Indo-Scyths 
. the 
Xiongnu divide their forces and ý JHýO] U7cFfra march westwards. That is clearly not 
MWi v. , 'jAStfýli possible. The Xiongnu that you 
V, #T'1J: 1t t. +ä [Marquis 1] saw are small bands of no 
hj! It, more than 100 men. They cannot do us 
any harm. 
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49-59 ": 4f, -*)K 
üF#tittF f19 T, li> Iýri 
i15Ae r, j 
i ftfllflýfJrrlý 1i 
(flltxüif><JJF° :! t 
iX1 i; 3EM T, 1&; T'9. 
%1E3ri1 J ')J fC-, ft l'JrAQ 
A 119 IlL 1; 611 f1 k 
WE°ZýF iX7id"J 
>f+9pfPtiItt " in 
id V z5 - VE. 1$ IT 
° nf]lltURiJUEM1 
GJiE#c, #trýfill%! 1ä 
Marquis of Guishuang: Your majesty, 
in the future the world will not depend 
upon armies but on trade caravans. 
War has never brought happiness to 
any people. Only trade caravans will be 
able to build bridges of friendship 
between all ethnic groups. Your 
majesty should not be discussing a 
westward migration and attack. Since 
the Han envoy has come so far to visit 
the Indo-Scyths, we should decide how 
many trade caravans our two states will 
be exchanging. Your majesty, the Han 
dynasty's silk is a rare commodity for 
which faraway places like Rome will 
pay 10 pounds of gold per load. 
However I have heard that a batch of 
silk only costs 50 grams of gold in 
Chang'an. 
. In the future, trade will be 
more important than 
warfare 
. War causes suffering for 
the people 
. Trade creates friendship 
between ethnically diverse 
groups 
" Chinese silk is a precious 
commodity worth trading 
for 
60-70 *IRT: to l'J1f'JM' Marquis 4: Older people will often " Although older Indo- 
' 'tq "A #I1iJ, . #An, of remember with 
longing Qilian and Scyths have fond 
; f=V#iFlt f0Ut 1L 
Dunhuang, but when you ask them to memories of their 
1iJZi1 (1: 7 ° I1jA(s 
return they actually do not wish to do homeland, those lands are 
{l' so. That is because those places are not as fertile as the 
not as richly endowed as we are here. present ones 
411,111fi AýIfit3hflL Here, we have fertile soil that we can " Returning to the Indo- 
I7VAVt1'1 [X11`119*: k cultivate [original script: we have slaves Scyth homeland would 
ff JTf Jal. AyAnijik` from the border people at our demand], mean to lose the current 
1e), 1ii9$ISfi} and have extremely rich banquets state of prosperity 
+. ph° Ift610`"JeP every day. We have huge plates of beef " Foreign policy should take 
ICJ xi4dIý'fi1Cfýü [f and we also have rich and 
fertile into consideration public 
Hfä9 ` iß7hf 
grazing land [original script: before opinion and be in the 
#cý1kJ]. Ti F7F1ff1 
each banquet we have dancer girls interest of the people 
from the border regions perform songs 
III [ !1H fä9 4ý: NK V°1 4* and dances for us] and what's more, we 
»A& x1eJ1i J° *. M410 J" have beautiful snow-capped mountains 
ii'L rr 9 urn ( X1 H)Kl14: [original script: and in our tents we have 
jz 4 #ISiithikkt' J slave girls from Greece waiting for us]. 
q- 1, Va T rr 4M Is it likely that we would possess such 
[X1nw1*: -Jft7St 
things again [original script: would we 
J° ý' ET ýT 
have that in Dunhuang and the Qilian 
mountain range]? That would be 
extremely difficult [original script: it 
if lfi t JS( lJ wouldn't be the same]. Your majesty, 
? týh3 fit ! the popular will should not be 
disobeyed. It is dangerous to anger the 
masses. We can absolutely not attack 
the Xiongnu and migrate eastwards! 
70-77 A'REZ, Pak, #, A3!! 4-, Marquis 5: The Xiongnu must not be " The Huns are too strong 
M. I [LIFO, 10$AJr slighted. Just over ten years ago, we an adversary 
1 Ji. I IJfiYif+ildi moved 20,000 troops against the A victory over the Huns is 
#'Wýx, yr. #JT 
Xiongnu. Confident of our strength, we not realistic 
I& [1A)z it l A- _ T__tL 
underestimated the Xiongnu and as a 
result, we were defeated by them 
13l! fA4'1JI{J d"c [original script: who defeated our troops 
1 h, TU%KL11i. with an army half the size]. Now 
1 j%A° 11t}i currently we have 200,000 men at our 
1, tt:, 1iART'° Aji disposal, but the Xiongnu already have 
,, V1 y, J S ýX014X f; J if 
600,000 riders. That is half of the troops 
ýJ 1) 9SCfxýD1( yf1 iu `+' f they dispatched, and still they are 
1¬äi1hý1St! ' stronger 
than our army. To believe that 
we could join forces with the Han 
dynasty and defeat the Xiongnu is 
entirely wishful thinking. 
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The overwhelming number of shots in this sequence is clearly devoted to the opposition of a 
military alliance with the Han dynasty: of the seventy-seven shots that compose the debate, 
51 show the opposition making its case (66%), while only fourteen are devoted to the sole 
supporter of an attack on the Huns (18%); the other twelve shots either contain no dialogue 
or have the queen asking for the opinions of individual royal elders (16%). Those opposing 
an alliance draw from various different discourse strands in order to make their point (for 
instance the welfare discourse, the public security discourse and the national identity 
discourse, suggesting that war would have adverse affects on each of these areas). The main 
discursive statements that are made in this dialogue are: 
" War is a matter of honour. 
" Peace is not a permanent state; it is fragile and must be guarded 
constantly. 
" Historical defeats lie in the past and cannot be changed. 
" Foreign security policy should be in the service of the people. 
" Wars destabilise a state domestically. 
" Wars cause suffering for the people. 
" Trade, that is the mutually beneficial exchange of rare goods between 
friendly societies, facilitates peace. 
The conclusion of the debate is then relatively clear: the queen of the Indo-Scyth has to 
grudgingly give in to the majority and respectfully decline Zhang Qian's offer. She does, 
however, offer Zhang the secret formula to the steal compound used in forging the Indo- 
Scyth swords (shot 84). Also, with the debate touching upon the importance of trade 
relations between the Indo-Scyths and the Han dynasty (including a cross-cut to Zhang Qian 
nodding in agreement; shot 56), it is suggested that Zhang was indeed able to establish such 
relations. 
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This then concludes Zhang Qian's diplomatic effort in the West, and considering that the 
main discursive position on foreign security throughout HWDD is a martial one that gives 
priority to war over peace, it may be surprising that Zhang's failure to recruit allies for the 
war against the Han does not cause his mission to the West to be interpreted as a failure. The 
reason for this is not only that Zhang was still able to contribute to the war effort at home 
(securing the Fergana horses and the Indo-Scyth swords for the Han army), but more 
importantly the fact that Zhang's voyage has received a new significance throughout the 
sequences discussed above: the actual achievement is Zhang's establishment of trade 
relations with amiable Central-Asian states. This is also the reason why the pacifist argument 
of the Indo-Scyth is not ridiculed here: it is on one hand the position of a future friend and 
ally, and on the other hand it fundamentally contributed to the formation of the new trade 
relations. But even though the discursive statements on trade and foreign security 
(particularly that trade facilitates peaceful relations between ethnically diverse groups) 
present such an outcome as valuable in itself, the true reason why Zhang's voyage to the 
West is in the end viewed as successful is that his achievements are linked to the discourse 
on Chinese national identity. This is achieved by presenting Zhang's voyage with a high 
degree of pathos, and repeatedly clarifying that he was the one to essentially 'invent' the Silk 
Roads. These Silk Roads are then interpreted as part of the Han Chinese heritage; something 
that the audience should feel proud of. The three central moments in the drama that assure 
this effect are (see also Figure 32): 
1. Sequence HWDD 26-17: Zhang Qian says his farewell to the emperor and sets out on 
his voyage. The dynamics lead up to the moment when the emperor gestures Zhang 
to rise after he had bowed down, and the rest of the sequence then shows Zhang 
walking off, and finally riding off with his entourage, while the emperor looks after 
him in reverence. A romantic theme plays throughout, and low angels are repeatedly 
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used to relay the glory of both Zhang Qian and the emperor. The sequence concludes 
with the narrator stating the following: 
Narrator: In order to fulfill Liu Che's grand strategy of establishing 
contacts with potential allies, Zhang Qian and his meticulously 
chosen entourage of over one-hundred men secretly left 
Chang'an and marched westwards. They would cut across the 
Xiongnu territory and seek out the nations of Central Asia. Two 
thousand years later, all historians of the world would regard 
this small special group of envoys as the pioneers who 
established the Silk Roads, which would connect Europe and 
Asia. But as this tiny group disappeared into the distance leaving 
Chang'an and departing for out-of-the-way places, on a journey 
that would last more than ten harsh years, the Han Emperor Liu 
Che who had dispatched this group essentially did not know 
whether Zhang Qian's team would ever return. 
$P; MA XJ ,W Aft-KP M A. 4th1t1*' ' tl Kiib c, J to ESC e 9-f- 1p>Ä, $ bt71ý 11'l#L°iýi7ýi{i1 t3'7 d'ftf ' Mf'X31: # RJ9AA tUkff_ZI'alkilzl MY'A Mafia 19CA ýi ä$xýJ«Jýt3hf ff c lÄ7 i-&P 3ý tFi F 
----TT, A'SiS* ft $M*? 
Note in particular how the claim that Zhang Qian linked China with Europe by 
establishing the Silk Roads is here legitimized with the statement that "all historians 
of the world" agree on this issue. 
2. Sequence HWDD 44-02, scene 2 (shots 24 - 51): Zhang Qian arrives at the Indo-Scyth 
border. There, he falls to his knees and calls out to the emperor, swearing his 
undying loyalty to the Han cause (note in particular how the melodramatic music 
and the shot dynamics maximise the emotional gravity of Zhang Qian falling to his 
knees; shots 38-44). The sequence ends with Zhang staring into the distance and 
starting to cry (shot 51), while his entourage is arranged in the background. 
3. Sequence HWDD 45-19: Zhang Qian returns to Changan after 13 years of hardship. 
The emotional impact of Zhang's arrival before the emperor has already been 
230 
discussed (see 4.1. i), but it is worth reproducing here the narrator's summary of 
Zhang's voyage (shots 98 -102): 
Narrator: In the third year of the Yuanshuo era, Zhang Qian finally 
returned to Chang'an from the western territories. Although he 
had failed to complete his assigned mission, but as an emissary 
of the Han dynasty his errands had taken him ten thousand miles, 
and he brought back with him geographical knowledge that 
many of his compatriots simply could not fathom. No matter 
whether for the Han Emperor Wu or for Chinese people who 
wished to understand the world, Zhang Qian's actions had a 
pioneering significance. From that time onward, there would 
always be men who travelled west with the sun, from the east to 
the central plains, across wide ranges of mountains and deserts, 
to finally establish the Silk Roads, which would shine brightly in 
the historical annals for two thousand years. 
fV VIVI VIf, Mr'fk2 L Iffl7: MAi`. -A &*IA QinMI 
ifhlE01R. 5EiE 1'TYJZA-V ici : V-fIf, L, I>I Lt ]+C A, I-K 
'n 3 #ý rich cýCo 1 kZR3, TIMTIfAf1t1IifY, Eb 
NZA. 
Here, the extreme notion that Zhang established the Silk Roads himself is softened 
slightly by the statement that others followed his trails to create the famous trade 
routes, but Zhang's pioneering influence is nonetheless stressed. Note how the 
sequence ends with the Emperor staring off into the distance, solemnly saying about 
Zhang "A hero! You are a hero of our great Han dynasty" (yingxiong! ni shi wo da 
Hanchao de yingxiong!! ! Tfi it /X ýh ! shot 102), thereby leaving no room 
for misinterpretation of how significant Zhang's achievements are. 
A 
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Figure 32: Emotive Imagery to Instill National Pride in the Viewers 
Emperor Watches as Lhang Qian Embarks on his voyage (f-iWDD 26 17, shots 08.12,13,23 and 
26; all underscored by a romantic musical theme) 
!ý "*ý 
ý 
r, 
. Olaf ý 
.ýf> 
Zhang Qian Arrives at his I)eslinafion and Honows uw I iul, r-ror (HWDD 44-02, shots 40,42,43,44 
and 51, all underscorec by a melancholic musical theme) 
Zhanq UJ, ln Returns Home and his Achieverui rt, . u,, 11, womi, 1 HWI)t) '11i Ifi , I, i 
102, first underscored by a grand imperial theme, and then by a romantic ttiuin ) 
All of these sequences have one thing in common, and that is the use of extreme pathos in 
relation with the heroic exploits of Zhang Qian. This is the same mechanism that also 
functions to legitimize throughout the drama series what might otherwise be conceived as 
warmongering on the part of the Han emperor. His battles against the I luns are justified in 
the end by the expansion of the Han nation, which is presented in heavily pathos-laden 
sequences such as HWDD 58-14. Even the demise of the Fluns, who functioned as the 
antagonistic force throughout the drama, is used to instil pride in the viewer. This is most 
strikingly exemplified by the last sentence of the drama series (l IWDD 58-15), in which the 
narrator concludes: 
Narrator: The lifeblood of the Huns has now merged with the blood vý tisels 
of the great Chinese family of ethnic groups. 
ri IT '-7 H r#' 'P K AAýitWYMLlWtl 
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I igqure 33: Patriotic Imagery in the Final Sequence of HWDD 
m 
HWDD 58-15-04 HWDf) `. )8-15-08 HWDD 58-15 09 HWDD 58-15-22 
The disconcerting use of the eugenic discourse in this verbal statement is then juxtaposed 
with images of the imperial palace in a thunder storm (including angles that prominently 
feature dragon statues in the foreground; see Figure 33) and with a powerful imperial music 
theme. The last shot of the drama is a blazing red setting sun. This arrangement is clearly 
meant to give the assimilation of the Huns by the Han Chinese a patriotic connotation, 
thereby contributing to the notion of a great Chinese heritage that literally all Chinese 
viewers share "in their veins" (mai U). 
To summarise, the foreign security discourse in HWDD is primarily martial in nature. 
Warfare is depicted as a legitimate tool to protect the nation from foreign aggressors. 
Discursive statements on the barbaric nature of the aggressor, as well as on the weakness of 
pacifists, help to further justify military conflict as a solution to foreign security threats. 
Diplomacy is ostensibly given the same priority as warfare, but the relation between the two 
foreign security approaches is put into perspective on one hand by the fact that the I Ian 
court understands diplomacy merely as the recruitment of military allies, and on the other 
hand by the enormous amount of drama sequences that deal with warfare instead of foreign 
cooperation. 
Discourse fragments on peace are also presented in this drama, and are interlinked with the 
welfare discourse, repeatedly stating that foreign security policy should be in the service of 
the people and that wars exhaust the population. In addition, trade is presented as a viable 
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form of state interaction that is said to promote the amiable relations between ethnically 
diverse groups. This last discourse strand is developed primarily in the narrative arc that 
shows the 'foundation' of the Silk Roads, and helps sanction the achievements of the alleged 
founder of these trade routes, Zhang Qian. 
Both the discourse on war and the one on peace (or rather: on the establishment of peaceful 
trade relations) are presented with an abundance of pathos. The outcomes of the war as well 
as of Zhang Qian's diplomatic mission are equally presented as national achievements of the 
Han dynasty, and are used to instil patriotic pride in the audience. In this sense the martial 
means of conducting foreign security policy are justified by the ends, i. e. by the expansion of 
the great Han Chinese nation. 
4.2 Visual Political Discourses in a Main-Melody Crime Drama 
Next in my analysis, I shall turn to the governance and security discourses in a modern crime 
drama. For this purpose, the series GAJZ was chosen (Jin, 2003). The twenty-episode series is 
amain-melody' drama, i. e. an official state propaganda series, commissioned by the top 
functionaries of the Public Security Ministry (Gonganbu z , V%) in order to improve the 
public image of the police (113,07: 56 - 08: 19). The production details were handled by the 
Ministry's production unit, the Golden Shield centre (Gongan bu jindun yingshi wenhua 
zhongxin which possesses its own filming permit; CCTV followed 
as a second production company, and a Shenzhen construction company involved in visa 
services at the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border joined as a financier (113,65: 33 - 71: 07). The 
script was written by a former director of the Public Security Ministry, Zhu Entao *1 /f}, as 
well as his wife, the journalist Yang Zi WT. The drama was directed by Jin Tao *Wi, and 
featured the renowned television actor Pu Cunxin E#W in the main role. The series aired 
on CCTV-1, starting on 26 August 2003, and was broadcasted each evening during prime- 
time; it ranked as the 4th most popular television drama of 2003 (Wang, 2004,249). The drama 
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tells the story of Commissioner Li Jian ýMJ, who is transferred to the fictional north-eastern 
Chinese city of Yundu ii fi (roughly corresponding to the city of Dalian )c A where the 
drama was filmed) to solve a recent crime case and reform the local law enforcement system. 
According to one interviewee, the drama was based on the original (yuanxing RR; ) 
experiences of six commissioners and various police officers who were interviewed by the 
screenwriters (113,02: 24 - 15: 07 and 22: 48 - 23: 34). The main theme of the drama by default is 
public security, but the repeated interaction between Li Jian and his party and government 
superior Cheng Zhi fM. also offers strong references to the discourse strand on governance. 
The discursive statements identified in this analysis, as well as the signs used to construct 
these statements, are summarised in the corresponding tables in Appendix 3. 
4.2.1 Responsible and Professional Leadership 
The main melody drama GAJZ and the historical drama HWDD analysed above have in 
common that they both focus strongly on those who govern, and those who are being 
governed. However, the discourse fragments on the state are communicated differently in 
the crime drama than they are in HWDD. In general, the governing theme is personified and 
hence channelled by the head of the CCP's provincial Political & Law Committee (zhengfawei 
AY ), secretary Cheng Zhi n who is Commissioner Li Jian's superior, and represents 
the provincial government and party leadership. For the purpose of analysing the discourse 
on governance and leadership in GAJZ, I am focusing here on the discursive statements that 
I was able to isolate concerning the character of Secretary Cheng, his function as a superior to 
Commissioner Li and his role as a leader to the people of Yundu city. 
Cheng Zhi's function as a leadership figure is generally not emphasised very strongly 
through visual signs. One exception is the first brief appearance of the character in GAJZ 01- 
11. The sequence shows Deputy Commissioner Huo Xiang 190 and his men handling a 
hostage situation at the cruise ship SS Oriana. After a fifth of the sequence, Secretary Cheng 
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arrives. The following two scenes (shots 32 - 46) are then used to introduce the character for 
the first time in the drama, and establish him as a proactive leader. Upon arrival (first scene; 
shots 32 and 33) Secretary Cheng's immediately attempts to obtain a better picture of the 
situation. The discursive statement made here is that the party leadership is taking charge of 
a potentially dangerous situation. The character's first line of dialogue is: "Huo, let's go up 
there and have a look. " It is then made clear through additional dialogue that such an action 
would be unsafe. The secretary, however, ignores the cautioning officers and makes his way 
towards the cruise ship, accompanied by the two deputy commissioners Huo Xiang and Dai 
Wenqing JUC7, as well as a heavily armed police escort (second scene; shots 34 - 45). The 
walk across the quay bridge is then used to make additional statements concerning Cheng's 
role as a leader (Figure 34). This is achieved by layering various visual, acoustic and verbal 
signs. 
Visually, the character Cheng Zhi is placed in the centre of the frame, flanked by the armed 
police officers, and backed by Huo and Dai (shots 34 - 37,39 - 41 and 43 - 45). All shots 
except for one are frontal shots of Cheng and the men surrounding him (the exception is shot 
36, which shows the men from the side). Low camera angels force the viewers to look up to 
the characters (shots 35,36, and 40). All of these signs work together to emphasise Cheng's 
authority. 
The general sense of urgency already established through the context (hostage situation) and 
the early shots of the sequence (especially shots 10 - 16 and 18 - 28, in which armed police 
officers storm the quay and get into firing position) is further heightened by shaky hand 
camera movement throughout the scene and a high shot frequency (the average length of 
shots 34 - 37,39 - 41 and 43 - 45 is 3.5 seconds; shots 38 and 42 show a different scene and 
are therefore not included in this calculation). Tensions are further raised acoustically, 
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through a suspenseful soundtrack and a constant, unintelligible walky-talky noise that can 
be heard in the background. 
Figure 34: Secretary Cheng from the CCP Assesses a Hostage Situation 
GAJZ 01-11-35 GAJZ 01-11-37 GAJZ 01-11-40 GnJL 01-11-41 
As the men arrive at the other side of the bride, Cheng Zhi gives the following orders to I Iuo 
Xiang in shots 39 - 41 (the character makes a very similar verbal statement later in the 
sequence, during shots 75 and 76): 
Cheng Zhi: Regardless of the measures you take, you have to guarantee the 
hostages' safety. If you can spare the hostage takers' lives, then 
do so. If that's really not possible, then kill them. 
N ýK #RTil% fiifi{b - ý`'ri`ý'üF. %A, M141\JfW11it- (i, lifiiiIl 
Man. 
To sum up, the combination of these verbal, acoustic and visual signs formulates of the 
following discourse fragments: 
" The party leader wields authority. 
" The party leader is capable of assessing a dangerous crime situation. 
" The party leader is proactive. 
" The party leader is fearless. 
" The party leader has zero tolerance towards criminals. 
" The party leader cares more about the safety of the general populace 
than about his own wellbeing. 
Other than in this sequence, most discursive statements made by or about the character 
Cheng Zhi are verbal in nature and feature very few visual signs. the majority of such verbal 
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discursive statements are made in dialogue sequences between the secretary and 
Commissioner Li Jian (see GAJZ 04-13; 04-16; 04-19; 6-14; 10-10; 14-14; 16-02; 17-20; 18-01; 
and 19-01). As a representative example, I have provided a sequence protocol of GAJZ 04-16. 
The sequence consists of one scene, which takes place in the office of secretary Cheng, and 
shows Li Jian reporting back to Cheng Zhi on the progress of his crime investigation. 
The arrangement of this scene is entirely conventional (Figure 35). All shots except for one 
are medium close-ups at an eye-level angle, showing either one of the two characters. 
Camera movement is kept to a minimum: Camera actions such as pan and tilt are used 
occasionally, and are consequently marked in the protocol, but these movements are merely 
very minor corrections to keep the respective characters in the frame as they move their 
bodies during the conversation. The only shot that somewhat deviates from this norm is a 
long shot of the two men talking to each other across secretary Cheng's office desk (shot 13). 
However, this perspective is also a conventional part of dialogue scenes, functioning as the 
main shot, i. e. the shot that shows the line of sight between the characters, and gives an 
impression of the general setting. 
Other aspects of the scene also do not constitute particular signs purveying meaning. The 
sequence does not feature any music or any sound effects, and the dynamics generally follow 
the flow of the conversation (lengthy shots showing the person who is speaking, juxtaposed 
with short shots showing the character who is listening). The shot frequency slopes 
downwards towards the middle of the scene (the dynamics reaching the slowest point 
roughly when the two characters are shown facing each other in shot 13), and then slopes 
upward again as the conversation picks up some momentum. However, these dynamics do 
not underscore a particularly important part of the dialogue or action. 
The only visual signs that the viewer is provided with are the objects and persons in the 
scene and the way they are arranged to each other. The physical objects that are shown 
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indicate that the action is set in a government office: a Chinese flag and a calligraphy provide 
the background for the shots featuring Secretary Cheng, who is wearing a dark suit; a map of 
China and a green plant can be seen in the shots that show commissioner Li, who is wearing 
a police uniform. Otherwise, however, the arrangement of objects and personage in the scene 
is as functional as the shot angles and editing dynamics. 
In this sense, everything in this or the other dialogue scenes between Li Jian and Cheng Zhi 
is geared towards keeping the viewer's attention on the verbal statements. I have translated 
below five sections of dialogue from this and similar sequences in order to show what 
discourse fragments are presented in these types of conversations (Figure 36). 
Figure 36: Discounze Fragments In the Dialogues between Commissioner and Secretary. 
Sequence No. 
and content 
Chinese 
Original 
English 
Translation 
Discourse 
Fragments 
GAJZ 04-16: *: tir fl 8-28 t. jk Chong Zhi: To tackle the case " The provincial Li Jlan reports ktgry° ry tir j, }#h tl of 26 August was the right leadership supports 
back to Chang +jr° $iiJI&f thing to do. I agree with your the law enforcement Zhi on his analysis and assessment. We efforts. 
progress with a definitely have a criminal 
crime underworld group at work in " The provincial and 
investigation. Yundu. police leadership have 
the responsibility to 
LI Jian: Secretary Chang, protect the people. 
there may be some who fear if 
this assessment is confirmed " The two leaders are 
äfCýdt°fp7ii{Jf'ý. that the common people might professionals who 
#5id. Js` , fG 111 Rffl'1/A* ask who serves as 
their have been called upon 
Ri'*H. *, T, *Jý, Ulct protective umbrella. Secretary to reform law 
ym y Chang, you and I have both enforcement in the 
been transferred here recently. city. 
May that not cause 
misunderstandings? 
_ý11T1% 
Chang ZhI: Actually, we don't 
have to worry about this. The 
provincial government called 
me in first and then called in Hhiý#i" () you In order to full-heartedly 
change the face of Yundu's 
public security. (... ) 
GAJZ 10-10: , ("., ) jA-j§M9htx1*3it Chang 
Zhl: (... ) This series of " The provincial and 
Li Jian reports {ff3ý[fiT4ýý1. murder cases Is putting a lot of police leadership 
back to Chang T, b 31f itm ä{t pressure on both of us. If we answer to the people. Zhi on a bribery can't solve these cases, we 
' attempt by fý fltJ'ý'' g 
t justify ourselves to the can The provincial and 
crime-lord Ma 
Fugui, and 
' 
s®ý#F 
common people. If this 
continues, you and I losing our 
police leadership have 
the responsibility to 
explains his 9hf31F#kFl!. (fFittýfý j"qC posts will be the smallest of protect social stability 
strategy to fight our worries. If the national and economic 
crime. policies for stability and unity development (which 
as well as the goo economic are threatened by 
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GAJZ 14-14: 
Chang Zhi 
invites Li Jian 
for lunch and a 
drink after a 
failed murder 
attempt on Li's 
life. 
GAJZ 114-M-- 
Chang Zhi 
invites Li Jian 
for lunch and a 
drink after a 
failed murder 
attempt on Li's 
life. 
GAJZ 1 6-02: 
Chang Zhi visits 
Li Jian's office 
to talk about the 
corruption 
accusations 
against Li's 
deputy Huo 
Xiang. 
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ýaý ýýJENýßhýE4ýýýiIE#1Z 
arrangements fall into disarray, 
then you and I will be in 
serious trouble. 
LI Jian: I know. Secretary 
Cheng, you may have to back 
me up again. We are currently 
faced with a web that is 
covering up a collaboration of 
evildoers. The roots are deep. 
You have to give me time so 
that I can thoroughly dig them 
up. 
Chang ZhI: Director Coo and I 
are very pleased with your 
work so far. 
LI Jian: (... ) When I had just 
arrived, I wanted to attend to 
three fires: the first fire I have 
tended to, the second fire was 
to solve the connected cases 
that had been put off before. If 
we don't pull out the roots, 
how can we uphold the public 
order? What are the 
leadership's instructions? 
Chang Zhi: I never had any 
instructions, I only have 
suggestions. I hope you'll take 
the opportunity to rest for a 
few days. 
LI Jlan: You also want me to 
take It easy? 
Chang ZhI., No, Wa to beat 
them at their own game. 
LI Jian: That's exactly what I 
was hoping for. 
LI Jian: This commission you 
gave me really Isn't a good 
commission. The things I 
loathe most are these types of 
complicated social relations. 
Every time you try to get 
something done, there's 
always someone who is trying 
to undermine you. 
Chang Zhl: Yeah. Some have 
already reported your situation 
to the province, and have 
reported it to me, saying you're 
not impartial, and that this 
hinders police (military) 
operations; that that's why you 
let Ma Fugui escape. That 
money he gave you, even 
though you handed it over to 
the disciplinary commission, 
crime). 
" The provincial 
leadership supports 
the law enforcement 
efforts. 
" The provincial 
leadership oversees 
the law enforcement 
effort and is satisfied 
with the 
commissioner's 
progress. 
The provincial 
leadership potentially 
has the power to 
decree how the law 
should be enforced, 
but chooses instead to 
merely advise the 
police. 
" The provincial 
leadership 
understands the 
strategies necessary 
to fight crime. 
" Law enforcement is 
hampered by complex 
social relations, which 
are on occasion 
interpreted as 
corruption. 
" Law enforcement is 
under public scrutiny 
for corruption. 
The provincial 
leadership monitors 
the law enforcement 
efforts and 
investigates corruption 
accusations. 
The police 
commissioner is 
responsible for the 
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ti7 " f'Aalr T54*1 Aifi, but you still got Me Fugul's son safety of an entire iýiifF ^ A, , ßg9&" X into Xu Lei's school. Well, did region. 
tirf n cAci 4 %? you then possibly take some other bribe? And then Ma " The police 
Fugui openly comes to the commissioner is 
public security bureau to visit required to maintain a 
you. Someone overheard Ma spotless public image. 
Fugul telling someone else 
that you were a very capable " The provincial 
man, that you were a friend. leadership supports So how should your the police. 
relationship be interpreted? 
*O1: -t Ahl 1tl. NO, ff 4 5" LI JIan: I have my principles. It ' doesn t matter what other 
people say. 
1 tixý 1 ý` Chong Zhl: You're not the 
captain of the vice squad 
%. iff9h--J)IY: J anymore. You are a 
? riJzrfi t3h{ý commissioner, responsible for 
tsi7t47"diff the safety of a region, and 
your every move influences 
AäR4ä4r" the stability of Yundu city. Social relations are also a 
science. I believe you, and the 
provincial government believes 
you, but that doesn't mean that 
everyone believes you. 
To summarise these findings, the provincial leadership and the police force in GAJZ work as 
a team. The leadership is portrayed as a responsible, professional administration that 
oversees police work, investigates corruption within the police force and facilitates reform. 
At the same time, the leadership understands the difficulties that police officers are faced 
with when fighting crime: it grants the law enforcement experts a high degree of autonomy, 
trusts their judgement and supports their efforts full-heartedly. Moreover, both the 
provincial and the law enforcement leadership serve and answer to the people. 
The concept that the party and state serve the people (in line with the Mao Zedong quote u'vi 
renmin fuwu h%RBR?. ) features strongly in GAJZ, and is particularly dominant in the 
sequences that deal with those being governed, i. e. the people. In order to demonstrate this, I 
shall turn to a narrative arc in episode 8 that focuses not on Cheng Zhi, but instead on 
Commissioner Li and his police force. The arc consists of three sequence: one in which Li Jian 
gives a speech to the police force on the meaning of being an officer (GAJZ 08-05), a sequence 
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during which the commissioner inspects a female police official doing her job (GAJ/. 08-07), 
and finally a sequence of police officers around the city serving the people (GAJZ 08-08). 
First, the sequence during which Li Jian addresses the police force is again a scene that relies 
heavily on a verbal message. Nonetheless, a number of visual and acoustic signs are worth 
mentioning: the general arrangement of the characters and objects in the scene places 
Commissioner Li behind a podium, along with his deputies Huo Xiang and Dai Wenging, as 
well as Secretary Cheng. The audience (i. e. the police force) are seated on blue chairs, and the 
montage of shots suggests they are facing the podium. Behind the podium, a red curtain 
functions as the backdrop, and a red banner with white characters reads: "mobilization 
meeting for the strengthening of troop construction, the management of the police by law, 
and the strict management of the police" (jiagiang duiwu finnshe, yi /ii zhi jing, coiigyan zhi jin, ti 
dongyuan dnhui bHgIOAtfiT iý, l: lY MW red (i. e. national colour) 
theme here emphasises the gravity and official nature of the meeting. 
Figure 37: Visual Arrangement of Li Jian's Speech (GAJZ 08-05) 
GAJL 08-05-02 & i? 3 GnJL uB-05-04 s ub (, n, il ur+ u', 18 & 19 Gn. 1l WR M 20 ,w21 
The sequence opens with a close-up of the propaganda banner, the camera panning slowly to 
the right to reveal the entire slogan (this is the only camera movement in the sequence, aside 
from a zoom in shot 16). After this initial close-up, the sequence then alternates between 
lengthy medium close-up shots of Li Jian giving his speech and quick shots of his listeners' 
reaction, i. e. medium close-ups of Cheng Zhi, I luo Xiang, and I)ai Wenging; sitting at the 
'12 
podium, as well as of Officers Chen Xiaorong ß,: Ps IP, Zhang ; K, Liu Qiong Wu , 
Lin 
Jun $ rF, and an unnamed officer sitting in the audience. The ways in which these characters 
are placed in the scene as well as their demeanour suggest support for Li jian from those 
seated at the podium and agreement to his words on the side of the audience (Figure 37). In 
the middle of the sequence, two very lengthy long shots show the entire podium, including 
the propaganda banner, as Li continues his speech (shots 14 and 16). The shot frequency 
increases during the last few shots of the sequence, as Li concludes his speech and his 
audience applauds enthusiastically (see Figure 38). With the exception of the first shot, the 
entire sequence is underscored by a sentimental trumpet melody (the shot of the propaganda 
banner is underscored by drums). 
Figure 38: Shot Frequency and Dynamics in GAJZ 08-05 
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Throughout this sequence, Li Jian is giving a speech in which Ilea dmonishes bad behaviour 
within the police force. I have divided the speech into units (based on punctuation and shot 
division), and have paraphrased the main arguments made in each unit (sec Iigure 39). 
Figure 39: Li Jian's Speech on the Conduct of Good Police Officers (GAJZ 08-05) 
Shot 
No. 
Chinese 
Original 
English 
Translation 
Main Argument and Rhetoric 
Devices (in brackets) 
1 V311: "P'NOT/A Li Jian: You don't think your conduct is . Public security depends on a 
, jyjIJ Y]! Ea%fi1n-1X ridiculous. 
In order to ensure public well-managed police force, 
fi. t %x Act- security, we need to first manage the which in turn requires a well- 
Mr, police force; in order to manage the managed leadership 
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police force, we need to first manage the (rhetorical question; 
leadership. parallelism & climax). 
2-4 At AYfa. )R*# The people are our parents. To serve the " The police serve the people 
AtTf]13h$P masses is our bounded duty. The (reversed paternalistic 
1f]ýht1f~k; ý1 majority of our people's police officers metaphor). fulfil their duty. " The police generally fulfil their 
duty (generalization) 
5-8 I . zl "'i` MA ^M 
However, there are a few individuals who " There are some bad police 
aggg, iJJFZ openly ignore police guidelines and officers (indefinite pronoun 
", , 6T, #g violate 
the laws and regulations. Such generalization). 
KIMFt, 7ý is phenomena shall never again be " Bad conduct within the police 
ilk> jtxtAt, tolerated. Anyone who does tolerate force will not be tolerated them is being Irresponsible towards the (hyperbole; metaphor: human 
( people, 
the party, and the nation. behaviour as phenomenon). 
" The police answer to the 
people, the party, and the 
nation tri-colon . 9-11 1lZif]AE$FHh What is the purpose of the people's " The police serve the people 
A1-[ i,? AYMMS police? It is to serve the people. (hypophora). 
12 p1; ß Jtif14MAt A Yet some people joke and say that the " The police do more than 
At94gll people's police are about arresting petty arrest thieves (indefinite 
ý" thieves. " pronoun generalization; joke: 
synecdoche &trivialization . 13 Police Officers: [laugh] 
14 991j; tf T1R LI Jiang: "You shouldn't laugh. This " The crime-fighting function of 
" b7alT sentence at 
first doesn't seem wrong. But the police should not be used 
if it is used to justify misconduct, it will to conceal misconduct 
i MM TAZß, f# make anyone who hears It blush with (appeal: to sense of honour; 
RPM flRUMTrr shame. imagery). 
16-19 ) il7A_1; AhtýUx All the old ladies in the street know that " The police's crime fighting 
g311ýi(, j"{ý, fo we arrest petty thieves. And yet you, a function is commonly known 
4r. -^I ýR9Xý, 
five foot tall fellows with the nation's (synecdoche & trivialization; 
emblem on your hat, you're still yelling imagery). 
&AM0 0ij out that your arresting petty thieves... in a " Covering up derelictions of 
ýýý moment of 
truth such dereliction of duty duty by referring to that 
will not hold up. However you scorn at an function will not go unnoticed 
" tHM'J` old lady who is able to arrest a petty thief. (synecdoche & trivialization; fi9Ah*At. 1-'rMAI frowning as you file her case, you lose appeal: to patriotic sentiment; 
AN, W; Nnt, (fj; M your temper, what is that about? Don't Imagery; trope: moment of 
-Fff oý? lfrif]Ti M you think your conduct Is ridiculous? truth). 
BMff MISNJ--PT X Pitiful? Even shameful? " It Is unacceptable for an 
*? uTtýJý, °? ýý officer to look down on the 
*04? people 
(synecdoche & 
trivialization; tri-colon 
rhetorical question; climax 
20 RI -A-1f]. *R-Ifp$]i9. Comrades, In peace times, the main task " The police's function in peace 
-i1f]AR111 M*A of the people's police Is to safeguard the times: uphold the social order 
1ý3iBDi11#t$ social order and the public safety of the and protect the people 
common people. (personal address: comrades; 
" 
definition). 
21-24 AJ9 IcE#1k1%, OFfi In the extreme this may mean that we " Police work may involve 
t&ft, +fýj#lktkll have to rescue the dying and heal the extreme sacrifices (hyperbole; 
41 9k*'rlh&. wounded, muster our courage and parallelism; definition). 
sacrifice ourselves. At the very least it " Police work generally means 
means that we have to overcome providing for the people 
difficulties and provide for the daily (parallelism; definition). 
necessities. 
25 Alf, f1f]id: tttik Of course, we also have to Increase the " Fighting crime is an important 
f&S*" gJJFgh>]di rate at which we solve crime cases. Of part of police work (anaphora; 
kw1&*" f&T, 7 course, police officers have to solve procatalepsis). 
ý Jr T )E ATWI crime cases. 
If you can't solve the case, " If the police do not fulfil that 
you are not a good police officer. You function, they lose their public Tt 9 14 3)-K ýF T, it won't be able to justify yourself towards mandate (personal address). 
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(fiGýr I'I L ý(l , the leadership above or the common 
people below. 
" The police answer to the 
people and the leadership 
arallelism; alle cry) 
26-27 PhElAifLX T xlS Therefore I declare here in all " The Ministry of Public 
rkir^a °dfs, i fjg seriousness to the Ministry of Public Security and the provincial 
943, h'1 8/26 114 k* V Security and the provincial government government oversee the 
-fAW, IA who are overseeing our work on cases police's 
law enforcement 
H 5ý ; 1Pti' , 
such as the August 26th incident, that if efforts. 
we are unable to solve these major cases " The commissioner is 
within one year, I will be the first to take personally responsible for the 
the blame and resign. police's performance (pledge) 
The verbal rhetoric techniques as well as the visual and acoustic signs adopted in this 
sequence function together to make the following discursive statements (which at this point 
cross the discourse on governing with that on public security): 
" The police and their leadership serve the people, and answer to the 
people. 
"A public leader is personally responsible for his subordinates' 
performance. 
9 Police work is under public and governmental scrutiny. 
" Public service is a patriotic duty. 
Particularly the idea that law enforcement is equivalent to public service is then picked up 
and reiterated in the other two sequences of this narrative arc. In the first of these sequences 
(GAJZ 08-07), this point is exemplified through the work of a female police officer. 
Figure 40: Shot Frequency and Dynamics in GAJZ 08-07 
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The sequence, which consists of one scene, is set in the service area of the police precinct. It 
starts with the longest shot of the sequence: an establishing shot that first shows a filing case 
(close-up), and then zooms out to reveal the female officer filing documents behind the 
service desk (medium shot). A woman carrying a baby arrives at the desk and asks for help 
with her child's residence permit, apologizing for arriving after hours. The rest of the scene is 
largely arranged as shots aimed through the window of the service desk, from either side of 
the counter. The dynamics divide the scene into four segments (see Figure 40): during the 
first six shots, the female officer handles the women's case; second, Li Jian arrives and asks 
the officer a professional question (shots 07 - 11); during the third section, Li asks another 
professional question as well as the officer's name (shots 12 - 18); and finally, Li Jian 
commends the female officer for her good work and leaves (shots 18 - 22). 
The first section is used to make the statement: The female officer is polite, helpful, dedicated, 
and efficient (see Figure 41). This is achieved through the juxtaposition of shots showing the 
officer working (particularly a close-up showing her hands typing on a computer keyboard; 
shot 04) and the person she is helping out (particularly the close-up of the woman's baby; 
shot 05). Acoustic signs are used on the one hand to clarify that the help desk is a public 
space (cars honking, traffic noise), and on the other to emphasise that the officer is being 
industrious (keyboard typing). The editing in this part highlights that the officer is a fast 
worker and that applying for a residence permit is a minor formality (the officer needs 
roughly twenty seconds to complete the task). The verbal signs further underline two 
discursive statements: first, that the officer is dedicated to her work (the woman stating that 
she is late in shot 01, and the officer nonetheless helping out without much further ado); 
second that the officer is efficient at her job (shot 06): she presents the final documents with a 
simple: "There" (gei , °'), and the woman then gasps in surprise: "Done? And so fast! Thank 
you, thank you! " (Haola? Zheme kuai! Xiexie, xiexie ah! fl? i$%, fit !i fief, i Ii fl ! ). At the 
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same time, another visual sign is used to emphasise that the officer is working late: Li Jian 
arrives in the background of shot 06, looks at the help desk, and then checks his watch. 
Figure 41: A Dedicated Police Officer doing her Job to the Costumer's Satisfaction 
GAJZ 08-07-02 , ýi6. ' ..., u, u. GAJZ 08-07-04 GAI' : 
As the scene continues, the woman with her child walks off, smiling happily, and Li Jian 
takes a seat at the help desk (shot 07). After reinforcing verbally that it is after hours (Li: 
"you're still working this late? "; zheme wanle hai ntei xiahan? J 1N, (; f ui 'Q FJJI.? ), Li 
introduces himself, and inquires whether he may quiz the officer about her work (shot 08). 
He then first asks: "what do police officers working at the service desk need to accomplish? " 
(chuanghu danwei jiedni minjing you zuo dao nur dian? 'c11' JI i4 ll; NI'I %'1OJII ) L!. ', i'! shot 08) 
and then: "what documents do persons require who have given birth to a child abroad and 
wish to receive a residence permit for the child upon their return" (chugoo rent/Inn zu! guowu: 
shenyu de zinü huiguo loo hukou xuyao chi naxie zhengjinn? 1N 1811v J: fr I KI WI: ri (I'J J' 0111 1 kl i? 41'' 
lii M-, 04uN'L"iiETt? shot 12). During these two sections, the shots of the female officer 
undergo a change in perspective, and she is now continuously shown in frontal brief 
medium close-ups (emphasizing the interview character of the conversation; shots 09,11,13, 
15,17,19 and 21). Her verbal answers to the two questions are (shots 09 - 10 and 13 - 15): 
Officer Xu: Their manners should be dignified, their appearance neat and 
professional, their attitude enthusiastic and their language 
civilised. 
i4=R v: *llAnil: i:, *4r"°V, ANIA'tilr`ihl .' KIý1J - 
Officer Xu: The birth certificate of the child that was born abroad, the parents' 
passports, and the passport that the child used to return to the 
country. 
iFVV: Im * ýfi t-/1ýoW1.1f; `ý. ill' M, : S0, Itl'1#1''llrs, 1"fý pýllýlllilJiý"111' lirt . 
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These answers are offered without hesitation, and their brevity and clarity again underline 
the efficiency of the officer. That these answers are satisfying is made clear by various visual 
signs (Li Jian looking at his colleagues Dai Wenqing and Fang Hua )ri $, an impressed look 
on his face; shot 10) and additional verbal reinforcement (Li praising the officer's diligence 
and expertise; shot 18). Finally (shot 18-20), Li Jian sums up the encounter by stating: 
The establishment of our image project is not just a pretence that we enact for 
others but is meant to establish an ideology of wholeheartedly serving the 
people. Wouldn't you agree? 
1ýýýR)IM . TI, 
tpa tiriAR; Af4xtv4? 
The female officer then enthusiastically agrees with Lis assessment (shot 21), and they shake 
hands through the service window before Li moves on to attend a meeting (shot 22). 
All in all, this sequence can then be said to make the following discursive statements: 
" Law enforcement is a service provided by the police to the people. 
" Good public servants are polite, helpful, dedicated, diligent, 
professional, efficient and well-spoken. 
" Public leaders care personally about the good performance of their 
subordinates. 
Again, the main emphasis is placed on the state serving the people. The extent to which the 
police help the common people is then demonstrated visually in the final sequence of this 
narrative arc (GAJZ 08-08). Here, an arrangement of scenes shows police officers at work. 
Three different types of police activity are depicted: 
First, an extremely long shot shows two officers walking through a neighbourhood, greeting 
people on the street and shaking hands with the local inhabitants. The same two officers are 
then shown having a conversation with an old lady, asking about her wellbeing and assuring 
her that she can come by the precinct anytime she needs help (shot 02). A similar situation is 
later depicted in shot 06, with the two officers again chatting to an old lady. 
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Second, a three-shot scene shows a police officer regulating traffic. The female officer is 
shown at a low angle as she waves traffic through (shot 03), and then at a distance (long shot) 
as the traffic roles by in front of her (shot 04). Finally, the last shot pans left as it follows a car 
driving by, establishing visually that the traffic is indeed flowing (shot 05). 
Third, another female traffic warden (possibly the same as above) is shown helping a blind 
man across the street. The man is thanking her as they walk across a pedestrian crossing 
(shot 07). 
The sequence then ends with two police officers (possibly the same as in shots 01,02 and 06) 
receiving a reward at the local police station from the community for their sociable 
behaviour. In this sense, the above activities are positively sanctioned by'the people': In shot 
08, the camera pans right as Commissioner Li motions the community representatives into a 
room filled with applauding police officers. The two officers who receive the reward are 
standing at the far side, before a red curtain, and below the national police emblem. A red 
banner reads: "carry out profound activities for the establishment of service mechanisms" 
(shenru kaizhan jianshe fuwuxing jiguan huodongA3ý; i>ýý3#)lr§Yh). The civilians 
hand a red flag with golden calligraphy to the two officers (the characters on the flag are 
illegible at this angle). The final shot of the sequence then shows the community 
representatives leaving the police stations past two rows of clapping police officers, while 
Commissioner Li and others see the guests off (waving and applauding). Another banner is 
shown in the background, reading: "actively participate in the annual grassroots activities 
for competent citizens" (jiji canjiajicheng zhan suo xing min jianshe nian huodong 5? #1A$' )DI 4-1,3 
$WIT Ki; ift The entire sequence is underscored with a dynamic military march. A 
number of discursive statements are made here, most of which are related to the public 
security discourse, and concerning the responsibilities of the police: 
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" The police are helpful, sociable, and part of the community. 
" The police ensure the flow of traffic. 
" The police help those in need, even with minor tasks. 
" The people appreciate the police force's efforts. 
What is important with regard to the discourse on governance is that the sequence visually 
reinforces the discursive statement: 
" Public servants serve the people. 
It is particularly noteworthy who'the people' in this narrative arc are. In the two sequences 
GAJZ 08-07 and GAJZ 08-08, the police help the following'common people': a mother, a 
little baby, old ladies and an old blind man (see Figure 42). In this sense, there seems to be a 
parallel to the people depicted in HWDD: in both dramas, the'common masses' consist of 
children as well as elderly, largely female, and possibly disabled persons. 
Figure 42: The Common People in GAJZ 
GAJZ 08-07 0: ' GAJI W'I iý (", 
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4.2. ii The Military Nature of Public Security 
Some discursive statements concerning public security have already been made above, in 
connection with the governance discourse. In general, law enforcement is shown as a service 
that the police provide to the people. What is noteworthy about the security discourse in 
GAJZ is that law enforcement is in addition equated with military activity. In sequences 
where law enforcement means more than community service, the 
fight against crime is 
visually, acoustically and verbally arranged through signs that are 
borrowed heavily from 
war discourses. The analysis of two sequences shall serve to exemplify this. 
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The first of these sequences has already been mentioned: it is the hostage situation during 
which Secretary Cheng Zhi makes his debut appearance (GAJZ 01-11). A key aspect of this 
sequence is the use of images that feature weapons and heavy armour. Almost half of the 
shots in this sequence show law enforcement officials carrying, loading or aiming some form 
of firearm (Figure 43). 
In some cases the firearms are a subtle background aspect of the shots, in others they are the 
dominant feature (Figure 44). At any rate, images of weapons in the hands of police officers 
seem ever present. The fixation on weaponry is particularly obvious when police officers 
load their shotguns (for instance shots 16,18 and 23); a gesture that signifies readiness for 
battle, but in some cases has no actual relevance to the plot (see particularly shots 50 and 93, 
in which the same police officers load their guns twice, as well as shot 26, in which a row of 
officers performs the characteristic pump-action movement in synchronicity). Other types of 
firearm images include close-ups of shotgun barrels (shots 48 and 60), medium close-ups as 
well as medium shots of snipers aiming their rifles from behind cover (shots 49,52,79,81,83, 
97,112 and 132), shots that show Special Forces squads in green camouflage (! ) uniforms 
armed with automatic rifles (shots 10-14,19-21,24,27,34,43-45,80,102,105,107,109,113 
and 120), and regular police officers readying their side-arms (shots 04 - 06). Note also how 
shots of the main protagonists in this scene (i. e. Huo Xiang and Cheng Zhi) are arranged in a 
way that almost always places heavy weaponry in the frame as well (three perspectives are 
relevant in this regard: the one shown in shots 35,36,37,40,41,43,44,45 and 46; the one in 
shots 56,65,72,74 and 76; as well as the one in shots 50,93,106,111 and 115). 
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Figure 43: Amount of Armed Law Enforcement Featured in GAJZ 01-11 
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Figure 20a: percentage of shots 
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Figure 20b: percentage of total time 
Considering that the music used in the sequence also possesses a distinct military quality, 
and that the shots of firearms are edited at a high pace to increase tension, it can be said that 
the visual and acoustic signs in this sequence are tailored to inform the viewers that they are 
witnessing a military operation, and to hence make the discursive statement: 
" Law enforcement is warfare. 
The degree to which weaponry is shown here stands in rather stark contrast on one hand to 
the threat that the police force actually faces (two criminals carrying pistols, with one of the 
men also being armed with a suicide bomb) and on the other hand to the way the situation is 
later resolved: one criminal is shot in the back of the head at close range with a handgun 
(implied in shot 131), the other is thrown off of the ship's railway (shots "155-158) where he 
explodes (implied in shot 159 by a fade to white and the sound of an explosion). None of the 
firepower brought to bear on the two rather unprofessional criminals in this sequence 
actually comes into play at any point of the operation. 
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Juxtaposition of Protagonists and Firearms 
Before turning to the question why this may be the case, it is worth taking a closer look at 
another related narrative arc: Li Jian's first large-scale crime-fighting; operation. This Orr, 
which deals with the raids on various nightclubs throughout the city, spans ai ross the final 
sequences of episode 4, as well as the first part of episode 5. I will be examining here I. i Jian's 
announcement of the campaign (GAJZ 04-21), the staging of the operation ((, AJZ 05-01), and 
its execution (GAJZ 05-03 and 05-06). 
Sequence GAJZ 04-21 serves as the starting point for the operation and gives the character of 
Li Jian the opportunity to explain its relevance. The sequence is again underscored with the 
characteristic military march that was also used as an action theme in GAJ/ 0I-I I. the 
cinematography of this one-scene sequence is similar to the one adopted for I. i lian's speech 
in GAJZ 08-05: there is little camera movement except for the first shot (which is used to 
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establish the scene and is the longest shot of the sequence) and the last shot (during which 
the camera tilts slightly up- and downwards to keep one of the characters in the frame). The 
scene otherwise consists of static medium shots and medium close-ups at eye-level angel, 
showing either Li Jian as he gives his orders or the faces of those reacting to his orders. These 
shots are edited in a way that gives maximum emphasis to Li Jian's speech, for example by 
cutting to Huo Xiang (shot 05), Dai Wenqing (shot 06) and Fang Hua (shot 13) as Li Jian 
explains their individual responsibilities, or by paralleling a tri-colon sentence structure in Li 
Jian's speech with shots of his subordinates: 
This operation shall be kept MEN110. [medium close-up of Huo 
rigorously secret... Xiang; shot 14] 
rigorously in line with the law... 0=101. [cut to Dai Wenqing; shot 151 
and shall seriously investigate any NERº [cut to Lin Jun; shot 16] 
suspicious person. 
Similar to sequence 01-11, we again find repeated references to the military discourse, in this 
case verbally: First, the operation receives the code name "cloud sword" (shot 02), a 
reference on one hand to the fictional name of the city the drama is set in (Yundu ; 1j can be 
translated into "cloud city") and on the other hand to Li Jian's first name (Jinn 9IJ meaning 
"sword"); second, Li Jian refers to the operation as "large-scale warfare" (dahinghuan zuozlian 
; kARJI'M shot 03); and third, Li uses military terms such as "strike" (daji #T r; shot 01), 
"battle front" (then J; shot 07), and "detachment" (zhidui ik; shots 09 and 11) as he talks 
about the upcoming campaign. 
This military theme is further developed in sequence GAJZ 05-01, when Li Jian launches the 
operation. Various visual and acoustic signs reinforce the militaristic nature of the operation 
(Figure 45): 
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Figure 45: Visual Signs of Military Discourse in GAJZ 05-01 
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w1.1. ... .. ý i ."I. _ ý, ýii . 
'. 1 
1) The police force is lined up like a battalion at a military parade, with the officers 
standing at attention next to or in front of their vehicles (shots 02 - 12), the vice squad 
officers holding their rifles in a way that is common in military drills (shots 13 - 15, as 
well as 21 and 22). The line-up concludes with green military transporters loaded 
with Special Forces troopers who are clad in green camouflage uniforms (shots 16 - 
20,24 and 26). In total, seventy-seven per cent of the shots in this sequence show 
some aspect of this police formation. 
2) Low angles are used throughout the sequence to emphasise the grandeur of the 
police force (in fact, on average every third shot in the sequence adopts a low-angle 
perspective, see Figure 46). 
3) Similar to the other sequences that feature military themes, the same characteristic 
military march is again used. The sequence's dynamics are constructed in a way that 
gives additional stress to this tune (for example by aligning cuts from one shot to the 
next with drum beats) while at the same time adding tension to the images of the 
police 'formation' (very high shot frequency throughout the shot series 21 - 24,2(, - 
27,33 - 34 and 36 - 39). 
255 
Figure 46: Shot Frequency and Low Angle Shots in GAJZ 05-01 
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Ir the middle of the sequence, Li Jian addresses his troops, clarifying verbally the military 
nature of the operation by stating: "comrades, combat is imminent! " (hnis., ': h: nien, : Iun dou 
niashnng yno daxiang! [H]IMf ], i4 -1ý1: 
)LVfJ ullýl 1. shot 31). 1 le then launches into a brief 
speech, which is accompanied by a surge in shot frequency (shots 35 - 42): 
Li Jian: Everyone knows that there are as many pairs of eyes here on 
earth as there are stars in the sky. The eyes of the masses are 
watching us attentively! We have to strengthen our quality 
within and act as models without! Strike at criminals, and 
stabilise society! I command every unit and every type of police 
to begin their operation in line with the scheduled program! 
Move out! 
id k I-. h ýý'ý+iýýi!. ýi', 1111,.. I: ýý(Ill: ll1';.. lýlýilYfýl'111I 
týäk111! R1iMIA1; a: k, ll yh"r? /f; I 1J ; 'II'1k. #; 'ýi! fl 
ýr lr, -T, r. ý'R fl. 
1ýý llfiH! iLfiljJV lliilJrj!! Ilk! 
Note how the masses are again evoked here. 'I'hrough the simile in the first sentence, i. e. that 
the operation is literally being watched by as many eyes as there are stars in the sky, the 
discursive statement is made that: 
" The police force is under close scrutiny by the people. 
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The articulation of this idea in this particular context is remarkable, considering that a few 
sequences earlier (GAJZ 04-21) the operation was deemed top-secret. The public scrutiny 
trope is then used here as a sign for the legitimacy of the upcoming law enforcement 
activities. Before ordering the troops to move out, Li Jian adopts a parallelism (4X4 characters) 
to state the general goals of operation "cloud sword": to improve the police force's own 
performance while simultaneously acting as a role model for others (within vs. without), and 
to strike at criminals while upholding social stability (attack vs. defence). 
After the announcement and the launch of operation "cloud sword", the campaign is 
enforced in two sequences (GAJZ 05-03 and GAJZ 05-06). Both are devised as action 
sequences: fast-paced editing provides tension as police officers storm buildings (shots 07 - 
14 in GAJZ 05-03, and shots 02 - 05 in GAJZ 05-06), as well as during a chase scene in a 
nightclub (GAJZ 05-03, shots 15 - 25). Shaky hand camera movements as well as low (in 
some cases Dutch) camera angles further add to the dynamics (GAJZ 05-03, shots 18 - 25). In 
addition, acoustic signs purvey suspense: the sounds of running men's footsteps, sirens, 
screeching brakes and car doors being slammed are featured throughout both sequences. 
The sequences are again underscored with the recognizable military march. Finally, an array 
of verbal signals with little actual relevance to the plot is used to clarify that the police are 
exerting authority. A loose juxtaposition of often contradictory commands is launched at the 
viewer as police officers arrest criminals, yelling: "don't move", "move", "freeze", "sit 
down", "take him away", etc. (the almost ritualistic repetition of such commands gives these 
otherwise mostly empty phrases the meaning: action is being taken; see GAJZ 05-03-05 and 
GAJZ 05-06-06). All of these signs are combined to make the discursive statement: the police 
are swiftly and efficiently fighting crime. Images of Li Jian overseeing the operation from a 
command centre filled with computers and surveillance screens (GAJZ 05-06, shots 01 and 10) 
further add the discourse fragment: 
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" Yundu law enforcement is professional and technologically advanced. 
However, the sequences are used to also make another statement; one concerning the nature 
of the public security threat in Yundu city (Figure 47). What was previously described 
merely as "illegal criminal activities" (weifa fanzui huodongzYLRiii1J; GAJZ 04-21-01) 
committed by "suspicious persons" (xianyiren SPIN),,; GAJZ 04-21-16) is now visualised. 
Three, possibly four offences are depicted visually in the two sequences, and only one of 
these offences is also expressed verbally. The first is prostitution, which is signified by a 
woman dancing for a group of costumers at a nightclub (GAJZ 05-03, shots 03 and 05) and 
later verbally reinforced by an officer announcing to a suspect: "I have the suspicion that you 
are involved in pornographic activities" (wo huaiyi nimen zher shexian seqing huodong i'Pfi 1%r 
1(jVU2Mtt*r7 1J; GAJZ 05-03-29). The second offence is gambling, which is signified by a 
group of men playing Mah-jong and counting money as the police storm in and arrest them 
(GAJZ 05-06-06). Third, the police officers arrest two men and find a plastic bag filled with 
white powder on their person, signifying drug trafficking (GAJZ 05-03-26). The fourth 
offence is only implied: at the club where the drugs are confiscated, three shots show the 
dance floor filled with ecstatically dancing young people (GAJZ 05-03, shots 07,09 and 11), 
who are then detained by police officers (GAJZ 05-03-13). The erratic dancing and the 
sudden use of force against these individuals are possibly intended to signify illegal 
substance abuse. The drama then manages to not explicitly portray criminal activity, while 
still visually making the discursive statement: 
" Public security is threatened by prostitution, gambling and drugs (or: 
huangdudu 1k*). 
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Figure 47: Public Security Threats in GAJZ 05-03 & 06 
GAJZ 05-03-26 GAJL 0! ) 06 06 
Similar to sequence GAJZ 01-11, the clash between the threat level that the police are faced 
with and the degree of force used on the side of the law enforcers is remarkable. This "large- 
scale warfare" operation now sees hardly any struggle on the side of the criminals and no 
involvement at all of the camouflaged Special Forces troopers that were depicted so 
elaborately earlier. Instead, the offenders are coerced into cooperating through verbal 
statements or some minor use of physical force on the side of uniformed patrol officers. In 
fact, aside from a short chase scene in GAJZ 05-03, the entire operation is resolved with 
hardly any conflict. 
The question then is: if the excessive amount of weaponry and military themes that are 
developed in most of these sequences is not relevant to the plot, then what are these signs 
supposed to signify? I would argue that the military discourse serves two functions: On one 
hand the dominance of martial themes is meant to propagate an image of the police force 
that those sponsoring the drama (particularly the Public Security Ministry) regard as 
desirable, i. e. one that shows the People's Police as a strong and well-prepared force which 
criminals should better not cross. On the other hand, it serves to instil awe in the audience 
and tap into their patriotic sentiment (particularly through the combination of glorifying 
military imagery with a pathos-laden musical score). In this sense, the commissioner I. i Ilan 
becomes more than a police official fighting crime, but functions as a military leader who 
goes to war to protect the stability of the nation. Similar to the drama II WI)I ), we are then 
confronted here with a juxtaposition of the security discourse strand with the discourse 
strand on national identity. 
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4.3 Visual Political Discourses in a Teen Drama 
The final part of my analysis focuses on the entirely commercial production of the teen 
drama NCNM (Tang, 2003). The twenty-episode series was written by the three screen 
writers Zhou Yong IN Y, Wang Qun 
-1and 
Zhang Wei 3M, and was directed by the 
Hong Kong director Tang Jill 1'*4L. The drama was produced with no state involvement by 
purely private companies, headed by the firm Xingguang International (I[; tMA FA FLr 1 S: ). 
The series started broadcasting on CCTV-8 on 12 April 2003, and was aired each evening 
from 20: 00 to 21: 00; it ranked as the 11th most popular television drama of 2003 (Wang, 2004, 
249). The drama is set in modem-day Shanghai and tells the story of the two young female 
university graduates Su La t#A and Yan Ruyu 9411± (also referred to as Yan Yan ffil ! ), 
who are trying to make a living in the metropolis. The plot primarily revolves around love, 
relationships as well as issues of welfare and consumption, and at first sight does not seem to 
strongly feature discourses on governance or security. However, a close analysis shows that 
even though these discourse strands are presented more subtly, they are nonetheless present. 
The discursive statements identified in this analysis, as well as the signs used to construct 
these statements, are summarised in the corresponding tables in Appendix 3. 
4.3.! The Professional Bureaucratic State 
In contrast to the two series HWDD and GAJZ, the teen drama NCNM does not contain as 
many references to governance and official state or party leadership. However, it does 
include some information concerning administrative procedures as well as the concept of 
serving the people. 
There are three instances in which characters from NCNM are confronted with the state. The 
first is the various characters' interaction with the law and with the Shanghai police 
throughout the drama; an issue which I will return to below in the context of security 
discourses (Section 4.4. ii). The second is a series of sequences that deals with various 
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application procedures for Shanghai residence permits (NCNM 04-10,06-21 and 06-22). The 
third occasion is portrayed in a narrative arc which tells the story of the heavily pregnant 
character Jing Sa f a applying for a pregnancy permit (NCNM 11-09,11-10 and 11-19). 
Let me turn first to my analysis of the residential permit applications shown in NCNM. 
Residential permits, or hukou P Q, play a role throughout the drama for various welfare 
reasons, which shall not be discussed here. Instead, I am interested in the portrayal of 
administrative procedures and government authority. An analysis of the respective 
sequences yields a result that at first sight deviates strongly from that of the other two 
programmes: the state hardly plays any role at all, and its relevance is merely implied by the 
general context. For instance in NCNM 04-10, the character Yan Ruyu seeks a hukou for 
Shanghai after having secured a new job at a fitness club instructor in the city. For this 
purpose, she meets with the fitness studio's manager, who then takes care of the formalities 
for her. In the single-scene sequence, Yan Ruyu drops off the necessary documentation in the 
manager's office. The scene is generally very functional (shot 01 serves as an establishing 
shot, shots 02 - 04 then show Yan Ruyu as she hands over the documents, and the rest of the 
sequence is assembled as a standard OTS dialogue with minimal correctional camera 
movement and no significant dynamic developments). However, a number of aspects about 
its arrangement are nonetheless noteworthy here. First, the mise-en-scene places the 
manager behind a large desk, with a bookshelf in the background; the man himself is 
dressed in a grey suit (shot 05). In this way the scene establishes visually that the manager is 
a professional businessman. Second, the two characters' posture is relaxed throughout the 
entire sequence; their exchange of the documents (visually marked by a close-up of the 
certificates being handed over in shot 03) and discussion of the procedure is accompanied by 
smiles and laughter, suggesting that the occasion is generally jovial. Third, the dialogue 
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offers some insight to the extent of the formalities that the two characters are confronted with 
here: 
Manager: Miss Yan, have you brought all your certifications? 
ýl3m: 0), dN v , ýTMEOAýý411*7&lf? 
Yan Yan: Yeah, I brought everything. Look, here's the diploma, a copy of 
the residential permit, the student ID, and the birth certificate. 
Look, is anything missing? 
MM: PE, 09*7e 1fit, 4-! 41kiiE. I'QnY-EP1t-, t-IýiiE, iifiý e 
*xcP1ta 21M, icz. elt% 04? 
Manager: No, that's about it. If there are no complications, you'll be one of 
our formal employees by next week and you'll be a Shanghainese 
with a blue residential permit. 
&If, ATT]r, 7e ý'r, FlMAX#ltii]iEsC10-1- 
ý 
Yan Yan: Haha, when that time comes I'll definitely invite you for a big 
dinner. 
Manager: OK, it's agreed then. I'll be looking forward to it. 
Yan Yan: Sure. I'll go back to work then. 
PO : APWA, ftAf s1 7e 
That the administrative procedure is simplified for dramatic purposes is in itself not 
surprising. However, the degree of the simplifications72, the general setting the conversation 
takes place in, the demeanour of the characters, the pleasant atmosphere that is portrayed in 
the sequence as well as the brevity of the scene (a mere 41 seconds) together make two 
discursive statements: 
72 For an insight as to how gross a simplification is being made here, see the guidelines for blue card hukou- 
applications on the Shanghai online information gateway (Goldalm, 2002). 
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" Residence application procedures are regularly handled by Chinese 
employers in the private business sector. 
" Under normal circumstances, residence applications are a standard 
procedure that requires little time, effort and formalities on the side of 
the applicant, and are not in any way unpleasant. 
Whereas this first instance of a hukou application in the drama deals with a standard case, the 
second occasion involving such an application is more specific: it is a short narrative arc 
describing how the mother of the main character Su La is able to secure such a permit. In that 
section of the drama, Su La's mother, who is originally from Shanghai and had to move to 
Guizhou because of "historical issues" at a young age (a euphemism for having been 
forcefully relocated during the Cultural Revolution), wishes to move her residency back to 
her home city. This then becomes the theme of two sequences, in which the main male 
character Qiu Shi lif3 is established as a resourceful and competent man who is worthy as a 
boyfriend of the female lead Su La. 
The first sequence (NCNM 06-21) is used to raise the hukou issue and show how Qiu Shi 
decides to convince Su La's mother of his worth by solving her residency problems. The 
character is shown in the office of his friend, the police officer Zhao kX-A, as the two men 
talk about Qiu's relationship to Su La. After the obligatory establishing shot (shot 01) and 
some verbal bantering between the two characters to underlines their friendship (shots 02 - 
03), Qiu moves into Zhao's office and sits down on his desk. The ensuing conversation then 
takes place in a very relaxed atmosphere (shot 04). The dialogue is again visualised through 
medium close-up OTS shots, but it should be pointed out that the camera keeps a significant 
part of Qiu Shi's body in the frame as it shows Zhao Lei (shots 06,08 and 10), and moves 
slightly closer to the character of Qiu Shi in the reverse shots (shots 05,07 and 9). In addition, 
the shots of Qiu Shi are filmed from a low camera angle, which places the viewer in a 
position that almost coincides with that of Zhao Lei looking up at his friend from his desk 
(the perspective is not a point-of-view shot as such, but the angle nonetheless contributes to 
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the general feeling of intimacy that characterises this sequence). The shot length ensures that 
Zhao Lei receives longer periods of dialogue to make his first two suggestions on how Qiu 
should impress Su La's mother (shots 04 and 06), while attributing slightly briefer periods to 
Qiu's nonchalant reactions (shots 05 and 07). As Zhao makes his third suggestion (i. e. that 
Qiu Shi should solve the residency problem for Su La's mother), the sequence slows down 
significantly (shots 08 and 09), showing how the suddenly pensive Qiu Shi asks about this 
option: 
Zhao Lei: Man, I say, Shitou, how come at your age you still don't know 
what to do? If you really want to help Su La's mother thoroughly 
solve her problems, then nothing beats helping her get a 
residence permit. 
ýx9: 
Qiu Shi: Get a residence permit? 
W; F: XP? 
Zhao Lei: Exactly. 
9: Rif u5f 
Qiu Shi: You're the specialist in this area, help me think about this. 
Someone like Su La's mother, who moved away because of 
historical issues... can her residence permit be transferred back to 
Shanghai? 
VýNCA/JMT3Jlr 
*VR: 
Lr: 
Mi 2%J`MYr'7Mr 
KJ/`JoXm 
MANA, 9TRxtpAaQ±*? 
m i1 
The sequence then picks up speed again as Zhao Lei states that such an outcome was 
possible but would be accompanied with a lot of paperwork and as Qiu Shi decides that this 
is the right way to help Su La's mother (he storms out of the office, probably to fetch the 
necessary documents). However, even though Zhao's verbal statement and the increase in 
dynamics suggest that this hukou applications is more than a mere formality, this potential 
interpretation is immediately counteracted by three additional signs: First, by Qiu's slightly 
comical reaction (he suggests that Zhao Lei, being the expert, will have no problem solving 
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the issue for him; shot 11); second, by Zhao yelling a friendly insult after his friend as he runs 
off (shot 14); and finally by the introduction of relaxed easy-listening music at exactly the 
point where the character's behaviour and dialogue would otherwise suggest an increase in 
tension (shot 12). 
This narrative is then immediately concluded in the following sequence (NCNM 06-22), 
which depicts how Su La's mother pays a visit to her daughter and tells her that the 
residency problem is being resolved. The first few shots show Su La at work in her office as 
she receives the news of her mother's surprise visit (shots 01 - 03). As her mother is being 
treated to some water by one of the employees (shot 04), Su La walks through the travel 
agency she works at to welcome her visitor (shot 05; this is arranged as a long shot with 
substantial movement and serves the function of establishing the general setting and mise- 
en-scene). The rest of the sequence is again a relatively conventional dialogue scene that 
focuses strongly on the mother's verbal statements that Qiu Shi was able to take care of the 
administrative procedures quickly and effectively, or as she puts it "with just one word" (yi 
ju hua -'Wit). The dialogue then continues as follows: 
Su La: But is he not a business man? How come he can help you solve 
the problem by just saying one word? 
#F: 0-Ti VtA^t4A9 ? Z, %#*-f9i I11fi>l 4kM? 
Mother: Oh, he's really very skilled. Haha, oh, he said to others: 'this lady 
was born and bred in Shanghai. The hospital still has her birth 
certificate. ' That way he was able to fetch my certificates in one 
go. Tell me, is he not really skilled? 
u u, ý, 1tb ý* 9ý. upuq, Uit , 11u3FYRh*t: i 1JY. A l: J. 
ýf ftýctýhý+' A. firl di i, Tý11 .i1i (i 1t' 
Y, #L° tQ1iýEýAý7-F>Jt$ýa 4ri#1ih#? #ýfý1: u%1? 
What is noteworthy about all three of the above sequences is on one hand that the state is 
hardly personified at all (merely indirectly through the character of police officer Zhao Lei, 
but even he is shown in a relaxed and even slightly comical context, and does not fulfil any 
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official functions), as well as on the other hand that the 'common people' (represented here 
largely by entrepreneurs) are able to handle administrative procedures without much effort 
or complication (Figure 48). 
Figure 48: How the Characters of NCNM deal with Government Formalities 
Another narrative arc in NCNM deals with the application procedures that one of the 
characters is confronted with as she applies for a pregnancy permit. In the three sequences of 
this arc, the discourse on state administration is presented more explicitly, and is linked with 
the drama's gender discourse. However, in this case the issue is not resolved as easily. 
The first of the sequences (NCNM 11-09) is used to address the general crisis that one of the 
characters faces: the pregnant Jing Sa has been left by her husband, and is now encountering 
problems as she tries to register with a hospital for the delivery of her baby. l'he person of 
authority in this sequence is not a government official but a female doctor. The sequence 
starts with two establishing shots of the hospital, and then continues with a three-way 
dialogue scene between the doctor, Jing Sa and Jing Sa's friend Su La, which is set in the 
doctor's office. Some camera movement is used in the medium shots of the scene to show all 
three characters seated around the doctor's desk (shots 04,05,08,10,15 as well as the final 
shot 16), but otherwise the medium close-ups of the individual faces are kept static. The 
doctor's attire (lab coat, stethoscope around the neck and a pen in hand) as well as the 
arrangement of the office setting (a desk featuring two phones, some medical equipment, a 
line of books and an open file-case in front of the doctor) suggests that the girls are 
confronted with a professional. At the same time, the woman's den eanour and speech, as 
2h(i 
well as the use of high angles in various shots (shots 04,08 and 15), indicate that she is 
impatient, patronizing and generally looking down on the two girls. The dialogue then 
clarifies the extent of the problem, and the doctor's view of the situation: Jing Sa cannot have 
her baby delivered without a pregnancy permit, and that has to be obtained at the local 
residence office. When the doctor realises that the girls are confused by these formalities, she 
laughs and says: "There's no way for me to explain this to you. How about this, you go and 
get your husband and I'll explain it to him, maybe he will understand. " (wo gen ni ye shuo hu 
qingchu. Zheyang ba, ni qu ba ni laogong lai, wo gen to Jiang, yexu to neng dong. 1tliR *, t+ý i# +i 
M. 3, tiT #Lti'1; , Z*, filRjti#, tb iq-4th ft'ffe ) Jing Sa informs the doctor that 
she is not married, which then leads the medic to deride the two girls for being irresponsible 
(shots 12 - 14). The general humiliation of this sequence is reinforced through quick medium 
close-ups of Su La's embarrassed face (shots 03,07 and 12) and Jing Sa's offended reaction 
(shot 14). The sequence concludes with the two upset girls leaving the hospital and heading 
for the government office of their residential district. 
The second sequence (NCNM 11-10) shows the girls trying to apply for the required 
pregnancy permit at the local government office. An establishing shot shows the doorway to 
the social service centre at Shimen Road Number 2, and a second shot focuses on the door 
sign to the office. The rest of the sequence then largely consists of medium close-ups of the 
girls' embarrassed faces and of the annoyed female official who is dealing with their case. 
Similar to the previous sequence, this scene again shows the person of authority shocked by 
Jing Sa's marriage status and then has the official scolding the two girls for being 
irresponsible. It is made clear to Jing Sa that she needs her former husband's credentials in 
order to receive a pregnancy permit. Since the husband has already left the country, the two 
girls are again unable to overcome this crisis. 
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What is significant here is how this conflict is finally resolved. Jing Sa's condition compels 
the character Zhao Lei to demonstrate his noble personality by offering to marry her (NCNM 
11-15). When they return to the government office together, the situation changes 
significantly (NCNM 11-19): after Zhao Lei entices the female official with his patients and 
friendly attitude (as well as with a reference to his profession as a police officer), the 
formalities are concluded in less than thirty seconds (shots 6-13). The procedure is essentially 
simplified to close-up shots of certificates being exchanged (shots 6 and 12), a close-up of a 
red stamp being applied to one of the documents (shot 10) and medium close-ups showing 
the applicants' faces (shots 09 and 13). In the end, two signs are juxtaposed to ensure that the 
viewer interprets the scene positively: on the one hand the visual sign ofZhao I. Ci and ling 
Sa's laughing, happy faces and on the other hand the acoustic sign of a romantic melody 
setting in after the permit has finally been stamped (Figure 49). 
Figure 49: A Pregnant Woman's Administrative Procedures Resolved with Male Assistance 
! ý"ý' 
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In this sense, Jing Sa's experiences in these sequences are not used to criticise the Chinese 
state or its degree of bureaucracy. Instead they help characterise one of the main figures by 
offering the second male lead Zhao Lei a chance to demonstrate his value as a potential 
provider. The ease with which the red tape is finally resolved again suggests that 
administrative issues are easily settled in modern-day China, at least if one is a man. 
What is then most striking about both the hukou application theme and the pregnancy permit 
narrative is their gender dimension: None of the actual formalities are handled by the lenºale 
protagonists. Instead, the procedures provide the backdrop for men to demonstrate their 
social value by solving the conflicts: The pro-active character of Qiu Shi obtains the residence 
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permit for Su La's mother, the honourable police officer Zhao Lei obtains the pregnancy 
permit for Jing Sa, and even the otherwise assertive female character of Yan Ruyu has her 
male employer handle her hukou application. When confronted with the state, women are 
shown as incapable of dealing with the administrative procedures, and the officials involved 
are portrayed as being impatient with the suggested degree of female naivety. 
Even though this thesis does not focus on gender discourses, the case of NCNM is 
nonetheless a good example of how competing discursive positions vie for hegemony within 
a popular television drama: In many sequences, the drama takes a very strong feminist 
position on gender issues, but in the end conservative themes dominate? + The reason for this 
is that the screenwriters' personal preferences compelled them to include some emancipated 
themes, but that the drama's marketing required conservative conclusions in order to ensure 
the series' appeal to the generally older target audience of TV dramas in China (19,62: 01 - 
68: 29). This shows what a powerful role the production companies' perceptions of CCTV 
drama audience demographics play during the formulation of discursive positions. 
4.3.11 Security Issues as a Comical Plot Complication 
In comparison to the dominant role that public security issues play in GAJZ and foreign 
security issues have in HWDD, the most striking aspect of the security discourse in NCNM is 
its apparent absence. Foreign security issues are not dealt with at all in this teen drama, and 
public security is merely a minor side-issue. In contrast to GAJZ, no explicit verbal 
declarations are made concerning, for example, the police's service to the people. However, 
the discourse fragments that deal with public security in this drama are not entirely different 
73 The way in which the girls are treated by the doctor in NCNM 11-09 suggest a critical attitude towards arrogant 
and sexist persons in power, but the fact that the girls' problems are resolved not by them but by men undermines 
this originally feminist sentiment. As an even stronger example, consider the sequences in which the main female 
character Su La discusses marriage roles and gender Issues with various other characters towards the end of the 
series (NCNM 18-03,18-04,18-12,18-13, and 18-14), and then decides not to marry Qiu Shi because she fears 
it would curtail her independence (NCNM 18-23 and 18-24). However, the conflicts are all resolved, and the 
majority of characters marry in the end (Jing So marries Zhao Lei in NCNM 15-23; Su La marries Qiu Shi in 
NCNM 20-22; Xiaofang accepts LU Ke's marriage proposal in NCNM 20-12). The only character who is not 
married at the end of the series is the tragic figure Yon Ruyu (her divorce highlights her personal failings and 
functions as a punishment for her antagonistic behaviour throughout the drama). 
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from those used in the main melody propaganda drama GAJZ, even if they are more implicit. 
To analyse these discursive statements, it is worth examining two types of sequences: the 
ones that feature law enforcement activities, and the ones that deal with the character Zhao 
Lei and his work as a police officer. 
Let me turn first to the character of Zhao Lei. The few short sequences that show Zhao Lei 
working as a police officer depict him as a friendly professional who is dedicated to serving 
the public (NCNM 01-08,01-13,03-18 and 06-17). This mainly serves to underline this 
character's general personality traits: throughout the drama, Zhao is established as a 
compassionate and responsible person (for example on the various occasions that show him 
caring for Jing Sa; NCNM 05-08,05-09,09-02 and 11-19). His main function is arguably as the 
main male character's best friend and a source of advice in moments of conflict. For the 
majority of Qiu Shi's relationship problems, the male lead turns to Zhao Lei, who then helps 
to put the problem into perspective. Note how these sequences are often set in Zhao Lei's 
workplace, i. e. either at his office at the police station (NCNM 01-14,03-10) or on the street as 
he is patrolling a neighbourhood in Shanghai (NCNM 06-17). In these cases, Zhao Lei is 
shown wearing his police uniform and doing his duty as a civil servant as he hands out 
words of wisdom. The most extreme case of this character's function as a moral compass for 
those around him is shown towards the end of the drama series: after having been injured 
during a law enforcement operation in Yunnan, Zhao spends two episodes in a coma. The 
actual circumstances of Zhao Lei's injury are not shown in the drama, but Zhao's 
commitment and heroism are implied both through telephone conversations during his 
absence (NCNM 16-04,16-19) and the melodramatic scenes that show his return to a hospital 
in Shanghai (NCNM 17-03,17-04). When Zhao Lei awakens towards the end of episode 19, 
he realises that the marriage between his friends Qiu Shi and Su La was cancelled because of 
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Qiu Shi's stubbornness (NCNM 20-01). Once again it is Zhao Lei who talks sense into the 
main male protagonist (NCNM 20-02,20-14) and saves his friend's relationship. 
Through actions such as these, Zhao Lei's character is constructed as virtually flawless, 
especially next to the main male protagonist Qiu Shi: Zhao is shown as caring, amiable, 
responsible, self-sacrificing and wise. In this regard, Zhao's profession as a police officer is 
used as an additional device to reinforce these character traits, thereby making the discursive 
statement: an honourable and friendly man such as Zhao Lei would be likely to also be a 
police officer (Figure 50; note how the idea of 'serving the people' is not verbally expressed 
in any of these sequences, but how images of Zhao Lei riding his bicycle through the 
neighbourhood community or helping out an old lady nonetheless imply such a meaning). 
Figure 50: The Amiable Police Officer and Flawless Character Zhao Lei does his Duty 
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Next, it is worth examining more closely the occasions on which law enforcement activities 
play an explicit role in the series. In addition to being friends with law enforcement official 
Zhao Lei, the characters of NCNM are confronted with security issues in two other ways: 
either directly as a plot complication or indirectly when police presence is a background 
theme. 
The first case can be found in two narrative arcs, as well as one hrief srquenre: the brief 
sequence deals the two girls Su La and Yan Kuyu trying to find accommodation by placing 
hand-made posters on walls throughout Shanghai's former French Concession quarters, and 
then being chased away by the local neighbourhood watchmen (NCNM UI-ie, ). The 
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watchmen are only shown very briefly, and the whole sequence is given a non-threatening 
air through its dynamic and upbeat musical score. 
The first full narrative arc that deals with public security involves the characters Su La and 
Yan Ruyu mistakenly being arrested for human trafficking. The second narrative deals with 
Qiu Shi repeatedly returning to a metro station in Shanghai where he first saw his dream girl 
Su La. When he finally sees her again, he is detained by the police for loitering. Both conflicts 
are again resolved by police officer Zhao Lei. To exemplify what discursive statements on 
security issues these narrative arcs make, I will analyse the key sequences of each arc 
(NCNM 01-13 and 01-15 for the first narrative, NCNM 03-18 for the second). 
The sequence NCNM 01-13 is set at the Shanghai Railway Station and shows how the girls 
take shelter in a public place after having lost their dormitory apartment to a fire. The 
sequence consists of three different scenes, which each possess their own dynamic arc: The 
first introduces the setting with a series of brief establishing shots (shots 01 - 05) and then 
shows Su La making a phone call to her mother from a pay phone at the station (shots 01 - 
16). The discursive themes of this first part are family, employment and perseverance in the 
face of adversity. The tone is generally melancholic (signified by slow fades between shots, 
slow camera movements, and a poignant flute melody playing throughout); security issues 
play no role at this point. The second scene has Su La walking back to her friend Yan Ruyua, 
who is sitting in the waiting hall of the train station. As the melancholic flute music fades out 
and gives way to the background noise of the train station, the two then talk about Su La's 
ex-boyfriend Ying Shan, and about her relationship to her mother (shots 17 - 28). While this 
section again focuses on discourse strands such as family and relationship, it also introduces 
the security theme that will later move to the foreground: in shots 23 - 26, a group of men 
and women enter the station's waiting room, carrying babies on their arms. Note how these 
four shots are underscored by a suspenseful tune. This acoustic sign serves to mark the 
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group as a threat; an association that otherwise would not be supported by the visuals alone 
(the group theoretically pass as a migrant family from the country-side). As the men and 
women sit down near Su La and Yan Ruyu, the two girls continue their conversation, 
dreaming of a big, comfortable bed. 
Figure 51: Comical Twist to a Distressing Encounter with the Law in NCNM 01-13 
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At this point, the third scene commences. Police officers storm into the waiting area, and the 
shady group of men and women start to run, after handing the babies to the battled Su ki 
and Yan Ruyu (shots 36 and 38). Increased shot dynamic, action music, rapid camera 
movements and the sound of the babies crying underscore the urgency of the scene. To relaN' 
the fact that the viewer is witnessing a police raid, two verbal signs are relentlessly repeated 
(shots 33 - 37): police officers yelling "freeze" (zhanzlruu 
klif1: ) and "don't run" lino 1, i'I 
A; with the minor alteration hie pnn tii! J ). The last part of this scene uses no verbal signs at 
all (shots 39 - 48). Instead, it shows how the fleeing men are apprehended 
by the police, and 
how female officers surround Su La and Yan Ruyu. As the men are struggled to the ground 
by male officers (shots 43,44 and 45), the two female officers merely tap the girls on the 
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shoulder, a gesture that here signifies 'arrested' or 'detained' (shots 42,46,47 and 48). In this 
sense, two opposed themes clash: on the one hand, the juxtaposition of shot dynamics, 
acoustic signs and camera movements gives the scene a threatening and potentially 
dangerous air; on the other hand, the girls' situation receives an almost comical connotation 
through the confused expression on their faces as they hold the babies, and the non-violent, 
mild manner in which they are arrested by the two female police officers (Figure 51). 
A similarly light connotation can be found in the conclusion of this short narrative arc, the 
sequence NCNM 01-15. This sequence is constructed as five different scenes, all set in or 
outside the police station that the character Zhao Lei works at: 
Scene 1: Shots 1-16 J Su La and Yan Ruyu are 
interrogated by two officers. 
Scene 2: Shots 17-28 mmº Qiu Shi's car breaks down as he 
and Zhao Lei are about to drive to 
dinner. 
Scene 3: Shots 29-33 mmmiº Zhao Lei finds out about the girls' 
arrest and the two are set free. 
Scene 4: Shots 34-48 monjo. Qiu Shi sees the girls get into a 
taxi, but is unable to stop his 
dream girl before she drives off. 
Scene 5: Shots 49-66 mmmpo- Qiu Shi asks Zhao Lei for help in 
finding Su La. 
Scenes 1 and 3 each explicitly deal with security issues. The first shot of scene 1 is a lengthy 
establishing shot during which the camera moves through the police station waiting room. 
The shot derives its significance from the raise-en-scene, taking in first the two criminals 
from NCNM 01-13, who are shown locked up in a cell, then female police officers caring for 
babies, and finally the entrance to the interrogation room. In this fashion, the camera moves 
from the crime (and its punishment) to the victims and how they are being cared for, and 
finally concludes with the protagonists and their role in the situation. The following shots are 
arranged in a way that emphasises the confrontational nature of the scene (Figure 52): 
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medium shots showing the two girls (shots 03 and 05) are pinned against a mirrored 
perspective of the two interrogating police officers (shots 02 and 04); a main shot establishes 
the line of sight between the two groups as they look at each other across a table (shot 10; 
note how a window frame divides the image into two distinct sections: the left one showing 
the officers, the right one showing the girls); and finally a number of medium close-ups of 
the girl's embarrassed faces (shots 11 - 13,15 and 16) is juxtaposed with low angle medium 
shots of the interrogators (shots 08 and 14). The entire section of shots is dominated by the 
colour blue and is characterised by relatively hard lighting as well as stark light-dark 
contrasts. For instance, the scene makes distinct use of shadows (note the shadows on the 
wall behind the two officers in shots 02,04,08 and 14) and features backlighting created by 
the office lamp on the interrogators' desk (shots 08 and 14). Acoustically, the scene features 
the sound of babies crying in the background. 
Figure 52: A Threatening Police Interrogation Scene in NCNM 01-15 
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The visual and acoustic signs first seem to imply a threatening situation. This impression is 
further enhanced by the demeanour and verbal statements of the police officers. {very 
excuse the girls present is questioned by the officers, and when Yan Ruyu threatens to sue 
the police for having unlawfully detaining her, she is bluntly told that she had better not 
threaten legal action in a police station (shot 08; it is thereby suggested that due to the 
gravity of the crime, the girls are in no position to demand anything). All of these signs are 
used here to emphasise the severity of the situation. I lowever, this severity is then quickly 
dissolved, first through the general absurdity of the misunderstanding (the two university 
students being mistaken for traffickers of infants, and the police officers not believing their 
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story), and second through an acoustic sign: when the girls' explanation culminates in them 
having to admit that they do not possess any means of identifying themselves (their 
credentials were destroyed when their dormitory burned down), a comical melody sets in 
and gives the entire scene a light air. 
From that point on, the sequence moves away from the graveness suggested in the first shots, 
and becomes much less serious. The next scene shows how Qiu Shi's car breaks down 
outside the police station, just as Qiu and his friend Zhao Lei are about to drive to dinner in 
Qiu's car; again, the scene features the comical melody, as well as the light bantering 
between the hungry Zhao Lei and his friend Qiu Shi. Zhao is then called back into the station 
to confirm the two girls' identity (he met them when they reported the fire at their 
dormitory). This third scene further increases the comical theme, first through the 
continuation of the comical melody that plays in the background, second by having Zhao pat 
the little babies as he walks through the waiting hall (shot 29), and then through shots 30 to 
33, when Zhao sees the girls and they all laugh as the situation is resolved. Note how 
additional acoustic and visual signs are used to enhance the impression that all is now well 
(Figure 53): no additional high or low angles are used; the lighting is softer and dominated 
by a warm, orange colour; the two interrogators are no longer shown, and neither are the 
table or the blinding desk lamp that dominated the first scene. Furthermore, the background 
melody pauses briefly as Zhao Lei enters the room (shot 30), and then starts again as the two 
girls recognise Zhao and jump up in joy (shot 31). The scene ends with the girls looking 
embarrassed as Zhao Lei laughs at them (shots 32 and 33). Any further official formalities are 
now only implied, and not explicitly shown. The next shot has the two girls leaving the 
police station, and the entire conflict has been resolved in 18.8 seconds. 
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Figure 53: The Conflict with the Police is Resolved and Justice is Served 
The rest of the sequence is then used to further develop the love story between Su La and 
Qiu Shi, and only makes two verbal statements on law enforcement: Yan Ruyu voicing her 
anger at having been unjustly detained, and Su La calming her down by stating that 
everything had been resolved and that the police had apologised for the misunderstanding 
(shot 34). Both these statements do not imply here a particular discursive position towards 
police work, but instead serve to highlight Yan Ruyu's impatient nature and Su La's 
forgiving and mild character. They also tie straight into the discussion on relationships and 
the gender discourse fragments that now follow, with Yan Ruyu stating that she feels 
compelled to either find herself a "a knight in shining armour who is handsome, rich and has 
a car" (you shuai you you qian you you the de hai ina wangzi X ý1IU .KhRfi 
'I:. (I'J I' l '' I J'-), or to 
return home to the countryside and get married. The statement here is that women can only 
find stability and safety either in a relationship that facilitates a lifestyle of consumerism or in 
the protective setting of rural marriage. 
What the viewer is then left with after this sequence is the impression that confrontations 
with the law merely help drive the overall plot forward. 'I his can he paraphrased as the 
following discursive statement: 
" Confrontations with the law are minor comical distractions in life. 
The same usage of the law enforcement discourse can be found in NCNM 03-18, although in 
this sequence additional emphasis is placed on the professionalism of the police. 
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The sequence is divided into two scenes (shots 01 - 10 and 11 - 24): First, OfficerZhao Lei 
receives a phone call at his office, informing him about a conspicuous man loitering at a 
Shanghai metro station. Zhao and his colleagues then grab their hats and rush out of their 
office. Second, Zhao and his men observe the suspect via the metro station's surveillance 
cameras. When they apprehend the man, Zhao realises that the suspect is his friend Qiu Shi, 
and that Qiu had merely been searching Shanghai's subway stations for the woman of his 
dreams, Su La. But before the sequence takes the usual upbeat comical turn towards the end, 
an array of visual and acoustic signs are used to construct a suspenseful crime-fighting; story. 
The first of the two scenes contributes to this overall theme by strongly featuring increased 
camera movements (shots 01,02,03,07 and 09) and fast shot dynamics (the fastest shot of the 
sequence is the one in which Zhao Lei grabs his police hat; shot 08). In this way, the pace of 
the action is increased. Also, the confined space and crowded mise-en-scene add the sense 
that the police station is an industrious place full of hard-working law enforcers (Figure 54); 
note how the camera repeatedly cuts across all three of the officers and their work spaces, 
and often keeps additional personnel in the background of the frame as /hao Lei is going 
about his business, for instance in shots 04,05,07,09 and 10. 
Figure 54: Efficient and Professional Handling of a Law Enforcement Emergency in NCNM 
Throughout the scene the only character who has spoken text is Zhao I. ei. 'I'he initial part of 
his cle-facto monologue is the (implied) telephone conversation with an employee at a 
Shanghai metro station. Note how the text consists of short, elliptical clauses that are spread 
across a total of four shots (shots 03 - 06): 
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Zhao Lei: "Hello? Police station. A suspect has been sighted at the metro 
station. Ok. Address? Ok. You stall him first. I'll be over 
immediately. " 
jM: "OR? ilýtHýl"ro ýýýýýQ-^3gftýýýo ýFfa okti? 
After Zhao hangs up the phone, the dynamics pick up and he announces to his colleagues: 
"Hey! We have work! " (ai! kaigongle! W fI 7! shot 07), and then repeats the earlier 
statement: "A suspect has been sighted at the metro station" (ditieli faxian yi ge xianyifan AA 
T sY'c -4 l; shot 9). The suspenseful music that now sets in further underscores that 
the time for action has come. The general discursive statement here is that: 
" The police are assiduous professionals who are ready at a moment's notice. 
The next scene continues the statement on the professionalism of law enforcement officials, 
before then resolving the crisis in a similarly light fashion as seen in NCNM 01-15 (Figure 55). 
Again underscored by the same suspenseful musical theme, the scene builds up an air of 
foreboding through slow and largely equally paced shots of Zhao Lei and his men as they 
assess the situation at the metro station and apprehend the suspect (shots 11 - 16). What 
particularly adds to the sense of a professional law enforcement intervention here is the use 
of images-within-images, i. e. of shots that show the action through surveillance screens 
(shots 12,14 and 16). In this fashion, the viewer sees what Zhao Lei is seeing (POV shot): a 
suspect standing on the metro platform and the police rushing in to apprehend the man. This 
signifies a general 'watchfulness' of law enforcement officials. In addition, the use of 
surveillance camera shots links the public security discourse to the discourse on technology, 
suggesting that law enforcement in Shanghai is technologically advanced. This is further 
amplified by the relatively cold, blue colour-scheme throughout these shots, and the mise- 
en-scene: the background of the surveillance room in which the action is set is dominated by 
flashing dashboards. 
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Once Zhao Lei walks down to the platform, the suspenseful music fades out (shot lti) and 
the scene is resolved with smiles and laughter (shot 21). The colour-scheme changes from the 
former cold blue filter to a much warmer red colour. In addition, the camera angles (medium 
close-up shots that are angled in a way that almost offers POV perspectives of Zhao l. ei, and 
the scene concludes with two OTS perspectives) are used to create an intimate feeling 
between the characters of Qiu Shi (the potential suspect) and his friend Officer Zhao. 
Humour is provided through the verbal statement by Qiu that loitering at the metro station 
was, in a sense, Zhao Lei's idea, as well as by the other officers patting Qiu on the back when 
they realise that they accidently arrested a famous millionaire. 
Figure 55: Conflict and Conflict Resolution in NCNM 03-18 
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The Crisis is Resolved in a Humorous Way (shots 18 
The comical touch to this sequence again shows that public security issues only functions as 
a mild distraction to the general plot development in NCNM (an additional example can be 
found in NCNM 02-05). Confrontations with the law occur when characters are in the wrong 
place at the wrong time, and although such conflicts can cause considerable inconvenience, 
the general impression is that the police are merely doing their job, that they are vigilant, 
trained professionals with technologically advanced equipment, and that justice prevails in 
the end. 
A final case of the public security discourse in NCNM that needs to he addressed is the 
background presence of law enforcement during various sequences. In none of these cases 
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do the police provide plot complications, but their presence nonetheless contributes to the 
security discourse. The most prominent example of this can be found in episode 7, during a 
narrative arc dealing with an accident in which a travel agency bus from Su La's company 
was involved (for another example see sequence NCNM 01-07, during which the police help 
handle the fire at Su La's and Yan Ruyu's university dormitory). In the sequences NCNM 07- 
14 and 07-17, Su La and her boyfriend Qiu Shi travel to the crash site to assess the situation 
and handle the travel agency's responsibility for the accident. Upon Su La's and Qiu Shi's 
arrival, the police are busy securing the crash site, while various helpers and medics are 
tending to the victims. 
The purpose of the two sequences within the greater scheme of the series is threefold: to 
show how the female protagonist Su La deals with a professional crisis, to give the male lead 
Qiu Shi an opportunity to take charge of a complex situation and prove his courage in the 
face of danger, and to further develop the romantic relationship between the two characters. 
Also, the professional crisis that is introduced here is developed throughout the next two 
episodes of the series and provides the stage for circumstances that later cost Su La her job 
(NCNM 09-10). 1 shall not analyse these plot elements here, but will turn instead to these 
sequences' discursive content on the function of law enforcement during a public security 
crisis (in this case a major car accident). In this regard, four statements are made through 
visual and acoustic signs. 
First, the police are again portrayed as professionals. Officers are shown securing the crash 
site in an organised fashion, speaking on their walky-talkies and directing the emergency 
vehicles (for example in NCNM 07-14, shots 02,05 and 07; NCNM 07-17, shots 01,03 and 04). 
In the first sequence, two officers are depicted questioning a witness with candid questions 
and diligently taking notes (shots 12 and 13). In the second sequence, the situation is directed 
by a police commissioner (who collaborates with manager Qiu Shi, which again asserts the 
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fact that the male lead is a man of action who wields substantial authority; shot 08). This 
commissioner takes immediate and appropriate action when an additional complication 
occurs (a child with a heart problem has not been found and requires urgent medication). In 
this sense, verbal statements, gestures, the general set design and use of equipment, and the 
way in which the plot is developed, all contribute to the sense that the police are in charge of 
this hazardous situation, and that the law enforcement officials know what they are doing. 
Second, the police are portrayed as being dedicated and helpful. Various shots in both 
sequences show police officers searching the surrounding for missing persons (for instance 
NCNM 07-14, shots 01,02,04 and 07; NCNM 07-17, shots 01,25,27,28,29 and 30) and 
helping victims of the accident out of the bus wreck (for example NCNM 07-14, shots 06,09 
and 11; NCNM 07-17, shots 35,36,37,38 and 39). What is particularly revealing here is that 
the sequences also feature medical personnel and fire-fighters (for example in NCNM 07-14, 
shots 01 and 04), but that shots of uniformed police clearly dominate: in the first sequence, 
every single shot features uniformed police; in the second more elaborate sequence, seventy- 
seven per cent of all shots show police officers (Figure 56). 
This is then also the third statement: the police are reacting to the accident with a massive 
amount of force. Not only are uniformed men and women omnipresent in both sequences, 
but the camera movements and angles also maximise the visual effect of their presence: 
numerous shots employ a camera crane to show birds-eye perspectives of the spectacle and 
move across the crowded scene (NCNM 07-14, shots 02,05,08,13,14,17,19,21 and 22; 
NCNM 07-17, shots 07,14,18,32,38,41 and 45). The significance is that the police are 
deploying a substantial contingent of men and women to solve this crisis and are hence 
taking what is de-facto a car crash very seriously. 
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Figure 56: Percentage of Shots Featuring Press or Police in NCNM 07-14 & 07-17 
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The final statement concerns the juxtaposition of the public security discourse with another 
discourse strand: the media discourse. Similar to the constant presence of law enforcement 
officials within the shots of these two sequences, the press are ever present. In the first of the 
two sequences, eighty-one per cent of all shots show journalists taking pictures or filming the 
proceedings; in the second sequence, forty-two per cent of the shots show members of the 
press reporting on the crisis (see both Figure 56 and Figure 57). Even in the shots that do not 
explicitly show photographers or cameramen, the presence of the media is nonetheless 
constantly signified by two signs: both sequences are acoustically underscored by the 
continuous clicking sound of cameras shooting photos, and repeatedly feature the visual 
sign of flash-lights illuminating the set. 
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Figure 57: Visual Public Security Discourse in NCNM 07-14 & 07-17 
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Through these techniques the impression is created that the crisis management is transparent 
and under the diligent scrutiny of the public. This notion is further strengthened by the tact 
that the press are allowed access to the crash site and the area in which the victims are 
treated by medics. There are a few shots that show police officers pushing journalists out of 
the way, but these actions are presented in a context that reinforces the authoritative and 
professional nature of the law enforcement personnel, and not in any way that might leave 
the impression that the press were unwelcomed at the site. To the contrary, the 
photographers and cameramen are presented as a constant background feature, suggesting 
that media scrutiny of law enforcement actions is a common-place. Note how the two series 
NCNM and GAJZ differ in this respect: whereas NCNM strongly makes use of the media 
discourse strand (thereby presenting the discursive position that the journalistic 
investigation and public dissemination of events is part of every-day life; see also NCNM 01- 
05,02-14,10-04,15-14 and 20-23), the main melody drama GAJZ does not contain 
comparable discourse fragments and only suggests verbally that the public is observing the 
police force's work. However, despite this discrepancy in presentation forms, the discursive 
statement made in both series concerning the public scrutiny of law enforcement activities is 
nonetheless the same (Figure 57): 
" The police are diligently monitored by the people. 
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4.4 Summary: Shaping Political Truths for a Conservative Target 
Audience 
The above analysis has shown that even a communication form as seemingly trivial as 
television dramas substantially draws from and in turn contributes to political discourses, 
thereby shaping what concepts such as governance, the citizen, the police or crime mean. 
In HWDD, the discourse on those who govern (the emperor) and those who are governed 
(the people) is presented as an amiable relationship between a fatherly ruler and his devoted 
subjects. The ruler Emperor Liu Che is presented as a humane figure who cares about his 
subordinates and the people. In so doing, the drama series combines the classical notion of 
the paternal ruler (though in a modem interpretation, with 'fatherly' here signifying 
kindness, not rigidity and strictness) with the Maoist concept of the state serving the people. 
At the same time the series shows the common people supporting their ruler despite abject 
poverty and immense suffering. The argument here is that such suffering is for a good cause: 
the expansion of the great Han nation. Considering that the target audience of such dramas 
coincides with the demographic group of the villagers shown in HWDD, it is likely that the 
creators of the series were hoping that the experience of suffering patriotically for the 
greatness of China would be one that their viewers could share. 
This patriotic sentiment is also found in the discourse on security issues: the drama presents 
with much pathos the martial foreign security policy of the Han emperor as a necessary 
means to a great end: the expansion of the Han nation. Similarly, the failure of the Han 
envoy Zhang Qian to recruit foreign allies for the war against the barbaric Huns is re- 
evaluated in the face of Zhang's other achievements. A case is made here for the peaceful 
coexistence of various ethnic groups, and for the harmonizing effect that trade has on the 
relations between such groups: Through its visuals, acoustics, and its narrative, the drama 
shows Zhang Qian as the person who established the first trade relations between the Han 
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Chinese and their western neighbours, thereby bringing together these ethnically diverse 
peoples in a bustling and peaceful exchange of exotic goods. This achievement is then 
reinterpreted with much pathos as an achievement of the great Han nation, and is 
legitimized by the claim that historians across the world agree with this particular 
interpretation of the events. 
A similar use of patriotism can be found in the modern crime drama GAJZ. In particular the 
security discourse in this main melody drama exhibits parallels to that of the historical 
drama HWDD, even though the latter deals with foreign security issues, while GAJZ is 
concerned with public security. However, GAJZ purveys a similarly militant notion with 
regard to security: the police are visually and acoustically presented in a way that constructs 
them as an army going to war against crime. At the same time, verbal statements throughout 
the series draw heavily from military vocabulary to re-enforce this point. Considering that 
the presentation of a huge, heavily armed and technologically advanced police force stands 
in no relation to the public security threats presented in the drama suggests that the 
overwhelming display of executive power is meant to inspire awe and a sense of patriotic 
pride in the viewer, while at the same time promoting the valour of the Chinese People's 
Police. 
However, this is not the only parallel that the propaganda drama GAJZ shares with the 
historical series HWDD. It also contains strong references to the idea that the government 
serves the people. In addition, GAJZ presents a similar discourse concerning who the 
'common people' are: elderly, often female, and on occasion disabled persons. It is of course 
no coincidence that this group should again largely overlap with the target audience of 
prime-time TV in China, and it can be argued that similar to the case of HWDD this is an 
attempt by the producers to encourage this particular demographic group to identify itself 
with the television drama. 
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NCNM at first sight differs substantially from the other two series in the way it presents 
discourses on governance and security. How the state governs its subject and what security 
problems threaten the stability of society are side issues in the series. Instead, the programme 
focuses first and foremost on topics such as love relations and consumerism. It is in this 
respect revealing that the only one of the three drama series solely financed and created by 
private companies is also the one to focus primarily on the entertainment function of 
television, and not on propaganda or didactics. It is also striking how the series seems to be 
characterised by an almost complete absence of state authority. 
However, a close analysis of this series nonetheless reveals political discourses at work, and 
it may at first sight seem surprising that essentially the same discursive statements 
concerning security issues are made here as in the other series. The police are portrayed as 
friendly, well-trained, technologically advanced professionals who serve the people by being 
ever watchful. Also, the idea that public servants answer to the public is relayed by a 
juxtaposition of the security discourse strand with the discourse strand on the media. The 
reason for this is that the depiction of good officials instils pride in the target audience of 
prime-time TV and compels viewers to 'tune in'. 
While NCNM does not contain a similar militant or patriotic sentiment as HWDD or GAJZ, 
it is nevertheless noteworthy that the drama strongly features conservative gender themes. 
Discourse fragments on clich@d male-female relations and role functions were included here 
alongside more emancipated themes to provide consistently conservative conclusions to 
various plot complications. The reason for this is again the same one that fuels the repeated 
recourse to nationalist sentiments in the other two drama series: all three programs are 
tailored to a certain market that demands precisely such themes. 
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5 Conclusion: Chinese TV Discourses and the Factors of their 
Production 
This qualitative research project has demonstrated what types of political discourses are 
communicated through popular television and what factors generally lead to the production 
of such discourses. In this sense, my analysis answers a question that previous research has 
not adequately addressed: do popular Chinese entertainment formats such as TV dramas 
constitute a commercial enterprise or a political propaganda tool? Other authors have argued 
either that all content on central television is blatant propaganda which is commissioned and 
controlled by the Chinese leadership (Kramer, 2004; Yan, 2005), or that market reforms have 
liberalised the entertainment industry to such an extent that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for the authorities to dictate content at all (Griffiths, 2005; Zhang et al., 2005). My 
work suggests that the problem is much more complex, and that its answer is situated 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
My analysis has shown that television drama in China is created within an intricate system 
of political, cultural and economic constraints. One of the factors that influence the creation 
of drama content in the PRC is indeed the Chinese leadership. Through censorship 
guidelines and procedures, the government and the party continue to exert control over the 
system. It can therefore be argued that the Chinese authorities are controlling television 
content in order to assure the political hegemony of CCP cadres, and the above analysis does 
in fact show that such a motivation is partially responsible for the regulations that govern the 
broadcasting and production system in China. It is also partially responsible for the content 
of explicitly 'main melody' dramas such as GAJZ. This may at first sight lead to the 
misconception that all TV dramas are propaganda, particularly when considering that series 
from various genres and with different production backgrounds, such as GAJZ, HWDD, and 
NCNM, all draw from the same conservative notions of nationalism and gender. This then 
confirms Mark Harrison's observation that TV content in China is remarkably homogenous 
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(2002). However, my research suggests that except for the particular case of the main melody 
programme, centrally televised drama content as a whole should not automatically be 
categorised as propaganda. This is evident on the one hand from the fact that China's elites 
criticise partially state-funded CCTV programmes such as HWDD as feudalistic trash; in fact 
such dramas are not commissioned by the authorities to promote the CCP's rule over China 
as some claim (Yan, 2005). Their content is instead influenced by more factors than merely 
state and party control. On the other hand, commercial programmes such as NCNM are 
entirely produced by private institutions and, as my conversations with production crew 
members who worked on that particular programme show, are not at all influenced by 
government or party directives; again, the content of such programmes is influenced by 
other factors. 
This leads me to the conclusion that drama content in China is indeed highly ideological 
(meaning that it relays certain discursive positions through the conscious arrangement of 
signs in different modes), but that this ideological dimension does not stem from'hard' state 
intervention. The question then is: why are Chinese television dramas so ideological. My 
research indicates that three factors are important in this regard. 
First, political controls still apply to the Chinese entertainment sector, but they no longer 
directly dictate what is produced. In fact, the 'hard' censorship tools that formerly played a 
role in this system are no longer sufficient to control content production and distribution in 
the increasingly liberalised market. However, despite the fact that'hard' controls have been 
loosened by market dynamics, a range of 'soft' controls still functions, thereby assuring that 
the Chinese television drama market remains highly rigid. These'soft' controls (such as 
incentives for the production of certain content, mechanisms that inspire self-censorship, etc. ) 
are not able to dictate the communication of specific propaganda statements, but they do 
function as a general framework or confinement within which drama content is produced. 
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This is the reason why the general format of Chinese drama series has not yet converged 
with similar foreign formats: the various political restrictions only allow for a certain type of 
narrative (usually twenty episodes with an overarching storyline, which are produced and 
aired en-bloc), because other formats (such as the continuously produced soap opera that is 
common in other countries) would eventually render the few remaining forms of political 
control useless. This is then, in a sense, the 'outer boundary' of entertainment production in 
China. 
Second, from a discourse-analytical perspective, it is important to realise that the Chinese 
explanations on how the broadcasting system works (and should work) are deeply rooted in 
production crew members' perceptions of China's social, economic and political problems, as 
well as in conceptions of how China's development should progress in the future in order to 
assure the population's welfare. It is further worth noting that Chinese intellectuals, 
professionals and government officials all genuinely believe that their assessments of what 
television content's relevance to Chinese society is, are true. In this sense, the tropes and 
metaphors used in the Chinese debate on media content create and enforce a reality in which 
government control is not only acceptable, but necessary. In particular the trope of social 
stability and economic progress has considerable constructivist power in this context, and 
defines how the Chinese elites view their responsibility towards the'common people'. It 
would be interesting to conduct a survey to establish how far the economic development 
argument has been adopted by the average Chinese citizen in his or her everyday discourses, 
and to what extent the 'common people' accept the role that the elites have constructed for 
them. This question cannot be sufficiently answered in this thesis, but my hypothesis would 
be that the argument described above is in fact accepted by the often evoked 'masses' as 
much as by the elites. 
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Third, the introduction of market reforms in China is a crucial aspect in the production of 
television entertainment. However, instead of displacing political controls as some observers 
have claimed, the liberalised market has introduced a whole range of new restrictions that in 
fact work in harmony with the old ones. These new restraints arise from a complex series of 
individual factors such as the audience rating system, producers' dependency on a limited 
range of distributors, Chinese broadcasters' profit making strategies and target audience's 
viewing preferences. These factors influence each other and therefore create a system that 
constantly reinforces itself: 
1. The television rating system assesses mainly urban households, and by default 
primarily measures the viewing habits and preferences of older, often uneducated or 
unemployed, mostly female urban viewers; 
2. The broadcasting system relies on this data to sell advertising slots, and 
hence 
specifically airs television content in a way that will satisfy this viewer groups' 
preferences (i. e. broadcasting a full drama series consecutively, two episodes per 
day, 
until the drama's conclusion); 
3. The production companies, aiming to sell their products to the broadcasters, 
primarily create drama content that fits this format (i. e. dramas with a closed twenty 
episode narrative, featuring the discourses and modes of expressions that will attract 
an older urban female audience); 
4. The general offer of television content excludes younger, more educated viewers and 
instead appeals again to the same typical drama audience, who in turn comment 
favourably on the TV content through the various channels of communication, tune 
in when new drama series are shown, and are consequently again measured by the 
audience rating system; 
5. The cycle therefore begins anew. 
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It is thus at the cross-section of these three institutional fields (the political, the cultural and 
the economic) that the creation of television content is negotiated in the PRC. The creative 
environment that arises from this condition offers little room for the development of 
innovative contents or counter-hegemonic discourses. Instead, this environment facilitates 
the construction of conservative and often nationalist discourses in drama series. It can 
therefore be argued that even if China abolished the last of its 'hard' censorship mechanisms, 
this would have little effect on the homogeneity of Chinese drama discourses. 
Aside from clarifying how drama content is produced in China, this research project has also 
contributed to the theoretical debate on how visual communication works. My analysis has 
shown that popular entertainment formats such as television drama series function as 
complex mass-communication practices, and that these practices are capable of purveying 
political meaning. The scientific examination of such practices calls for a broad 
methodological approach that takes into account not only the factors that lead to the 
production of content, but also the various levels at which this content communicates 
meaning. I have presented such an approach in Chapter 2: by combining a critical discourse 
analysis perspective with a visual analytical methodology grounded in semiotic theory, this 
approach enables us to identify the various 'signs' (or markers of meaning) that function 
within the different modes of such communication practices, to isolate what'discourse 
fragments' (that is: truth claims) these signs create, and to analyse how a variety of factors 
contributed to the formulation of such statements. This approach has considerable 
explanatory value when it comes to the analysis of visual formats such as television dramas, 
but it also offers a theoretical basis and a range of tools that lend themselves to research into 
other mass-communication practices. The analysis presented here suggests that such projects 
would offer valuable insights into how political discourses are communicated throughout a 
wide variety of visual contexts. In this sense, the present research opens up various 
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opportunities for future projects in three different disciplines: Chinese studies, political 
science, and communication or media studies. 
With regard to Chinese studies, visual media content is a particularly relevant research field 
that has received little attention from scholars in the West: my interviews with Chinese 
media experts have shown that the Chinese leadership and the professionals who create 
television content both attribute strong political and social power to visual formats such as 
mass-communicated images. The use of these visual forms is tied to a conscious effort by 
those who produce them to guide public opinion and educate the'common people'. In this 
sense, all visual practices that communicate to these 'masses' (and not only the televised 
image) need to be understood as tools that are aimed at instructing and educating the 
recipients, and therefore as social forces that create meaning throughout Chinese society. 
Researchers in Chinese Studies need to realise the importance of visual communication in 
the PRC, and should not neglect the political and social impact of a wide variety of 
communication practices. The following issues promise to pose particularly promising future 
research questions: 
" While this research project has answered the question of how political discourses are 
constructed in popular Chinese television drama series, it nevertheless had to exclude 
a number of issues. The analysis examined only two political discourse strands 
(governance and security) in three particular television drama series aired on national 
television during a specific time interval (between 2003 and 2005). Consequently, this 
research has a limited focus. While this limitation does not make the research results 
any less valid (the drama series examined here are each representative models of 
their respective genre, were all highly popular with the Chinese audiences, and were 
produced in different institutional settings), the question still remains how political 
discourses are portrayed in other TV drama genres (for instance family dramas, kung 
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fu series, or "pink" programmes), in particular local settings (such as the market 
segment that stations such as BTV, STV, or OTV cover), and at other times in PRC 
history (for example subsequent to major events such as Hong Kong's return to the 
mainland, China's accession to the WTO, or the Olympic Games). It would be of 
particular interest to establish how current events influence the formulation of 
discourse fragments; a question that the present thesis did not address. At the same 
time, an analysis of additional political issues (for instance welfare) in these and other 
drama series is called for, such analyses promise to further contribute to our 
understanding of what social and political 'truths' such popular entertainment 
formats communicate. 
" It should also be pointed out that this analysis has approached visual material from 
the production side and the product side. It has not examined the effect side of television 
dramas in China. Quantitative surveys by companies such as AGB Nielsen or CSM 
that attempt to provide reliable data on who watches what on Chinese television are 
faced with substantial demographic challenges in a nation as large as the PRC, which 
leads them to fall back on insufficient statistical samples. This then raises the question 
of whether representative data can at this point be collected in such a diverse 
environment. Qualitative approaches to the field of viewer analysis offer a viable 
alternative, but past research on how Chinese audiences watch television and what 
relevance TV entertainment truly plays in their lives are today either outdated (Lull, 
1991), lack a comprehensive research methodology (Kramer, 2006), or use a non- 
representative sampling base (ibid.; Li, 2007). The challenge for future projects will be 
to address these problems and provide a coherent and representative answer to the 
question of who watches what in China, and why. 
294 
" Authors such as Zhao Yuezhi (1998) have presented insightful works on Chinese 
news broadcasts. Such research should be augmented with visual analyses of Chinese 
programmes such as CCTV's daily evening news or of CCTV news magazines such 
as Dongfang shikong4,75 If or Jiaodian fangtan At OW 
" Visual political analyses are also needed of other television formats, for instance of 
talk shows such as Shihua shishuo i' iii, or of educational programmes such as 
CCTV's lecture room series on historical and philosophical topics (Baijiajiangtan 
ME-). 
" Staged events in China, for instance opening ceremonies for events such as the Beijing 
Olympics or the Shanghai Expo, have not been approached from a visual political 
communication perspective. The semiotic and discourse theoretical framework used 
in this present project offers the tools for an examination of how various signs are 
arranged in such a mass-communicated mega-event to communicate political 
meaning. 
" Finally, the semiotic framework used here could easily be extended to the analysis of 
architectural projects and monuments. Such research could focus either on small 
artistically and politically relevant constructions such as specific hero memorials, but 
could also analyse the visual political impact of single buildings such as the new 
Beijing airport terminal, the Beijing Olympic Stadium, or the new CCTV office tower. 
It would further be a promising endeavour to examine the political relevance of large 
urban-planning projects from a communication perspective, for instance the 
arrangement of the various World Exposition sites along the Pujiang River or the new 
deep-see harbour near Shanghai. 
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In the field of media studies, approaches such as the one adopted in this thesis also promises 
to yield new insights into more general communication practices. The following gaps in the 
current literature need to be filled: 
" Comparative research is needed in order to establish how the production and 
distribution process of Chinese dramas differs from similar procedures in other 
societies, and how such processes tie into global trade patterns. Previous comparative 
works, especially on Latin-American formats and US entertainment programmes, 
indicate the direction that such potential future research could take (Hong, 1998; 
Lopez, 1995; Martin-Barbero, 1995). 
" Previous studies of media discourses that mostly analysed verbal or textual aspects of 
communication should extend their focus to visual elements, such as the photos used 
in newspapers or the selection and montage of visual material in Western news 
broadcasts. Works on visual culture by author's such as Gunther Kress and Theo van 
Leeuwen (2001), Myra MacDonald (2003), or Nicholas Mirzoeff (2005) are steps in the 
right direction, but they would further profit form detailed visual fine-analyses like 
the one presented here. 
With regard to political science, the present project also raises a number of new questions, 
particularly concerning the problem of how a society under increased liberalization, 
internationalization and commercialization pressures can still be effectively governed. This 
issue is a relatively recent yet nonetheless pressing concern in political science (Gamble, 2000; 
Jessop, 1997 & 1998; Stoker, 1998). China is a particularly interesting case in point: the market 
forces that have been unleashed in the PRC have compelled the leadership to revise their 
authoritative top-down way of governing. The regulation of the TV drama market shows 
that new, soft mechanisms of control are largely replacing the former hard regulatory 
methods. Is China then moving towards a new system of governance? And how does this 
2% 
new approach compare to governance concepts in Western societies? Also: should the move 
towards softer regulatory practices be regarded as a chance to increase pluralism and 
participation, or have the former mechanisms merely been replaced with a new set of 
controls that now follows a capitalist rather than socialist logic? Such questions need to be 
answered through in-depth analyses of China's new governance methods in a variety of 
policy fields: 
" Media and information policy, particularly the issue of content control; 
" Economic policy, particularly urban development projects; 
" Public security, particularly the management of public conduct. 
These are examples of questions that future research should address. This analysis is a first 
step in this direction. It has shown that entertainment formats in the PRC are an important 
method of communicating political meaning and contributing to the construction of social 
and political reality in China. In this sense, mass-communication formats deserve attention 
from researchers in the social sciences and in Chinese Studies alike. They need to be 
understood no longer merely as texts that function primarily through verbal expressions, but 
as complex communication practices that relay their content in various modes. My research 
has shown that an analysis that takes these modes into account has strong explanatory 
power and helps us to understand how visual communication works in the PRC. It shows 
how such communication practices are shaped both by direct policy interventions and by the 
personal perceptions of those involved in them, and it further shows how political such 
processes truly are. 
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